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## **NEW APPROACHES TO THE WORLD OF VALUES AND GOOD. PROPOSED BY TISCHNER**

**Summary.** The article proposes some form of practising philosophy and its related issues as an innovative analysis in the field of human relations. It presents an original proposal by Tischner who analyses ethical values in terms of good. These considerations constituting the core of the article present a brief discussion of the concept of traditional values, e.g. Scheler's. Tischner's innovation lies in the recognition that the proper access to the world of values should be sought through multi-faceted analysis of the relationships. Such an approach seems to significantly deepen the discussion of the concept of value and exposes their ethics.

**Keywords:** Tischner, axiology, agathology, values, ethics, innovation.

## **NOWE SPOSOBY PODEJŚCIA DO ŚWIATA WARTOŚCI I DOBRA. PROPOZYCJA JÓZEFA TISCHNERA**

**Streszczenie.** W artykule zaproponowano pewne formy uprawiania filozofii i podejmowane przez nią zagadnienia jako innowacyjne w dziedzinie analiz relacji międzyludzkich. Przedstawiono oryginalną propozycję etyczną Józefa Tischnera analizującego wartości w perspektywie dobra. Rozważania te, stanowiące jądro artykułu, prezentują krótkie omówienia tradycyjnych koncepcji wartości, między innymi Schelera. Innowacyjność ujęcia Tischnera polega na tym, że właściwego dostępu do świata wartości poszukuje on poprzez wieloaspektową analizę relacji międzyludzkich. Takie podejście zdaje się istotnie pogłębiać rozważania pojęcia wartości i eksponuje ich etyczność.

**Słowa kluczowe:** Tischner, aksjologia, agatologia, wartości, etyka, innowacje.

## 1. Broad understanding of the concept of innovation

Talking about the development of innovation, what on our mind are new technologies, patents, or implementation rather than a solution inspired by social science, philosophy in particular. Ongoing discourses on usefulness of university schooling and opportunities for graduates of universities on the modern labor market, leave the humanities and social sciences in the permanent isolation from other areas of social life. And yet they contain an enormous potential to create innovation, not only in the social field, but also in the economy. Although the flagship term "technology" does not appear in this field, but it is here, where serious analytical, specialist 'products' for understanding social phenomena are created<sup>1</sup>.

We are now facing the unknown, common universal access to technology. Inventions and modern technologies, designed to improve prosperity, often instead of improving the quality of life, not only do not give solutions to human problems, but make it appear still new ills, or those existing for a long time take on new meaning and become more and more complicated. Also new demographic situations, such as rapid urbanization, conflicts intergenerational, intercultural tensions, or permanence of change and isolation, loneliness, old age and disease create the need to take up new solutions. Philosophy, like any other discipline allows you to re-look at the problem of human relationships, which constitute a basis of a dignified and secure life in the modern world. It is worth pointing out to the solutions of philosophy, which allows to answer the most difficult questions about the man and his condition<sup>2</sup>. One of the interesting and original proposals we can find in the philosophy of ethical drama by Tischner, especially in his deliberations on axiology and agathology, namely the science dealing with the ways of experiencing good<sup>3</sup>.

## 2. Difficulties associated with the concept of values and axiological ladder

As noted by Tischner, in human relations we cannot omit any references to the world of values. The idea of value has already its inherently anthropological and dialogic overtones. The matter concerning the question about man and the question of values remain inseparable.

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<sup>1</sup> cf. Rudnicki S.: *Wstęp*, in: Rudnicki S. (ed.): *Nauki społeczne a komercjalizacja wiedzy*. Kraków 2013, p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> cf. Kuzior A.: *About the philosophy teaching necessity*, in: Adamowiciene G. et al. (ed.): *Siulaikinio specialist kompetencijos: teorijos ir praktikos derme*, vol. 1, Kowno 2007, p. 177-183; Motycka A.: *Czy nauczanie filozofii jest potrzebne*, in: Piotrowska E., Wiśniewski J.(ed.): *Dydaktyka filozofii u progu XXI wieku. Problemy ogólne i perspektywy*, Poznań 2002, p. 35-44.

<sup>3</sup> These thoughts were expressed in part in the doctoral dissertation by Marszałek I., titled *Zło dialogiczne. Józef Tischner wobec wybranych koncepcji zła filozofii Zachodu*, Wrocław 2011.

It seems that you could watch an analogy here with the view of W. Stróżewski, talking about the axiological structure of man<sup>4</sup>.

What does, however, the very concept of value mean? The term "value" has indeed appeared in the texts of Kant, but only recently has it a permanent place in philosophy, it means since the end of the nineteenth century, thanks to Nietzschean postulate "revaluation of all values"<sup>5</sup>.

The analysis of the world allows us to find both positive and negative values there<sup>6</sup>. The phrase "negative value" may raise some concerns, but it merely expresses the fact that each value can be contrasted with the corresponding anti value<sup>7</sup>. S. Szary mentions some of these pairs: good and evil, truth and lies, loyalty and betrayal, forgiveness and revenge, beauty and ugliness, love and hate, justice and injustice<sup>8</sup>.

Tischner at the initial stage of ethical reflection applies this "positive and negative" division but at some point he states that the term "negative value" is contradictory in itself. Thus, while in his earlier texts such a formulation can be found quite often, then in subsequent texts he uses the term "value-antivalue". But the problem of renaming is not caused by the formal reasons only. It conceals a change in the way of perceiving of what is named "antivalue"<sup>9</sup>. Changing the name of "the negative" to "anti-values" meant for Tischner not only the changes in naming, but was accompanied by a deeper reflection on their character. Tischner, using the term "antivalue", wanted to point at the moment of its illusive impact. However, antivalue, as Any other value, desires appear to man as something positive. So it is characterized by ambiguity, because it exerts the effect on human beings in the form of seduction by the apparent good.

Tischner describes various values of the so-called Scheler's axiological ladder<sup>10</sup>. Its lowest level are the values referred to as "pleasant - unpleasant". At this level, what is meant as positive values appears everything that provides human comfort and pleasure. There are mostly objects, but sometimes - as noted by Tischner - also people are dehumanized, which means reduced to the level of things providing satisfaction. In this case, all their personal dimension is omitted. Tischner emphasizes, however, that when our life is a constant quest of pleasure and hedonism it triggers human selfishness. This results in the fact that in the social sphere the principle of bringing mutual assistance is negated, and its place is taken by various antagonisms.

<sup>4</sup> cf. Stróżewski W.: *O wielkości. Szkice z filozofii człowieka*, Kraków 2002, p. 28-64.

<sup>5</sup> Stróżewski W.: *Istnienie i wartość*. Kraków 1982, p. 21; Gadacz T.: *Myślenie z wnętrza nihilizmu*. „Znak” 46(1994) no. 6, p. 4-14; Nietzsche F.: *Z genealogii moralności. Pismo polemiczne*, trans. L. Staff, Kraków 2003.

<sup>6</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka a historia. Wykłady*, Kraków 2008, p. 343; idem, *Etyka wartości i nadziei*, in: idem, Kłoczowski J.A.: *Wobec wartości*, Poznań 2001, p. 26; Stróżewski W.: *Istnienie i wartość*, p. 61.

<sup>7</sup> cf. Tischner J.: *Etyka wartości i nadziei*, p. 27; idem, *Etyka a historia...*, p. 343.

<sup>8</sup> cf. Szary S.: *Człowiek – podmiot dramatu. Antropologiczne aspekty filozofii dramatu Józefa Tischnera*. Kęty 2005, p. 67.

<sup>9</sup> Tischner J.: *Myślenie według wartości*, Kraków 2002, p. 367.

<sup>10</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka wartości i nadziei*, p. 31-37; cf. Dulieu P.J.: *Aktualność Schelera*, trans. J. Tischner, „Znak” 27(1975) no. 2, p. 211.

On the second level of the axiological ladder following Scheler Tischner lists vital values. One of them is all that is health and contributes to physical strength and life. The strength and physical fitness, resistance to pain, illness and fatigue, the ability to sustain hunger and cold are positive values. According to Nietzsche, only they are the ethically good values; all weakness and sickness are ethically wrong. In this context, the ethically good actions can include, for example, killing of a dying patient, however human compassion belongs to the category of evil<sup>11</sup>. To this type of views – Tischner reminds us - once alluded racism and Nazism, and today they are evoked by the supporters of euthanasia.

The next step of the axiological ladder are spiritual values: truth, goodness and beauty. Tischner explains that the truth is the opposite of error, good - the opposite of evil, beauty - the opposite of ugliness. Under the name of good there hide specific ethical values. Tischner lists the following: justice, nobility, courage, kindness, heroism, truthfulness, reliability, objectivity, wisdom. Ethical values constitute a particular point of interest for Tischner. He calls them "spiritual" because they are carried not by the human body, but a person<sup>12</sup>.

At the top of the axiological ladder M. Scheler, followed by Tischner, situates the most important values, namely holiness - the source of religion. Its opposite is defined as demonic<sup>13</sup>. Holiness, as Tischner stresses, is independent to the time and space, and pervades everything submerged in time and space. The human relationship to holiness is ambivalent<sup>14</sup>. Although man longs for it, he - at the same time- constantly runs away from it. It is for him a source of fear and fascination - the mystery *tremendum et fascinatum*<sup>15</sup>. What is significant for Tischner's axiology is the thesis that human sensitivity to the value of Holiness allows man to open up to the space of generosity, the attitude – as he writes - "allowing to be"<sup>16</sup> the Other, and at the same time providing a source of both morality and ethics.

Tischner, in the context of spiritual values, pointing, apart from sanctity, at morality, skips the entire metaethical discussion over its phenomenon, is not involved in the analysis of the concepts and principles formulated within its area, and suggests only the most general of its definitions. As a phenomenologist he is only interested in capturing the essential features that constitute morality. Therefore, what he sees in it, at the most basic level, is a set of rules indicating what is good and what is bad, what people should follow in their lives, and what should be avoided. So Tischner does not treat morality and ethics as an area of possible dispute between different philosophical schools, he does not enter any theoretical debates over the functions of values, does not recognize them as abstract elements in the discourse,

<sup>11</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka wartości i nadziei*, p. 34; F. Nietzsche, *Z genealogii moralności*, p. 8-9.

<sup>12</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka wartości i nadziei*, p. 35-36.

<sup>13</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka a historia...*, p. 390-391.

<sup>14</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka wartości i nadziei*, p. 37.

<sup>15</sup> cf. Otto R.: *Świętość. Elementy irracjonalne w pojęciu bóstwa i ich stosunek do elementów racjonalnych*, trans. B. Kupis, Wrocław 1993, p. 52.

<sup>16</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka wartości i nadziei*, p. 36.

but he always refers them to the man. Outside man they make no sense at all. In this context, we can say that morality is a way to realize the personal values<sup>17</sup>.

### 3. Tischner's axiology in the field of dialogic awareness

These views can also be found in Tischner analyses. However, what requires explanation are the characteristics which decide what values are considered ethical. This is a fundamental question, because in contrast to other authors assigning fixed values to objects, Tischner is of the opinion that all values - because of their anthropological component - can become ethical values<sup>18</sup>. So how does their ethics stem from the anthropological assumptions? What are their characteristics?

Firstly, Tischner explains, ethical values occur only when in the field of our consciousness is another person. Cracow philosopher in his pleadings repeatedly emphasizes that the primary source of ethical experience is not the experience of value as such, but the discovery of another human being<sup>19</sup>. The presence of the Other marks the values with a special stigma of ethical values. According to Tischner, meeting the Other in his tragic, and sensitivity to his fate, opens our awareness to objective values and antivalues<sup>20</sup>.

The objectivity of ethical values is the second feature mentioned by Tischner. What does it mean that values are objective? This means that they are rooted in human tragedy - as W. Bożejewicz says<sup>21</sup>, interpreting the thought Tischner. What is the link between the tragedy of objectivity? The objectivity of values is expressed in the fact that a person can experience them, regardless of his/her own will, they are somehow imposed on him/her "from above". As their source of experience is not subjected to any manipulation on the part of the human will, they, at the same time, reveal the tragic dilemmas of a man in certain situations. To solve a problem or not, to help the suffering one or not? Experiencing values in these circumstances raises a sense of duty, but also opens the field for the possible disregard of the obligations or even its obscuring. Thus, the value realized or abandoned in the relationship with another man reveal both its ethical and objective dimension.

Thirdly, as Tischner writes, ethical values are the source of moral obligation<sup>22</sup>. And because the values are objective, not subjective, they are in force in terms of all people<sup>23</sup>. He, therefore highlights their universal nature. Commitment is an internal order flowing to every human being from the value. Man goes through his or her drama within the radiation field of

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<sup>17</sup> cf. Stróżewski W.: *Istnienie i wartość*, p. 235; W. Stróżewski, *Trzy moralności*, „Znak” 30(1978) no. 2, p. 155.

<sup>18</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka wartości i nadziei*, p. 47-48.

<sup>19</sup> Tischner J.: *Myślenie według wartości*, p. 363.

<sup>20</sup> Bobko A.: *Poszukiwanie prawdy o człowieku*, „Znak” 53(2001) no. 3, p. 59-60.

<sup>21</sup> Bożejewicz B.: *Tischner. Poglądy filozoficzno-antropologiczne. Szkice*, Warszawa 2006, p. 64; J. Tischner, *Sztuka etyki*, p. 367.

<sup>22</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka wartości i nadziei*, p. 20-22.

<sup>23</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka a historia...*, p. 342.

these values. From the side of the value there goes to the man either the imperative of prohibition or the imperative of order. An example of such a dual experience of a warrant and the ban could be frequently discussed by Tischner the experience of enigma face of the Other. One can recognize in this experiment an injunction "do not kill" which is both a positive call to save human life, as well as negative - to refrain from certain action. In this way, the entire act of experience of the face of the Other, although at its bases sunk in the agathological horizon, also bears the characteristics of axiological experience. The combination of positive and negative imperative in certain key experiences of our lives is the original thread in the axiological thinking of Tischner, which Kłoczowski draws attention to analyzing Tischner's thought<sup>24</sup>. Positive values embody such a strong moment of the claim demanding implementation that even rule out the possibility of an indifferent behavior towards them<sup>25</sup>. Talking about values that are valid, we point out to the way of their existence, different from the ways of existence of objects<sup>26</sup>. As an aid in understanding this issue may serve Stróżewski's ideas. He claims that the value is itself a way of existence of beings, because - in his opinion - it is neither their characteristic or property, nor affliction<sup>27</sup>. So what is the essence of values? In Tischner's approach what belongs to the substance of the value is the moment, in Polish skilfully conveyed by the word "roszczenie"(claim). It brings us back to the level of consideration in terms of moral values. And, although in terms of Tischner thought, values are not real, but ideal, it is through people - the carriers of these values<sup>28</sup> - that they become real, acting as an autonomous realm of the real world<sup>29</sup>. They exist so far as there is a way to achieve them<sup>30</sup>.

Another issue here is the issue of the very cognition of the value. To realize the value, you must first recognize them. But what is the process about? How can a man recognize individual values? Well, Tischner believes that this is done not only by the intellect, but above all because of emotions, through the so-called preference<sup>31</sup>. Explaining the process, Cracow philosopher uses the example of the biblical Samaritan, undergoing the emotions of compassion at the sight of a man beaten by the robbers and lying on the road<sup>32</sup>. Preference based in the compassion suddenly spreads to a man the world of various possibilities, which

<sup>24</sup> Kłoczowski J.A.: *Filozofia dialogu*, Poznań 2005, p. 115.

<sup>25</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka wartości i nadziei*, p. 26; W. Stróżewski, *Istnienie i wartość*, p. 28.

<sup>26</sup> Rickert H.: *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*, Tübingen 1928, p. 260; A. Bobko, *Norma jako ważna nicość. O aktualności „Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis” Heinricha Rickerta*, in: A. Hernas, K. Mech, D. Zmuda (ed.), *Pięknie myśleć. Księga jubileuszowa na siedemdziesiąte urodziny Profesora Karola Tarnowskiego*, Kraków 2007, p. 149.

<sup>27</sup> Rickert H.: *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*, Tübingen 1928, p. 260; cf. A. Bobko, *Norma jako ważna nicość. O aktualności „Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis” Heinricha Rickerta*, in: A. Hernas, K. Mech, D. Zmuda (ed.), *Pięknie myśleć. Księga jubileuszowa na siedemdziesiąte urodziny Profesora Karola Tarnowskiego*, Kraków 2007, p. 149.

<sup>28</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka a historia...*, p. 374.

<sup>29</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka a historia...*, p. 374.

<sup>30</sup> Ingarden R.: *Książeczka o człowieku*, Kraków 1972, p. 113-114.

<sup>31</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka a historia*, p. 353; J. Tischner, *Myślenie według wartości*, p. 478.

<sup>32</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka wartości i nadziei*, p. 18.

hide specific values. Although preference, as Tischner notices, is not the act of choice, it tells a man what constitutes the value.

In his analysis, Tischner shows that when we are faced with the Other waiting for help, succumbing to emotions we do not think about what rules should be followed. What you should do is seen as a value, what you should avoid – as antivalue. We usually take any step in a spontaneous way. Human spontaneity sometimes goes so far that the values, although shamefully and carefully hidden by some people – W. Zuziak notes – can work even against the will of their owners<sup>33</sup>. In the situation when the action is taken immediately man does not even try to remember any proper standards of conduct. Anyway – as stated by J. Filek – normativity itself has nothing ethical in itself, in the sense of some intellectual digressions, and ethical reflection is not comparable with any set of assessments and standards<sup>34</sup>. Standards remain completely neutral in fact, as long as man does not come into contact with the human tragedy personally, such as illness or death of the Other. Only then are subject to understanding and the necessary *conditio* of that understanding, as Tischner says, is a certain intuition of value and creative use of imagination. Man thus has the possibility of evaluating ethical manner both objective and subjective<sup>35</sup>, and the inalienable basis of this evaluation is he himself, seen as the so-called personalistic norm of all behaviors and actions<sup>36</sup>.

#### 4. Ethics of axiological ideal

Tischner makes a clear distinction between the ideal of legislation from the ideal of ethics<sup>37</sup>. The ideal of legislation serves as a foundation to build the external order of the community. The ideal of ethics brings order within man. What requires explanation here is the word "ethics". Tischner is willing to use it either in the form of a noun and an adjective. It occurs in his works in a slightly different sense than in other thinkers'. This concept is not clearly interpreter in the history of philosophy. A framework for reflection on morality as an ethical matter, was set in the ancient times by Socrates. He considered, how a man should live in the harmony with the requirements of goodness, truth and beauty. For centuries, the history of ethics simplified the essence of Socratic question to alternative choice of only one of these values. For example, for Aristotle, moral conduct means seeking to do good<sup>38</sup>. Kant, on the

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<sup>33</sup> Zuziak W.: *Jak przywrócić sumienie w życiu indywidualnym i społecznym*, in: Jagiełło J., Zuziak W. (ed.): *Sumienie w świecie wolności*, Kraków 2007, p. 274.

<sup>34</sup> cf. Filek J.: *Filozofia jako etyka. Eseje filozoficzno-etyczne*, Kraków 2001, p. 13.

<sup>35</sup> Drózd M.: *Człowiek ma sumienie*, in: Jagiełło J., Zuziak W. (ed.): *Sumienie w świecie wolności*, p. 254.

<sup>36</sup> cf. Wojtyła K.: *Miłość i odpowiedzialność*, Lublin 1982, p. 109-125; Kant I.: *Uzasadnienie metafizyki moralności*, trans. M. Wartenberg, Warszawa 1984; Galarowicz J.: *Odpowiedzialność i osoba. Próba analizy doświadczenia etycznego*, „Znak” 42(1990) no. 12, p.72.

<sup>37</sup> Bożejewicz W.: *op.cit.*, p. 64.

<sup>38</sup> Arystoteles, *Etyka Nikomachejska*, trans. D. Gromska, Warszawa 1982, p. 3.

other hand, means realization of the good identified with the rational order<sup>39</sup>. A different approach to this issue can be noticed in the works of philosophers of the twentieth century. For example, Schlick's ethics is primarily a science of moral facts, which deals with what exists in reality<sup>40</sup>. E. Podrez believes that ethics is not a discipline dealing with giving judgements, but trying to discover the roots of morality<sup>41</sup>. According to Kłoczowski, what should be considered as the most important elements of the ethics is the value itself<sup>42</sup>.

Talking about axiological ethics, Tischner does not use the word "ethics" in the modern sense - as a reflection on the moral phenomena, but He is looking for its original meaning. The roots of ethics should be sought in ancient times. This is because it was created and developed in a particular philosophical context, namely in the belief of the first, ancient thinkers claiming that man essentially always strives for good. Ethics served as the philosophical reflection, allowing - as proclaimed by Aristotle - to become ethically "brave"<sup>43</sup>, in other words - good. According to Filek, it was not purely theoretical area, but was rather of a theoretical-practical kind<sup>44</sup>.

The name "ethics" stems from the Greek word *ethos*, etymologically meaning a habit, custom, and also a place conducive to the development of an animal, apartment, country<sup>45</sup>. Tischner is, however, of the opinion that, with respect to human such understanding of the word is not sufficient. He believes that the *ethos* of a man is not only the environment, but above all the human environment. Tischner understand ethics very originally, as the world of human relationships, that is just as *ethos*. Thus understood, the *ethos* is the basis of various morals that can be different from each other and vary, depending on the views that person represents. The *ethos*, then, means for Tischner a place among other people, a place where – as Cracow philosopher writes - a man can "be himself"<sup>46</sup>. What makes a man want to "be himself"? According to the analytics of M. Heidegger to "be themselves" calls for the very human being, that is, in the terminology of the German philosopher *Dasein*. On the other hand E. Levinas believes that the call flows from the face of another human being, to which the very access constitutes ethics<sup>47</sup>. According to the phenomenological ethics, this call is guided toward the man by the values that demand to be implemented<sup>48</sup>. Tischner is even inclined to agree with this, namely that ethics is some kind of a theory, but only under the condition that

<sup>39</sup> Kant I.: *Ugruntowanie metafizyki wolności*, trans. Zarychta P., Kraków 2005, p. 22; Bobko A.: *Myślenie wobec zła. Polityczny i religijny wymiar myślenia w filozofii Kanta i Tischnera*, Kraków-Rzeszów 2007, p. 144.

<sup>40</sup> Schlick M.: *Zagadnienia etyki*, trans. M. i A. Kawczak, Warszawa 1960, p. 35.

<sup>41</sup> Podrez E.: *Wstęp*, in: Podrez E. (ed.): *W kręgu dobra i zła. Wybrane teksty z etyki współczesnej od Hegla do Lévinasa*, Warszawa 1994, p. 10.

<sup>42</sup> Kłoczowski J.A.: *Drogi człowieka mistycznego*, Kraków 2001, p. 200.

<sup>43</sup> Arystoteles, *ibidem*, p. 45.

<sup>44</sup> cf. Filek J.: *Filozofia jako etyka...*, p. 14-15.

<sup>45</sup> Kopaliński W.: *Słownik wyrazów obcych i zwrotów obcojęzycznych*, Warszawa 2004, p. 159.

<sup>46</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka wartości i nadziei*, p. 12.

<sup>47</sup> Filek J.: *Człowiek wobec wartości czy wobec człowieka?*, in: Jagiełło J., Zuziak W. (ed.): *Człowiek wobec wartości*, Kraków 2006, p. 26; Lévinas E.: *Całość i nieskończoność. Esej o zewnętrznosci*, trans. M. Kowalska, Warszawa 1998, p. 232.

<sup>48</sup> Bobko A.: *Poszukiwanie prawdy o człowieku*, p. 60.



its framework is set by means of experiencing oneself - experience mediation by the experience of the other person. In this way - as he notes - we avoid the danger of transformation of ethics in an abstract discipline detached from the practical and existential problems of man.

According to Tischner, a highly negative impact on today's understanding of ethics has technical thinking, trying first to change the man provoking him to certain actions, and only secondarily to get to know the man in the perspective of action consistent or inconsistent with expectations. It puts the essence of man in his power and action through the formulation of common operating standards, models of conduct similar to instructions manual of machines, to ensure order in the society. Ethical thinking here is far detached from its experimental sources<sup>49</sup>.

Man, according to the philosopher from Cracow, is a particular kind of "material" for the value. J. Jagiełło accurately states that, in relation to the value, what can be said about a man is not so much that "he is" but „he happens to be” under their influence<sup>50</sup>. Responding to their call, the man fulfills himself, giving a shape to his humanity. Ethical relationship between humans comes from mutual assistance in building their humanity. Building himself as a man, one finds his *ethos* and manifests himself as a special value, as I<sup>51</sup>. Tischner perceives man as a being inherently ethical, identifying a problem of *ethos* with a problem of his own being<sup>52</sup>. Thus, for the Cracow philosopher to be "the ethical being" means to live in a world of values, through the relate to other people and through these values refer to another man and create yourself. All the values are there "for" people and "due to" them. The man is for Tischner a value that does not require any special justification, because it is justified by the value having their own existence just for man.

All Tischner analyses concerning human being contain a priori belief that the nature of man is to be good. This conviction is a firm and original claim of Tischner's anthropology.

## 5. From axiology to agathology

It remains a matter to explain how the values appear in the light of the experience called by Tischner agathological experience. Tischner describes them as anchored in the good. The good is their main source. In them it is more precise, and shows the way of its implementation. The very good in fact demands a certain orientation. It is only due to the values that it leads the man to recognize good and distinguish it from evil, and initiates a

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<sup>49</sup> cf. Tischner J.: *Myślenie według wartości*, p. 362.

<sup>50</sup> Jagiełło J.: *Wprowadzenie. Tischner wobec wartości*, in: Jagiełło J., Zuziak W. (ed.): *Człowiek wobec wartości*, p. 11.

<sup>51</sup> cf. Marszałek I.: *Józef Tischner i filozoficzne koncepcje zła. Czy zło jest w nas czy między nami?* Kraków 2014, p. 155-159.

<sup>52</sup> Tischner J.: *Etyka wartości i nadziei*, p. 12.

fundamental choice between them. In this sense, good can be regarded as the main source of value. According to the dialogic principle, good based in values becomes a tool "to help another human being afflicted with evil, difficulty, and the possibility of tragedy"<sup>53</sup>. Values are like landmarks, helping man in the light of truth associated with the good come out of the darkness of evil to the brightness. They cannot be interpreted only as an expression of "promoting their own existence"<sup>54</sup>.

Analyzing the structure of agathological horizon and attempting to describe its constituent elements, one should not forget about its indelibly dialogic mediation. Experiencing another man in a mysterious confusion of positive and negative we realize some kind of tragedy of human existence<sup>55</sup>. Visibility of the tragedy is imposed on us with the full force just in the meeting of the Other and thus gives us a glimpse of the axiological as well as in agathological horizon of human existence<sup>56</sup>. At the same time we must remember that axiological horizon is for Tischner secondary. Primordially of meeting somebody in the agathological horizon he sees in the fact that when meeting the Other it is not yet known what exactly to do, but we know that something must be done<sup>57</sup>. Only then man follows the search for ways to fight evil, that is, to design events, and thus get to axiological level<sup>58</sup>.

Tischner, referring in his analysis to the concept of Lévinas, agrees that the gift of the agathological horizon of meeting is the "face". Face as a trace and the announcement of good at the same time, reveals the possible evil. It opens the possibility of the victory of evil over good. The experience of the Other is the experience of being in a "face to face" relationship with him. In terms of Levinas it is not a cognitive relationship. The face does not appear as the phenomenon possible to be described. Experience of face means the experience of speech. This face is always the face of poverty - face of the orphans, widows, or a foreigner<sup>59</sup>. Tischner in his own phenomenology of drama accepts after the French thinker that access to the face is at once ethical, not metaphysical or ontological<sup>60</sup>. What does it mean? We experience face always as something defenseless, stripped, and thus provoking violence. At the same time - paradoxically - in the same helpless face there is a order which forbids killing. Face makes the most basic demand on a person encountered: "You will not kill me"<sup>61</sup>.

Another important element in the experience of seeking the face of the Other is here the voice of "inequality". The relationship between one man and the other started by the experience of face is not symmetrical. This asymmetry lies in the fact that experiencing the

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p.170.

<sup>55</sup> Tischner J.: *Myślenie według wartości*, p. 485.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 491.

<sup>57</sup> Tischner J.: *Filozofia dramatu*, Paris 1985, p. 57.

<sup>58</sup> Tischner J.: *Myślenie według wartości*, p. 486; Gadacz T.: *The Problem of Evil in Tischner's Philosophy*, Forum Philosophicum, vol. 12, Kraków 2007, p. 281; cf. W. Bożejewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

<sup>59</sup> Tischner J.: *Filozofia dramatu*, p. 68-69; Krasicki J.: *Przeciw nicości. Eseje*, Kraków 2002, p. 115-116.

<sup>60</sup> Lévinas E.: *Etyka i nieskończony. Rozmowy z Philippe'em Nemo*, trans. B. Opolska-Kokoszka, Kraków 1982, p. 49; Kłoczowski J.A.: *Filozofia dialogu*, p. 79.

<sup>61</sup> Tischner J.: *Filozofia dramatu*, p. 30; Marszałek I.: *Józef Tischner i filozoficzne koncepcje zła...*, p. 141-143.

face of the other, we are called to take responsibility for him without expecting any reciprocity. Face of the other only puts me in a situation of obligations towards him, not giving me the right to put up any claim against him. Living in a specific time and specific space a human being is left to various limitations. This means that the people encountering each other do not create relationships which are perfect or excellent in terms of good.

Priority of agathological order in our experience of the world, points to the inevitability of drama leading even to the tragic in our lives. Thinking based on the idea of good is to reveal the tragedy of our existence, which is a central element of our human dramas. We note that good in a sense, facing a challenge with evil is powerless, but - still - life does not have to end up in a disaster. Goodness can continue acting through its powerlessness, through non-violence. The concept of the good, the form of its effectiveness, its salvage character, to put it briefly, an insight into agathological order - according to the Cracow philosopher - is possible by means of infiltration to the numerous and very varied dramatic threads that build structure of interpersonal encounters. Any attempt to confuse the agathological order results in a variety of evils both in the individual and social dimension. This has repercussions also in axiological order. What can be possible at this level, under the influence of blurring the brightness of good idea, are various attempts to manipulate values. They are subjected to a deceitful interpretation, and in their world there are introduced tensions and contradictions that make it difficult to rely on them building one's own personality or organizing social order. They introduce human into the world of deception, justify the use of violence, and ultimately contribute to building inhuman systems. Modern systems should seek to lighten agathological order. Good, though elusive fits in human relationships. The idea of agathology as the light of good is integrally connected with the question of humanity and the possibilities of its development. Thus, from the agathological perspective, everything you can refer to a person can be applied to entire societies.

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## Omówienie

Mówiąc o innowacyjności, myśli się raczej o nowych technologiach, patentach, wdrożeniach, a nie o rozwiązaniach inspirowanych filozofią. W artykule zaproponowano sięgnięcie właśnie do filozofii jako sposobu nowego spojrzenia na problemy dotyczące współczesnego człowieka. Aksjologia jako miejsce myślenia o wartościach stanowi w tej kwestii interesujący dyskurs, pozwalający na opis i ocenę zjawisk społecznych w szerokim tego słowa znaczeniu. Artykuł poświęcony jest przede wszystkim ujęciu krakowskiego filozofa Józefa Tischnera ze względu na oryginalność jego rozwiązań. Nie przeprowadza on jedynie abstrakcyjnej analizy wartości, jak to miało miejsce u klasyków antropologii, lecz ukazuje głębokie uwikłanie świata wartości w ludzkie działania i zachowania. Kiedy Max Scheler monologicznie analizuje poczynania konkretnego człowieka w świetle wartości, Tischner rozważa wartości ze względu na ich dialogiczny wymiar. Człowiek – wskazuje Tischner – nie tylko odnosi się do wartości, ale doświadcza ich w świecie relacji międzyludzkich. Miejscem objawienia się etyki wartości nie jest jakiś wyalienowany świat, lecz konkretna rzeczywistość ludzkich spotkań.