PHILOSOPHIES OF MAN
(A STUDY ON/IN A META-ANTHROPOLOGY)
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WITH ALL MY LOVE AND GRATITUDE, THIS BOOK I DEDICATE

TO IRENA CZAJKOWSKA, MY MOTHER
TO STEPHANY VAN WYCK, MY MOTHER’S SISTER.
- THEIR LABOR IS EMBODIED IN THIS WORK.
W.Cz.

INTRODUCTION

0.1. To decide how to commence a text is always a difficult task. And philosophers
know that the problem of the beginning is - to a much greater degree - substantial
rather than literary.

I have decided to start this Introduction, and therefore this essay, with some
words on a philosopher who may be regarded as emblematic - in various ways - for
the present undertaking. It is Hegel whom I mean. His political concerns and the
metaphysical courage as manifested best in Science of Logic; the vision of the
history of philosophy as a logical (supraindividual) process and not a collection of
manifestations of individual opinions and insights, thus his profound way of
regarding the plurality of philosophical theories, the vast vision of world history and
the deep understanding of his own time... The list (it might be enlarged) demonstrates
my respect for Hegel’s legacy. Yet they are by no means without reservations: some
elements of this legacy are, in my view, of greatest importance and validity; some
others are interesting still ‘false’ (however this word might be specified), still others
yet - simply irritating in their unrestricted speculative character or verbosity... So
much about “the greatest thinker of modern times” - to use the qualification
formulated by Józef M. Bocheński [1993:XXVIII], a tomatist philosopher and a
logician. And also - the author of these words: “analytical philosophy is a result not
only of breaking away from so-called modern times, but of the return to the pre-
Cartesian, classical thinking - to Plato, Aristotle, scholasticism, and among the
moderns - to Leibniz.” [Ibidem:43]) - These words on Hegel and the quotes from
Bocheński should convey some elements of the philosophical attitude out of which
the present essay stems.

And now, let the author of Phenomenology of Spirit speak in his own words:
“Truth is the becoming of itself, it is a circle which assumes in advance its own end-
point as its own aim and for which the end is also the beginning” [Hegel, 1963a:26-
27] Interpreting this formulation rather loosely, I’d say that at least in philosophy (a
sort of) circularity of thinking is unavoidable.

(If I could furnish this book with some illustrations, the drawings of M.E.
Escher would be used: in an artistic-visual way they depict best, as far as I can see it,
the metaphysical-logical confusions being coped with in this text. The picture of
Moebius band which has fascinated many writers and artists could be also placed
here.)

In the case of the present work, the beginning/end may be characterized as, say,
a) political philosophy: I start from a political philosophy and am also going to end
this essay with an idea of political philosophy.
Having said something about the beginning-and-end, I should say now at least a few words about what is to be expected between the beginning and the end. First, a strategy of philosophy-constructing is to be presented. This strategy is baptized with the name of 'meta-philosophy'. (Let me, at once - before in the chapter 1/Part One/ it will be said in detail, say in brief that the word 'meta-philosophy' is here to designate something which could also be named 'second-order philosophy' and what should not be confused with a body of ideas which if often referred to with this name, a body which could be alternatively characterized as 'philosophy of philosophy.' And second, this strategy is to be demonstrated 'in action'. The area in which this strategy is to be adopted is that of philosophical anthropology.

This strategy is motivated by an image of our global historical situation, of its threats, chances and challenges, and - on the other hand - by a view on the present predicament of philosophy and its relations to this very situation. Just for this reason this essay in meta-philosophy is opened with some passages in political philosophy.

0.2. The beginning (in our case: a political philosophy) is not a 'point'. Therefore, it should not be surprising that I start its presentation not with 'strictly' political issues but with some general remarks on philosophy: the present-day situation of philosophy is viewed as part and parcel of much more general cultural and social atmosphere which in turn is not void of political consequences.

Philosophy is - in a number of ways - a curious discipline. To the list of its peculiarities our age has added an rather odd item: 'For more that one hundred years, a considerable part of academic philosophy has been engaged in demonstrating the impossibility or the uselessness of philosophy, or both' notes Kolakowski in his *Metaphysical Horror* [1990:14] - a good deal of philosophical activity has been devoted to the proclamation and elucidation of the alleged 'end of philosophy'. This peculiarity would perhaps deserve a systematic study. At the present moment, however, I would like to mention but one aspect of it: there is, I believe, an affinity or correlation between the thesis proclaiming the 'end of philosophy' and that of Fukuyama, announcing the 'end of History'. This is - again - a complex matter. I cannot discuss it systematically. Yet, since my opinion on it determines in a way this work, I'd like to declare at least what my position is. It might be summarized briefly as follows.

[1] The theory/ideology of the 'end of philosophy' is - to a degree, and implicitly rather than explicitly - part and parcel of the theory/ideology of the 'end of History'.
[3] The ideology of the 'end of philosophy' should be reworked in the light of the acceptable elements of the Fukuyama's thesis.
[4] The task of the present work might be defined as an attempt at reworking as being postulated in the previous point.

Even if I am put to declare my stance, this summary is too succinct. Some additional remarks seem to be necessary.

Ad [1]. There has been no one theory of the 'end of philosophy' but possibly a number of them. The interrelations between members of this family call for separate study in the history of 20th century culture (incidentally, it should be noted that quite a few similar slogans have been heard in our age: end of art, end of novel, end of opera etc.) My focus is on something what might be called post-modernist version of this slogan. While speaking of post-modernist version of this slogan I keep in mind at least the following ideas:

- the alleged end of Truth (subjectivism, relativism etc.),
- the alleged end of Totality (or of 'Grand Narratives'; cult of dispersion, chance, detail, etc.),
- the alleged end of Logical Language (elevation of variety of 'language games' combined with preference for those game which lack well established sets of rules ),
- the alleged end of Universalism(s) (apology of various particularisms).

The post-modern criticism of Truth, Totality, Language, and Universalism is perhaps best visible in the criticism of (any) philosophy of History: any of such philosophies is supposed to lead more or less directly to Auschwitz and Kolyma. Or, one might even suppose that the destruction of the very theoretical possibility and any moral credibility of philosophy of History is a hidden (not very much) motive of post-modernism which gives it its militancy. Whether the thesis (ironically, itself a historiosophical one...) linking causally historicity and totalitarianism is right or wrong (personally, I am very skeptical as to this supposed causal link), it accounts for the intimate relations between 'end of philosophy' and 'end of History' theories.

Or, putting it in somewhat different way. If there are no more any 'great (social) questions', if the questions have been resolved (theoretically - the only remaining problem is to implement the resolutions), then there is no need for any great debates. Thus, let everybody think what she or he likes. Individualism and the cult of private sphere, so dominating in the today culture, are reflected in this attitude. And, as Zygmunt Bauman suggests, these cultural phenomena are fragments of broader processes. "Globalization of economy and fragmentation of political sovereignty seem to stay, logically, in contradiction to be not reconciled - but in fact they complement each other as equally indispensable and interlinked conditions of the reorganization - on the world scale - of the systemic integration being under way today. /.../ Initiative of the nation governments - 'economic policy' of state - is reduced in fact to encouraging agents of stateless firms to stay in the country for a longer time...even in this domain they have to compete with others in offering attractive incentives in the form of low taxes, cheap and obedient labor force, and comfortable hotels and night-life." [Bauman,1996:315]

If seen in the context of Bauman's analysis, post-modernism could be regarded as a 'lubricant' facilitating possibly frictionless functioning of global economy in culturally diversified world... Well, such an image of post-modernism is undoubtedly a caricature. Even - I'd agree - a vicious one. Yet, even such a caricature may unveil a facet of its object.

Ad [2] Two elements (descriptive/theoretical and evaluative/ideological) of the Fukuyama's thesis can and should be distinguished. Commence with the descriptive. I tend to think that it reflects two aspects of the actual historical process. First, the possibility of the 'end of History'. I suppose (on the present day level of our knowledge about History one must confuse one's epistemic attitudes to rather weak suppositions) that there is historical possibility that a combination of capitalism and democracy will survive and will continue to exist for indefinitely long time in the future. Still, it is - in my view, contrarily to the original Fukuyama's claim - only a possibility. And perhaps not a strong one. There is also a possibility that the couple capitalism-democracy will turn out to be not adequate to sustain the pressures and tensions it produces and will have to be replaced with this or that system. And it is also possible that the choice (continuation or change of the system) is our. It is also
possible that the choice - between alternative systems which are to replace the former - is also our. (Personally, I tend to share L. Nowak’s thesis which claims both for the inevitability of replacement this system with another one and for ‘bifurcational’ character of this predicament: either ‘solidaristic society’ or ‘global totalitarianism’. [Nowak, 1997:315]) So much for the first aspect of the historical process.

As to the second, the thesis reflects, quite correctly I believe, the end of Grand Designs (the end of Grand Narratives that are believed to be necessary for legitimation of Grand Designs). But, in my opinion, the thesis is true if Grand Designs are conceived of as being, so to say, complete, closed, and immutable. If we fancied partial, open, and evolving Designs (even ‘Grand’ ones), then we should expect them to be not without prospects.

And now let us pass to the axiological/ideological element of Fukuyama’s thesis. My position is very different from the Fukuyama’s one. And since just the difference is of central importance for further considerations, something more than a mere declaration of disagreement should be offered.

To avoid misunderstandings, particularly possible if emotion-laden matters are being debated, let me say what follows: The democracy-and-capitalism is - one cannot, if being honest, raise any doubts about it - morally more acceptable than many other social orders mankind has experienced in its long history; in particular, much more acceptable than some systems designed to replace it, systems which claimed for themselves moral (and other) superiority. Nevertheless, it is not so wonderful that one should not even try to imagine something better (if successfully, it cannot be decided in advance). Moreover, as some warn, after a few decades of rivalry with communism, having gained victory, it may become not more but less wonderful. It could be so just due to the situation of being not-threatened by any alternative, or due to some internal tensions which can aggravate, or - due to both. The necessary reservation having been made, somewhat more elaborated analysis will be presented.

But first, again, a declaration. Personally (and, so to say, pre-philosophically), I do agree with Zygmunt Bauman who says in his Postmodern ethics what follows. "Moral responsibility is the most human and indispensable of human liberties, and the most precious of human rights. It cannot be taken away from man, it cannot be shared with the other man, it cannot be transferred to another, or pawned or given to repository. Moral responsibility is unconditional and unlimited, and it manifests itself in permanent anxiety of being manifested insufficiently. Moral responsibility does not look around for assurance; it does not need any assertions that it is right or any excuses for being as it is. Moral responsibility is there - and there before any proofs of its being right are given, and is there long after the producers of excuses pensioned it off." [Bauman, 1996:341] I’ve used the somewhat clumsy phrase “personally...I do agree”. Not incidentally: on the level of pure (‘emotion-free’, if possible...) philosophical considerations I am aware of various objections that might be raised against the quoted opinion. And I know that those objections could not be easily dismissed. Still, just pre-philosophically I feel strong solidarity with the views expressed so aptly by Bauman.

Perhaps (I am not sure about it, but I suppose it may be so) there is one point in which I do not agree with Bauman. I mean his formulation about ‘unlimited responsibility’. Surely, there is something tempting (though also something dreadful) in the Sartrian image of man who making any decision does it ‘on behalf’ of all men. But even if to preserve this image, some more specific prescriptions would be needed. These doubts left aside, the question is to be asked: why is the author speaking just here about responsibility? The answer refers to some intuitions concerning relations between responsibility, knowledge in general, and philosophy in particular. Trying to encapsulate these intuitions into one sentence, I would say: Since there is moral responsibility, we do need philosophy. For it is philosophy that may be (if actually is, let’s leave the question open) able to define the scope of our moral responsibility.

Let’s start with moral responsibilities of philosophers. I see it as follows. Philosophy is to play an important role in the global civilization the making of which is under way and in the process itself. To put it more precisely: this thesis should not be read as a forecast; it is to be read as a thesis on a historical possibility (not necessarily a ‘strong’ one), and - as a manifestation of a value-judgment. It is important to state the latter explicitly. From the ethical viewpoint of the present author, the moral responsibility of philosophers concerns in the first range the problems of transforming the possibility into reality. Why, and exactly what role philosophy is to play in the process in question? To answer this question in detail and with precision would be a difficult task. So, let me make use of a historical image.

I mean here that of the ancient polis. This image (to a degree, a mythological one - but it does not matter here) fascinated many philosophers, in our age - G. Lukacs or H. Arendt, to give but two examples. This fascination has something to do with the fact that the ancient Greece gave birth both to democracy and philosophy. It has also something to do with the unquestionable difference between the democracy of the Greek polis and that of modern mass-societies.

I am not sure that the MacLuhanian ‘global village’ can be transformed into a ‘global polis’. But I am not convinced that it definitely cannot. And since I appreciate this ideal, and more - I believe its even partial actualization to be of some more practical (even in the utilitarian sense of the word) importance, I regard it as necessary to debate the conditions of such transformation. Among them I want to count the role of philosophy.

In short, assuming that the re-constitution of the ‘Greek-type’ democracy - this time on a ‘global’ scale - is possible at all, it must be remarked that it demands, among many other things, a new role of philosophy. (If present-day philosophy is ready to play this part will be discussed below.)

Why should the global-scale Greek-type democracy be so important today? To offer an answer, let’s read, for instance, the following Apel’s words: “Today..., for the first time in human history, the point is to assume common responsibility for global consequences and side-effects of the collective activity of man - say, industrial application of science and technology - and organize this very responsibility as collective praxis. Individual, whom the conventional morality is addressed to, cannot assume this task though he can feel co-responsible; the alternative of totalitarian-bureaucratic despotism removing individual from co-responsibility is - as the experience with state-socialism teaches us - neither efficient nor to be accorded with freedom and moral autonomy of an individual.” [Apel, 1992:6] Picht puts it even stronger: “Owing to science and technology people are in power to destroy life on the Earth. They have gained the negative power to have command over their own history. As the result of this very possibility of making an end of the human history, a qualitative transformation in the whole history of man has taken place.” [Picht, 1981:51-52] And the Nowak’s conjuncture can be quoted again. According to him, capitalism, due to ecological effects of its functioning, cannot survive: “Society...faces a choice: either catastrophe, or transformation of the mechanism of free competition.” [Nowak, 1997:314] And again, the transformation in question may
go toward two very different directions: either totalitarianism or solidarism is to be a solution to the problem [ibidem, 314-315]. And solidarism may be conceived of as an other aspect of democracy; or democracy as a side of solidarism.

The cultural situation cannot be presented as one-to-one function of the social-civilizational one. Nevertheless, the following remarks seem to be possible:

[A] Fundamentalism does tend to enhance (directly) totalitarian trends.
[B] (Radical) anti-fundamentalism, though does not enhance totalitarian trends directly, while weakening the possibilities of resistance and eliminating the ideological alternatives to capitalism, actually supports the 'objectively' stronger alternative, namely the totalitarian one.

If I speak of democracy on the global scale, I relate the problem of democracy to the process of globalization. This fashionable word should be, I think, read in several ways. The standard, 'geographical' reading is no doubt relevant. Moreover, it may also refer to the growing interconnectedness of various human practices: genetics and religion, space exploration and law, Internet and national cultures, world finance and national sovereignty... Even a succinct discussion of this meaning (dimension) of globalization would be a task in its own right. My aim here is but to call for some intuitions. They should, if not validate, then at least make plausible the above mentioned thesis. After all, one can claim (and this claim is, in my view, well justified) that the more the whole-ness of the world-we-live-in practically matters, the more practically relevant is the understanding of this world. And, all the conceptual debates aside, it has always been the job of philosophers to provide such an understanding. It really is an irony of History that philosophers are so skeptical as to their profession as they have virtually never been just in the time when their past claims are more justified than ever. (A short discussion of this predicament has been offered above.)

Ad [3]. The conclusions for philosophy are rather obvious. We should not reject philosophy (in general, and philosophy of History in particular). We should reject any fundamentalism, absolutism, dogmatism etc. Yet, we should not end in any relativism, subjectivism etc. But we should not spend too much time on saying again and again that virtually no thesis is absolutely true; we should rather try to formulate better and better philosophies, even if we know they never will be fully endorsed. - Surely, it is a difficult problem and the difficulty we face in the philosophical area is, in its core, almost the same we try to cope in our social and political life: how to go beyond the opposition of collectivism and individualism.

Ad [4]. The main task of this essay is to work out an idea (ideology, methodology) of philosophy which would be both anti-fundamentalist and anti-skeptical. Or, put in other form, an idea of philosophy is being looked for which both would take into account the lessons and insights offered by post-modernism and would avoid the destructive consequences it brings about.

To be more specific. We should find a resolution to this dilemma, if some values, such as 'global responsibility' (to quote the title of Hans Jonas' book) or democracy are to have better chances for their actualization. Still, neither post-modern skepticism nor return to earlier, rather shallow, optimism is, I think, a solution. To put it in other words. Skepticism is a praise, somewhat masochistic, of philosophy's own (alleged) impotence. On the other hand, one has - in my view - to accept, either willingly or unwillingly, that we cannot simply follow the path of Plato and Aristotle, of St. Augustin and Acquinata, of Descartes and La Mettrie, of Hegel and Marx...

These words are not intended as any systematic analysis of the problems in question. They are to outline a motivational context for the present undertaking. More will be said below.

What is known under the name 'post-modernism' is a complex socio-cultural phenomenon. Thus the attitude toward post-modernism may also be a complex one. (It might be noted that such a complexity seems to be perfectly in line with a post-modern idea, namely the idea of de-centration/deconstruction; incidentally, just this idea is among those of post-modernism I appreciate.) My own attitude is partly positive, partly negative. Generally speaking, positively I value the main critical thrust of post-modernism, negatively - its anti-analytical tendencies and anti-metaphysical orientation.

Andrzej Szahaj in his book on Rorty is attempting to determine what he calls 'general distinctive trait of the hypothetical postmodernism'. In his opinion, 'postmodernity would be the matter of the status of the claims one links with one's own cultural activity and with one's believes more than the matter of their content... it would be identical with greater and greater transparency of culture... By the growth of transparency I understand the process of widening the scope of cultural beliefs being not only respected but also consciously accepted (or consciously rejected)." [Szahaj,1996;217] If postmodernism should be conceived in this way - and only in this way, I would subscribe to this attitude without particular reservations. And if so, I would agree that 'analytical post-modernism' might be quite a good label - if any at all is necessary - for the stance to be developed below. This label might appear somewhat ridiculous. Yet, perhaps just in Poland it should be so to a lesser degree than in other countries. In the tradition of Polish analytical philosophy, we have had materialist metaphysics of Kotarbiński, and Łukasiewicz's program of scientific philosophy, yet one being not anti-metaphysical, and philosophy of Bolechowski both analytical and rooted in Aristotelian and tomist tradition, and analytical Marxism of Kmita and Nowak... Thus, why should we not accept the notion of 'analytical post-modernism'? I do not see why we should. But, frankly speaking, I am not attached to this label and am not going to insist on its being used. Nevertheless, the very possibility of such a label should be regarded as telling.

0.3. In the previous point, I outlined some motives of my undertaking. Now, I would like to give some introductory information about the text which objectifies my intentions.

At the very beginning, it should be stressed that the present work belongs to the domain of systematic philosophy. It is not my aim to offer a historical and interpretive presentation of any set of ideas. I do not attempt at any historical synthesis of philosophical anthropology.

My main task is to construct a logical model of a part of the 'cultural realm' that may be designated as 'philosophical anthropology'. The model seems to be as distant from this realm as from apples and foot-balls a material point is. On the other hand, this model is intended to cast some light on this complex area. (If it really does it, should not be decided by the author himself.)

And my second task is to specify what such a model is to be and why it makes sense to construct such models.

Therefore, the present work is conceived as a diptych. Using the name, I want to emphasize both the specificity and inter-relatedness of its two parts. Both are supposed to achieve goals that are at the same time different and strongly linked.
The first 'panel' is to present a methodological (in a sense, ideological - in another) program how philosophy might be being made in our age. And the second tries to demonstrate this program in action in a particular field. The program is to be expressed most shortly with the word 'meta-philosophy', the field may be designated as 'anthropology'. The two-foldness of this goal is by no means incidental. I would hope that the reader will rather find it 'signifying'. - This might be the most concise characteristic of this essay. A bit more detailed one will not, I hope, trespass upon the reader's patience.

As regards the 'diphy' character of the present works, the following remarks may be of some use. Viewed from the perspective generated by the first part, the second is a practical demonstration of the general ideas the former presents. In other words, the first part outlines a research-program, the second attempts at its (partial) realization. The first part, if viewed from a standpoint located in the second, may be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, as just an elaborated methodological introduction explaining the goals being striven for in the second part. And secondly, as a part of social/political philosophy (or even ideology) based upon some anthropological premises elucidated in the second part of this work.

My essay both elucidates an methodological idea/program and tries to actualize it. The idea of meta-philosophy - as the remarks presented further demonstrate - is by no means a new one. Still, two things can be said. First, the idea has been practically adopted rather seldom. To a degree this fact may be accounted for by the second remark: the idea 'has hung overhead'; still, it has not been (to my knowledge) elaborated in a systematic way. So, I am trying to bring together some ideas taken from analytical philosophy, hermeneutics, critical theory, historical materialism and put them into a possibly coherent whole.

0.4. Commence with the program. The solution the outlines of which are becoming visible (though not so much in the very area of philosophy as in those of some other branches of culture, say mathematics or cosmology) I've labeled with the word 'meta-philosophy'. The task of the first part of the present work is to characterize briefly what sort of intellectual activity this word is to designate, but - above of all - to say why undertaking it is, as I see it, of importance. Moreover, it seems to me that the characterization of the motives for this strategy contributes also to its 'definition'. And saying about definitions... Even if we are able to provide one more or less formal, this sort of definition known as 'ostensive' or 'deictic' is of some value. So, the second part of this work can be regarded as an - rather elaborated - ostensive definition of meta-philosophy (in the sense adopted in the present essay). And seen in other perspective, it is simply an attempt at the realization of the program outlined in the first part. And it is important to try to achieve a goal but it is also important to be aware of what exactly a goal one tries to achieve.

The connections of this sort are important, still they are to be found in very different areas. You might outline a program of, say, writing syntheses of the history of this or that country, and to write the history of a specific country as an instance of the strategy promoted by the given program. Besides the general link, there may be some more specific ones. In our case, they can be specified as follows.

On the one hand, philosophy is an important part of the 'human reality'. If we are looking for those kinds of human activity which are rather specific for man, philosophy will surely be among them. Hence, to understand man means also to understand philosophy. And to transform the human world may mean also to change the way in which various activities, say - philosophy, are being pursued.

On the second hand, any attempt at the understanding of Being should take into account that it is man who tries to understand it. In other words, however 'abstract' or 'general' any philosophical question, how very remote from the human reality is that area in which the object of the given question is located, it is always man who asks the question. And this simple (pre-philosophical) fact matters; at least prima facie: Even if we wish to maintain that actually it does not matter at all we have to accept some assumptions as to man and his cognitive capabilities. One could say that it is the epistemological link between anthropology and (general) philosophy (metaphysics). There is also one that could be called 'metaphysical': man is a part of the world and any comprehensive philosophy must account for him.

However important are the anthropological presuppositions of any philosophy of philosophy, they do not exhaust the list. Of importance are also assumptions concerning such notions like 'sense', 'meaning' and the like. Philosophy of philosophy shares thus an area with philosophy of language, or, say, hermeneutics, or even with philosophy of logic and mathematics. This fact brings about serious difficulties: to write a text that would discuss all topics that seem to be of importance would be beyond any limits, these of time and place, and those of competence of the present (- surely; perhaps: any) author. I was thus faced by a dilemma. To stretch the scope of this work (beyond any reasonable limits) in order to discuss all the important issues or to confine my attention solely to the anthropological matters? Neither solution seemed to me possible, though for rather different reasons. Finally, I decided to choose a 'third (middle) way'.

To characterize this solution, I would make use of an analogy with painting. Since Renaissance, in the European painting of central importance has been perspective: some objects situuated nearer us are depicted in greater detail, some other - more distant - less accurately, and those quite remote - merge in the background. In the case of this work, the greater or lesser accuracy can be characterized in two ways. First, the analytical precision with which various opinions are formulated. These of the 'first plan' are attempted to be presented with the greatest (achievable for the present author) precision. Those of the 'background' are simply mentioned, and often only metaphorically. Second, the argumentation in favor of various statements varies with respect to the 'perspective importance': these located in the 'foreground' are given possibly elaborated argumentation; those located in the 'background' are but mentioned. Thus, respectively to the location of various statements I sometime try to 'prove' them, and sometime just outline my views. Briefly put, if characterized from the literary point of view, the first part of this work is rather essayistic, the second - more analytical. This diversity in style reflects a logical difference: in the first part I try to describe some intuitions of various kinds, in the second - I am attempting an analytical construction. One comes here across a circle of a sort: some vague, imprecise and mingled intuitions determine the adopted way of an analytical construction. And only having completed such a construction, one can formulate those intuitions in a more rigorous way. The only question is if one should present those intuitions. My answer is 'yes': if there is a place for informal considerations in mathematical works, then a fortiori such a place should be preserved in philosophy.

0.5. And now on the second 'panel'. I decided to concentrate my attention on philosophy of man (or anthropology; these two phrases are used as synonyms). This
philosophy. Nevertheless, this preference is in any case unconditional. First, I
clarity, precision, logical coherence - in sum all the features specific to this kind of
personal style-preferences. My favorite style is that of analytical philosophy. I prefer
political debate some moral rules of 'honest quotation' might be formulated). Of
words'. - I do believe that published texts are 'public property' and can be used in
they express the idea I am going to convey better than I could do it 'in my own
obtained descriptions and searching for new ones is of identical importance.

Second, it is just anthropology which, in my opinion, calls - for a number of
reasons, and much more urgently than other branches of philosophy - for a strategy
of such a sort as proposed here.
The domain is very vast. Therefore, I have had to find a key which would help
me to arrange so variegated items. As I said earlier, it is a meta-theory of History
which is my final goal. Thus, my focus is on man as acting subject. Though it is still
a wide area, it seems to be sufficiently homogenous to be studied without further
limitations. But being very wide, it needs to be somehow divided into smaller sub-
areas, if for 'technical' reasons. Putting it now rather crudely, it is divided first into a
part devoted to 'internal' description (or explanation) of actions and a part devoted to
description of 'external' determinants of actions. The first part is further subdivided
into chapters on, respectively, formal ('syntactical'), substantial ('semantic'),
'procedural' (decisional) and performative ('pragmatic') aspects of actions.

0.6. Having presented the key ideas of this work, their motivation and contexts, I
have to say now some words on the more 'technical' aspects of the text.
First, I would make a comment on the attitude toward the historical-philosophical
past as being promoted by the meta-philosophical ideology. Meta-philosophy invites
looking for new philosophical ideas but rejects the strong version of the idea of
philosophical progress. I would say that all philosophies describe a part of extra-
temporal reality, one being possibly infinite. Therefore the conservation of the already
obtained descriptions and searching for new ones is of identical importance.

Second, some words on the method of quotation. I would distinguish two ways
in which I make use of quotations: direct and indirect. As regards the latter,
quotations are to illustrate some viewpoints (theories) I am discussing. As regards
the former, I am availing of some words uttered by another author when I believe
they express the idea I am going to convey better than I could do it 'in my own
words'. - I do believe that published texts are 'public property' and can be used in
whatever way you like (at least on the level of theoretical debate; in the case of, say,
political debate some moral rules of 'honest quotation' might be formulated). Of
course some reservations are always in such cases necessary.

And third, several words on literature. I will start with a declaration on my
personal style-preferences. My favorite style is that of analytical philosophy. I prefer
clarity, precision, logical coherence - in sum all the features specific to this kind of
philosophy. Nevertheless, this preference is in any case unconditional. First, I
remember the Aristotle's dictum that various things have their own measure of
precision. In this sense, human matters seem to be similar to those of meteorology
rather than to those of rigid-bodies mechanics. Second, the following observation by
Elzenberg expresses an actual problem: "Reading Heidegger after Russell. The
situation in philosophy looks like this: one can think poorly about important matters,
or clearly and orderly about trivial ones. The worst is the position of those who
contend that since the important ones cannot be thought of in an ordered way, they
simply do not exist. Comfortably, but perhaps a bit immoderately? Since one makes an
assumption that whether there is a thing, or there is not, depends on the possibility of
forming it into shape which prevents us from disgrace caused by unordered thinking,
one being always shameful." [Elzenberg, 1963:1940] At this moment, I might be
allowed to indulge myself into some speculations; I mean here historiosophical (in
the sense: historiosophy of philosophy) speculations. To pass from 'primitive' to
'sophisticated' philosophy, retreat of a kind from the metaphysics might have been
necessary. The possible (historical - but it has also 'micro' interrelation) sequence
may run as follows: action - critical analysis - new action etc. Viewed in the
Braudelian perspective of long duree, a century of predomination (by no means total)
of 'introvert' orientation may be interpreted as a 'pause' for self-critical reflection in
the long march of human kind toward better understanding the world (Universe,
Being or whatever you like).
The fourth remark. A part of the historical process, and an important one, is the
process of 'clarification' of the philosophical theories. However distinct two extremes
of the spectrum of our intellectual products may appear to be and actually are,
between metaphors-images and formalized logical systems there is - in my view - a
continuity rather than a gap. As to particular fields of our knowledge (of philosophy
also), the degree of logical precision, we are able to reach, varies considerably.
Applying these general remarks to the domain of anthropology, I would say that both
Heidegger and Schlipp, both Scheler and Arrow (to invoke but two incidentally
composed pairs) are, despite the respective differences in style, important - though in
different ways - to our understanding of ourselves.

Fifth, given the scope of this essay (even if all the reservations being made are
taken into account), the list of books and papers used while it was prepared is not
only far from completeness (which is today absolutely impossible, except perhaps for
some very special and narrow topics) but also lacks order of a kind. To a degree, it
was a deliberate decision. I preferred to read (somewhat at random) things from
distant areas than pursue a detailed plan of reading. If this strategy failed or, at least
partly, succeeded is not to be decided by he who adopted it.

Sixth, of some use may also be a remark on how I see history of philosophy: it
is not a collection of 'closed' 'self-contained' and 'incommensurable' entities. Quite
the opposite. Possibly, any two philosophies have some common, identical elements;
they are composed of some elements being very similar, and also of those very
different yet manifesting recognizable resemblance. And so on... There is other point
to be made: even in philosophy both progress in general, and - in particular-
accumulation of results are possible and actually, if not too often, have taken place.
In the essay, I would like to support this view. For this reason, I deliberately quote
authors belonging to various orientations yet expressing, if occasionally, identical or
similar opinions. I also think that an observation once made by Lem as to plurality of
empirical languages can be adopted in the philosophical domain. Commenting on his
Philosophy of Chance, Lem is explaining why in this work "the same things are
Part One: ON AN IDEA OF META-PHILOSOPHY

The task of this part is to characterize an idea of meta-philosophy. This idea may be comprehended as a strategy (program, or - ideology) of philosophical practice. And in order to characterize any strategy, it seems reasonable to say something about its main objective(s), about motives to assume it, about knowledge that makes it reasonable, and about the tradition it continues and avails of.

Therefore, I shall proceed according to the following scheme. First, I will say what a specific goal is in this work attempted at; thus, I will introduce and contrast two notions of meta(-)philosophy, and then will give a tentative definition of meta-philosophy (in the sense assumed here). Second, I am going to say why I am trying to achieve this goal; thus I will present a number of reasons for this strategy of making philosophy; reasons, or - in other words - a set of values which direct my efforts. Third, to make the project of meta-philosophy meaningful, one has to accept some philosophical premises - in other words: knowledge which validates the supposition that the values may be achieved in the assumed way; I find it necessary (or at least useful) to characterize those assumptions. And fourth, I will make an overview of ideas I have drawn upon or found similar to the mine.

1. Metaphilosophy and meta-philosophy - two notions of meta(-)philosophy

The word 'meta(-)philosophy' can be used in two ways. (For the reader's convenience, I adopt a graphical convention: the first, most common, use of the word rendered without hyphen: metaphilosophy; the second, more important for the present work, with hyphen: meta-philosophy.) Both of them are, in my view, legitimate and important.

In the first case, it designates this type of reflection that could also be termed methodology, epistemology or - most generally - philosophy of philosophy. This is the meaning that was assigned to this word by M. Lazerowitz who coined it (though, he would perhaps prefer to speak of sociology or psychology of philosophy rather than of its philosophy). In his Studies in Metaphilosophy, he tried "to improve our understanding of what a philosophical theory is, what its supporting arguments come to." [Lazerowitz,1964:ix]

No doubt that any 'good' philosophy should say something about man and his various activities, cognition including, thus also - about philosophy (in the generic sense of the word). But there is little more doubt that in this century we have witnessed (over)proliferation of the 'philosophical egocentrism/introversion'. (Incidentally, it may be noted that what I call here 'philosophical egocentrism' or 'introversion' can be seen as a part of a much broader cultural phenomenon, rather typical for the 20th century, for which the name of 'auto-thematism' was coined, three decades ago, by a Polish literary critic and writer, A. Sandauer.) Therefore, whatever might be thought of it, it isn't my goal to follow this path.

I believe that the field of 'meta-philosophy' in the second (to be elucidated below) sense of this term is no less important than that of philosophy-of-philosophy and much less cultivated. So, my key task is to contribute to its cultivation.

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Meta-philosophy, in the second - relevant for my work - sense, may also be characterized as second-order philosophy: philosophy that attempts to construct not the model of the world (or of a part of it, say, of man) but a set of such models, and to analyze the structure(s) of /a/ space(s) of these models. It should be noted that meta-philosophy in the second sense shares its 'extravertic' orientation with the classical tradition: from Tales, through Plato, St.Thomas, Spinoza, to Marx, Wittgenstein, Heisenberg... the prefix 'meta-' refers to a different strategy rather than to a different goal. It should be stressed that in this point I disagree fundamentally with Lazrowitz who maintains that "philosophical theories are nothing more substantial than linguistic chimerae". [ibidem]

Some additional remarks may be useful. First, note that the way the word 'meta-philosophy' is to be used in this work is somewhat similar to the way the term 'metamathematics' is being used. Metamathematics is generally considered to be a part of mathematics, while philosophy of mathematics is most often viewed as part of philosophy, hence as something rather external to this discipline. Simply put, metamathematics is said to be composed of logical syntax (proof's theory) and logical semantics (theory of models). [Marciszewski, 1987: 432] Therefore, such issues as the independence of the so-called axiom of choice from the other axioms of set-theory, the logical equivalence of Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry (if one is consistent then the other is so), the (ir)relevance of so-called continuum hypothesis for some mathematical problems, and so on - are examples of metamathematical questions. The problem of the cardinal number of the set of all intermediate logics can serve as an example of metalogical problems. - Meta-philosophy, in the sense proposed here, is fashioned after these examples.

Secondly. The distinction between metaphilosophy and meta-philosophy seems to correspond with Ajdukiewicz's differentiation of methodology and metascience. Let's glimpse at the way in which Ajdukiewicz argues in favor of this distinction: "the definition of methodology as a science about science is a particularly inadequate description for one...reason. This reason is the ambiguity of the word 'science'. This word, whose meaning is not clear, can in addition have the following different meanings. Namely, speaking of science, we may, principally, have two things in mind: either the activities that constitute the cultivation of science, or what we might metaphorically call the products resulting from these activities." [Ajdukiewicz, 1977:1] In another text, Ajdukiewicz characterizes the difference thus: "metascience does not take into consideration the role played by man in the construction of science; it considers science as a system of propositions... And methodology investigates the role of man who is availing of these propositions." [Ajdukiewicz, 1965:332] He defines then: "methodology, in opposition to metascience, is concerned with various human attitudes toward propositions, thus - with some human behavior." [ibidem:333] Therefore, "methodology, in opposition to metascience, is humanistic science" [ibidem:334] and "metascience is...science of mathematical character, one being very distant from the character of humanistic sciences" [ibidem:335]

Third remark. The strategy characterized here with the name of meta-philosophy may be regarded as an application of much more general methodological idea. This idea may be found, as I shall it demonstrate below (in the point 4.2.), in logic and mathematics as well as in some branches of natural sciences. As regards the latter, it might be not incidental that this strategy has developed best in the field of cosmology. Putting it in a somewhat simplistic manner, one might say that the greater

the scope (domain, universe...) of a theory is, the more important is the meta-theoretical approach. Thus, if this condition is valid, it is just philosophy in which the meta-theoretical strategy should be most widely and consequently adopted.

Fourthly. As noted Kolakowski (- for instance, many others did it also in very similar ways), "among all questions which have been for twenty five centuries keeping European philosophy alive one can find no one which would have been decided". [Kolakowski, 1990:7] The very fact is beyond doubt. But how should we explain it ? What an attitude one should assume towards it? - This could be the matter of a dispute. For Lazrowitz, the answer is simple. The "material from which" theories of philosophy are spun is "no more than matters of verbal fact." [Lazrowitz, 1964:56-57] His position might be reformulated thus: no results, no genuine questions, what is genuine is question in itself hardly answerable question (as the debate over the neopositivist idea of 'the empirical' demonstrated). Let me note that the trouble with 'meaning' is quite similar to that we have with 'existence': denying existence of an object leads to confusion or paradoxes (to say 'Life on Mars does not exist' seems to be a different proposition that 'Any man being 3m tall does not exist'); and qualifying the claim 'Only matter does exist' as meaningless is not identical with attributing meaninglessness to 'Human soul is immortal'. And, returning to the main point, let me declare that I accept the following opinion: "In philosophy, it is not the point to attain a definite and ultimate result: it is just the opposite: to keep open - against one-sided pressures, specific for each epoch - all the reasonable possibilities of understanding the world." [Elzenberg, 1963:355] It might be therefore said that the idea of meta-philosophy is an attempt at elaborating the attitude expressed in the Elzenberg's words.

Fifth. It is not my task here to discuss the problem of (lack of) progress in philosophy. However, I would like to sketch the outline of a possible resolution. It would start from Duhem's thesis about impossibility of experimentum cruce: one would maintain that if any 'local' theory is definitely undecidable then a fortiori any 'global' is not too. Thus, I would say that the difference between philosophy and sciences is, at least in respect to the problem of decidability, of quantitative rather than of qualitative character. Thus, progress may be defined either 'internally' - in the terms of logical precision, coherence etc., or 'externally' - in the pragmatic terms of effectiveness, predictability etc.

And the last, seventh remark. I am aware of the possibility of iteration - why should our context be an exception? - of the prefix 'meta-'. Therefore, I am aware of the possibility of using such terms as meta-meta-philosophy, meta-meta-meta-philosophy, etc. Moreover, I tend to suppose that this possibility is something more than an abstract language-play. I tend to believe that some actual problems are there. But my work is not in philosophical logic. I have other goals. Therefore, I deliberately decide to limit myself to the levels of philosophy and meta-philosophy only. Perhaps, one day time will come for tackling this problem. But definitely not in this essay.

Now, let me come back for a whole to metaphilosophy/meta-philosophy distinction. The double meaning of this word (one word if spoken) should, if only kept in mind, remind us and emphasize that both are strongly interrelated. These interrelations might be outlined thus.

First, meta-philosophy as a strategy of philosophy results from various metaphilosophical self-criticisms of philosophy. And though I do not accept many of
the conclusions these critics arrived at, I do believe that a good deal of their work must not be just passed by.

Second, metaphilosophy - if regarded as methodology of philosophy in Ajdukiewicz's sense - must be seen as a part of this or that anthropology. But there are various anthropologies, thus - various metaphilosophies, which deserve to be systematically - meta-philosophically - studied.

Third. Ajdukiewicz's view of methodology needs - in my opinion - a modification. Putting it in general terms, any specific type of action - be it swimming or proving mathematical theorem, making a clock or playing chess, or for that matter constructing philosophical theory - cannot be explained in purely humanistic terms. While accounting for swimming (and not only for the decision, desire etc. to swim), we need some knowledge about fluid mechanics, - for making a clock - about solid-bodies mechanics...And if we want to account for constructing philosophies, what should we know about? Roughly speaking, we should have an idea what is the content of philosophical problems. And meta-philosophy may be interpreted as systematic (perhaps: theoretical - in the sense close to the Knita's pre-theoretical/theoretical-knowledge opposition) knowledge about problem-field of philosophy.

As far as now I have conveyed but some intuitions concerning the idea of meta-philsophy. And it will remain so: as I've already declared, I am not going to work out any elaborated definition of meta-philosophy. Instead, I shall give a number of reasons for adopting this strategy. And doing it, I shall, let me hope, precise the notion involved. And, what is still more important, I am going to demonstrate this strategy in action - in the second part of this essay. So, the second part may be regarded as a kind of an 'ostensive' definition of meta-philosophy.

Thus, the first part of this essay is metaphilosophical (being a text on meta-philosophy), while the second is an exercise in meta-philosophy, and in meta-anthropology in particular.

2. Why meta-philosophy?

2.1. On the content of this chapter

The outlined above idea of meta-philosophy may be regarded as a 'research program', or - in a sense - as a/the (professional) ideology. It might also be interpreted as a project of a/the (intellectual, theoretical...) device or tool. If to accept this metaphor and to note that the 'meaning' ('sense') of a tool depends on goals which are to be achieved with its help, it is reasonable to say some words about the goals meta-philosophy is hoped to serve. In the present chapter I am going to present those goals and to formulate some arguments to support my conviction that meta-philosophy can actually contribute to their achievement.

Before going into details, let me present briefly these goals (or motives or reasons for this undertaking).

First, the objective formulated in a (negative) way by Wiener Kreis, and in a (positive) way by hermeneutics: to understand the (non)sense of philosophical theses, systems etc. It is related with a simple assumption: first understanding, then - evaluation.

The second goal has its roots in the Hegelian-Marxian tradition: to understand - and possibly account for - the changing - in the real historical time - plurality of philosophies. And basic idea: (meta-)philosophy must precede any theoretical history of philosophy.

For better understanding of any particular philosophy, and for understanding history of philosophy, we need new philosophies. (Some other justifications of this need will also be given.) Hence the third goal for which Raymond Lullus might be the patron: to deliver some heuristic tools for inventing (more precisely: discovering) new philosophies.

And it is not enough to have many philosophies. If the plurality is to play its hermeneutic, historical, and other roles, philosophies have to 'interact', thus - in particular - they have to be well 'organized' or 'catalogued'. As for this - the fourth one - motive, ancestry should rather be looked for out of academic philosophy: in science of science (the name of D. Solla Price may be here invoked) or in some areas of computational sciences; the issue (going well beyond the scope of philosophy) is, how to cope with the tidal growth of intellectual production.

As regards the fifth goal, it manifests an ethical (or, in a sense, political) option: the idea of dialogue, both in its inter-personal' (Buber's, say) and 'societal' (Habermas') version, lies at the very heart of it.

The sixth goal reflects an attitude toward the general 'climate' that dominates in the philosophical community; here, the question is how - if of course one would like - to promote more cooperative than competitive orientation among members of our professional community. And the last, sixth, motive may be derived from more broadly (than in the case of neopositivism; including for instance Łukasiewicz or Bocheński) understood tradition of analytical philosophy: to provide a possibly 'neutral' (in relation to various Weltanschauungen) ground for philosophical criticism.
2.2. How to understand philosophies?, or - hermeneutic reasons

"He who wants to understand can remain open the problem of truthfulness of the expressed opinions." [Gadamer,1993:348] We could paraphrase the Gadamer's claim and say: understanding first, then assertion. This rule needs reservations, since it may be (cf. below thesis [H1]) that the process of understanding is infinite. If so, no epistemic decision could be ever made. Thus, the practical problem of a trade-off between understanding and assertion arises. This problem has, in my opinion, no definite theoretical solution. It is rather 'practical wisdom' that should play here the most important role.

Anyway, understanding - perhaps not perfect - of (philosophical) theses should precede any other epistemic operations (acceptance, rejection...) we might effect upon them. (This postulate seems at first sight to be more than obvious; yet if we look at the practice of philosophical debates we may decide it deserves being reinvoked...) And since I believe that the meta-philosophical approach may be useful as a device for better understanding of philosophy, I shall start the presentation of reasons for this approach with the hermeneutic ones.

Before more detailed presentation, the main idea in its intuitive form: Any proposition may be regarded as a 'point' of a 'logical space'. Therefore, to understand a proposition is to locate it in a space. Therefore, understanding a proposition assumes knowing a set of propositions and its structure (relations between them). The term 'space' is to convey the intuitive image that comprises such elements like 'distance', 'surrounding', 'ordering' etc. In particular, the term 'logical space' is to suggest that such a set might be, if properly formalized, furnished with some topological or algebraic structures, which in turn would contribute to the understanding of the theses. And now some points of more detailed presentation.

I shall start with an idea formulated explicitly by B.Wolniewicz. The author of Rzeczy i fakty (Things and facts) says: "in order to ask if the given thesis is true, one has to realize what its proper meaning actually is. Meaning of a philosophical thesis is determined by two factors, internal and external. The internal factor is the role of the thesis in the given system; the external factor is its relation with an other philosophical thesis, belonging to an other system, one to which the given thesis stands in opposition. Exposing that external factor, we express a possibly debatable opinion that in order to understand the meaning of a philosophical thesis T, one has to consider it in opposition to a thesis T', being contrary to it." [Wolniewicz,1968:178] Incidentally, it is noteworthy that this opinion is formulated in the context of an analysis of the meaning of logical atomism. The latter is contrasted with absolute monism (of which historical representatives have been, among others, Parmenides, Spinoza, Hegel). [ibidem:183]
The basic intuition might be summarized thus.

[CT1] ‘A thesis T is understood iff its negation ~T is understood.

Yet, this formulation is in fact a very weak one. To make it stronger, let me follow some remarks of Elster. He notes that "the opposite of a profound truth is another profound truth." And he adds: "Opposite" must be taken in the sense of internal rather than external negation. The internal negation of 'People prefer what they can have over what they cannot have' is 'People prefer what they cannot have over what they can have' Both statements yield true and important insights. The external negation of the first statement is simply that 'People do not prefer what they can have over what they cannot have', a statement that does not suggest any important insights." [Elster,1989:9] Thus, let's reformulate (CT)

[CT1'] A thesis T is understood iff (an) its concrete negation T' is understood.

What Elster calls 'internal negation' is to be understood as both a special case and an a model for the notion of concrete negation. Some aspects of this notion may be presented with the help of everyday-language examples. Let's say that we consider the following sentence:

[S] John takes part in his son's wedding.

Its external negation is just:

[~S] John does not take part in his son's wedding.

The list of its concrete negations comprises for instance the following sentences:

[S'] John is seriously ill and stays at hospital.

[S''] John is completely drunk and cannot come to the wedding.

[S'''] John participates in a conference,

etc.

In this case it could hardly be maintained that the literal meaning of [S] can be understood iff [S'], or [S''] etc... is understood. Yet, if we say that [S] represents a situation then is seems plausible to say that we understand this situation if know the list of possible alternative situations being represented by [S'], [S''] etc.

It could be noted that just this idea of concrete negation supports this strategy of philosophical construction which calls for 'radical' (extreme) theses. For now, so much about the notion of concrete negation. Let's touch the issue from an other side.

The idea expressed in [CT1'] should, I believe, be linked with some elements of Gadamer's hermeneutics. A whole section of his Wahrheit und Methode he devotes to the "hermeneutic primacy of question". [Gadamer,1993:337] The central intuition of the section may be expressed with this thesis: "To understand an opinion means: to understand it as an answer to a question." [Gadamer,1993:349] Why should it be so? The answer is likely to be looked for along the way suggested with this opinion: 'To question is to expose oneself to an open space. Openness of what is being asked about consists in the answer being yet not determined.' [Gadamer,1993:338] The notion of openness, as adopted in Gadamer, calls for being stated more precisely.

Before accomplishing this task, however, let's supplement Gadamerian considerations with a remark made by Sartre: "no question could be asked...if negation did not exist. But this negation itself when inspected more closely referred us back to Nothingness as its origin and foundations. In order for negation to exist in the world and in the order that we may consequently raise questions concerning Being, it is necessary that in some way Nothingness be given." [Sartre,1989:21-22]

And now, let's return to the notion of openness. In order to elucidate it, some references to erotetic logic would be useful. Let's thus make a stop in the discussion of Gadamer's stance, and direct our attention to this area of logic. Amidst the issues studied in this domain, the problem of the very notion of question is among the
Thus the content of $C_n({\neg T})$ depends on the assumed logic. Thus to understand a question means to know its content. But to understand a thesis means to know also what difference is, if any, between sets of its consequences obtained with the help of various logics.

The next condition we shall obtain if we avail of the theory of rejected sentences. It may be formulated as follows.

[CT3] A thesis $T$ is understood iff all elements of $dC_n(\neg T)$ are understood. (Symbol $dC_n$ represents so called 'dual consequence' which goes from false (resp. rejected) sentences to other false (resp. rejected) sentences. For formal definition: cf. Woleński [1996:209]).

To summarize these remarks. In order to understand a (philosophical) thesis one has to:

1. determine its 'positive content(s)', thus - its logical consequences (perhaps of various types);
2. determine its 'negative content', thus - its dual consequences,
3. determine its 'background', thus - the set of its 'concrete negations'.

It should be observed that [1] and [2] may be iterated: For each element of the set of concrete negations we may determine both its positive and negative content. On the other hand, for each element of either positive or negative content its 'background' is to be determined. And so on. As it is visible, even starting from a single (philosophical) thesis, we obtain a wide (potentially infinite) network of theses. And if we take into account even a relatively small number of theses... The image becomes more and more complicated. Anyway, two conclusions may at this moment be formulated.

[H1] The process of understanding a (philosophical) thesis can never be completed.

[H2] The more 'wide' (varied) set of alternatives to a thesis, the better understanding this thesis.

I'd like to complement those somewhat 'abstract' (here: distant from everyday preoccupation) considerations with a summary of a debate devoted to a more 'real-life' philosophical issue. I mean here a question raised by the editors of a Polish Catholic monthly Znak. A few years ago, a whole issue was dedicated to the problem encapsulated into a short yet strange phrase 'God of atheists'. "What does this title mean?" - ask the Editors "To look for easy paradoxes would be the goal, or the experience of atheism contains substance which allows Christians to see their faith in a new light?" As one can guess, the whole debate is a complex one. Neither possible costs, in all their seriousness, are being uncovered in the process of internal confrontation with the radical alternative of faith - with atheism... internalized, experienced in the full light of its not only theoretical but also life consequences." [ibidem:42]

To those reflections on atheism I would add an idea formulated once by Wittgenstein, and presented in a paper of Peter T. Geach. "At a time I had a few
chats with Wittgenstein on his personal contacts with Frege. Wittgenstein once told me that he decisively condemned Fregean critique of idealism (in particular one included in the paper on Der Gedanke) since Frege was permanently criticizing idealists at their weak point, and he should have criticized them at the strong one. Unfortunately, Wittgenstein’s stance was for Frege completely incomprehensible. As it may seem, the opinions of Marxist philosophers concerning this issue are divided. I know that some of them do agree here with Wittgenstein and are convinced that the profound roots of idealist illusions can be eradicated but through penetrating investigating idealism in its most consequent form.” [Geach,1969-93]

Quite interestingly (though perhaps not so much as it were a time ago when the image of Wittgenstein as neopositivist was still popular), this Wittgensteinian idea might be regarded as expressing the same basic intuition pronounced by Hegel in Die Phaenomenologie des Geistes: “The thorough refuting of a principle were in fact its developing and thus elimination of its shortcomings”. [Hegel,1963:33]

Some additional comments and observations might be called up. First, Cassirer’s words on language: “Wer fremde Sprachen nicht kennt, weiss nichts von seiner eigenen” – said Goethe. In a sense we do not know our own language as long as we do not know any foreign language, for we are not able to notice its specific structure and particular traits.” [Cassirer,1971:226] This same may be said about national (or more broadly - group) consciousness (cf. Simmel and Schutz on the relation: fellow - stranger) and self-consciousness (cf. Hegel’s dialectic of Master and Servant). And about culture: M. Bakhtin says that “in the domain of culture staying outside is a great lever of understanding...One culture unveils itself more completely and profoundly but in eyes of another one” [Bachtin,1983:370]. Also about concepts and notions: Feyerabend, for instance, notes that “our understanding of the somewhat elusive notion, constructed by Newton, of absolute space and understanding of its value are getting more profound through comparing this notion with concepts of relativity of Berkeley, Huyghens, Leibniz, and Mach.” [Feyerabend,1979:105] We could complete this passage with the Spinoza’s phrase, quoted by Hegel: *omnis negatio est determinatio*.

Second comment, on the theory of meaning. Frege established - in opposition to the earlier tradition - ‘proposition’ as the basic unit of meaning. Goedel, I would say, made a step further: the meaning of a notion (say of natural number) depends - at least partly - on a set of sentences. The idea of meta-philosophy seems to be in line with the trend of more and more holistic approach in the theory of meaning.

And the last remark. In his Tractatus (at the point 5.64), Wittgenstein claims that “solipsism is identical with pure realism” [Wittgenstein,1971:69]. This brief thesis suggests an additional ‘dimension’ of understanding: determining the set of theses being ‘identical’ (resp. equivalent) with a given thesis. With only noting the intuition which says that Suszko’s non-Fregean logic with special functor of identity would be perhaps a proper tool for this investigations I have to complete this remark.

Having formulated those remarks, I would like to return for a while to the problem of questions. An interesting and important (specially in the context of the problem of in/commensurability to be discussed in chapter 3) observation was made by Rene Thom. While discussing the problem of universal grammar and semantics, he distinguishes its linguistic and philosophical aspect and on the latter says that “problem of universal grammar should be related to that what happens to be called great categories of human mind. As we well know, Aristotle was the first to have given a table of categories, adopted and modified later on by Kant. Curious thing,
the course of history radical changes, then we assume that there is a basic characteristic of collective which is satisfied by primitive society as well as by contemporary one. This characteristic is *ex definitione* an invariant of history. If there were no such an invariant, then the phrase 'society is changing' would lose any meaning, thus there would be no reason that two radically different objects (primitive society and contemporary society) should be determined with the same term 'society'. In this sense, the idea of change does always contain the idea of continuity, quite similarly as the idea of discontinuity of a variable contains presupposition that and other variable preserves continuity. This fact can be - and has often been - refused on the level of philosophical declarations. It has not been refused (and...it is not possible to be refused) on the level of philosophical reflection. Saying it simpler, a philosopher can of course utter such opinions as 'everything is changing' or 'there does not exist anything permanent' but is not able to equip these declarations with meaning which would allow for regarding them as genuine utterances about the world." [Mejbaur, 1983b: 9] Let note that the quoted below opinion of Lovejoy (temporarily earlier that of Mejbaur) may be regarded as a concretization of the just cited one.

It may be also interesting that the Mejbaur's opinion manifests a resemblance to a phenomenological thesis. Characterizing the role of language - and ordinary language in particular - in phenomenology, D. Gierulanka states that this role is so important due to "setting forth by phenomenology the descriptive problems (with conviction that before any genetic-causal research one should realize how looks out that of what the genesis and causes are asked)." [Gierulanka, 1997:9-97] And according to Dilthey, "the comparative historical method is always preceded by the systematic considerations". [Dilthey, 1987:131] Using still different language, we could say that structural (static) description must precede genetic-historical (dynamic) explanation. This rule seems to be so much valid for description/explanation of physical movements as for intellectual developments: purely 'Heraclichian' stance seems to be unspeakable, thus (?!) impossible.

History of philosophy is regarded here as theoretical history of philosophy (in a sense close to the one with which is equipped the term 'theoretical history of science' in the 'historical epistemology' of J. Knita) I do believe that for a number of reasons such a history deserves attention and effort. Moreover, I tend to believe that a (Marxian) thesis on the history of philosophy, which is supposed to have (had) an autonomous history of its own (more precisely, Marx and Engels claim in *German Ideology* that "morality, religion, metaphysics and all other kinds of ideology, and the corresponding with them forms of consciousness, lose the appearances of independence. They have no history, no development..." [Marx & Engels, 1961:28]), though not quite true, contains more than one grain of truth. Still, there is a difficulty raised by Kolakowski in his *Main Currents of Marxism*. Since, on the one hand I believe that this difficulty is a real and serious one, and on the other I suppose that the meta-philosophy can contribute to overcoming it, I want to refer Kolakowski's opinion at length.

Kolakowski puts the following question: "what exactly is historical materialism?" And while answering it, he formulates the following dilemma: "If it assumes that all the details of 'superstructure' can be explained as products of the demand on the part of 'basis', it is an ungrounded and unacceptable absurd. If in turn it rejects, in the spirit of Engels' remarks, the idea of one-to-one determinacy - it is a true of common sense. Historical materialism, rigorously understood, seems to be a violation of the simplest rules of rational thinking, while loosely understood - a commonplace." [Kołakowski, 1976a:371]

Subsequently, he discusses the well-known Engels' formula (which was often believed to be a way for evading the above dilemma) about 'last-resort' determinacy: two methods of making this rather vague formulation more precise are indicated. The first method bases upon the idea of indirect (mediated) determinacy. According to Kolakowski, it does not change substantially the conception of 'absolute' determinacy which is said to be an 'absurd'. More promising, at the first glance at least, is the second method which is relied upon the idea of non-one-to-one determinacy. This idea is summarized by the author of *Main Currents of Marxism* thus: "not all facets of culture are determined by class relations...but only some of them, namely the most important." [ibidem] But this formulation is in fact devoid of real meaning until a criterion of 'importance' is given. And if the criterion is based directly upon historical materialism, "we have to do with tautology or vicious circle: it turns out that 'basis' determines those facets of superstructure which are determined by basis." [ibidem]

To some extent, I agree with Kolakowski: while commencing with such concepts like 'bourgeois philosophy' (or, let's add, 'modern', 'classical' etc.), we almost unavoidably slip into tautologies. Yet I do not agree with Kolakowski's suggestion that we have to accept that history of culture can be cultivated only idiohistoriographically, or - at best - that some 'internal' regularities can be formulated.

Thus, if we want to demonstrate any (not-trivial, non-tautological) relation between history of philosophy and global history, we should first assume that there is (has been) an actual history of philosophy. And to describe such a history we need to be equipped with devices for (internal, independent from more general ones) classification of philosophies and for their comparison. We need methods which allow us to determine 'from inside' more and less important aspects of philosophies; to distinguish between their 'deep structures' and 'surface structures'. And so on. In other words, an immanent description of the 'space of philosophies' is a precondition for any nontrivial theoretical history of philosophy.

At this moment, it cannot be said what results could be obtained by theoretical history of philosophy: a lot of work should be first accomplished; both in general philosophy of History and in meta-philosophy. However, I believe that some interesting results can be expected.

To justify my expectations, let me cite my own paper on *The Epochs of History and Philosophical Paradigms* [1994]. In this work, I tried to define, on one side, three philosophical paradigms, and on the other - three epochs of global history. I suggested that a correlation should hold between the sequence of paradigms and the sequence of epochs. This model, though presented in very sketchy way, seems to have - I dare to claim - one virtue: it is nontautological: the way in which paradigms are distinguished is logically independent from the classification of epochs.

Also on more general historiographical relevance of the meta-philosophy a few remarks could be made. That any culture (the term being understood as in cultural anthropology and related domains) contains a general world-view, it does not seem very controversial. Somewhat more controversial may be the thesis claiming that any such world-view can be represented by a philosophy, or - perhaps, it would be better to put it so - by a set of philosophies (to give but one example motivating the second formulation: any philosophy is, *ex definitione*, consistent; contrarily, a world-view can be inconsistent - a contradiction can even be constitutive for a world-view - in such a case, a world-view would be represented - partly - by two, or even more,
philosophies). Yet, making some further reservations - for instance, noting that 'complete' philosophies are perhaps 'too big' (as addressing problems being not even noticed by world-views) - we can make this thesis less synthetic, and more analytical, thus - much less controversial. Having made all these specifications and reservations, we can generalize the thesis on historical/historiosophical relevance of meta-philosophy: Meta-philosophy turns out to be relevant not only for theoretical history of philosophy, but more generally - for theoretical history of culture, and - finally - for philosophy of History. Of course, some believe that we do not need any. I think that, given a diagnosis of our time and given some moral decisions, we do need philosophies of History. And in particular, for reasons I presented in Preface, we need philosophies of History presenting actual - and possible - role of philosophy (written large). Therefore, we need meta-philosophy.

So much about my general stance. And now, glimpse at some details.

First - at the meaning of 'autonomy of philosophy'. "All human works come into existence at particular historical and sociological conditions. However, we would not be able to understand those particular conditions if we could not grasp the general structural assumptions lying at the foundations of those works." [Cassirer, 1971:133] I do agree with this opinion of the author of Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. It is the basic intuition expressed in the opinion which I would like to develop starting from the metaphor of space and journey. The metaphor of space of philosophies (resp. of philosophical theses) was introduced in the previous sub-chapter. The space is there: it is not constructed but discovered by philosophers. The history of philosophy is a history of great many journeys undertaken by philosophers in this space. Thus the knowledge of this space is the first prerequisite for describing and understanding those journeys. And only having described and understood 'from inside' those journeys we can look for some construals. We can ask why some started their journeys here and some others there, why some moved very quickly while others did not move at all...We can consider why some were going alone while some others followed well treaded paths. Etc. etc. The (epistemological) situation is almost the same as in the case of 'real' (of a Columbus, or of a Magellan) journeys and geographical knowledge. It is obviously true that just those journeys extended our geographical knowledge: thus - first journeys, then - geographical knowledge. But the history (and any its explanation) of great journeys must be based upon this very knowledge.

Second, what has just been said implies the following research strategy: first philosophy then (theoretical) history of philosophy. But to be able to look at a philosophy (theory) in this way, we have to understand better - at least in a sense - the given theory. And to do it, we should be equipped with proper analytical instruments. It should not, thus, remained unnoticed that, contrary to a quite widespread opinion, analytical methods (hence the tradition of Moore's and others) is of crucial importance for the historical analysis (as conducted in the tradition of Hegel and Marx, and of Dilthey and Gadamer).

In this context an observation on a seemingly distant topic is to be made: while constructing theory of fuzzy sets, we start with the classical ('Cantorian') sets; the logical type of fuzzy sets (which are pairs composed of classical sets and of some functions defined on these sets) and is higher than that of the classical ones. I believe this observation to be important in this context since I hope that some ideas drawn from the Zadeh's theory can be applied in (a) theory of meaning, text and understanding (cf. below the chapter on philosophical assumptions of meta-philosophy). Analytically reconstructed space of philosophies could be defined as a classical set, while the space of historically given philosophies would be defined as a fuzzy set defined on the previous one. In particular, I suppose that analyses of some philosophies will demonstrate that ambiguities, imprecision etc. characterizing these systems are due not only to the lack of proper conceptual tools but is a reflection of some socio-historical factors (the history of Marxism should be an arena of particularly interesting investigations of this sort). - Formulating these remarks, I try to continue some ideas of Bronisław Baczko, presented in his collection of essays entitled Człowiek i światopogląd (Man and his visions of the world). I'd like to note here his considerations on the historic-philosophical relevance for of the Ingardenian theory of literary-work-of-art, and on the relation between the process of determining the 'places of indeterminacy' and that of 'disintegration' of a philosophical system. [Baczko, 1965:103]

Third, theoretical history of philosophy should describe not isolated events but - process(es). And the question about determinacy is question should be addressed at the set of relations between various historical processes - economic, political, cultural etc. And various theories may offer various images of these relations. At this context we should - while elaborating these sketchy remarks - consult, among others, Althusser's considerations on 'time of history of philosophy'. [Althusser & Balibar, 1975: 151-154].

Fourth, a remark on the notion of the history of ideas as developed by Arthur O. Lovejoy is particularly interesting. Let us read these words from The Great Chain of Being: "By the history of ideas I mean something at once more specific and less restricted than the history of philosophy. It is differentiated primarily by the character of the units with which it concerns itself. Though it deals in great part with the same material as the other branches of the history of thought and depends greatly upon their prior labors, it divides that material in a special way, brings the parts of it into new groupings and relations, views from the standpoint of a distinctive purpose. Its initial procedure may be said - though this parallel has its dangers - to be somewhat analogous to that of analytic chemistry. In dealing with the history of the philosophical doctrines, for example, it cuts into the hard-and-fast individual systems and, for its own purposes, breaks them up into their component elements, into what may be called their unit-ideas. The total body of doctrine of any philosopher or school is almost always a complex and heterogeneous aggregate - and often in ways which the philosopher himself does not suspect. It is not only a compound but an unstable compound, though, age after age, each philosopher usually forgets this melancholy truth. One of the results of the quest of the unit-ideas such a compound is, I think, bound to be a livelier sense of the fact that most philosophic a systems are original or distinctive rather in their patterns than in their components. When the student reviews the vast sequence of arguments and opinions which fill our historical textbooks, he is likely to feel bewildered by the multiplicity and seeming diversity of the matters presented." [Lovejoy, 1974:4-5] These ideas are clear and need no further comments. Let me note, however, two points. First, I'd like to remember you the Mejbaum's thesis quoted at the beginning of this sub-chapter. And second, I'd like to note that those Lovejoy's ideas anticipated at least some of those known today under the name of 'deconstructionism'.

At this moment, I would also add that there are some analogies between Lovejoy's (and perhaps Derrida's) ideas and some theoretical proposals put forward by Richard Dawkins. In his Selfish Gen, the English biologist outlines a theory of cultural evolution. This theory is being constructed on analogy with the version of
Darwinism in which the notion of gen plays the central role. The concept of mem has been introduced as a counterpart to that of gen. Mem is characterized as unit of cultural transmission, or unit of imitation. As instances of mems are given melodies, ideas, common phrases, fashion of garment...[Dawkins,1996:266] Philosophically more interesting instance of mem is offered by the idea of God. (It may be noted here that quite recently, a young Polish evolutionary biologist published a book on Genetics of Culture in which Dawkins’ ideas are being developed. [Biedrzycki,1998])

Moving from memetics, we could easily arrive to the theory of culture developed a decade or so before the ‘memic’ theory in Lem’s Philosophy of Chance. He speaks there of ‘culturums’ of which any culture should be constructed. He also asks if ‘there exists something like syntax which makes cultures out of ‘culturums” [Lem,1968:393]. It is to be noted that Lem himself points out that it is structural anthropology which aims at its discovery. [ibidem:405] This observation, however interesting and important, must remain in its form of a short note: structuralism is much too vast and complex a subject to be discussed here. Leaving this issue for an other occasion, let’s stay with Lem. In the present context, the following thesis is of importance: “All cultures taken together make up so to say a set of ‘utterances’ in a ‘super-language’, one which is at once instrumental-causative, informational-adaptive, and self-organizing-autonomic.” [ibidem:409] Of some interest seems to the thesis which claims that “culture is metagame” [ibidem:411]

While speaking of Dawkins and Lem, we should not neglect an important theory known as adaptive interpretation of historical materialism. It was developed by Leszek Nowak [1982], and its relations with Darwin’s theory were investigated by Krzysztof Lastowski [1981,1982]. This theory is quite complex one and cannot be summarized here: it speaks of all important elements of the historical process. I would like to mention but one element, namely the relation between socio-economic conditions and human consciousness. This relation is characterized with the following formula: “Those ideas out of the set of historically given ideas are adopted in a given society which - for given socio-economic conditions - ensure the greatest stability of a given politico-legal system.” [Nowak,1982:114] The notion of ‘ideas’ remains in the adaptive historical materialism on rather pre-theoretical level. (Though an interesting attempt was undertaken at developing the notion of myth as a second instance.)

These considerations offer an opportunity to mention again the intriguing figure of Jacques Derrida. In a short monograph of his philosophy, I have found a summary of Derrida’s theory of writing. Of all the remarks the summary contains, the following struck me as especially interesting. “Writing in the general sense of the term has a dual structure, or...movement: it is both residual and dynamic, retentive and productive...This structure, or rather, structuring principle is common to all complex systems involving the recording, storage and communication of information.” [Johnson,1997:49] And the next point goes on thus: “The movement of writing in the general sense of the term (trace, gramma, differance) is not something that proceeds from ‘life’ as we know it. Given what we now know about the structure of the genetic code, it would be tempting here to posit the biological as a kind of first and final instance; the various forms of ‘writing’ or ‘memory’ that structure and extend the human from this vital base could be seen as a continuation and modulation of the basic ‘writing’ or ‘text’ of DNA. This is not, however, Derrida’s argument. As he notes, one cannot conceptualize the different stages of the evolution of human life without general concept of the trace or gramma, without the concept of difference, which precedes the instance of ‘life’ and makes it possible.” [ibidem:49-50] A few pages earlier, Johnson points to the fact that “at the time Derrida was writing Of Grammatology...Watson and Crick’s work on the structure of DNA was barely ten years old, while the work of French biologists Jacob and Monod on RNA ‘messenger’ was still more recent. [...] Derrida’s model of writing as a dynamic process of difference-differance is in fact very close to the idea of DNA as both a process of difference-differance and as a kind of a Darwinian model of mutation as a dynamic process of difference-differance.” [ibidem:45-46]

Fifth, as we perhaps still remember, F.Engels formulated a very strong (thus both historical and provoking) thesis on history of philosophy. According to it, all the history of philosophy is but an permanently ongoing - at moments overt, at moments veiled - battle between two main orientations: materialism and idealism (That many analyses and valuations of concrete philosophers - Hegel is surely the best example here - were at variance with the general historiosophical model, it should not surprise us; it is exactly in whole historical materialism on one side, and historical analyses of its creators on the other.) Engels’ historiosophical thesis suggests a meta-philosophical one, namely a thesis which claims that there is only one philosophical question and there are possible only two (consequent) answers. Other questions are either other forms of formulation, or partial formulations; other answers are either unclear or futile attempt at reconciliation of which cannot be reconciled. While evaluating Engels’ thesis, we should be specific in our judgment: it is hardly difficult not to note the (mostly negative) role it played when fostered into a dogma; on the other hand, one should appreciate it if regarding it as one of the very initial formulations of theoretical history of philosophy. If viewed in this perspective, it might be appreciated in the similar way as we do with the Tales, Anaximander and others. Surely, virtually no one would like today to follow Tales’ cosmography. Still, many of us believe that Tales expressed the very fundamental intuition each philosophy tries to elucidate. And , in this perspective, it makes so much sense to criticize Engels for the ‘simplification’ of the complexities of the world-of-philosophy as to criticize Tales for his ‘simplifications’ of the material-world. - If but one concretization might be formulated here, let it be the following. Even if the set of mutually independent philosophical questions should be quite numerous, it may be so that actual philosophical oppositons (debates, polemics) have been much fewer. If it were so, an interesting question would arise: why only some possible philosophical oppositions have been actualized while some others played but minor role or even remained unnoticed? But to be able to ask such a question we have to know these historically unnoticed problems.

It should be noted that Engels’ idea was, to a degree at least, a reformulation of the fundamental - one would say: meta-philosophical - thesis of Fichte. This thesis is presented by an author of a monograph of Fichte thus: “According to Fichte, but two kinds of philosophical systems can be coherently constructed: ‘dogmatic’ or idealist.” [Kuderowiec,1963:46]
The history of Marxism is interesting in another way too. The false dichotomy: Marxist vs. 'bourgeois' philosophy resulted is a peculiar replication: it may be demonstrated that the internal divisions in Marxist philosophy reflected - to a degree, not completely - the differentiation of the area of 'non-Marxist' philosophy, for instance the opposition: existentialism - neopositivism was reflected as opposition between 'praxist' and 'scientistic' orientation in Marxism.

Sixth. On orientations, trends and the like. There is a strong tendency toward classifying various philosophies into orientations, schools, trends and the like. This tendency is quite natural: classification is an elementary (and also  - in the further stages of the research process - advanced) research procedure. Yet, as the history of biology demonstrates it most vividly, classification is quite difficult. In the domain of philosophy (as in all areas which overlap ideology) in addition to standard epistemological difficulties some sociological mechanism contribute to the complexity and difficulty of the task of proper classification. Let me give you but one example. While reading numerous presentations of the 20th-century philosophy it is almost impossible not to meet 'existentialism'. However, despite the popularity of this name, it is held to be devoid of any theoretical meaning. As says an expert in this field, "there are no common elements in thinkers" who are regarded as "existentialists" [Toepplitz, 1983:195].

Seventh, an issue - once raised by Kolakowski, and recently discussed by Przełęcki - should be mentioned. According to Kolakowski, one cannot help but feel that "great philosopher is always right; as well Plato as Augustine, as well as Hume and Kant, and Nietzsche, and Marx. /.../ It seems as if the contradictions between 'great philosophies' were apparent, as if any of them would make visible an actual face of Being, viewed from different side, as if they were particular views taken from different observation-standpoints, but oriented toward the same reality". [Kolakowski, 1967; 574] - This is both hermeneutic and historical problem: to what extent historically registered controversies reflected actual philosophical differences, and to what extent - differences of ideology, everyday-life experience, or just style, phraseology and the like?

Eighth. At this moment I'd like to summarize some of the remarks on hermeneutic and historiographical motives of the idea of meta-philosophy. A good deal of the philosophers' labor is being invested into activities sharing the name of 'interpretation'. It has been suggested that two kinds of interpretation should be distinguished: adaptive and historical. This distinction should by no means be rejected; nevertheless, it should be noted that from the standpoint advanced in this essay, there is an important link between these two types of the interpretative activity: the historical one must be based upon the adaptive one; at least, if it is to be something more than a philological study. But we can go still further: there is no well adaptive interpretation without substantive work in the given domain. In this perspective adaptive interpretation can be seen as a 'mediating link' between advancing philosophy and understanding its history. This remark shifts our attention to the third motive for meta-philosophy, namely heuristics.

2.4. How to discover (or invent) new philosophies?, or - heuristic reasons

2.4.1. Do we need new philosophies? One answer might be rather frivolous: "Not necessarily, but - on the other hand - why not?" Fortunately, also more serious answers can be given. For instance, following the remarks made in the sub-chapter 2.1., we could say that even if one strongly believes in a philosophy, one should be interested in formulating new and new philosophies: the better described the whole space of philosophies the better he or she understands any particular philosophy, say his or her own one. Of course this fact matters only if one really wants to understand what one believes in; if one only needs to have some phrases to be declared in some public situations then no self-understanding is needed. Quite contrarily, in such cases self-understanding is rather disturbing.

This line of reasoning might be taken also by those who accepts the mentioned in Preface - social/cultural marginality of philosophy. This position is not mine. I believe that we do need new philosophies. Argumentation in favor of this standpoint is based on three premises. One is of historiosophical-and-ethical nature, the second may be classified as belonging to, say, sociology of knowledge, the third - again historiosophical in nature.

The first premise says that we do need social theory/theory of History. We need it since we are responsible for our common future, and without a social theory/theory of History, we cannot answer the most fundamental (though simple) question: "What (if anything) is to be done?" - In Preface, I have already said quite a few words on this issue; therefore, here I recall only the main line of my argument.

The second premise is based upon a hypothesis on relations between philosophy and science(s). The well known formula, the one which says about the process of separation between science and philosophy as a precondition for the achieving by the former the stage of 'mature' (theoretical) in Kripke's terminology science, seems to be well justified. Still, it is not obvious if it is as well justified in the domain of history, as it is in the domain of physics. My supposition is that it is not. More still, I tend to believe that more complex image is true. We might (very roughly, no doubt) divide various 'empirical domains' into 'simple' and 'complex' ones. If you accept, if tentatively, this distinction, you will be able to consider the following hypothesis:

[H] The separation from philosophy is a precondition for maturity of any scientific theory of a 'simple' domain, but in the case of 'complex' domains the opposite condition holds: the development of philosophy is a precondition for the maturity of scientific theories.

The third premise says that just in the domain of theory of History (and in the related areas) we need plurality of theories more than in other domains. This premise will be discussed in more detail in the next point.

However, we do not need to assume - what is very controversial - any special social (political, cultural...) role of philosophy. Even not leaving the domain of philosophy, we can insist on generating new philosophies, thus - answer positively to the initial question. In order to validate this contention, we could discuss the relation between heuristic and hermeneutic motives.

Roman Ingarden maintained that "the number of possible solutions of the fundamental philosophical problems is limited" [Ingarden,1963:643]. This thesis accounts for another one, of historiosophical character: "the evolution of philosophy is proceeding along a line which is oscillating between the same oppositions" [Ibidem]. Viewed from this point, inventing new philosophies (or, to put it more moderately, new solutions of a problem) is an attempt at the falsification of the Ingarden's thesis. And if the first thesis were falsified then the second one would
have to be reconsidered. Two ways are possible. First, the thesis could be regarded as simplified at best, thus in fact false, description of the actual history of philosophy. Or, second (more promising, in my opinion), an interesting problem would arise: why have some theoretical possibilities been systematically neglected? And a dose of externalism should be invoked while the question being answered.

In still other ways we might formulate positive answers to the question about the need of new philosophies. But in is not the key question. Let's pass on to the proper subject of this sub-chapter: the heuristic role of meta-philosophy.

2.4.2. There are many (socio-)psychological mechanisms determining creativity, discoveries, inventions. Of many factors which might be taken into account, I shall discuss briefly the following: fantasy, lack of fear, patience. Or, to be more specific, the relations between meta-philosophical approach and these factors.

Thus, firstly, fantasy. N. Bohr is said to have worded [Kaku&Trainer, 1985:34] an idea which says that (physical) theory has to be 'sufficiently crazy' to be true. I believe that is of no less relevance for philosophy. But - especially if we combine the idea of 'craziness' with that of 'sophistication' - the conventional image of philosophy as a container of crazy ideas needs, at least, qualifications and reservations. Thus, if we are interested in the development of philosophy, we should promote such methods of the philosophy-construction that encourage both 'craziness' and 'sophistication'. The idea of meta-philosophy seems to fulfill this condition.

Secondly, lack of fear. Meta-philosophy may be regarded as a means of protection against intellectual fear. Philosophical (and also sociological, psychological...) activity happens to be paralyzed with the fear of being viewed as a manifestation of 'ridiculous', 'obviously false', 'anti-humanist', 'reactionary', 'totalitarian' etc...ideas. Even some names of philosophical orientations become deceptive labels: to be qualified as 'positivist', 'proponent of naturalism', 'reductionist' or 'idealist' can be, in the worst case, the sentence of civil death...

It would be an interesting task to study the history of culture focusing on the type (style) of debates and polemics and its feed-back influence on the development of culture. It cannot be undertaken here. Only some examples can be given. For instance, we might quote Z. Bauman who speaks about some pessimistic lessons about human nature we can learn from Holocaust and about the attempts to hide them. [Bauman,1989:215-216] Or, we could mention the attacks directed against sociobiology. Or the marginalization of conservative thought even is some Western countries. Or the same fate of Marxism after 1989... And good deal of criticism of this sort is hardly anything more than mere moral-intellectual blackmail. If we want to understand better social world and ourselves we should protect philosophers and social theorists against such blackmailing. And from the meta-philosophical viewpoint, each philosophy - irrespective of its possible 'reactionary', 'nihilistic' or other consequences - deserves to be described, and the more original (more distant from any well known philosophy) the more so.

Thirdly, patience. Wittgenstein, in his notes published as Culture and Value, says that "salutation of philosophers should run: 'Do not hurry!" " [Wittgenstein,1995:198] To a degree, and in a concise form, he may be repeating here what was already said by Descartes: "those who stride very slowly can, if they keep a straight way, arrive much further than those who run and - run away". [Descartes,1970:3-4].

The Wittgenstein prescription seems to be quite important: among many philosophers, one may note a tendency (psychologically quite understandable) toward instant discovering the Truth, toward giving answers to the most difficult and important questions. Putting it in a more technical language (being of importance in the context of the second part of this essay), one might said that philosophers (and their listeners and readers) follow the principle of 'bounded rationality,' as put by Simon, rather than the standard model of rational action. To this observation the following comments can be given:

First. As a prescription, the Simon's rule should be recommended in many situations. Still, possibly not in all situations. In those that are of existential importance but of no every-day-life urgency, the standard model of rational decision-making may be favored. In particular, one could say: if you take your choice of your Weltanschauung seriously, you should postpone you decision as long as necessary. Perhaps all your life should be a journey, a never-to-be-terminated one, in the search of the Truth.

And second. Surely not everybody will want to undertake such a journey. Nevertheless, one may suppose that there are and will be some amateurs of it. And it is, in my eyes, the professional duty of a philosopher to be able to assist anybody who would want to undertake even the most risky and long-lasting expedition. Wittgenstein's dictum should help philosopher to play this role.

2.4.3. In the former sub-chapter, I presented some links between the meta-theoretical strategy and the psychology of discovery and invention. Now, a few words on some relations between this strategy and something what might be called 'technology of discovering/inventing' and what is known under the name of heuristic. I shall divide these remarks into two parts. The first will be devoted to the discovering new philosophical theses, the second - to discovering new philosophical systems.

Thus, let's speak first about theses. Thesis is, as noted in 2.1, an answer to a question. Thus, we may speak of a set of all answers to this question. How to find all those elements (or, if the set is - as it can happen - infinite, 'sufficiently many') elements? I would say that the simplest method might be, somewhat metaphorically, called 'interpolation'. Following this method, we try to define at least one pair of opposite theses which seem to be the most 'extreme' answers. And only having defined the 'extreme points', we may look for Aristotelian 'golden middle'. And having determined this point, we may be looking for next two 'middle-points': one located in-between the first 'extreme' point and the Aristotelian one, and the second - in-between the 'golden middle' and the second 'extreme' point. And so on. - In some cases, this may be quite mechanical procedure; yet, even if a formal language is used but not quantitative one, this method may turn out to be not so automatically applicable.

This strategy, as can be noted, suggests rather neutral stance in the quarrel between proponents of common-sense philosophies and 'radical' ones. If viewed from general meta-philosophical stance, all philosophies are of this same value; both most 'radical' and most 'commonsensical'. From other point of view, meta-philosophy underscores the role of 'extreme' philosophies: they serve best as 'points of orientation' in the space of philosophies. But, to look at the problem from still other standpoint, some most commonsensical may - after the most comprehensive analysis, and given a fixed epistemology - turn out to be the most truthlike.
Interestingly enough, we may apply this strategy to the just discussed problem. 
Thus, we can say that any of the two opinions need not be true. Neither it must be so 
that in all questions common sense is misleading nor it must be so that common sense 
is the best guide in all questions. And to say that in some questions it yields positive 
results, and in some others - does not, it does not mean defining the ‘middle-point’. 
It merely means giving a scheme for all, except for the most extreme, stances. And 
the genuine ‘Aristotelian point’ should contain a list of issues in which common sense 
good guide, and - correlatively - of those in which is not. 

And now, some remarks on discovering philosophical systems. The basic idea is 
very simple. Let’s assume that we have a number of philosophical questions, say: 
Q1,Q2,...,Qn, and each question determines a number of answers: A11,A12,...A1k; 
A21,A22,...,A2m;...; A31,A32,... A3s, respectively. Thus, we obtain \( r = (k \times m \times \ldots \times s) \) 
a priori possible ‘systems’. If all of them are logically coherent systems, it needs to 
depends on the relation of (in)dependency between those questions. 

In spite of its simplicity, this idea deserves to be explicitly formulated, and 
- consequently applied. And just consequent applying this idea is not so simple as it 
could be expected: there is acting peculiar a ‘force of inertia’ (of historical, social and 
psychological character) which buttresses some established configurations of 
(logically independent) theses and prevents probing new configurations. 

I would like to give you at least one illustration. Historically, ‘conservative’ 
historiosophies have tended to be bounded with anthropologies assuming existence 
of constant human nature; and conversely, anthropologies assuming changeability of 
human nature have been linked with ‘progressive’ historiosophies. The originality of 
Chomski’s philosophy consists in offering a new combination of ideas: ‘progressive’ 
historiosophy with ‘essentialist’ anthropology.

2.5. How to cope with the proliferation of (philosophical) literature, or - 
praxiological reasons

For reasons sketched above and below, we need theoretical/philosophical pluralism. 
But we also need two other things. First, we need some means of evaluating the 
actual novelty of ideas (cf. below:2.8.) And, second, we need some ‘maps’ (or ‘catalogues’) 
to orient ourselves in the expanding storage of ideas. This last point deserves; to my view, more elaboration. It will be undertaken in the next point.

Two decades ago or so, Stanislaw Lem ‘reviewed’ a nonexistent book of a 
Joachim Fersengeld (who also did not exist) [Lem,1874:80-86]. In ‘Perycalypsis’ (so 
run the title of this book), its virtual - so to say - author outlined a project how to 
cope with inflationary growth of intellectual production: with the exponentially 
growing number of books, journals, movies, paintings… The core idea of this project 
may be summed up thus. Any inventor, scientist, philosopher and designer “who 
does not write, paint…or propose anything is receiving yearly a stipend of 36 000 
dollars. He who does anything of this sort receives respectively less.” [ibidem:81] 
And if someone wishes to write three books or more, he has to pay himself. - In 
a somewhat ironical form, Lem raised a problem which seems to be of growing 
importance for our culture, and perhaps even for our whole social life.

Other aspect of the problem in question is presented in Bell. He notes that 
“today many people do not read books and rely upon reviewers. Considering the 
pressure of media and the character of culture, knowledge acquired in this way 
happens to be dangerous, for - even if the book offers developed argumentation - 
most of the reviewers, they are after all so busy, are skimming through it, looking for 
a few lines which summarize the main idea and allow for attaching to the author a 
label locating him in one of the pigeonholes being convenient during the parlor 
conversation. American culture has liberal tendencies, therefore any critical remark 
on liberalism disturbs self-confidence of many reviewers. On the other hand, the 
authors of works condemning those aspects of the contemporary culture being 
conducive to cheap calls for ‘liberation’ are usually qualified by them as 
‘neoconservatives’. Such denominations have little sense, for they assume that social 
views can be ordered ‘one-dimensionally’. (Ironically, those who condemn the 
‘one-dimensional society’ pronounce often such one-dimensional views concerning 
politics.)” [Bell,1994:9]

The main thesis of this sub-chapter is simple yet somewhat paradoxical: meta-
philosophy is conceived of as a means counteracting problems generated by and 
related to phenomena described by Lem or Bell.

2.5.1. At the first sight, this thesis must appear paradoxical: As it’s been said in the 
previous sub-chapter, the idea of meta-philosophy not only accepts but event 
provides the process of quantitative growth of philosophy. It calls for both creating 
new philosophies and preserving the old ones. But before the apparent character of 
this paradox will be, as I hope, demonstrated, let’s consider first a simple yet 
fundamental question: why should we be troubled with the results of quantitative 
growth of philosophical production?

There would be nothing to be worried about if philosophy were to play a role 
similar to that of pop-music, entertainment-literature, ‘soap-operas’, and so on. If 
people listen to other music in Paris and to other in New York, and possibly to still 
other in Kansas City - there is nothing in this situation what might be complained 
about. The same might be said about criminal-stories, and TV-novels.

With other branches (sectors) of culture, the situation is, I believe, different. 
And in particular - with philosophy. To be more precise: not necessarily so - 
philosophers may be regarded as producers of some goods (texts) to be consumed 
individually. If viewed in this perspective, the sheer number of various philosophies 
can be but praised. And, I would suggest, post-modernism may be regarded (also; it 
is - let me repeat it - a complex and ambiguous phenomenon) as an ideological 
sanction of such orientation of the professional philosophers.

It may be viewed also as a form of professional ideology of intellectuals 
working in ‘over-crowded’ Academies. The alleged ‘end of Great Narratives’ plays a 
very useful role in this ideology. If there cannot be any ‘total theories’ - in particular 
of man, society, and History - but only ‘particular theories’ of this or that - possibly 
small - part of reality, then the existence of tens or hundreds of disciplines (sub-
disciplines, sub-sub-disciplines...) does not reflect some (someone would even say 
pathological) social mechanisms of Academy but the very essence of the reality 
(post-modernism has - as neopositivism had - its own, if hidden, metaphysics).

Therefore, if we accept such cultural position of philosophy, if we are satisfied 
with the intellectual games we play, then the rising flow of texts need not be viewed 
as specially disastrous: each group plays its own language-game, and...there is noting 
to be worried about. But if we think of the social (practical) relevance of culture, of
ideas of philosophy, then we should perhaps be troubled with the information-noise that can be heard in, and from, Academies.

Personally, I am troubled. First, I regard philosophy as a part of universal human culture, this part which is centered around the notion of Truth and Understanding. And plurality of philosophies is - in this perspective - regarded not as a goal for itself but as a means for approximating these two values. And second, I regard philosophy also as a means of collective (political) action; and plurality of philosophies - as a way for making this means more effective. And if you accept these values, you should also agree that we need new philosophies and that we also need means for coping with the embarrasses de richesse, with the growing number of philosophies. These two tasks are, from my point view, of equal importance; they are two sides of the same coin. And meta-philosophy is conceived of as a multifunctional device for both generating and ordering new philosophical ideas.

This point is - in the context of axiological perspective assumed here - of central importance. Therefore, I would like to discuss it in some detail. At the beginning of this discussion, I would like to recall some theses on knowledge and democracy which have already been formulated in the Preface.

1. There is no real ('true', 'full',...) - any systematic explication of the vague intuitions expressed with these adjectives is impossible here; anyway, they are to mean that such a democracy is 'something more' than procedural democracy) democracy without ('proper',...) again reservation, knowledge shared by all the members of a community (today: more and more of the whole human kind);

2. The world-we-live-in (say: men + environment + artifacts + ideas + relations) is getting more and more complex;

3. There is no ('good',...) knowledge of complex world that would be non-theoretical, in other words: no common-sense (everyday...) knowledge is sufficient for understanding (and steering) the complex world.

These three theses should validate the fourth, being most important in the present context:

4. The social distribution of theoretical knowledge is of key importance for advancement of democracy.

The present-day situation is, in this respect, far from being satisfying. It seems to me (I do not know any systematic studies of this problem, thus I refer to my personal observations and to similar observations made by philosophers, sociologists or even journalists) that it has not been noticeably changed (at least for better; perhaps it has for worse). Since 1985, when J.M. Bocheński was admonishing: "More and more common, man's turning his back on reason is the greatest danger we face today. The sheer number of those spending their money on astrology, numerology, and superstitious practices of similar sort, it confirms how much people are irrational. /.../ One might suppose that scientists should be the guardians and custodians of reason. /.../ It is however surprising, how far those scientists can be irrational while thinking and voicing opinions beyond their branch - if only on philosophical and political matters. /.../ It is thus clear that scientists as such cannot, in spite of their rationality in their own domains, pass for teachers and defenders of reason in people. Who can perform this task? Not religion which is oriented at something different. Not ideologies which so often pronounce irrationalism of the worst kind. The only power that could perform this function is philosophy. And not each philosophy, but that one which openly, both in theory and practice, acknowledges reason and rationality: analytical philosophy." [Bocheński, 1993:48]

[1] And Picht remarks, in a somewhat similar vein, that "Balkanized science is bereft of reason." [Picht, 1981:130]

To the words of Bocheński and Picht, I would like to add some reflections of Leszek Nowak. "Mass-culture undermines the essence of science so much as it does with other spheres of cultural activity and with other cultures. It is not so, as it is being presented by post-modern criticism, that aggressive science struggles with all other cultures different from it. It is mass-culture that absorbs and deprives of identity everything what is different from it, science being not excluded. In fact, the image of science in mass-culture created by 'scientific-technological civilization' is not...what is should be; namely, it is not the image of an enclave in which man can free himself from the burden - and dirt - of human skin he by necessity bears, and plunge in what is bigger than he himself. It is not - I do add - a sole enclave. Each domain of culture creates a niche of such a kind. It might be that the fact that those enclaves are so much separated, that so complete lack of communication dominates...between science, art, and religion - that it is the result of the activity of the same demon. /.../ Mass culture - the cult of business and power, the theater of big money and the farce of little politics - can dominate over the spiritual culture only if the latter is so weak, thus in pieces, that it will not be able to offer any other pattern of human life than it, the mass-culture, imposes upon us through the screens of TV-sets. It is in profound interest of mass-culture that science, art, and religion should not see and understand its profound and hidden union. The breaking into parts of the spiritual culture is in the interest of the mass-culture." [Nowak, 1995:56]

To the observations of Bocheński, Picht, and Nowak, I would like to add some reflections of Lukacs. In his last, published posthumously, work Ontology of Social Being, he writes: "If science ceases to aim at possibly most adequate cognition of the reality which exists in itself (der anschziehende Wirklichkeit), if with the help of methods being constantly perfected it does not try to discover new truths about this reality, ones being by necessity ontologically based and making ontological knowledge more profound and rich - then the activity of science is reduced to supporting practice in its immediate sense." [Lukacs, 1982:39-40] And, it might be added, science - in Lukacs's view - "actively participates in the developing of manipulation, in its general bringing into being." [Ibidem:39]

I quote Lukacs, since I think that he raised a problem being important in itself, but particularly in the present context. - If we recall what Bocheński said about scientists, but also if we remember what his general position ('general', since in some details it was quite complex) towards Marxism was, we should find it interesting, and perhaps confirming the actuality of the problem, that opinions of those two so otherwise different thinkers are converging at this point.

I would also put Lukacs's theses together with Husserl's idea of Lebenswelt. It seems to me that these two thinkers grapple with two different aspects of one problem (or, perhaps it would be better to say - in two different, but not necessarily opposite, ways). This problem might be formulated thus: there is a gap (hiatus, divergence...) between the image of the world as experienced in the everyday-life ant that generated by various sciences. Moreover, the point is - and both in Husser and in Lukcs - that the gap is of some serious, practical consequences, out of which something that might be termed 'disintegration of man' could possibly be the most serious one.

Nowak's remarks outline a way along which the solution of the problem posed implicitly in Bocheński, Picht, and Lukacs, could be looked for. Yet, even if the factors suggested by Nowak are taken into account, it is still somewhat bewildering
that at the end of the 20th century, a century having been proclaimed 'the age of unprecedented progress of science', growing interest in various forms of pseudo- or para-science, and of irrationalism in general, has been reported. To account for this phenomenon, in all its nuances and complexities, may be a difficult sociological task. Not attempting at undertaking such a task, I would like to offer some theses being possible elements of a future comprehensive account.

First, the immense quantitative growth of the scientific information and related to it - the growth of specialization in education and research (which seems to advance in spite of all the recurrent invocations to 'interdisciplinarity', 'integration' etc.) is to be mentioned. Should we speak of 'over-production' of information? Is it a real problem? According to the great physicist, Murray Gell-Mann, it is a serious one. So much serious that, in his opinion, the rules deciding about professional careers ins science should be modified: "To a considerable degree, explosion of information is, unfortunately, explosion of misinformation. [...] We dramatically need greater number of intelligent comments and review-papers. [...] Mankind will profit greatly, if the system of rewards has been changed so as selection pressure deciding about career should favor both getting new information and its sorting." [Gell-Mann, 1996:443] And Stanislaw Lem suggests even to study 'limits to the growth of culture'. According to him, the paradigmatic changes in culture, being accelerated, are "changes for worse, introducing greater and greater chaos into the dominating patterns of creativity." [Lem, 1996:19]

Second, not only the number of 'pieces' of scientific information has been growing (according to Stanislaw Ulam's estimation, in every year about two hundred thousand new mathematical theorems are proved [Davies & Hersch, 1994:29]) but also the number of disciplines, branches etc., has been increasing. Classification of mathematics comprised in 1868 twelve branches, and in 1979 - sixty. And those classifications comprise, respectively, thirty eight and about three thousand subbranches. [ibidem:35-36] For these reasons, we might speak today about the difficult-to-be-grasped 'architecture' of the contemporary theoretical (scientific...) knowledge. Also, as suggests Thom, the 'divorce' between science and philosophy may contribute to accumulation of "knowledge lacking internal organization, chaotic and anarchical knowledge" [Thom, 1991:63] This phenomenon may also contribute to the persistence of processes described by Bocheński or Nowak.

Third, the growing abstractness of modern science, thus - the widening gap between Lebenswelt and the 'world of science', plays a role too. If we have recently read about ten-dimensional space being seriously discussed by physicists, then such elements of the contemporary scientific world-view as the 'beginning of time' (Big Bang) or finite volume of the Universe will turn out but minor challenges to our imagination and everyday world-view.

Fourth, some pathologies connected with the sheer numerical growth of researchers and with that of journals and books as well as of seminars, conferences etc are not to be neglected.

2.5.2. Having explained, why praxiological dimension of the program of meta-philosophy is in my opinion so important, I should demonstrate how meta-philosophy could contribute to solving problems mentioned above. I think that it might be instructive to commence with an analogy. I mean here of the program of reconstruction of mathematics, advanced by Nicolas Bourbaki - a group of mathematicians using common pen-name (among members of this group we find such great names as H. Cartan, J. Dieudonné, A. Weil) which came into existence around 1935. Later on, they started to publish many-volumes treatise Elements de mathématique which has considerably influenced post-war mathematics.

Following John D. Barrow, let's look first at the motivation of their work: "Mathematics, according to Bourbakis, resembles a rapidly developing city...The growing city experiences...a crisis of identity...Some peripheral areas have so rapidly grown as to become independent cities; there is no exchange between them The communication between chaotically burgeoning centers being very weak or even non-existent, the city needs radical urbanistic modernization, 'accomplished in accordance with well considered project... Bourbaki comes in as great urbanist and construction-investor." [Barrow, 1995:189]

One of leading members of this group, Laurent Schwartz characterizes the nature of the Bourbakis' endeavors. To this end, he distinguishes two schools of scientific, and in particular - mathematical, activity (resp. types of scientific mind); he calls one of them - school of 'details', the other - general school. Those belonging to the first school start and advance exploration of a new field. Those grouped in the second one are ordering and selecting results obtained by the first. "Their work is more pedagogical than creative, yet equally important and difficult as the works of thinkers of the other kind." [cited after Barrow, 1996:188]

More detailed description of their work-methods is given by Jean Dieudonné. In particular, he characterizes their way of work as 'long and arduous' yet 'imposed practically by the project itself'. Collective character of their work should also be stressed, though some phases are accomplished by individual mathematicians: successive versions are prepared by different persons, but initial general idea is agreed upon by all members of the group, and all the individual drafts are scrutinized in detail.

If we speak of the Bourbaki-mathematics, we should not ignore various criticism addressed at the group. In particular, there is wide consent that educational effects (especially on the level of elementary education) were mostly negative. Also the form philosophical point of view, their program stirred up critical comments being regarded as most articulated instance of formalistic, devoid of intuitive meaning, mathematics.

On the other hand, Bourbaki contributed to a unification of mathematics, mainly by propagating set-theoretical, algebraic, and topological 'common language'. Summarily, I think that both successes and failures of the Bourbakists offer an interesting material for considerations for anybody who would like to initiate and advance a similar program in any domain. Thus, in particular for those who would like to advance meta-philosophy.

2.5.3. I think that just now is the proper moment to say a few words on the problem of idealization. The epistemological, or even metaphysical, significance of idealization has been extensively debated. Less attention has been given to the problem of the praxiological importance of idealization. I see this question as follows. We construct (scientific) theories not exclusively to understand the generic mechanisms of the Reality. We are no less (and society which pays for it - even much more) interested in the application of these theories to the description of the actual events or processes and to the prediction of their further developments. But to do this, it's not enough to have a general model. We also have to know the particular values of the determining variables. Quite often the number of the relevant variables
is so great that is either impossible at all or too expensive (determining values of variables is a practical activity that does cost). Hence, for practical reasons we need models that are both sufficiently precise and sufficiently ‘handy’. (It could be suggested that the praxiological part of the theory of idealization has something to do with the theory of marginal utility.)

It should be added, however, that some analyses of this kind can found in the domain of system-theory. (Cf. in particular Weinberg’s paper of which a chapter is devoted to ‘Simplifying of science and science of simplifying.’ [Weinberg, 1976:105-108])

Let’s add some more specific comment - as to the anthropological problems. The present work is planned as a part of a wider project of a meta-historiosophy of which meta-anthropology would be just a part. It seems to be almost obvious that we need a different model of man if we want to write the biography of a ‘great man’, a different one - if an explanation of the history of a political party is aimed at, and a different one if a model of the global history is to be constructed. To put it on a different manner: Undoubtedly, we are quite complex beings (some would even say: the complexity of man is inexhaustible... but it should not be forgotten that an author once claimed - perhaps rightly at that moment - that even ‘electron is...’). Still, it’s not clear how much does this complexity historically matter... Thus, it would be desirable to build up historiosophies on man-images of different types (degrees) of idealization.

To put it in still other way. We need - for some reasons - ‘economical’ theories (strategies of theory-building). Therefore, if we are interested in resolving a given problem (in the most economical way) we should know what are the other questions that are relevant for this problem (in other words: different solutions of these questions determine in a way that of the given one). Hence, it would be of importance to be able to demonstrate that of whatever sort the resolution to a question A would be no solution of the question B is excluded. (It should be stressed, specially in the context of some remarks to be made below, that ‘economicality’ is but one type of all possible values that can be ascribed to theories. Therefore, more classical epistemic values - Aristotelian truth including - need not to be excluded from the epistemological discourse. Machian epistemology is obtained only when we regard ‘economicality’ as the single epistemic value. But it is by no means necessary.)

While speaking about ‘economically’in theoretical discourses, it would be interesting to say a few words about some HP Grice’s ideas. I mean ideas presented in 1967 in Harvard lectures on Logic and conversation. Those ideas concern dialogue as a form of rational cooperation. According to Grice, if the exchange of words is to be rational, it has to be viewed just as cooperation; and this cooperation can be viewed as if governed by ‘Principle of Cooperation’. This principle is formulated by Grice in the following way: “Contribute to the conversation in the way determined by the accepted goal or direction of the exchange of words in which you participate”. [Grice, 1980:96]

On the basis of this Principle, Grice formulates four maxims: of Quantity, of Quality, of Relation, and of Method. [ibidem:97] Out of those four maxims, two are here particularly interesting: the maxim of Quantity ant the maxim of Relation. The first says: “Let your contribution contains no more information than it is necessary”, and the second: “Let what you say be relevant” [ibidem]

I believe that Grice’s rules are both important and rather non-controversial. If we assume (and there is no other serious option) that our debates are going on in real physical time, and that this time is limited, the necessity to accept those rules will become self-evident. And we could still note that discussions, however important, constitute a part of our lives. Therefore, if one opts (as I do here) for an important role of philosophy in public debates (thus in the reproduction of democracy), one has to take into account these simple yet important observations.

And if so, one has to know which philosophical questions are relevant, and which are irrelevant, for the given public problem. One should also know which are the basic positions and which stances are but minor variations of the basic ones. Etc. Thus we again come across the necessity of having ‘maps’ (or ‘catalogues’ of philosophical - and not only philosophical - questions/problems and theses/theories). And it is meta-philosophy which, among others, is to be regarded as such a ‘map’ or ‘catalogue’.

2.5.4 I would like to mention, if very briefly, more practical dimension of the possible importance of (meta-) philosophy. For ages, in fact - until post-2nd World War period, knowledge-production had been relatively cheap activity. But recently, in the last ca. five decades, production of knowledge has become - at least in some fields, such as physics and biochemistry - a branch of industry, and amount of money being invested in it is not any longer economically negligible. The single most telling, almost symbolic, illustration of this situation is offered by the (failure-)story of the Superconducting Super Collider. This story has been told by Steven Weinberg in his Dreams of a Final Theory. [Weinberg, 1994:330-355] It demonstrates how interconnected science, politics and business have become in our age.

Thus, there arises the problem of Rational Allocation of Resources to Scientific Research, to avail of the title of a P. Suppes’ paper. In this text, its author discusses not only allocation of resources between various research projects, but also - between various disciplines. He analyzes also the arguments being used while allocation decisions are being made. The list of them comprises seven items, such as: science for its own sake; the importance of understanding as such; source of increased productivity; source of new products; concern for future generations; cost of research; quality of research. [Suppes, 1982:778-782]

Suppes ends his paper considering “what can be said about distributive justice in the allocation of resources for scientific research”. [ibidem:786] One observation though obvious is yet important: they are not market forces which play the key role in the allocation, as far as basic scientific research is concerned. - We can note that epistemology and political philosophy, and even a kind of metaphysics (conceived as a ‘general vision of the world’) are today interwoven more strongly than it might be expected.

I think that in the context of the problems discussed by Suppes, their relations with problems once raised by Popper deserve being mentioned. In the introduction to the English edition of The Poverty of Historicism, Popper summarizes in five points his overcoming historicism. For him central is the third thesis saying that we are not able to predict the future history of mankind. For us, however, more interesting is second thesis which says that “Future development of knowledge cannot be predicted with any rational or scientific methods.” [Popper, 1989:2] The latter thesis is elaborated in The Open Universe: An argument for Indeterminism [Popper, 1996:90-107]. At the first sight, Popper’s argumentation appears unshakable. However, if we scrutinize it, we will be less convinced as to their absolute character. We will note that his argument remain valid, at best, for something what could be called ‘radical theoretical revolutions’. But such revolutions, however important and impressive, constitute a part of the knowledge progress.
Some more, so to say, 'algorithmizable' developments play also a role. But such developments can be, at least partly, predicted. These sketchy remarks should be developed in another place. Now, some other-kind comments on Popper. I would say that that the problem of predicting future state of knowledge could, in my view - should be re-stated. Instead of asking the question: 'Is the predicting of future knowledge possible at all?', we could ask - following Kant - how such prediction is possible. In asking the 'Kantian' question, we should make use of actual predictions, as - for instance - presented in Michio Kaku's *Visions* [idem.2000]. Or, coming back to Suppes, we could consider, how any rational policy toward science could be conducted, if no predictions about results of scientific investigations were possible.

2.5.5. We should not avoid noting some difficulties linked with the idea of meta-philosophy. To pinpoint one of them, let me avail of an analogy with mathematics. Commenting on the notion of formalized theories and on mechanization of mathematical reasoning, the authors of *Mathematics of Metamathematics* write: "...all known mathematical theorems can be derived from the set of axioms of formalized set theory and from the set of all logical axioms...by means of purely mechanical operations called the rule of inference...On the other hand, it should be emphasized that this methodical method of deducing some mathematical theorems has no practical value because it is too complicated in practice...even formulas expressing a very simple mathematical content are usually very long and not readable. Moreover, formalized proofs are usually very long and complicated. It is theoretically possible to construct a machine which will systematically print theorems deduced from the axioms of set theory. It will print true statements, but only exceptionally will these statements be interesting. The aim of a mathematician is not merely to deduce true statements but to discover interesting true statements. Therefore the theoretically possible mechanization of the process of deduction in mathematics has no practical value." [Rasiowa&Sikorski, 1970:201]

To my knowledge, there are no universally accepted criteria of being 'interesting theorem' in mathematics. On the other hand, there are some partial criteria, such as practical applicability, counter-intuitiveness, or place in the logical structure of a theory. It seems to me that those criteria, perhaps modified, could serve as a means for coping with (over-)abundance of philosophical theories, as promoted by meta-philosophy.

Personally, I would opt at least for three criteria. Two of them could be characterized as rather 'external', the third one - as 'internal'. Firstly, as a criterion could serve the relevance of a philosophy for clarification of a problem co-constituting Weltanschauung. There are not too numerous problems being central to any Weltanschauung: (non-)existence of God, (non-)existence of immortal soul, man's freedom and his moral responsibility... If a philosophy contributes, if indirectly, to better formulation of these questions and to better knowledge of the possible answers, it satisfies the criterion. And second. Political philosophy is - in my view - a 'crown' (or 'cap') of all philosophy. To avoid possible misunderstanding: if speaking of 'political philosophy' I mean something more than problems of state, power etc. In the very heart of political philosophy (as conceived here) lie such subjects as 'collective action', 'collective responsibility', 'History' etc. (More on political philosophy will be said in 'Final remarks'). If any philosophical thesis is relevant for better understanding of any of those issues, then it is just important

Thirdly, a criterion of 'internal' importance of philosophical theses might be formulated thus. Some problems are relatively, so to say, 'isolated'; some others, contrarily, constitute central 'nodes' of the network of philosophical problems. In different words put, in some cases, answers to some question constitute positive or negative assumptions of few, if any, questions; contrarily, in other cases, specific answers to a question are important assumptions of many other questions.

These three criteria are partly complementary, and partly overlapping; taken together - they can, I believe, serve not as absolute and universal, still as important yardstick for estimating 'relevance' of philosophical questions and thesis.

2.5.6. In this sub-chapter, I have tried as far as now to demonstrate the importance of 'synthesis' rather than say in detail how the idea of meta-philosophy could actually contribute to a synthesis. Let me thus list the elements of the idea being of particular importance in this context.

First, meta-philosophy promotes the idea of one common philosophical language. I believe that it might be demonstrated (and to a degree I hope to do it to the anthropological domain) that quite often the same ideas are put in various languages, pretending to be what they are actually not, namely different ideas. I would even suggest that we could speak of 'apparent pluralism'. Well, it is surely not so that there are not any real differences between various philosophies. They are there. Still, I tend to think that the number of actually different philosophies (existing in the 'Second World', about the power of the set of all philosophies existing in the 'Third World' I was speaking earlier) is smaller than it might be expected. Thus, to focusing on the really different philosophies should the number of items to be presented and discussed.

Second, (relative) anti-systemness. To be more specific. Meta-philosophy is not against systemness. Quite contrarily, it is conceived of as a method of inventing new systems. The only point is that meta-philosophy is directed against what could be named 'meta-philosophical monadology'. In other formulation, meta-philosophy is oriented against the supposition that any philosophy should be constructed completely of its own 'elements'. But if we allow (cf. the ideas of Lovejoy) that a new philosophy can be, in an extreme case - wholly, constructed of 'old' elements being arranged in a new way, then we will be able to concentrate upon the 'logic of arrangement' and upon its consequences without having to explain what actually is already well known.

Third, the insistence on questions (problems) allows for natural grouping of philosophical theses.

Fourth, the idea of meta-philosophy is related to that of idealization. As stressed above, in many situations it is not necessary (or it is just superfluous) to discuss all the details of a problem. An analysis of the content of a question might demonstrate that whatever the answer to a given question were, it would of no importance. In other words, meta-philosophy is intended as a device for deciding which questions are - in a context - most important, which are less so, and which are completely unimportant.

2.5.7 I would like to look at the praxiological dimension of the meta-philosophy program still from other side. We can think of philosophical, and more broadly - intellectual, activity as a form of 'production' (this term is being used here metaphorically rather than literally, though more literal reading should be possible, provided analytical specifications were made). This conceptualization seems to be
particularly proper in the context of technological, intellectual and social transformations being already in full swing and still gaining momentum. The basic intuitions concerning these transformations and their significance could be summed up thus.

A remark on sociology of knowledge could be made here. Even in the Marxist tradition, the 'technological' aspect of knowledge-production is greatly neglected. Social factors determining the process of producing knowledge are usually interpreted as one of, say, 'macro-sociological' character: class structure, civilizational patterns, cultural paradigms... Surely, all those factors play its role. It might be - though it is less sure - that it is the decisive role. However should it be, the 'micro-sociological' factors could, and I believe they really do, matter.

First, sociological hypothesis which says that 'production of information' is becoming main branch (sector) of production seems to be plausible.

Second, assuming validity of this hypothesis, we can predict some profound changes both in the 'relations of production' and in the 'means of production' specific for this branch.

Third, as regards 'relations of production', one can already note some manifestations of a tendency which could be defined as 'socialization of production'; one can also predict that this trend will continue to exist.

Fourth, we could draw some conclusions from the industrial revolution. Passing from craft-production to the industrial one was associated, among others, by developments in standardization of tools, machines and products. The fascinating history of this process, its social and political dimensions, was described by Witold Kula in his Miary i ludzie (Measures and People). It demonstrates us that even such 'innocent' procedures as counting human beings were at a time strongly and emotionally objected. However, standardization is inevitable; not absolutely of course but relatively: providing that socialization of production is (will be) advancing. In the case of intellectual production, such processes as codification, unification and formalization of theoretical language can be seen as specific instances of standardization. If it is so, these language-changes are inevitable. And even more, if one believes that socialization of intellectual production should be welcome, then one should also promote these language-changes.

Fifth, the following observation concerning the creator of deconstructionism may be placed here: 'Derrida's own thinking on writing was not only inspired by scientific theory but also, inseparably, by the practice of the new information and communication technologies developed in the postwar period. In a very real sense, it is the presence and pervasiveness of this new ambient technology which makes possible the grammatological enquiry into the essence of writing.' [Johnson, 1997:46]

At the very end of this sub-chapter, a reservation - demanded by honesty is to be made. Though particularist tendencies dominate, some counter-tendencies can be observed. I mean of a current which itself assumed the name of 'third culture', manifesting its aspiration for overcoming the opposition, or - conflict, between the 'two cultures' (humanities - science) described by C.P. Snow. Among the persons actively participating in the making third culture, we could such researchers as Gell-Mann, Hawking, Penrose, Jay Gould, Mandelbrot and many others [Brockman, 1996:18-20]

Extrapolating this trend, one could speculate that one day genuine philosophy will perhaps be flourishing in Departments of Physics, Biology or Computer Sciences rather than in Departments of Philosophy. But this is another story...

2.6. Is philosophy with authority but without power possible?, or - ethical reasons

In this point I am going to touch upon the problematic explored first by Nietzsche and more recently by Foucault (to mention but these two figures, probably most important in the field), the problematic that might be summarized with the following 'equation': knowledge = power. Besides these two figures, we should mention Feyerabend's criticism of 'statised' science, and his proposal to 'de-link' state and science.

Putting differently, the central question of this section is this: Has a philosopher to make a choice between three social roles - namely that of a 'priest' (in the broad sense of the Leszek Nowak's non-Marxian historical materialism), that of a 'clerk in ivory-tower', or that of 'producers' of some 'cultural commodities' - or, she has still other options? This question can be rephrased thus.Leaving aside the image of philosopher as a producer of some commodities, are there still but two 'pure' ('coherent', etc. - postponing decisions, making ambiguous decisions are real options too, yet here are just set aside) possibilities, of which one was formulated by Lenin in his theory of party-philosophy, and the other in Benda's ideal of 'clerc' (cf. his theory of the 'clercs treason' [Migasiński, 1994:22-23])?

As it can be expected, my answer is positive: it is meta-philosophy which allows for going beyond the alternatives defined by the dilemma; it is the idea of meta-philosophy which offers a ground for defining an other (I wanted to write: 'new', yet this word cannot be applied here: as often in philosophy, we should rather speak about a return to a very old idea, in the given case to that of Socratician 'maieutics' or 'intellectual midwifery' role of a philosopher. And it is the task of this section to characterize this role.

2.6.1. Epistemologically, it should be clear that Nietzsche-Foucault's stance is far from being self-evident, though it is by no means evidently false too. Whatever the situation actually looks like, let's assume that the Nietzschean thesis may express an 'essential' truth about man (I tentatively assume here the stance that might be potentially most destructive for the project of meta-philosophy. If it is possible to make sense of this project, the latter being discussed - and having passed it with positively - in the context of the most destructive stance, then a forori the project will be plausible if analyzed in any less 'dangerous', more favorable context.)

Ideals can be characterized either directly, in a positive way, or indirectly: by negation (critique) of a situation. The ideal of philosophy and philosopher being a part of the present project of meta-philosophy can be positively characterized by placing it in the context of Habermas' utopia. And the positive characteristic should be complemented with a negative image. As noted, it might be constructed of elements taken just from Nietzsche and Foucault, but also from the theory of symbolic violence of P. Bourdieu or the theory of the ideological domination being a part of non-Marxian historical materialism. Methodological anarchism of Feyerabend should also be mentioned at this place.

Before discussing some details, let me emphasize the sense of the question in the title. If the question were put in shorter form: is philosophy without power possible?, the answer would be just 'yes'. The powerlessness of philosophy is not only possibility, it is - reality. But it is a result of socio-cultural marginalization of
philosophy. The question I am asking expresses more complex problem: could philosophy (re-)gain culturally central (non-marginal) position without philosophers becoming a part of class of 'priests'? Also to this question, my answer is yes. I should still add that I am only touching one side of the problem: the question of whether such a central position is in itself possible is remained open. To put it more precisely, if somewhat clumsily, I maintain that the following implication is true: if it is in general possible that philosophy should be in the center of culture, then it is in particular possible that it should be there without participation in spiritual dominance. But I do not decide whether the premise of this implication is true or not.

I should perhaps remind you my opinion as to the problem of social/cultural position of philosophy. And if I am to do it, I will also make an additional point.

It is today a commonplace in sociology to stress 'growing importance' of knowledge. And in some cases this general opinion assumes more specific and radical shape of a historiosophy. Among others, Peter Drucker in his The Post-Capitalist Society outlines such a theory. He is speaking there about passing "from capitalism to knowledge-society" [Drucker, 1999: 22-44] And he maintains that what we need is a revolution in education, creation of new school which would differ from the existing today so profoundly as the latter - according to Drucker: created 350 years ago by Comenius - has differed from that existing before the reform of Jan Amos. [Ibidem: 160-161] The book is ended up with the following declaration: "one thing can be foreseen: the greatest change will be one in knowledge, in its form and content, in its understanding and its responsibility; an in the meaning of being educated person." [Ibidem: 177]

As for me, I am perhaps less optimistic than Drucker: I am not sure - as he seems to be - that those transformations he is describing will necessarily contribute to a better world. Yet I am not a pessimist and do not think that they necessarily cannot do it. Thus I rather suppose that the area of knowledge and education should become in the coming future one of the main fields of social conflicts and political battles. The problem of the system of education (of its social accessibility, of its organizational structure, of the content of its functioning...) will be hotly debated. I think that philosophers (qua philosophers and not only qua citizens) should participate in these coming battles. I think that they should defend a vision of general, universal education. And philosophy should become a central element of education being so conceived of. But such a vision should not be a form of ideology outlining a new road to the intellectuals' power. The idea of meta-philosophy is regarded as a check upon the possibility of such degeneration of this vision. If effective, it cannot be said in advance.

2.6.2. At the beginning, I am going to make use of an analogy between the problem of spiritual dominance and that of (physical) violence. Let's start with the assumption (to be found, say, in Konrad Lorenz's anthropology) that psychological construction of man is historically constant, and that it comprises such a trait as 'aggressiveness'. Then, or even just then, it does matter whether man is equipped with a wooden stick or with a hydrogen bomb. The possible effects of his aggressiveness will extremely vary according to the sort of the means of violence he has at hand. Thus, it is of importance, what means of violence exist. And how they are distributed in society, and how the access to them is regulated...

What is so clear in the case of material means of violence, is less clear in the case of the spiritual means of spiritual power. Nevertheless, even if the general image of the problem is more fuzzy, the main line of argument remains, I think, valid. Thus, even if we assume that the will-to-(intellectual)-power is inherent in the human essence, it makes sense to construct intellectual means that would be less 'dangerous' than others. I'd like to think that the idea of analysis and meta-philosophy may serve as possibly 'safe' implementations. It should be obvious that no absolute safety is in this - as in any other - domain of life possible. But it is the degree of safety which really matters.

2.6.3. Meta-philosophical strategy of constructing, teaching, and popularizing philosophy is less 'authoritarian' than others. It should be so for a number of reasons.

First. In meta-philosophy, there is no room for pre-selection of problems. All historically known problems should found their reconstruction in its framework. Rejection of some problems may be only relative: in the context of some solutions to other problems. If selection of problems is not quite unavoidable, nonetheless it should be possibly comprehensive.

Second. Pluralism of answers is at the very heart of this idea. And the radical (and opposite) answers are given prominence, though comprehensiveness in presentation of various answers is desirable.

Third. Meta-philosophy is oriented against pseudo-systemness. The latter phenomenon itself is multifaceted, thus will be discussed in different contexts; at the present moment, it is its ethical aspect I focus on. Meta-philosophy, viewed in this perspective, is oriented against dishonest strategy of gaining support for some theses through grouping them either under 'respectable' (for some, it's enough) name of a St. Thomas or a Karl Marx, or around widely accepted thesis ('freedom is ultimate value' or 'all people are equal') Putting it differently, I would say that the (apparent) system-ness might be viewed as (method of) a kind of 'conditional sale': if you gained acceptance of a thesis (or a set of theses), you try to 'sell' (in fact: to impose) some other ones as being a part of a 'coherent whole'. I tend to think that the most popular well known form of this conditional sale is the one being characteristic of some religious philosophies: the most often 'purchased' good is an ethics. And a cosmology is being 'sold' as a part of whole 'packet'. Manipulation (possibly unconscious one) of this sort is well known from the history of neopositivism: a materialist metaphysics was being 'sold' as 'logical analysis of the language of science (a systematic, and in my view very convincing, analysis of this manipulation was given by Ingarden in 1936 [1963:643-654; in particular: 650-651]). The by-effect of this manipulation has been to a degree negative for the subsequent developments in philosophy: logical analysis has for long appeared as being espoused to the particular metaphysics (and epistemology) of Wiener Kreis (see in this context the misunderstanding of the philosophy of Wittgenstein's Tractatus); therefore any other metaphysics has seemed to call for other, less 'formalistic', 'scientist 'positivist' means of expression. Only in the recent two-three decades the situation has been changing. At this point I share an intuition with post-modernism which rejects the idea of beginning, the idea of which the concept of axiomatic system is the best epitome. A fortiori, it rejects, if implicitly, the idea of one axiom (or a finite set of axioms). Thus, in my view, post-modernism expresses - in less clear, though perhaps more general, way - the idea which founds its manifestation in Goedel's incompleteness theorem.
Fifth. Meta-philosophy (conceived of in the generic sense, and not as its particular realization in the present work) being - in a sense - an offspring of analytical philosophy seems to inherit many of its intellectual values. And, what is of importance, most of them, if not all, have a moral dimension. What should be stressed here, in view of the just mentioned conflation of the whole orientation with one (only one but, on other hand, best known) of its currents, namely with neopositivism, is the fact that possibly all philosophies (metaphysics, anthropologies, ethics) may be presented in the analytic style.

And it has something to do with other, I'd - say socio-epistemological, fact: Any philosophy can be presented in a 'coercive' (resp. 'non-coercive') way: be it spiritualism or materialism, fatalism or voluntarism, or whatever you like. If this hypothesis is true, then the next hypothesis may be formulated: the qualities in question are located completely in the (literary, logical...) form of a philosophy, not in its substance (content). Let me list some arguments in favor of this thesis.

Firstly, let's look at the analytical (im)precision. The more a thesis is vague, the greater is the number of vague theses, and - in result - to the greater degree the content of a doctrine is vague ('fluid', 'shapeless'...), the more often it may be re-interpreted. Thus, the more badly experts in the re-interpretations are needed.

Secondly, let's note the proliferation of emotionally-loaded terms. To use Austin's names: the perlocutionary function of the statements takes, so to say, predominance over the locutionary and illocutionary ones. But rational debate, rational argumentation is possible only if the locutionary function dominates.

Of course, there are different philosophical questions. And some of them are more strongly and directly related to the existentially most fundamental problems (of death and immortality, of freedom, liberty and equality...) than the others (such as, say, those of the status of mathematical objects, or those of analyticity/syntheticity...). And there should be not surprising that these being more close to the life-questions will be more often discussed in a less precise language, and those more distant - will find more precise articulation.

Saying this, I tend to agree with the following opinion of Perzanowski: "Anthropo-philosophical disciplines [the cited author divides all philosophical disciplines into general ones and anthropo-philosophical - W.Cz.] are different as to their problems and domain. From general disciplines, they are differentiated... by great variety of languages being in use, diversity and imprecision of methods, and fragmentary character of proposed theories. They constitute an area of activity of various philosophical schools, being prone to substitute presentation of their own stances for substantial discussion, and in discussion between them linking lack of substantiality with praising the virtues of the own school. That autism of the schools operating in anthropo-philosophy is the main cause of the disciplines being lagged behind other philosophical sciences, of their continuing to be still semi-sciences." [Perzanowski, 1989a:242] Thus anthropology is being seen by a logician. Perhaps he is too critical. Still, even being a caricature of the actual situation, this image says something important about it. And if we do not want to pretend that there is no problem at all, we should be looking for remedies. I think that meta-philosophical strategy may turn out to be such remedy.

And, one could note, from a moral point of view, logical precision is in the anthropological domain not less but more necessary than in other areas of philosophy: intellectual freedom in these domains which directly influence our world-view and our life-decisions is more important than in those being more remote from our existential preoccupation.

2.6.4. With the help of some analogies, let's try to present an image of the role of philosopher as being entailed by the program of meta-philosophy. All those analogies are complementary and demonstrate the idea of philosopher from various sides.

We could open these remarks on the philosopher's social role with the Schopenhauer's idea of ethics as a non-normative theory. In the presentation of Schopenhauer's anthropology, Wollnowicz summarizes it in the following way: "Ethics is a part of philosophy, and it is not the task of philosophy to teach adult people what they should do, or what they should be. Its only task is to make them aware - if they wish it - of what they are actually doing and what they actually are." [Wollnowicz, 1993: 5] Thus, philosopher may be viewed as, say, an adviser. And the latter role is very different from that of a prophet, of a priest or even - a teacher. It might be added that - to a degree - this idea of a philosopher can be traced back to Socrates: philosopher does not communicate (ages latter we'd perhaps add: ex cathedra) some truths: he helps those who listen to him to look for the truth on their own.

An other analogy: with philosophers it should be, roughly saying, like with doctors. Nobody in liberal-democratic society can be (except for some very special cases) pressed to visit a professional physician. One can, if he wish, to consult nobody or to consult a quack. But if he consults a doctor he should be ordered not the most pleasant but most effective treatment. In democratic society no one should be obliged to consult his various decisions with philosopher. Yet, if some people decide to do it, they should not be flattered; they should not be said to have more wisdom than professionals.

To take another view, let's read a passage from a Belgian thinker, Henri Van Lier. The author ends his vast panorama of transformations having been going on in our age with the following words: "...philosopher, like artist and scientist, has become a worker. He does not break off society and has stopped to communicate to it the truths from the top the mount of Sinai. He only follows - more thematically, but on the same level - common answers and questions. He has come closer to all men, and all men have come closer to him. And this bringing together of all human functions - technology, science, art and ethics - gives the mass-man of great network, a new, modest but fruitful sense of grandeur." [Van Lier, 1970: 255]

This image seems to be close to that which is implied by the following words of Wittgenstein, who in the first of his lectures on the foundations of mathematics was saying: "Gelegentlich äußere ich vielleicht neue Interpretationen, aber nicht um sie der alten an die Seite zu stellen und zu sagen: 'Hier entscheide dich, such's dir aus.' Ich werde nur Dampf machen, um alten Dunst zu vertreiben." [Wittgenstein, 1978, 14]

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Yet another image of philosopher could be obtained if to follow an idea of Frideric Schiller. According to the German poet, the task of philosophy is to make
order, to introduce harmony into the world of man's opinions (Here, I make use of the brief presentation of Schiller's ideas given by Hartshorne [1987, 223]). One could even say that the borderline between un-philosophical Weltanschauung and philosophy in the strict (academic?) sense can be drawn with the help of the idea of (logical) order.

It should be noted that virtually nobody would today defend the idea of the (! single, unique) harmony. Still, even if we accept (and we should in my opinion) the variety of harmonies, we can maintain that not every order (in the general algebraic sense of the word) deserves the name of harmony. Hence, the plurality of philosophies does not entail rejection of the difference between philosophy and (unphilosophical, 'chaotic', unordered... ) Weltanschauung. Thus, we might compare philosopher with an artist who arranges apartments. His task (as a rule) is not to make choice on behalf of one who is to live in the given apartment. Nevertheless, his work can be quite creative, even if he takes into account the aesthetic preferences of the person who asks for his help.

So much about the relations between philosopher and an individual. Let's pass now to the relations of a philosopher with a group of people.

2.6.5. At this moment, I'd like but touch upon a problem being a subject of great many analyses. I mean the vast area of so-called philosophy of dialogue or philosophy of encounter. I mean the tradition of M. Buber, F. Rosenzweig, E. Levinas, or J. Tischner...

Two elements of this complex tradition are here of the greatest importance. First, the idea of 'equality': the relation between I and Thou is one in which both the elements are fundamentally identical as to their ontological and axiological status: both are subjects, not mere objects, let alone things. Thus, their views, opinions and beliefs are equal. To be precise: they are equal in a special sense, surely not in any sense - ethics of dialogue does not necessarily imply epistemological relativism.

To disentangle the knotted problem, I would put it so: even if we assume (as I personally would do) that views can be epistemologically evaluated 'from outside', thus that some of them are 'true' ('right', etc.) and some others are 'false' ('wrong', etc.), we can say that all of them - if only freely accepted, in good will etc. - should be respected as being, so to say, elements of individuals' personality.

There is still other important element of the tradition of philosophy of dialogue and encounter. I mean the ideas expressed by Bukowski in his Outline of the Philosophy of Encounter in the following way: "Encounter is an event that can take place only between two persons." [Bukowski, 1987:16] In encounter, "something important, something going beyond everyday-life, beyond normalcy is happening." [ibidem:19] Encounter is to engage its subject "completely". [ibidem:25]

To make the next step, we have to recall the thesis of those philosophers who, as Dilthey, regarded philosophy as a constitutive element of human individual. If it is actually so, we could maintain that Weltanschauung/philosophy defines the horizon of inter-personal encounter. In other words, there is no encounter without mutual revelation of one's Weltanschauung or - philosophy.

Seen in this context, the part played by philosopher could be compared (but to a degree only!) with that of translator. His task is to facilitate the face-to-face relations, and not to determine either their content or their form.

2.6.6. From the philosopher's role in the inter-personal ('micro-societal') relations, I am going now to pass to that in the 'macro-societal' relations.

Die ideale Sprachsituation - from this notion of Habermas to commence seems to be both justified and convenient. Before I make my comments, I will outline a summary of the reconstruction and discussion of this notion as presented by A. Kaniowski [1990:479-482] and A. Szahaj [1990:129-140]

- symmetrical relation between parties of the communication,
- debate should freed from any political structures of dominance and power,
- parties assume cooperative attitudes,
- none of opinions can be excluded.

Interestingly, quite similar ideas are to be found in French sociologist, Alain Touraine (perhaps not incidentally they were formulated, as those of Habermas, in the 70's). He maintains that "Un type traditionnel d'intellectuels disparait. Son propre était de poser que le sens vient a l'acteur d'un monde situe au-dessus de lui, de sorte que l'acteur manifeste un sens qui est dans son principe etranger a sa conscience. Les relations entre ce type d'analyste et l'acteur etaient donc necessairement des relations de domination." [Touraine, 1982:17] The role of a sociologue is characterized thus: "le sociologue...aide l'acteur a se reconnaitre comme producteur de sa propre histoire" [ibidem:21] The following opinion seems to be somewhat off the main track of the present discussion: "Le lieu central des rapports et des conflits sociaux s'est deplace du champs du travail vers le champ plus large de la culture" [ibidem:19]. If, however, linked with the quoted above Drucker's theses, it turns out to be also relevant.

Touraine's position is additionally interesting for another reason. He not only pronounced those ideas but also practiced them: the book out of which his theses are quoted - Mouvements sociaux d'aujourd'hui. Acteurs et analyses. - is a collective work. Written by sociologists, but also by trade-unionist, social workers and other men-of-practice, it demonstrates the Touraine's ideas in action. Unfortunately, I have no idea if this social-intellectual practice has been continued. If it in fact has not been, it would be little surprising: it was almost completely new idea and practice. I hope, it is continued and, if not one day it will be started anew.

Trying to generalize the ideas of Habermas and Touraine, we could say what follows. Any public debate must be provided with some 'conceptual tools', with a 'theoretical infrastructure'. And the professional task of a philosopher - as seen from the standpoint developed in this essay - is to produce these tools, and to construct this infrastructure.

Assume that social situation looks like as in the following description, given by Saul Bellow in his Foreword to the book of Bloom: "The heat of the dispute between Left and Right has grown so fierce in the last decade that the habits of civilized discourse have suffered scorching. Antagonists seem no longer to listen to one another." [Bloom, 1987:18] We could ask about the position a philosopher should take in such a situation. My answer is simple. He should play the role of 'moderator' in such debates.

Of course a philosopher is a citizen, and he has these same rights as all his fellow-citizens. Still we need some institutional and 'ideological' means (I do think of the means of self-control and not of any censorship) devised to prevent these two social roles - that of philosopher qua philosopher, and that of an philosopher qua citizen - to be confused and mingled. As to the institutional means, this problem cannot be discussed here. As to the 'ideological' means, it can be said that the idea of meta-philosophy is conceived here as the theoretical 'skeleton' of such an ideology.
2.6.7. Let's formulate some final remarks on the problem of social role of philosopher. First, admit that even the role of a 'guide', an adviser, or a 'interpreter' is not free of dominance-potential. In a sense, as long as the social division of labor continues to exist, institutionalized and professionalized philosophy being a branch of it, this situation will remain unsurmountable. Have we been, thus, engaged in a utopian exercise?

I would say not. What actually matters in the real world is, I think, not quality but quantity. Therefore, if we could speak of the relations of social communication as being symmetric to greater or smaller degree, we should be satisfied. And if we could maintain that the process of 'symmetrization' of those relations will advance, we should be even more satisfied.

And my hypothesis is that meta-theoretical strategy could contribute, all other factors being equal, to more 'symmetric' society than alternative strategies do.

Now, we should perhaps note that the idea of meta-philosophy shares, especially if read in the context of the present section, some elements with one of Karl.Mannheim. Having adopted Alfred Weber's notion of 'free floating intelligentsia', the author of Ideologie und Utopie emphasized the specific part to be played by this social group. [Mannheim,1992:122-124]. This idea has often been criticized; yet, in my opinion, this criticism has not always been deserved, even if Mannheim's idea is read as a description of the actual situation. And if it is read as an image of a possible situation, the critical remarks will be still less right. And if one regarded it - as we can, and in my view, should do - as a moral and political ideal, the criticism would turn out to be completely undeserved.

The situation of the (humanist) intelligentsia could be compared with that of physicians. More or less - it depends on place and time - doubts can be risen as to the centrality of the health of patients as the ultimate goal of the doctors' practice. Still, we do preserve in our normative systems an ideal of a doctor; an ideal expressed in the Hippocratic oath. And so could (and in my moral view - should) be with the Mannheimian (in fact, also Weberian) ideal of a humanist and philosopher.

There are of course difficulties: "The heart of Professor Bloom's argument is that the university, in a society ruled by public opinion, was to have been an island of intellectual freedom where all views were investigated without restriction. Liberal democracy in its generosity made this possible, but by consenting to play an active or 'positive', a participatory role in society, the university has become inundated and saturated with the backflow of society's 'problems'. Preoccupied with questions of Health, Sex, Race, War, academics make their reputation and their fortunes and the university has become society's conceptual warehouse of often harmful influences. Any proposed reforms of liberal education which might bring the university into conflict with the whole of the U.S.A. are unthinkable." - writes Saul Bellow in his Foreward to the famous Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind [Bloom,1987:18]. Let me repeat: these difficulties are real. But, in my opinion, we should grapple with them and not to declare them to be insurmountable.

There remains the third level to be mentioned. It is rather widely accepted that 'reflexiveness' is an essential trait of human being/consciousness. Man can stand in a relation to himself. More specifically, he can manifest some attitudes vis-a-vis his own opinions, beliefs, values etc. Among others, man can (and does) manifest various attitudes vis-a-vis his own Weltanschaung. He may take it more or less seriously, he can care more or less for its justification. I'd say that it is particular professional duty of the philosopher to cultivate some sort of 'distantiation' towards his own 'private' Weltanschaung. Sucha 'distantiation' is not psychologically 'natural'. Thus some special training seems to be needed.

The following passage from Heidegger's Brief ueter den 'Humanismus' may quite aptly end this point and open the road to the next one: 'If thinking, leaving its own element, loses itself, it makes for it up by causing its being appreciated as techne, as an instrument for education, and in this way as school undertakings, and subsequently as cultural undertaking. Philosophy is becoming gradually a technique of explaining with the ultimate causes. One does not think any more, but one is occupying with 'philosophy'. Such activities start to compete, they recommend themselves as 'isms' and try to vie with each other. The predomination of such labels is not incidental. It results, particularly in the modern times, from the particular dictatorship of public opinion. So-called 'private existence' is not essential, i.e. free being of man. /.../ The speech falls into the degrading servicing to the means of public communication, in which reification - as homogenous accessibility of everything for everybody - prevails, while all borders being blurred.' [Heidegger,1977:80]

2.7. Is a (genuine) community of philosophers possible?, or - social reasons

In his remarks on the concept of postmodernism, an expert in this field notes that "there appears to be persistent confusion about the content and scope of the terminology in this debate. In part, this confusion arises from the competitive struggle between intellectuals to control the debate, to exert influence over the nature of the dispute, and to manage the 'cultural capital' in the marketing field which is associated with postmodernism. The proliferation of terms and their variable meanings are an effect of conflicts between different sectors of the intellectual market-place for influence." [Turner,1990:4-5].

Without commenting upon this quote, let's cite an opinion of the authors of a popular presentation of various theories of personality; they find it necessary to declare: "No theoretician has the right to tell other theoreticians what they should do." This declaration completes a previous description of 'theoretical imperialism', characterized as 'attempts at convincing the reader that it [a stance elaborated by some theoreticians - WCz.] is the only way in which theory of behavior can be formulated.' [Hall&Lindzezy,1990:638-639].

These citations (many others of the similar sort could be also invoked) describe, and partly account for, the phenomenon which is regarded by the present author as negative, a phenomenon which should be opposed to. This phenomenon is to be central, though negative, reference point in this sub-chapter.

At the beginning of my own comments upon this phenomenon, a conceptual remark is necessary. While speaking of 'genuine community', I mean two things at least. First, such a group consists of people who share some fundamental values. Second, in such a group, cooperation plays predominant role, while competition - secondary, at best. To these two conceptual comments, a third one, more substantial, should be added. In our time, no community can be - as Toennies' Gemeinschaft was supposed to have been - based on the indisputable authority of tradition; if it is to exist at all, it must be self-created, and tradition - if it is to play a part - must be consciously chosen and accepted.
Thus, philosophers would constitute a genuine community if Understanding and Truth actually played the main role in determining philosophical endeavors, and philosophers cooperated much more than it is the case now. And such a community could only be a product of common intellectual and organizational activity of philosophers.

To be clear. It should be obvious for the reader of this text that I am skeptical as to the possibility (and desirability) of 'pan-philosophical' agreement. But still I do believe in the possibility of cooperation - without agreement. This - seemingly paradoxical - possibility is offered just by the 'meta-' approach. If accepted, it allows us to look at an alternative theory not as a danger for our own but as its enrichment.

2.7.1 But perhaps the community of philosophers is there? Before I answer this question, read Husserl. In the 1930s he saw the situation thus: 'Instead of uniform and lively philosophy, we have now unlimittedly spreading...philosophical literature; instead of serious polemic between mutually opposing theories, yet theories manifesting in this contention their internal co-membership, their community in basic opinions and in unshaken belief in true philosophy - we have pseudo-reviewing and pseudo-criticism, the mere appearance of serious co-philosophizing in which one philosopher would communicate something to the other. We do not find any proof of responsible and conscious common research conducted according to the spirit of serious cooperation and attempting at objectively valid results. Objectively valid results - it means ones being specified in the course of mutual criticism and standing the test of any criticism. But how can real research real cooperation exist there where there are so many philosophers and almost so many philosophies? We have still philosophical congresses - philosophers meet each other, but unfortunately not philosophies. Philosophies lack spiritual space in which they could co-exist, in which they could interact. Perhaps inside some 'schools' or 'orientations' the situation is somewhat better; but both as to those philosophies existing in form of something isolated and as to the whole contemporary times of philosophy, our characteristics maintains - in its main aspects - its meaning." [Husserl, 1982:6-7] Has the situation changed since Husserl wrote these words? Personally, I doubt. And I dare say that it is not only my perception. Only quite recently have been uttered these words: 'Twentieth-century is often portrayed as battle-field of rival schools - such as Analytical philosophy, Continental philosophy (phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism), and Marxism - which fail to appreciate and understand each other. Such lack of communication is sometimes described by Kuhn's notion of incommensurability: philosophical traditions are claimed to operate with so different conceptual frameworks that translation between them preserving any part of meaning are impossible." [Niiniluoto, 1990:9] And the two quotes I started the present sub-chapter with additionally confirm my claim.

To check it additionally, look only at the linguistic habits of more than few philosophers. (And in the related domains of humanities: sociology, psychology, etc., the situation is rather similar.) At some moments, the language of the philosophical debates sounds like that of ethnic conflicts. One is (1) a 'monist', so one cannot be (1) a 'pluralist'. She is accused (1) of being 'reductionist', but nevertheless she can be defended against the charge (1) of being 'positivist'. He claims to be a Marxist, but actually he cannot be granted with this name... I believe you could enlarge this list with many other examples...

Let's end these reflections with the following observation: 'mutual misunderstanding and almost complete insensitivity to criticism does not assures homeostasis for philosophy: the shifts in the balance-of-power are here relatively often and vehement, they manifest all the stamps of fashion-vagaries." [Stanosz, 1989:72]

2.7.2. Why should we aim at such a community? Perhaps the present state of the philosophical society is 'natural' (or 'normal' to use the recently fashionable word). And not only 'normal' but also productive; perhaps Truth and Understanding are served better if philosophers are directly motivated by more individualist values, such as fame, reverence and the like? Perhaps, actually, it is so. But 'actually' does not mean 'necessarily'. I am not sure that it must be so. And if need not to be so then, assuming some values, we can say that it must not be so.

It shall be honest if I start with my own feelings (it might be so that the further, in intention - more objective, considerations offer no more than rationalizations for my personal biases). I have to confess that I simply find the philosophical 'tribalism' disappointing. I would add - just disappointing. And if someone finds something to be disappointing, one has the right to fancy how it might be changed. And so do I here.

You may like, you may not, this professional philosophical 'tribalism'. But it seems to me that it is not but a matter of taste, a matter of more 'militant' or more 'peaceful' temperament. I think that the 'internal' situation of philosophy affects both its 'internal', substantive development and its 'external', societal position. There is, I believe, something much more important than mere dissatisfaction with the emotional ambiance prevailing in our professional milieu, something what accounts for and justifies the project.

2.7.3. Let me remind you the opinion of Wittgenstein as being quoted by Peter T. Geach's paper. According to the opinion of the author of Tractatus, we should criticize other philosophies in their strong points and not in the weak ones.

In my opinion, the righteousness or groundlessness of the Wittgenstein's postulate depends on what is regarded as ultimate goal of the philosophy-game. If it is Understanding/Truth then Wittgenstein was possibly right. But if it is a 'social success' (which could be defined in various ways; these variations might entails some modification of this implication) then Wittgenstein was almost surely wrong.

Let me note here still one observation. Some authors adopt - more or less consciously - strategy of 'vagueness': vague theories allow for evading critical assessments. This strategy may be defined, it seems to me, as based on manipulating the meaning of own theses. Accordingly to the course of a polemic, the 'meaning-center' is pushed here or there. I do not think that such polemics are very productive.

As an illustration, we could take some debates between 'dialectical' (holistic) and 'metaphysical' (atomistic) views. Boguslaw Wolniewicz's considerations on this issue are particularly instructive. Characterizing logical atomism, he says that the latter is oriented against absolute monism as expressed in the formula of 'pan- interconnectedness of phenomena'. He quotes an opinion of Kołakowski who once described it as an old banality. [Wolniewicz, 1968:179] Still, he also remarks that the standpoint of absolute monism may seem to be absurd [ibidem:183] And putting these remarks together, he points out that 'having been earlier surprised by the absurdity of absolute monism, we will now be prone to accept it as self-evident truth. It would be a very typical phenomenon. The oscillation between the sense of self-
evidence and that of absurdity is characteristic of the standpoint of so-called common-sense which tends to skip from one extreme to the other." [ibidem: 184]

At the end of this point, let me draw your attention to the fact that already Descartes phrased these words: "I have never noted that any truth, having previously been not known, should have been discovered in the debates being exercised in schools, for if everyone tries to win, we are practicing ourselves in exposing the probability of our own stance rather than in evaluating relevance of the arguments of the both parties; those who have for long been good barristers will thus not be better judges." [Descartes, 1970: 79-80]

2.7.4. Other aspect of the problem is discussed by Gadamer. "Among the most profound thoughts being delivered in Plato's presentation of Socrates, there is a thesis that putting a question is - quite contrarily to common opinions - more difficult than answer." [Gadamer, 1993: 337] This thesis can be properly understood only in the context of the next one. "He who in speaking is looking for a means to prove his being right, and not for an insight into the essence of things, he will actually regard asking questions as being easier than answering." And further. "If one is to be able to ask, one must want to know, and it means: to know that one does not know." [ibidem: 338]

An additional remark should be made at this moment. The idea of metaphilosophy may seem to suggest the image of a philosopher who, to put it in extreme form, lacks any personal beliefs, who is dispassionate etc. Honestly speaking, such an image is not without some justification. Yet, the link between the idea of metaphilosophy and the image of philosopher who is just playing with various ideas is not a case of the logical necessity. The same idea may be linked with an opposite image. Think of a philosopher who takes his own views very seriously. But, let's stress, one who regards seriously the content of his view, and not the fact of their being his 'private property', 'intellectual capital' etc... If we leave aside such factors like sentiments, pride, habit, we will be able to assume that serious commitment should imply interest in alternative theories; serious commitment implies interest in profound self-understanding and this is impossible without knowing and understanding alternative theories.

2.7.5. The following quotation introduces us into the very heart of the problem I am going to tackle now. "It is difficult to discuss any contemporary issue - crime or race, techniques of education, aid to underdeveloped countries or ways to bring up a baby - without finding oneself in the presence, sooner or later, of this ambiguous monster which seems always proceeding in two opposite directions at once. In many a parlor of contemporary discussion the word 'instinct' is banned more severely than some of its fellows boasting only four letters. To such subjective depths has an essentially objective problem been reduced that Abraham Maslow... has suggested a political explanation. To refer to human instincts is to damn oneself as reactionary, probably of the most fascist-minded sort. Total devotion to learning, on the other hand, is to label oneself as liberal, progressive, securely democratic." [Ardrey, 1966: 30] The phenomenon described by Audrey might be found in any domain of philosophy, though just in the anthropological and social domain is most pervasive and vivid.

The list of names with which philosophies happen to be 'stigmatized' is quite considerable: reductionism, positivism, metaphysics, naturalism, teleology, and - recently - Enlightenment. Any of those words has been used in this or that philosophical milieu scarcely as a descriptive term while very much as emotive and performative one.

This phenomenon should be negatively evaluated from the moral point of view: freedom of thinking - of 'loud', public thinking - is a value in itself, and should not be circumscribed. We can criticize this situation more instrumentally. For instance, from the hermeneutic point of view (as being outlined in the point 2.2.) to ban some theories is to remain (or even produce) smaller or greater 'gaps' or 'holes' in the philosophical space. It might also happen that just a theory, which has been 'banned' from science or philosophy, is epistemically the best one.

Yet, philosophers and scientists are more or less involved in social life as whole, in politics, religion, ideology, business etc. And it is hardly possible that all those forms of involvement should not be reflected in the philosophy/science as such. Yet, if one believes - as I do - that these influences are negative rather than positive, one should look for some preventive means. Let me risk the hypothesis which claims that it is the ideology of meta-philosophy which may perform the role of such a means. Why should it be so? For two reasons, I think. First, in this context philosopher might be compared with a zoologist who describes an unknown species. In general, any new species should be described, irrespective of the economic (un)usefulness or aesthetic beauty (ugliness) of the specimens of this species. In this sense, any philosophy should be described, irrespective of whether morally edifying or not, consolating or causing despair... (The scope of validity of this analogy depends on whether the space of possible philosophies is finite - as Tatarkiewicz claimed - or infinite.)

Second, and complementarily, meta-philosophy allows for a declaration of the following type: "I do not believe in this philosophy. Yet, it seems to be central in an area of the 'logical space of philosophies' which has not been as yet investigated. Thus I think it is necessary to study it." (You could compare such an attitude with one to be met in logic or mathematics: you might prove classical theorems even if you are a believer in intuitionism; incidentally, a situation of this kind took place with Brouwer.) How far-reaching consequences could have even very wide adoption of this ideology cannot be said in advance. Some of us should just try.

And now, let's pass from the phenomenon of 'stigmatization' to another closely related to it.

2.7.6. Here, I mean the process of 'polarization' as described by Merton. Originally, the analysis of which I am going to avail, is devoted to the various reactions of sociologists to the (recommended by Merton himself) 'middle-range theories'. Even if from philosopher's point of view this subject might appear relatively unimportant (in the context of meta-anthropology, it is surely not so), the general reflections go well beyond the specific subject.

First, on the intellectual conflicts as special case of a generic type: "The controversy follows the general patterns of social conflict. After attack, counter-attack takes place and the sense of separation between the parts of conflict becomes greater. Since the conflict is a public matter, it is slowly becoming a contest for prestige rather than searching for truth." [Merton, 1982: 73-74] Second, on the role of the quantitative growth of Academias: "Process of mutual alienation and succumbing to stereotypes is being intensified, possibly due to the great numerical growth of sociological publications." [ibidem: 74] And third, on the non-existence of the third part: "In controversies in which standpoints are much polarized, there is virtually no
place for the third part...which might transform the social conflict into intellectual dispute." [Merton, 1982:75]

There quite a few negative consequences of the process of polarization. Firstly, it works in the same direction as that of 'stigmatization': our image of the space of possible answers to a questions becomes very incomplete, thus - in more practical situations, when theoretical answers co-determine practical options - the set of possible decisions becomes very poor.

Secondly, this very process contributes to (over-)simplifications of our images of the world (or a part of it): all nuances make the differences between rivaling theories less sharp, thus reducing their internal cohesion, 'spirit of militancy', etc. To put it other way round, theories should be as simple as possible if they are not only to survive but even to win the polarized intellectual (?) battle.

Third, the process of polarization solidifies pseudo-systemness: a set of theses, perhaps even quite accidentally collected, if only gains a label (specially if becomes an '-ism') and position in the intellectual world, becomes a 'system': its adherents are supposed to defend all its elements, and the relations between the theses cease to be a subject of investigations and are regarded as self-evident.

That meta-philosophy is against any polarization need not be discussed. Therefore, if you agree with me as to the negative consequences of this phenomenon, you should say that meta-philosophical strategy is to be tried.

2.7.7. In the Academies which have in the last three decades (since the late'60s) experienced enormous quantitative growth, the mechanism of polarization cannot operate without any modifications. Refusal to cooperate can results in the 'militant' orientation. But it can also assume very 'peaceful' form. The latter can be described as 'enclave-creating' strategy.

It might be that there is also a psychological mechanism at work here. Those who are rather 'militantly' tempered would take part in various intellectual battles. Those being more 'peaceful' close themselves in their small-group privacy, following the rule: 'Live and let others live'. In the latter case we could even say about tolerance. Yet, if to accept the word in this context, it should be qualified: 'negative' tolerance or 'passive' one would be more precise terms.

As regards the second strategy, we could take economics as an instance. The situation in this science has been described by R. Nisbet thus: "The consensus wisdom is gone, succeeded by sheer Babel: monetarists, Keynesians, neo-Keynesians, supply-siders, and many others, each group speaking to itself, not to others. Economics is by now in much the same situation each of the other social sciences has been in for varying lengths of time since the World War II: bankruptcy, intellectual capital gone and credibility exhausted." [Nisbet, 1982, 285]

2.7.8. To put the issues in a broader theoretical context, the following should be said: I do agree with the opinion that Mandeville-Smith's model of 'invisible hand' of an impersonal mechanism describes quite well the development of culture in general, and science in particular. Yet, some reservations are needed.

First, it seems that the mechanism operates in some domains more effectively and in some others - less, and in some others (mathematics would be, I guess, the best example) its scope of operation is rather restricted.

Second, I think that even if but one domain is taken into account, the effectiveness of the mechanism varies correspondingly to different stages of development of the given domain. I suppose that today in many fields of intellectual activity, this mechanism encounters some specific 'limits to growth'.

And as regards philosophy, neither domain itself nor our time seems to be particularly favorable for the effectiveness of the 'market' as generator of progress in this field.

And from the intellectual 'market', we may pass on to the market as such. My stance my be put as follows. Contrarily to rather widespread opinion, it is not market (thus not competition, thus not individualist culture...) which - I believe - should be at the heart of global society.

Though, quite interestingly, there are those who pronounce a similar view, even among those participating actively in creating the global market (I mean here, first of all, G.Soros [1998:126-128]), they are philosophers, sociologists and other humanists who constitute the main group of critics of market and capitalism. The critique is based upon both controversial (theoretically) and obvious (in the context of 'logic of criticism') modal thesis claiming for possibility of non-market, non-capitalist society. And if we assume this modal thesis as given, what consequences will be for philosophers and others of this family?

The answer depends on the way in which an additional question will be resolved. The question may be reconstructed, if we start from the thesis formulated in German Ideology. This thesis maintains, to put it briefly, that the radical social transformation may succeed only if it takes shape of worldwide revolution. Even if we do not take into account its literal interpretation (it is today evident that any form of violence is not socially creative), there will remain still its more general 'holistic' orientation. And if we accept this orientation, we will have no particular precept to write for philosophers.

But we may consider less holistic view on mechanisms of social transformation. And if this very view is considered, then we can suggest a practical conclusion. We can just say: if we believe that cooperative (solidaristic, etc.) society is possible and desirable, and if we also believe that some social activities are autonomous (do not completely depend on the logic of the 'social whole'), let's try to build up a cooperative community; in particular - a cooperative community of philosophers. Both as a test for the authenticity of our attitudes, and as a sociological experiment.

The genuine philosophical community may be attempted at just for its own sake. It may be also be attempted at as a condition for development of philosophy. But it might be regarded both as a social experiment of a kind and a part of a much broader process.

If you would like (as personally I do) that global society be more communitarian, but if you also have learned some lessons from the 20th century political history, thus - if you are skeptical of global social constructivism - you might consider if it is not just 'from below' (and not 'from above') from where we should start anew our efforts?

Sure, the history of the commune-movement of the 60's and 70's is not too optimistic. But, on the other hand, we speak of attempts at changing social relations that have predominated for ages. If viewed in this historical perspectives, should be those failures regarded as surprising? And as decisive?

Are we speaking, then, of an Utopia? I do not think so. Let me invoke once more Ilkka Niiniluoto. Continuing his considerations on the our-age philosophy I've quoted above, he claims that the image of twentieth-century philosophy has recently been changing: "In this year 1989, when the centennial anniversaries of both Ludwig
Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger are celebrated, a new picture of our philosophical situation has clearly emerged. We can now see that the traditional boundaries between the problems and methods of philosophical schools - in spite of many genuine differences of opinion - have been largely accidental and artificial. Today we are increasingly aware that the major trends of our century...belong to a broader current of what may be called systematic philosophy. /.../ The new picture of philosophy is partly based on unprejudiced historical studies, across apparent boundaries, on such towering figures of early contemporary philosophy as Frege, Husserl, an Wittgenstein. This interpretative work would have not been possible without systematic developments of the conceptual tools and ideas of analytical philosophy.” [Niiniluoto,1990:9-10]

Let me end this point with the words of Nicolai Hartmann who years ago wrote: "Philosopher has to work trusting in historical progress, namely in the fruit of cognition which will belong to others...To keep staying in self-imposed critical modesty...man needs intellectual altruism.” [Hartmann,1947:78] Perhaps more broad political and social commitment (of the type described a few lines earlier) could support this 'intellectual altruism'. Or, perhaps, some motives operating in the same direction can bring about more considerable results than any of them operating independently.

2.7.9. Let me declare that technological progress could - in my view - contribute to advancing and realization of the idea of a philosophical community. I mean computers in general and Internet in particular

One of philosophical project being pursued in this form: Prinicipia Cybernetica (address: http://pespmc1.ubv.ac.be) was even mentioned in a book on applications of computers. [Duch,1997: 71-72] Such projects may already be more numerous, and - I believe - they surely will be.

Of course, the technological developments alone will not bring about social changes in the society of philosophers. But they can facilitate such changes if those being otherwise promoted.

2.8. How can one evaluate a philosophy one doesn't accept, or - critical reasons

2.8.1. Any genuine community needs a system of values. But does the idea of meta-philosophy allows for one? At first sight it might seem it does not: it evokes Feyerabendian 'anything goes' and recalls also the most controversial instances of the universal tolerance which are, in my view, to be found in the domain of fine art.

This last fact is to be considered seriously: the idea of meta-philosophy rejects such a line of demarcation between art and philosophy as drawn, say, by Krzysztof Pomian in his analysis of Witkacy's Nienasyencie [Insatiation] In the essay Novel as Philosophical Enunciation, Pomian maintains that the difference between philosopher and writer consists in the way the writing-man resolves the problem of relation between particular and universal perspective. According to him, "This one is becoming philosopher who tries to legitimate his perspective as universally valid, either through formulating such assumptions which - according to him - have to be accepted by every thinking subject...or through referring to experiences that can be repeated by each subject normally equipped...And this one is becoming writer who accepts perspective he takes even being aware of its particularity." [Pomian,1973; 148-149]

Having rejected Pomian's way of differentiating art and philosophy, I am not going to say that no difference exists at all. To define this difference, I would stand the Pomian's opposition upside-down. I would say that work of art is a self-contained 'world'. Or, to be more precise, the self-containment is - in my view - a measure of the 'greatness' of the work of art. And philosophical work is, in my view, always a piece in the great 'puzzle' we collectively try to arrange. In brief, art is individual creation, and philosophy - collective one.

The latter difference entails the general idea of the criteria for philosophical criticism. It is based on the contents-versus-form distinction adopted from aesthetics. (This distinction surely needs elaboration; nonetheless, as for the brief remarks to be made, the intuitions its convey should be sufficiently clear.) It can be summarized so: the more tolerant we are in relation to the content of (philosophical) theories, the less tolerant we should be in relation to their form. In other words, the simple command could be pronounced so: "Say whatever you want, but if you are a professional philosopher, it is your duty to say it clearly, using as few words as possible, properly logically ordering your propositions." It may be also said that the idea of meta-philosophy minimizes the role of 'external' critique but elevates that of 'internal' (immanent) one.

It may be interesting to compare this rule with the following opinion of Rawls. "The freedom of speech loses its value, if the reasonable procedures of investigation and debate are not accepted. In this case, it is the differentiation between ordering rules and those limiting the content of speech which is significant. Though the ordering rules limit our freedom, since we cannot speak when we just want to, they are necessary if we want to make use of this freedom" [Rawls,1994:277] I believe that the rules of the 'immanent' philosophical criticism correspond to the ordering rules of Rawls, while the limitation of the 'external' criticism may be referred to the rules that would limit the content of speech.

2.8.2. Having formulated the basic rule, let's try to be a bit more precise. I would say that the idea of meta-philosophy promotes two basic values: one is analytical precision (in broad sense), the other is originality.

Logical precision has so many aspects as any space of philosophies. It encompasses such elements as: clarity of notions, clarity of syntactical structure of theses, correctness of inferences, specificity as to question-answer relation and so on.

Originality is also multi-faced: a new problem may be discovered or a new answer to already known question A logical link between two theses may be pointed out. But also a new way of demonstrating the already known link.

Lower degree of precision may be allowed if there is in the given case actual originality. But this may be so only in a phase. In the long run, there is a link between these two values.

2.8.3. In our century in general, and in the post-war period in particular, we have witnessed rapid quantitative growth of the philosophical production: numerous texts, books, journals, conferences, symposia...Great many words, 'theories' or whatever...But whether many really new ideas...some skepticism can be voiced.

To say it somewhat differently, in philosophy - to a great degree - we are rather short of genuine pluralism. This thesis seems to stay in contrast with the apparent
variety of philosophical schools, doctrines, orientations and whatever. Nevertheless I’d say that this variety is - to a considerable degree (to say it cautiously) - superficial, apparent. Two arguments:

First. Different jargons and labels are quite often regarded as different theoretical orientations. (Incidentally, this situation offers opportunity for ‘interpretative’ jobs which often consist in a simple ‘jargon-into-jargon’ translations that reveal ‘striking’ similarities, convergence etc.) To give your but one example, but striking and in the present context very important: One may wonder (I stress this word: I have here some strong suppositions yet not a definite opinion - a detailed analysis of some texts would be necessary) what, if anything, does post-modern criticism of ‘Meta-Narration’ (or ‘Great Narratives’) add to the analyses contained in The Open Society and Its Enemies or in The Poverty of Historicism.

Second. Different ‘orientations’ pretend to be complete philosophies, or - for that matter - anthropologies, but in fact they should be regarded as different sub-disciplines of philosophy (or of anthropology) rather than as ‘orientations’.

2.8.4. At this moment, I’d like to formulate some remarks on the concept of (philosophical, or - more generally - theoretical) system, and on ‘systemness’.

It is to-day rather fashionable to criticize not only this or that philosophical system but the very idea of the theoretical ‘system-ness’. To attempt to construct a system is (according to this opinion) not to understand the critical results of the contemporary epistemology. (Incidentally, one could note - perhaps ironically - that the critique of any certainty is often presented as if it were absolutely certain.) Any effort of this kind is believed to be a priori sentenced to be a failure. In particular, the critique of ‘Grand Narratives’ (or ‘grand stories’) is among the fundamental ideas of (any) post-modernism. This critique is believed to be an ‘other side’ of deconstruction, of the ‘taking-into-pieces’ theoretical (philosophical) systems.

My opinion is completely different. To put it briefly, I regard the idea of deconstruction as a manifestation and a means for passing from what might be termed ‘false’ to what might be called ‘true’ systemness. And to put it more precisely, I would formulate the following points:

[1] philosophy (as such; the situation in the most specialized branches like philosophy of mathematics may be different) has not yet absorbed fully the conclusions that are to be driven out of the epistemological turn-over caused by the non-Euclidean geometry and the Goedel’s theorem;

[2] philosophy has not yet tried to apply the ideas and methods of para-consistent logic.

Thus to the principles of analytical precision and originality, I would add the principle of ‘true’ system-ness. If taken together, these three principles seem to be quite exacting. But they by no means contradict the basic idea of meta-philosophy, namely - the idea of plurality of philosophies as positive value.

3. Philosophical assumptions of meta-philosophy

3.1. On the content of the chapter

It is rather obvious that the program (ideology) of meta-philosophy has its own philosophical foundations and presuppositions. Both for logical and moral reasons, they should be openly formulated in possibly clear way. Still, on the other hand, I believe that the logical (epistemological etc.) foundations of meta-philosophy should be developed while its construction is being advanced, and not - before constructing has been started.

The latter option has two reasons: one ethical, and one methodological/praxiological. From the ethical point of view accepted by the present author (and presented in some detail above in the point 2.6.), the main social function of philosophers is, roughly speaking, to help people (those who wish to be helped) to develop (elucidate, discuss, perhaps transform...) their Weltanschauung. So, the problems that are ‘products’ of analytical elaboration of the issues constitutive for Weltanschauung should (if you accept this ethical stance) predominate philosophical praxis. And those of more ‘technological’ importance should be given relatively more subordinated position.

And from the praxiological standpoint, to be over-concerned with the foundational issues may mean to not grapple with the central ones: you may strengthen the fundamentals, and strengthen, and strengthen... without building up anything. To avail of this metaphor still for a while, it might be said that the fundamentals should be being strengthened ‘step-by-step’ as the construction is being advanced: one floor over the ground - one floor under the ground.

The two-sided option manifests itself in the character of this chapter. To be more specific, the goals of having written this chapter may be summed up as follows:

[g1] To demonstrate that the present author is aware of (no doubt: only some) philosophical assumptions that make meaningful this meta-philosophical enterprise.

[g2] To declare that he accepts (and does it ‘rationally’, since can offer some arguments in favor of his decision) these assumptions.

[g3] To outline one of the directions in which meta-philosophy might be developed.

The philosophical assumptions of meta-philosophy may be, at the beginning, divided into two groups: one comprising assumptions without which the very idea would be just meaningless (logically incoherent or empirically implausible); and one including those assumptions which justify the decision to develop (implement, propagate, etc.) this idea. The first set might be further sub-divided. On one side we might group assumptions concerning ‘substance’ or ‘matter’ (perhaps quite ‘immaterial’) of which, and with which, philosophy - as an object - is being made. On the other side, assumptions concerning men ‘producing’ philosophy might be collected.

Therefore, roughly speaking, we may speak of (epistemo)logical/metaphysical, sociological and ethical assumptions of the meta-philosophical program. In brief form, they may be summed thus:

[a1] There exists space of philosophies.

[a2] Philosophers are free.

[a3] Program of meta-philosophy is morally acceptable.
As noted, the fact that the idea of meta-philosophy presupposes some philosophical theses is rather obvious. Yet, in the specific context of a project oriented at arranging a space for inter-philosophical debates this fact cannot be just disregarded: a contradiction (pragmatic, if not logical) may be hidden here. Therefore, the presentation of philosophical assumptions of meta-philosophy is completed with a brief discussion of the idea of Voraussetzunglosigkeit.

A point should be emphasized. Each of the issues to be discussed below could be a subject of a separate study. Therefore, if I am going to devote them relatively short comments, I risk making but superficial and rather banal remarks. Does it make any sense to take such a risk? In my view, yes. It does so, since my aim is to contribute to the particular debates, often very complex and sophisticated, over the problems in question, but only to indicate the relations between some solutions of those problems and the program of meta-philosophy.

3.2. There exists space of philosophies

- In this way may be formulated the main philosophical assumption of the program of meta-philosophy. It needs to be stated precisely and, perhaps, validated. These tasks should be carried into effect, at least tentatively, in this sub-chapter.

Two aspects of this thesis can be distinguished. First, it claims for 'objective' existence of the space in question. Neither the space itself, nor any single philosophy - being a part of it, is regarded as a 'product', or 'construction' of man. Philosophies are not invented but - discovered. As you see, this aspect of our thesis directs us toward the domain of, let's call it so, metaphysics of meaning.

Secondly, the word 'space' has been deliberately used: it is to suggest that collection of philosophies is not a mere set of them. In particular, perhaps there are philosophies (philosophical systems, thus in particular - sets of theses) totally different: having not any common thesis; yet, it is not necessarily so: a priori it is possible that philosophies have non-empty intersections. Philosophies can also be said to be more or less 'similar', 'close' or 'distant'. These considerations make us to touch, at least cursorily, upon the issue of (in)commensurability of theories.

3.2.1. I would like to start the discussion of the problem of 'objective' existence of the space of philosophies with the following citation from Ingarden's paper on Neopositivists' attempt at reconstructing philosophy.

While analyzing one of the central theses of neopositivists, namely the thesis identifying meaningfulness with verifiability, Ingarden indicates that "methodical positivism actually assumes the meaning of a sentence; the very meaning the presence of which in the sentence is objected by positivism. The sentence: 'Inside electron there is nucleus which is always there but does not manifest externally its existence in any effects.' is - according to Schlick - an instance of a meaningless sentence, for it is a non-verifiable sentence. One should agree that this sentence is non-verifiable. But why is it non-verifiable? Just because it has meaning which excludes its verification; the meaning determines just that electron-nucleus as one which 'externally does not manifest its existence in any effects'. It means: In order to decide that the sentence being considered is non-verifiable, one has to make two assumptions: 1. that the sentence has meaning which excludes the verification of that sentence, 2. that it is possible to determine this meaning independently from the verification of the sentence, the possibility of the verification being just objected. Therefore, either the thesis about the identity of the meaning of a sentence and its verifiability is to be rejected, or meaning of a sentence in another sense, despite the meaning-verifiability, is to be accepted." [Ingarden, 1963:6]

I assume that Ingarden has demonstrated in this passage that the concept of meaning is logically prior to that of verifiability. This assumption is important for further considerations on meaning.

And now, let's pass to The Logical Basis of Metaphysics of Michael Dummett. He tried to demonstrate in this book a methodology of theory of meaning and to present "arguments attesting the importance of this branch of philosophy for its more prominent relative, namely metaphysics." [Dummett, 1998:6] As regards this general orientation, I do share it. But as regards some of his more specific solutions, I do not accept them.

In particular, I am somewhat skeptical of his contention that "Truth is the central concept of the theory of meaning" [Dummett, 1998:184]. To be more precise, I tend to agree with Dummet's opinion that we do not know what should any meaning-theory making no use of the notion of truth be like. A place for the concept of truth is there in meaning-theory, surely. But what is the place?

The notion of truth is no less difficult than that of meaning. We know various definitions of truth. We know also that according to some philosophers, the notion of truth is 'redundant'. We know of difficulties with relations between definition and criterion of truth.

We should also note that, as Woleński puts it, "according to Tarski, the notion of truth presupposes the notion of meaning" [Woleński, 1993:226]. But it must also not be forgotten that Tarski "did not explain anywhere the notion of meaning" [idem].

In view of those facts, I tend to think that just in philosophy we need a notion of meaning which is independent from that of truth. And I would say that this need may be justified in an 'empirical' way. I think that it cannot be seriously maintained that we cannot distinguish between say St. Augustine's theory of time and that of Kant, even if we should be not able to suggest any rule for epistemic comparison between these two theories. And in the context of the program of meta-philosophy, the need is still more evident. Having made this observation, I can only declare what follows. Remaining open the question of the possibility of its definition in the future, I want to regard the category of meaning as non-defined, but - characterized contextually.

The 'theory' (very brief and made ad hoc) of meaning to be given below is composed of two elements:

[m1] a metaphysical characteristic of meaning,

[m2] an epistemological characteristic of relation between (objective) meaning, as being 'contained' in propositions, and its (subjective) reflections expressed in thoughts and utterances.

Though not defined, meaning can be characterized as to its metaphysical status. In general, I want to opt for a stance which may be described as 'objectivism' (of a sort). Of course it is not possible to discuss the question of objectivism in any detail.

I only note some intuitions that are - as far as I can see it - relevant for (the possibility of) meta-philosophy. These intuitions will be taken from the following areas: philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of language, epistemology.

I would like to start with an excursion into philosophy of mathematics. My stance may be summarized into the following declaration: I do believe that, let's take it as an instance, the Pythagorean theorem ("the most important theorem in the whole
mathematics" [Bronowski, 1987:158] was discovered by this or other, the name does not matter - (Greek) mathematician, and not - invented. The same is to be said about any other mathematical theorem. In other words, I subscribe to (a) Platonistic philosophy of mathematics. Of course it is a decision: as virtually all philosophical issues also those of philosophy of mathematics cannot be definitely solved. Yet, some reasons (in my view, quite good ones) for this decision can be given.

Primo, Platinum is a 'natural' view of mathematicians: if they 'do' mathematics (and not philosophize of it), they regard their objects of research in a Platonic way. This 'immediate experience' does not have to be regarded as decisive; yet, it is - in my view - much telling and supporting the Platonic intuition.

Secundo, it seems to be most compatible with metamathematical theorems, in particular - with Goedel's incompleteness theorems: a set of all propositions being true in a (sufficiently 'rich') domain is essentially larger than any set of theorems provable on the basis of a finite set of axioms.

Tertio, it accounts best for transhistorical and transcultural continuity and coherence of mathematical tradition (this feature being hardly comparable with any other domain of culture); in other words, the history of mathematics supports empirically this metaphysical claim.

And having said about transcultural character of mathematics, I'd like to make a step farther and mention an aspect of the Search-for-ExtraTerrestrial-Intelligence program, namely the problem of commun-cation between 'us' and 'them': "How can we expect that a civilization vastly more advanced than we, and based entirely upon different biological principles, could ever send a message we could understand?" - asks Carl Sagan [1975:217]. And he answers: "the message will be based on commonalities between transmitting and receiving civilization. Those commonalities are...what we truly share in common - the universe around us, science and mathematics." [ibidem:217-218] In this moment, it is worthwhile to note that, according to Frank Drake, it was the great mathematician Karl Frederick Gauss who already in 1820 proposed to cut off in the Siberian forest an image representing Pythagorean theorem. This image was to be of sufficiently great scale as to be noticeable for extraterrestrial intelligent creatures. [Drake&Sobel, 1996:209-210] I would add, addressing this remark specially to those who could find the SETI-problems as speculative or and unphilosophical, that the notion of extraterrestrial intelligence may be viewed as an 'approximation' of the Kantian transcendental subject.

If speaking about Cosmos, we should not forget about Stanislaw Lem. In his essay on Artificial Intellect, he declares that he does not "regard 'human reason' as faculty being cosmidically unique, necessary and foremost" but also he does not "regard the whole set of philosophical school to be exhausting 'potential set of possible philosophies' " [Lem, 1996:225] This view, which I tend to accept, both calls for and strengthens the objectivity-of-meaning assumption.

Let's return to the Earth. Even here, we can face the problem of relation between mathematics and non-human intelligence. I mean of course some issues generated by the researches on the Artificial Intelligence.

The prospects of this research are hotly debated. Whatever the results of this debate, and first of all - actual developments are, we have already faced problems of that sort. In 1976 Keneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken proved so-called 'four-colors hypothesis'. They obtained this proof having used computer. And in this case, "the use of computer is principally quite different from applications...in applied mathematics and number theory." [Davies&Hersch, 1994:333] In a sense, mathematicians faced a completely new situation: on the one hand, the proof is regarded (by many mathematicians though not all of them) as complete and valid; on the other hand, human individual is not able to check all the details of the proof.

We could make still one step more in the direction determined by Appel and Haken. In doing so we can invoke again Stanislaw Lem. His idea of 'Golem', a computer /\ which is able to construct theories being too difficult (complicated, complex...) for even most intelligent men is of focal importance here. My argument runs as follows. If we accept that such 'Golem' could exist then we should accept that the notion of a mathematical or physical theory cannot be anthropologically reduced. And, in my opinion, we do not have to analyze technological and other more specific conditions which decide whether one day we will be able to construct such a creature or we will never be. The only point which is of relevance here is to decide whether such a being is metaphysically (ontologically) possible or not. As for me, I do not see any fundamental metaphysical (ontological) objections.

This short journey into the area of philosophy of mathematics, I would like to end with some reflections of Michal Heller. While presenting an interpretation of quantum mechanism, Heller notices that "given this philosophical option, there would exist Platonian Mathematics (with capital M) - world of abstract structures, being directly inaccessible for us, and created by us mathematics (with small m), which with the help of invented by us conceptual apparatus (axioms, rules of proof, symbols, etc.) would grasped (represented) some aspects of the Platonian Mathematics." [Heeler, 1996:113]

To these observations taken from philosophy of mathematics, I would add some intuitions drawn from philosophy of language. More specifically, I think of some Chomski's ideas. In particular, of his anti-behaviorist orientation: his insistence on our ability both to produce and to understand utterances we have never heard before. And of his distinction between language as such (as a 'system') and language-practice which is supposed to be co-determined by various non-language factors. And also of his image of language as an infinite set of sentences. - In brief, I would say that (early - at least) Chomskian philosophy of natural language shares its basic orientation with Platonist philosophy of mathematics.

What has just been said about language is to be referred to language conceived of as a set of propositions, 'containing' objective meaning. Yet the propositions should be distinguished from utterances and thoughts.

As regards the first relation I shall avail of the following metaphor: I would say that the relation between (human) utterances and (logical) propositions is more or less similar to the relation between apples, balls and other physical objects of this shape on one side and the Euclidean sphere on the other. Thus, utterances 'approximate' propositions. This process of 'approximation' never ends, at least in some cases, and perhaps in all.

I shall avail - also - of another metaphor. In this case, not surprisingly I believe, it will be metaphor of 'looking/seeing'. You can look at this or that direction or, perhaps in all. You can think of a problem or not; you can come across a thought or not; the shape you have seen could have been more or less clear, or - vague; here, the utterance which came to your mind can more or less perfectly 'approximate' a proposition. This metaphor should be developed also into somewhat different direction. We could say that utterance reflects what has been 'seen' - in the same way in which a drawing does. It is obvious that the quality of
drawing depends not only on the skills of eyes but also on the skills of hands, and on
the quality of paper and pencil.

Referring to Jerzy Kmita's philosophy, I would also add that the sphere of
objective meaning may be interpreted as constitutive for 'social consciousness'
(though Kmita's objectivism seems to be less strong than mine), and the sphere of
utterances as belonging to the domain of 'individual consciousness'.

At this moment I will stop these speculations on the sense of meaning,
proposition, thought etc.: now, I am going to demonstrate what consequences of
the outlined approach should be expected.

First, a remark on what is sometimes called 'Moore's paradox of explication'.
(For a brief presentation and discussion, cf. [Woleński,1989:35-36].) From my
point of view, it is not the explication of the phrase 'X is brother' with the help of 'X is
a man and has the same parents' which should be regarded as paradigmatic for (meta-)
philosophical explications. I would rather suggest to start, say, with the sentence
'Mr. Smith is tall.' This sentence can be viewed as a fuzzy set of sentences of this
type: 'Mr. Smith is 'x' inches tall'. As it is known, the construction of a fuzzy set
comprises two steps: [1] definition of a 'standard' (Cantorian) set X, [2] definition of
a function from the set P(X) into the [0,1] interval (some more general approaches
based on other ordered algebraic structures may be taken into account). If you accept
this approach, the Moore's paradox simply disappears: the goal of analysis is not to
determine the relation of identity between two prima facie different propositions but
to establish the relation of 'being an element of a set' between some propositions and
an utterance. Incidentally, it should be noted that, viewed in this perspective, many
utterances represent not one but many logical propositions. And still one comment is
needed: in the case of the simple sentence just analyzed, there is no problem with
finding the set of propositions of which the given utterance is a fuzzy representation.
But in the case of philosophical utterances just here is the trouble located.

Second. A topographical metaphor may be of some use here. Of little, if at all,
controversial character is a thesis which says that we can understand the difficulties
which were faced by Columbus, Magellan or others - better than they could themselves.
It is so just due to the simple fact that we dispose a better geographical
knowledge than they did. Following this metaphor, it might be said that there is
nothing strange in the fact that we understand (or, at least, should be able) ancient
Greeks or 18th century Scots better than they themselves were able. More generally,
if you have noticed a trait of an object and other person has not, you may find several
explanations of this fact: you can reject your perception or your fellow's perception,
and explaining the 'error' you can invoke either some immanent traits of apparatus of
perception (yours or your fellow's) or some traits of the situation (relation between
the perceived object and the perceiver). Mutatis mutandis, this same can be said
about perception of problems, and - propositions.

Third. There is a standpoint, one might call it 'romantic' or 'expressionist',
which considers utterances as expressions of one's thoughts, feeling, emotions. (This
standpoint does not necessarily contradict objectivism: objective meaning is an
object '/content'/ of one's thoughts or emotions.) Of relevance is here the following
historical fact: contrarily to a myth (still looming here or there), even great romantic
poets did not (usually; some exceptions are of course possible) create their works in a
moment of illumination. They were hard searching for the best words, best reflecting
their emotions. And the same can be said of philosophers. For instance, a known
logician and philosopher Raymond Smullyan opens his book in Taoism philosophy
with such a confession: "When for the first time I met the literary heritage of Taoism.
I was enchanted...I felt as if I were reading my own thoughts yet expressed much
better than I could do it myself." [Smullyan,1995:9] And Gadamer says: "just this
seems to me to be a great, breathtaking, drama of philosophy: it is a permanent effort
to find its own language, permanent hunger of language. It is not a novelty
introduced only by Heidegger." [Gadamer,1979:97] And in the same vein, he states
that "only he thinks philosophically who is not satisfied with accessible language-

And it is the case not only in poetry and philosophy, but even in mathematics,
as the following historical analysis seems to confirm: "Cauchy knew the Cauchy's
integral theorem, though he 'did not know' (in the formalist sense of knowing formal
definition based upon set theory) the meaning of any term used in the formulation of
this theorem. He did not know what is complex number, what is integral, what is
curve, and despite of it he knew the proper way of evaluating the complex number
represented by this integral" [Davies & Hersch,1994:344].

Fourth, let us read the following remarks on the history of existentialism:
"existential thought did not in fact exist as a current, since each of men cultivating it
expressed but himself, having no idea that others were doing it in a similar way.
Kierkegaard and Stirner did not know each other, and Nietzsche did not know about
them; when Unamuno learned Danish in order to read Kierkegaard, his views had
already been crystallized; also Shestov got to know the work of Copenhagen recluse
when himself was a mature thinker." [Pomian,1973:216] If in the case of so
'individualist' a philosophy, we can observe (some; despite of the criticism addressed
at the concept of 'existentialism' there are some obvious similarities between, say,
Kierkegaard and Sartre) 'converging' meanings, then a fortiori less 'poetic'
philosophies should be viewed as expressing some objective meanings.

Fifth, let us say a few words on (philosophical) translations (in the simplest
sense: from German into English, etc.) I will refer to some Hanna Rosner's analyses.
In her book on philosophical translation (its title is telling: 'Unity of philosophy and
multiplicity of languages'), she tries to validate the thesis about 'cognitive function of
the philosophical translation' [Rosner H.,1975:174] This book is opened with the
following quote from G. Mounin's 'Problème des théorèmes de la traduction': "si l'on
accepte le freyness courante sur la structure des lexiques, des morphologies et des
syntaxes, on aboutit a professer que la traduction devrait etre impossible." [Rosner
H.,1975:10] In other words, Hume's A Treatise on Human Nature or Kant's Kritik
der reinen Vernunft - to take them as examples - should be viewed as articulating
other philosophy than their counterparts - translations into Polish, or French, or
Hungarian, not to speak of Hindi or Japanese - do, Rosner tries to demonstrate the
very opposite thesis; just through various translations we can overcome the
ambiguities inherent in any philosophical texts. In this context, we could say that
meaning is an 'invariant' of translations.

These considerations on the philosophy of meaning, I would like to complete
with two notes. Firstly, with a comment on an observation made a time ago by H.
Buczyńska-Garewicz. And second, with a supplementary remark on the objectivity of
meaning.

A time ago, H. Buczyńska-Garewicz stated that "investigating meaning as
anthropological phenomenon, referring to the speaking subject as the fundamental
element in the world of meanings, has been becoming the dominant attitude in
contemporary philosophy." [Buczyńska-Garewicz,1975:52] There had (has) been
such a tendency, I do agree. But I do not agree if this historiographical description should be read more 'historiosophically': that this attitude-change (the shift from 'objectivism' to 'subjectivism') should be a cognitive progress is by no means evident. And, in my opinion, if this change were to be a progress, then to a degree only: as far as it was a result of shifting attention from cultivated area of investigation to the neglected one. And to a degree to which this change has manifested the trend toward subjectivization or 'anthropologization' of meaning, it has been - from my point of view - a regression to a pre-Logische-Untersuchungen stage.

In the context of Buczyńska-Garewicz's remark, the meaning of the thesis about objectivity of meaning may be better 'seen'. This thesis does not specify of what precisely mode of existence is the objective existence of meaning. It does not say if meanings are self-sufficient ideal entities, or, say, structures (elements) of possible worlds, or some mathematical structures, or whatever else. The meaning of this thesis (as being assumed in the present work) is negative: this thesis rejects any kind of 'anthropologization' of meaning.

In other words, I regard as important for meta-philosophy a basic intuition which has been shared by Plato, St. Augustine, Bolzano, Frege or 'young' Husserl, in spite of all differences between them; an intuition, which is fundamentally different from the one shared by Roscelin, Ockham, Hobbes, Gramsci, (late) Wittgenstein, Quine, Rorty... The division-line separating these two 'camps' may be vague. Therefore, to be more precise, we should consider an ambiguous case. Popper's theory of 'third world' seems to be. On one hand, he stresses the autonomy of this world and its being different from the world of states of individual human minds. Thus, it might seem that Popper's theory could be classified as a member of the 'objectivist' party. On other hand, he very clearly defines "third world as human product" [Popper,1992:213]. Analogies with honey being a product of bees, or with cobweb produced by a spider [ibidem:215] only confirm this position. Availing of this case, I would say that objectivism as being assumed here is a stance 'stronger' than that of Popper.

3.2.2. Philosophies are commensurable; therefore they make up a 'logical space'. Thus the main thesis of this section might be put. But are they actually so? The answer to this question is not easy. And even if I could give it more attention and space than I at this moment can, the answer would not be definite. On the other hand, I suppose that I can do more than just declare my standpoint. Some arguments are there.

Still, before starting presentation of my arguments, a remark on a consequence (or logical equivalent - I do not decide precisely of what type logical relation holds here) of the commensurability-thesis. It might be formulated thus: history of philosophy is possible. Of course, a specification is necessary. History of philosophy is understand here as 'something more' than mere description of a collection of 'systems', customarily called - philosophy. There has to be a core of common problems, if we are to speak about actual history of philosophy. If such problems did not exist, the name of 'philosophy' would be a label of no more value than a name one could invent for Kolakowski's aggregate composed of "my ear and the moon" [Kolakowski,1967:56] (My invoking Kolakowski in this context is not incidental: there is an analogy between his problem of 'natural articulation of the world', and the problem of what could called 'natural articulation of the space of philosophies'.) - This remark, as it may be noted, is but a concretization of the Mejbaum's thesis quoted at the beginning of the section 2.3. (on historiographical reasons for meta-philosophy).

Let us commence the presentations of those arguments with some comments on Feyerabend. As we remember, the notion of incommensurability is introduced in the context of analysis of relations between Newton's mechanics and Einstein's theory of relativity. According to Feyerabend, these theories should be logically incomparable since the basic concepts of the respective theories are apparently the same but in fact fundamentally different. In particular such notions like mass or length and shape are said to be different if considered in the context of the respective theories. [Feyerabend,1979:34-35, 230].

The crux of the argumentation can be put in simple words: in classical physics the respective notions denote one-argument predicates while in relativist theory the respective predicates are at least two-argument. The rest of the argumentation seems to be derivable from this logical observation. That there is a problem here, it cannot be objected. Yet the solution given by Feyerabend need not to be accepted.

As regards logic itself, we can quote first a quite general remark of a logician: "for proper understanding of the operation of simple recursion, one has to pay attention to the fact that any function of lesser number of variables may be viewed as function of any greater number of variables. In particular, constant functions, usually regarded as zero-argument ones, may be viewed, accordingly to needs, as functions of any finite number of arguments" [Gluszkow, 1967:47]. Of course one could maintain that this is but logical 'trick' which cannot decide the problem. Perhaps, yes. But if one has accepted this comment, then one has to admit that the issue goes beyond the scope of logic as such, and no simple logical qualification can solve the problem.

Let's go, then, to intuitions. If we consider three (possible) attributes of a body, say, its 'classical' length, its 'relativistic' length and its chemical structure, we will say that the first and the second are somehow related; related in a way in which neither first nor second is related with the third attribute. For instance, if two bodies are congruent 'classically' they should also be congruent 'relativistically'. But if two bodies are congruent, irrespective of the way, nothing can be said about the relations between their chemical structures.

We could go further and note that some physical theses remain valid irrespective of the character (classical or relativistic) of notion of mass or length. For instance the thesis which says, roughly, that the greater mass of a body the greater energy needed to change its trajectory remains true when mass is understood classically as well as when it is understood relativistically.

Or, consider a more 'philosophical' example taken from physics. The notion of time assumed in Newton's physics and that of Einstein's are not logically of the same kind too. (Possibly, the logical differences are of this same kind as in the case of classical and relativistic mass.) Yet, if theory of relativity is still today so strange for some of us (cf. the famous 'paradox of twins') it is not because it proposed a new notion with which the world is to be described. It is so because it disclosed an unexpected and intuitively strange attribute just of time as it is partly known to us before we study any physics or, for that matter, philosophy. The same can be said of 'space'. The famous debate between Clark and Leibniz proceeded just around the problem of absolute/relational (resp. substantial/attributive) nature of space. [Heller,1993:99-108]. The 'logical type' of Newtonian (defended by Clark) and Einsteinian (preconceived by Leibniz) space should be different. Was this debate possible only due to the lack of proper logical classification of concepts? I do not think so. I believe that it was (has been) a real debate. Similarly, I think that the controversy over 'objective' or 'subjective' nature of sense-qualities was a real debate.
We can ask whether the red color of an apple is its inherent attribute or is in fact an attribute of a relation between the apple and a man. Whatever our stance would be, we do normally - daltonism set aside - not confuse red and green apples. And surely, we do not confuse the apple’s color with its taste, no matter if sweet or sour.

It has happened that the problem of (in)commensurability of scientific theories has been mainly discussed in the context of physics. Interesting and important as it may be, it is not the only one which deserves attention. We could for instance focus our attention on logic, and more specifically - on the problem of logical constants. Susan Haack puts the problem thus. "It is not, in my opinion, possible that Lukasiewicz for example, when he contested that ‘p or ¬p’ represents logical truth, was just giving new meaning to ‘or’ or ‘¬’, and his incompatibility with classical logic could be completely explained as a result of this difference of meanings." [Haack,1997:246] Again, there is little doubt that the meaning of logical alternative is in classical logic different than in multi-valued or intuitionistic. However, I tend to think that it should not be maintained that difference between classical and intuitionistic alternative is in the same kind as the difference between classical alternative and classical implication.

Even more emphatic example can be taken from Ajdukiewicz’s work on elimination of intensional contexts. According to the interpretation assumed in that paper, relation ‘x believes that (...)’ has - in different cases - various numbers of arguments. (The operator ‘believes that’ is interpreted so that its arguments "are not ‘x’ and the clause (...) which follows that operator, but that these arguments are ‘x’ and the simple words of which that clause consists." [Ajdukiewicz,1979a:118]) If one should follow the line of Feyerabend’s argumentation, one would have to say that Ajdukiewicz offered in fact not one theory of a concept but an indefinite number of - perhaps even incommensurable - theories. Such a conclusion is rather ridiculous, and should be avoided - if possible.

Or, take a simple example from the anthropological domain. Let’s assume (in accordance with one anthropological stance) that a trait of someone’s behavior depends on (is a function of) relations with one’s children. The ‘logical status’ of the concept describing given trait would be indeterminate, as depending on the number of children.

Putting together these remarks on physics, logic, and on anthropology, I would say that we need a theory of concept-meaning which would allow for some changes in the meaning of concepts (in particular, it would allow for changes of ‘logical type’) while allowing for maintaining that such we have all the time to do with the same concepts. To my knowledge, we do not have any of this kind. It cannot be said in advance whether such theory is possible. However, I would maintain - for reasons outlined above - that we should reformulate the basic problem. Instead of debating whether theories are commensurable, we should rather ask how theories can be commensurable, despite of the change of the meaning of their concepts.

Having discussed the problem of meaning, let us analyze incommensurability-thesis in a different, perhaps broader, perspective. First, this thesis seems to have a consequence which is, in my view, rather untenable: accepting it, we would also have to accept that many questions are just not possible. For instance, one would not be able to ask such a question as “What does depend the mass of a body on?”. Of course, it might be claimed that this is incorrectly formulated question. It might be so. Perhaps no solution to the problem is possible without some substantial, in the given case - physical, considerations. And I lack competence to be involved in them. Thus let me avail of an example from the domain to be explored in the second part of this essay. One of central questions of anthropology can be put so: “Do people happen to be egoists by virtue of their immutable nature or due to their social situation?” In the first case ‘egoism’ denotes an intrinsic attribute of an individual, thus is one-argument predicate; in the second - a function of relations between individual and his environment, thus is two-argument predicate (to put it in most simple way; if we do not ‘aggregate’ those relations we should speak of multi-variable function, the number of variables being undetermined). - Inciden- tally, the trouble with ‘egoism’ in anthropology seems to be, as far as I can see it, basically of the same sort as that with ‘mass’ in physics. - However, this question is - in my opinion - well formulated.

Continuing this line of argument, we might arrive at the conclusion that theory of idealization could not be even formulated: concretization of any idealizational law would say about other magnitude than the very law, thus would be just other law - without any specific relation with the former. Even more destructive would be Feyerabendian argument for ‘categorial dialectics’ which suggests that logical type of a magnitude can be temporarily changeable (as the hierarchy of magnitudes - in particular: the number of the ‘most significant’ magnitudes - can change). Yet, I tend to accept, at least partly, both theory of idealization and categorial dialectics. And just for this reason I am convinced that we should find another solution for the problem put by Feyerabend. Problem which is, let me repeat, a real one.

It should also be noted that the relation between two important elements of Feyerabend’s philosophy, namely between his apology of pluralism and incommensurability-thesis is, at best, unclear. And I even tend to suppose that these two elements are contradictory. I should perhaps formulate it more precisely: pragmatically contradictory. I mean that the incommensurability thesis makes the postulate of pluralism either trivial or empty (‘object-less’). In the first case, pluralism says little more than that botany is as valid area of studies as psychology: you can investigate this or that ‘world’, as you wish. That’s fine; but it is not very controversial postulate. And in the second case, if we assume that really different theories (as Newton’s mechanics and that of Einstein) speak of different ‘worlds’, we do not recommend any real theoretical pluralism, if the latter term is to express the recommendation to construct alternative theories - of the same object. Assuming that these two elements of Feyerabendian philosophy are in fact pragmatically contradictory, I declare that it is pluralism which - from the point of view crucial for the present text - should be chosen.

As far as now, I have discussed the incommensurability-thesis as being referred to rather ‘local’ (partial) theories. I have offered some elements of a critique of this thesis. If this critique is convincing, it cannot be decided by the author. Let’s assume, however, that this critique might be accepted. Even then, the initial question - the problem of commensurability of philosophies - cannot be regarded as decided. It need not to be that commensurability of ‘local’ (say, scientific) theories should determine commensurability of the ‘global’ (philosophic) ones. Contrarily, it might be that scientific theories are comparable (commensurable), but philosophical ones - are not: Democritus’ and Plotinus’ philosophies should (be determined by) two distinct - and incommensurable - world-views.

As already said, I want to defend the thesis about commensurability of philosophies. Argumentation to be presented below, will be composed of three points: subsequently, I am going to touch upon the following issues:
Thus, I commence with a problem already discussed in the previous chapter. In the section 2.2., devoted to hermeneutic reasons of meta-philosophy, I quoted Wolniewicz’s thesis about relation between understanding a thesis and understanding its negation. Reverting to that problem, we could ask an additional question: are a thesis and its negation commensurable? My answer is positive (maybe I am wrong, but I do not even see what should mean the negative answer). Thus, if we still invoke our considerations on concrete negations, we could say that any (philosophical) thesis generates, provided an operation of logical consequence is given, a whole set of commensurable theories. And if we take a set of logically independent (‘positive’) theses and adopt the just made reasoning to all of them, then we obtain still larger set of commensurable theories. Summing up this point, I would formulate the following thesis: Even if not all (‘all possible’, ‘all conceivable’) philosophies are commensurable, there exist large spaces of commensurable philosophies. - In opposition to other my claims, this one seems to me to be almost analytically true.

In the second step, I am going to discuss the opposition ‘local’/‘global’, or -science/philosophy, and its relevance for the problem of commensurability of philosophies. I would put it thus: If there were a fundamental (absolute...) ‘gap’ (discontinuity, ‘logical break’) between science and philosophy, then the three ways, at least. First, historically: the border-line between philosophy and science (in fact, the very idea of this line) has been shifting: some classical problems/ideas of philosophy have become problems of science, to invoke but atomism or cosmology; on another hand, different problems of science disclose their philosophical relevance - the debates over the Artificial Intelligence can serve as an important example. Second, systematically: various philosophical questions (resp. disciplines) are, so to say, ‘at various distance’ from scientific problems: philosophers cannot today discuss seriously problems of time, ignoring theory of relativity or non-linear thermodynamics; they possibly can analyze problems of consciousness in an autonomic way though being-in-touch with cognitive sciences should be profitable; for the ‘fundamental question of metaphysics’ (Heidegger) “Why are there essents, why is there anything at all, rather than nothing?”, it would be rather difficult to find scientific issues that could be analogous with this question. And again, in the domain to be explored in the second part of this essay, in anthropology, the border-line between philosophical anthropology, psychology or even ‘sociological conception of man’ is virtually invisible. Third, logically: if philosophy were to learn a lesson from the set-theory (and in my opinion it should), it would be about logical inexpressibility of the intuition of ‘Everything’. The object of philosophy (at least: elocutionable) must always remain but a part of ‘Everything’.

In the third step, some words on the history of philosophy. It may be relevant for the problem of philosophy in a number of ways. First, there is a continuity of philosophical problems. Can it be seriously objected that there is a similarity between ‘Dogmatists’-Skeptics debate and that of Hegelians-positivists? Can be doubted that there is a resemblance between moral problems analyzed at a time by Socrates/Protagoras and more recently by Scheler/Ayer? Second, various philosophies are generally viewed as being more or less similar. Democritus’ cosmology and that of Epicurus’ are much closer each other than any of them is close to Plotinus cosmology (while the latter manifests, in my eyes, some intriguing convergence with the contemporary Big-Bang theory). Third, in somewhat similar vein: whatever can said of various classifications of philosophies (materialism/idealism, mechanistic-materialism/dialectical-materialism, realism/idealism, empiricism/raionalism, radical-empiricism/moderate-empiricism...) it can hardly be maintained that they are totally arbitrary. And I believe that more elaborate classifications are possible. But any classification, and elaborate one in particular, excludes ‘atomist’ or - better - ‘monadologist’ image of the space of philosophies.

Last but not least. Besides ‘theoretical’ ways of argumentation in favor of the commensurability-thesis, there is also more ‘practical’ one. Instead of debating if this thesis is true or not, we can try to check this thesis in practice. In other words put, the reasoning runs like this. Let’s say that we do not know if philosophies are commensurable or not. But if they are, they should be constructable from ‘simple elements’. Thus if we believe that it is possible that philosophies are commensurable, it is meaningful to try to construct a set of philosophies out of a set of some ‘elements’. The second, meta-anthropological part of this essay, is conceived of as an ‘experiment’ which should confirm/false the commensurability-thesis for a philosophical discipline.

While writing on Hintikka’s philosophical work, Niiniluoto says that the author of Knowledge and Belief "has contributed to conquer new realms for exact thinking. His examples of applying [new conceptual] tools...illustrate the best tradition of philosophical analysis...where the hidden and concealed presuppositions are uncovered and criticized and made more precise. This method suggests the thesis...philosophy has a radical function in our culture, since it systematically refuses to accept the idea that some conceptual frameworks would be destined to be incommensurable with each other." [Niiniluoto,1990:11] With this quote I’d like to complete my remarks on (in)commensurability.

3.2.3 I would like to end this subchapter with some words on possible worlds, unitarian metaphysics and similar issues. (Incidentally, it might be additionally noted that there are some interesting analogies between the philosophical ideas of, say, Lewis and Nowak and those of modern physics. I mean here, in particular, of the interpretation of quantum mechanics developed by Hugh Everett [cf. Davies, ed.,1996:49-53]).

These remarks have somewhat different character than those on objectivity of meaning or (in)commensurability of theories. The later have been specified since, as I suppose, they make the project of meta-philosophy meaningful. Those on Kripke, Lewis, Nowak’s theories are to be made since the idea of meta-philosophy seems to be somehow related to those theories, and I find this relation intriguing and fascinating. Therefore I would like at least to note this intuition and describe it briefly.

To be more precise, this intuition is not mine. It would be better to say that it is a modification of the intuition from which Meinong’s philosophy starts. And this ‘Meinongian’ intuition seems to be consonant with that on which Tarski’s semantics is based.

This intuition could be summarized into the following points.

First, any philosophy speaks of a world. Perhaps we should specify: any coherent philosophy. This specification, however, may not be necessary, if a paraconsistent logic or/and meinongian logic would be introduced.

Second. Any such a world does exist. ('Meinongian thesis' - thus it could be named.)
Third. Any possible world exists in a way. This assumption seems to be 'minimal' for meta-philosophy. I do not precise, and think it is not necessary to do it, whether all possible worlds exist in the same way or they have various modes of existence.

And fourth (additional) point. The following meta-philosophical conjuncture might be risked: The most fundamental metaphysical question is that of the philosophy of mathematics: how do the mathematical objects (structures) exist?

We have arrived at the brink of a metaphysical abyss. To note this, look at the sentence: 'There exists a mode of existence.' It seems to entail such a phrase as 'existence of existence'. And just here a metaphysical or/and logical abyss is opening. I do not know how to avoid this trap. I even do not know whether this trap should be avoided, or - contrarily - just explored in depth. (But, let's note that some attempts have been undertaken. I mean here of Jerzy Galecki's paper Essence of Existence. He tries to demonstrate that such compound phrases as 'essence of existence', 'essence of essence', 'existence of existence' are not meaningless. [idem,1964:49-50]

Therefore, the meaning of this sentence is rather unclear, yet I believe it is not completely devoid of any meaning. Thus, at the present moment, we have to remain on very intuitive level. In the work which is devoted to outlining a methodology of philosophy and its application in the domain of anthropology there no room for exploring such a metaphysical space. Let's return then to the main line of these considerations.

A few additional remarks about 'possible worlds' are to be made. First. I would say that situation of 'possible worlds' is more or less similar to that of classical definition of truth, or principle of two-valuedness. We can propose various definitions of truth. Moreover, on various logical levels we can avail of different definitions. However, we have at a level to decide whether some conditions are fulfilled, or - not. Thus, we have to avail of the classical definition. More simply put, however intricate the ways of reasoning, we have at a moment to decide: 'yes' or 'no'. Similarly, if we ascribe to 'our' worlds some attributes, we do not want to say (except for absolute monists, perhaps) that all these attributes are necessary and no other world is, even in the weakest sense of the word, possible. Thus, if we assume that an alternative world is possible, we have to ascribe to this world existence of a kind.

The reservation concerning monism deserves to be somewhat extended. Thus, we could say that there is a philosophical assumption of meta-philosophy that is both very metaphysical (in this sense that involved in the most metaphysical issues) and - as seen from any standpoint of a great variety of them - rather obvious. I think here of a standpoint that may be named anti-monism. In other words, meta-philosophy rejects the idea that but only one world is logically conceivable. - Or not?

Thus, the concept of 'possible worlds' seems to be presupposed by meta-philosophy. But, and this is the second remark, even if it not necessary, it is very useful for meta-philosophy. I see it as follows. According to the Meinongian intuition, any philosophy could be seen as a description of a possible world. Or, if a philosophy is to be conceived as a description of 'our' world, then it could be interpreted as a characterization of the 'location' of our world in a (the?) space of possible worlds. To follow this 'geographical' metaphor, such a location could be more or less precise: our world could be located on a 'continent', in a 'region' etc.

The notion of 'possible worlds' seems also to be useful for the discussion of (in)commensurability thesis. Availing of this concept, and following an intuition, we could interpret the incommensurability thesis as one claiming for the impossibility of any comparison between two 'worlds'. Putting it in other words, we could say that, according to the - incommensurability-thesis, we cannot find any 'space' ('supra-world?') in which those worlds could be located, and - compared.

And reading this interpretation in the opposite direction, we could say that, according to the commensurability-thesis, for any two possible worlds we can find a space into which the both can be embedded; therefore, they are - in this space - comparable.

As for me, I tend to believe in the commensurability-thesis. On the other hand, I don't think that this thesis, in its general form, could be proved in a way. It can work only as a regulative idea that calls for further attempts to prove it for any particular and - not yet demonstrated case. (We could make a comparison with this claim and so-called Church-thesis.)

I think that at this very end of these considerations, we might invoke some ideas of Hintikka. In a paper (incidentally noting, presented first at a conference on explanation and understanding) on The Intentions of Intentionality, he offers a simple and interesting solution to the problem of intentionality. He says that "a concept is intentional then and only then when it is linked with taking at the same time into account possible states of things (shortly speaking, many 'possible worlds'...). In other words, semantics of possible worlds is the logic of intentionality, and intentional is what requires reference to semantics of possible worlds." [Hintikka,1992:111]

Interestingly, specially in the context of the dyptychal character of the present essay, Hintikka suggests that his thesis ('of intentionality as intentionality') is, in its general ring, quite close to the declaration of William Hazlitt (1778-1830, an author of essays on Sheakspeare), who wrote that "man is the only animal which laughs and weeps; for it is the only animal being struck by the difference between the way in which matters happen to be and that in which they should be." [ibidem:112]

3.3. Philosophers (professional and other) are free

If we speak about feasibility of a project, be it trip to Mars or construction of a poetry-translating computer or whatever else, we should distinguish two basic aspects of the project in question. On one side, its 'internal' objective content, on the other - its 'external' subjective sense. Adopting this terminology, we could say that in the former point the 'internal' (logical or epistemological) feasibility of the project of meta-philosophy was discussed, and in the present point the 'external' (sociological and psychological) factors are to be debated.

The question which arises here may be formulated in that way. History of philosophy has been much more a history of struggles and rivalry than of cooperation; mutual misunderstanding has dominated over understanding. And so on... In the light of the historical experience, can we say that the program outlined in the chapter 2 has any reasonable degree of (social/psychological) realism? My answer to this question is positive. Specification of this answer and accounting for it is the goal of this sub-chapter.

3.3.1. The basic anthropological assumption I start from might be formulated briefly so: people are free, thus - in particular - philosophers are. Well, we are not necessarily - completely free, possibly - we are only partly free. But, I would say, the more free the more the issues to be settled are distant from the biological necessities:
people are not usually able to choose freely such a way of acting which would entail
permanent starvation, pain, risk of death... Still people are able to choose quiet life
rather than career, romantic love rather than big money... Thus, if it really is so,
philosophers should be able to choose cooperative attitude rather than competitive. If
they (if we...) only decide. And the decision depends, at least partly, on the accepted
values. Thus the importance of ideology which promotes these values. (In this
perspective, it must be honestly admitted, the present text is in some its aspects -
ideological. And it is deliberately so.)

3.3.2. Not only our biological nature but also social relations set constraints on our
freedom. Yet these relations are not 'given' to us. They are products of our actions.
Therefore, we may try to reorganize these relations through collective actions.
Various institutional arrangements can either strengthen or weaken these or those our
propensities.

In other words, we can create (or, more modestly, modify) ourselves. Partly
through meditation, contemplation and the like. And part through a roundabout
way - through participation is the change of social relations.

Moreover, I believe that we can learn how to change ourselves: how to avoid
unintended results and how to make more probable the expected ones. Thus, in
particular, I think that we can learn how to reorganize our academic practice so that
we change some our attitudes so that we can further change our practice.

If you accept this general anthropological stance, and if you share some values
I declared earlier, you should agree that the goal of sociology of knowledge is not (or
rather: should not be) to contemplate such facts as wishful-thinking, pseudo-
theoretical rationalizations of ideologies etc. In other words, sociology of knowledge
can - and should - be an instrument of transforming of the knowledge-production.

3.3.3. I think that the scope of possibilities of self-transformation of intellectual
practice need not to be constant. I suppose that some processes ongoing in the
contemporary world may open more space for transformations of philosophical
community. I mean in the first range globalization in general, and 'Internet' in
particular. The world-community of philosophers is today so numerous that it is
probable that a group of people sharing cooperative values is there. The point is how
they should find themselves. Just 'Internet' is the solution which instantly comes to
mind.

3.4. The project is morally acceptable

Let me start from a doubt. Should we discuss the moral dimension of this project? A
priori, it may be expected that its fate will be the same as that of so many other
projects, philosophical or not. And the fate is so familiar to all of us who spend their
lives writing books and papers: the death-silence of libraries, the dust-covered
shelves... Yet, if we regard ourselves seriously, and why should we not?, we should
not dismiss moral issues. We should take into account the probability, if very small
one, that our project will live and that we are thus responsible for it.

3.4.1. Is then the idea of meta-philosophy morally acceptable? It is, if the idea of
intellectual freedom is. And if the idea of possibly wide tolerance is. Well, neither
the value of intellectual freedom nor the value of tolerance is absolute, indisputable. I
tend to think that these values are - as many, many other - ambivalent. Ambivalent,
since there are other - and important - values which are, directly or indirectly, in
opposition to - in our case - intellectual freedom and tolerance.

Conservatism may be such a value ('conservatism' may be regarded as a name
for a family of such values as 'sense of continuity', 'rootedness', 'sense of
individual/collective identity'... it is hardly possible to maintain that any of them is
not a positive value at all). And, as Pomian once noted, true conservatism is (at)
philosophical: "any postulating presupposes...that individual is something more than
mere bodily-physical being, and thus it ascribes to him...the power of detaching from
his present state...Metaphysics, which is not separable from postulating,...even if in
words it accepts...the existing situation, justification of this acceptance is not based
on the fact that this situation is just there, but on the actual or imagine compatibility
with the accepted ideal. Therefore, the actual social conservatism has always been
profoundly anti-philosophical; its proponents suspect...that accepting the existing
situation, if justified by regarding it as compatible with an ideal, contains already a
critique of this situation and going beyond it, for it presupposes existence of a norm
which bases its justification on freely chosen reason..." [Pomian,1973:234-235]
(Interestingly enough, there may be a similarity between conservatism and
mysticism; as Smullyan claims, apologists of mysticism "are philosophers rather than
genuine mystics" [Smullyan,1995:24].)

Philosophical conservatism is at least a bit weaker conservatism than the
former; meta-philosophy goes perhaps a step further - it excludes the strongest
version of philosophical conservatism (rejection of possibly wide tolerance) - it
allows for any other version of (philosophical) conservatism.

Intellectual freedom, or lack of indoctrination, however important, is by no
means a self-evident absolute value. Specially, if we formulate this value in other
words: if we speak of society without individuals being moral or philosophical
authorities for others. If only so re-formulated, this value reveals its ambiguities: it is
by no means obvious that society without any individuals exercising personal
(moral, intellectual...) authority is possible and desirable.

Emotional engagement (in a Weltanschauung, in an ideology...) may be (and
also from my personal standpoint - is) a value. And this value might be at odds with one
being fundamental for the project of meta-philosophy. I think here of the ideal of
analytical clarity. Apparently, it is rather formal (non-substantive) requirement; yet,
not ethically neutral. Analytical clarity demands - from psychological point of view
- a somewhat 'cool' attitude. Surely, not necessarily even Stoics' apathy is
demanded, but a dose of emotional self-control - is required. And how much of such
self-control can 'coexist' with emotional engagement - cannot be precisely defined.

Perhaps also other values are at variance with those promoted by the program
of meta-philosophy. These three mentioned: conservatism, existence of intellectual
authorities, and emotional engagement seem to be the most important.

3.4.2. While considering moral acceptability of the project of meta-philosophy, we
should pay attention to the following facts.

First, closed societies are in our time just impossible (at least as far as we do
don't speculate about modernized 'concentration-camps' society). Therefore, plurality
of ideas is just a fact. And if so, pure conservatism (in the Pomian's sense) is just
impossible too. The only open question is 'Whether plurality?' but - 'What plurality?' Chaotic, difficult to be oriented in, or - ordered, equipped with 'orientation marks'? Generating noise of ideological battle-cries, or - more tempered murmuring of a logical dialogue? Being an area of rivalry and competing for publicity, fame etc., or - of cooperation, encounter of personalities etc.? If this is the actual choice, I have no doubt what should be chosen; ...what should be chosen - if we are to be faithful to the great European tradition, from Socrates to Husserl. And being faithful is a component of conservative attitude...

Second, there is no simple relation between knowledge of various ideas and instability of one’s views. Quite contrary, according to some socio-psychological theories, we may observe what was called 'effect of immunity'. A well known social psychologists describes its effecting thus: 'presentation of argumentation of both sides, linked with an attempt at refuting enemy's arguments, is not only more efficacious as a technology of propaganda, but also - if skillfully applied - generally increases the receivers' resistance against subsequent counter-propaganda.' [Riddle, 1998:135]

And third, it should be stressed that the program of meta-philosophy does not claim for any exclusiveness. It is just in accordance with the main line in this program to debate various strategies of developing philosophy, and - what is more important at this point - of teaching philosophy. A priori, it is possible that various combinations of the meta-theoretical strategy and that more traditional one ('dogmatic' - but without negative connotations; thus - quoting mark) should be adopted. In other words, it may be that in practice the role of 'moderator' and that of 'priest' should not be completely separated. In particular, a hypothesis seems very plausible which says that at various levels of (philosophical) education - from kindergarten (not very popular yet in some places in the world practiced) to universities.

3.5. Final remark: on the idea of the Voraussetzungslosigkeit

'Philosophical assumptions of meta-philosophy' - the title of this chapter may seem to be a puzzle, or perhaps a joke. In fact, it does indicate some real problems, surely only partially - if at all - to be solved below. But not only philosophy is involved in such logical traps. Mathematics, apparently the embodiment of logical precision and clarity of construction, is not free from logical difficulties. Thus, before we try to grapple with logical complexities of philosophy, an eye-cast on the situation in that domain will be of some help.

Mathematics of Metamathematics - so reads the title of one of the standard books on metamathematics. In the Preface, the authors say: "The title is not meant as a pun, although it may, at first sight, appear to be so" [Rasiowa& Sikorski,1970:5] They inform us that "metamathematics is a theory which deals with formalized mathematical theories" [ibidem]. The latter are viewed as sets of formulas and sets of terms, and the set of all formulas and the set of all terms...can in turn be the subject of mathematical investigations employing more or less advanced auxiliary methods taken from mathematics". Interestingly, "applications of metamathematics to mathematics", are possible, though in the quoted work disregarded [ibidem:7].

And quite recently, I have met - in a popular book on physics - a diagram representing "vicious circle of physics". It is composed of four boxes, containing subsequently the following concepts: 'light being reflected from things; relativist definition of space and time; movement; interactions related to non-steady movement'. Arrows representing determinations run from the first to the second to the third to the fourth and back to the first box. [Riddle, 1998:135]

Having read these words, one might say that philosophers should not be more logically careful than mathematicians and physicists are. Perhaps, it might be said so; especially, if only purely logical aspect of the problem is considered. Perhaps, we could learn even a praxiological lesson from 'exact sciences': first actual developments, even if logical risk is there, and only later on - logical purification. (We could additionally note that not only 'abstract' mathematics of Cantor and Russell, of Hilbert and Goedel, but the even core-discipline - analysis /differential and integral calculus/ was developed while its basic concepts were logically contradictory.)

Yet, if we take into account the specific character of philosophy, in particular its links with religions, political ideologies and other forms of Weltanschauung, philosophers should not be so complacent. In a sense, logical difficulties, and specially those of which circle is an image, should be attention-attracting for philosophers rather than for mathematicians.

3.6. Meta-philosophy is here conceived of as a 'common good' of various philosophical orientations, as a space for encounter of various philosophies: for inter-philosophical dialogue. However, as it has possibly been demonstrated in this chapter, the very idea of meta-philosophy presupposes some philosophical ideas. And yet, perhaps we could somehow dispense of those suppositions? And if not, what consequences - demolishing or not - for the project? Anyway, the confusion which arises here must not be neglected. Therefore, I'd like to discuss now the idea of the Voraussetzungslosigkeit. (Mainly, I shall avail of the Dobowski's [1987] book on this subject)

At the first sight, this idea seems to be outdated: hermeneutics and sociology of knowledge, Kuhn and cultural relativism... And a good deal of analytical philosophy is in this case in agreement with hermeneutics... (Gadamer and Goedel versus Husserl and Hilbert; it demonstrates, incidentally, the complexity of the space of philosophies...). Not to say about post-modernism, and also Marxism, and semiotics... Virtually all the powers of the to-day philosophy are (seem to be) against it. And yet, in my opinion, this idea deserves to be critically over-worked, and - in a sense - continued.

But first, to avoid pseudo-debates based upon misunderstandings, an overview of various meanings of this concept should be presented. Though (or perhaps just because of the fact) - according to Dobowski - such concepts as Voraussetzungslosigkeit, voraussetzunglose Forschung, voraussetzunglose Wissenschaft, or just Voraussetzungslosigkeit, came into existence in the mid-19th century and thus their history has been relatively short [Dobowski,1987:13], they are rather ambiguous: in particular, we may distinguish five main interpretations of the notion of Voraussetzungslosigkeit.

In the first ("radical and literal") sense, it denotes the possibility and necessity of removing all assumptions from the consciousness of the knowing subject (resp. subject of philosophical or scientific reflection) [Dobowski,1987:128].

In the second, less radical sense, it designates removing - from science and philosophy - "dogmatic assumptions", in particular, of religious, political or ideological character [ibidem:130].
In the third sense, this notion has a 'logical' meaning: it is read as postulate of 'claim for foundation' (petitio principii) without slipping into either circularus vitiosus, or regressus ad infinitum, or just - dogmatism. [ibidem:134]

In the fourth sense, it may be - more or less precisely - identified with Weber's idea of value-free science; in other words - with the postulate demanding separation between description and explanation on one hand, and evaluation on the other. [ibidem:137]

In the fifth sense, it denotes a practical postulate of "freedom of science" [ibidem:141]. Quite interestingly, it is just this very meaning was central when the word Voraussetzungslosigkeit was gaining currency. It was Theodor Mommsen who is said to have popularized this concept in the context of debates over university-freedom. [ibidem:14] And nine years earlier von Treitschke had already used this term while discussing relations between education and churches [ibidem:140].

Let me comment now on these notions. I will start from the very end. The idea of 'freedom of science' seems to be obvious. Yet, it is not so. I would say that the main concern has usually been with what might be called 'external freedom' of science; political in particular. No doubt political freedom of scientific investigations is of the utmost importance. I would like to avoid any possible impression that I should disregard it. Nevertheless, I would insist that the question of 'internal freedom' is of no lesser importance. Still more, today - as long (let's hope, it will be very, very long...) as we live in the 'third wave of democratization', as Samuel Huntington calls it, - it is rather the 'internal freedom' which should be of focal concern.

I do not want to decide what the situation is in mathematics or natural sciences. But as regards social sciences (humanities), I dare to say that they lack this kind of freedom to a degree. To put it in a brief though crude manner, the internal freedom of cognition is, in various orientations to various extent, limited by more or less hidden 'wishful thinking': a good deal of historical materialism which can be viewed as a pseudo-theoretical rationalization of the role ascribed to proletariat may serve here as the best example. But many others might be cited too. This point is in rather obvious way linked with the fourth and second meaning. - All these issues are practically very important, yet - at least on the level of philosophical declarations - not very much controversial.

It is the first (and third) meaning which is really at stake. And it is just this meaning in which the idea of Voraussetzungslosigkeit happens to be called 'utopian' (as in the title of Wolenski's paper: Why Presuppositionless is an Utopia?" [Wolenski,1996:137]) Therefore, just these two meaning s will be discussed below.

3.6.2. Thus: utopia or not utopia? If we take the notion of Voraussetzungslosigkeit in the first/third sense, and in this sense we take it literally, one will have to agree with Wolenski. The arguments formulated in the quoted paper are - in my opinion - quite convincing: Voraussetzungslosigkeit (understood literally) is an utopia.

But saying this, we may make a step further and ask "Utopia? Well, yes. And so what?" Are utopias in general meaningless? I wouldn't say so. Utopias may, and sometimes actually do, describe some ideals which are worth to be striven for, even if the attempts can be rewarded with partial success, at best. And Voraussetzungslosigkeit is, in my view, just such a utopia. Let me tell why.

First, the motivation of this idea has been linked with the ideal of episteme, of the certainty; in other words - with the monological ideal of knowledge. Ideal which today tends to be in disrepute. Yet this ideal has, despite some elements deserving - in my view - criticism and rejection, had an aspect which should be preserved. If we counter-pose episteme and doxa, we manifest our belief in the existence of supra-individual, impersonal authority compared with which all individuals are fundamentally equal, and should be - humble. This belief, if seriously accepted, manifests itself - positively - in the interpersonal relations and attitudes.

Second. Irrespective of what has just been said, or rather - in a complementary way to it, this idea of Voraussetzungslosigkeit could also be linked with the - some would say: just coming into existence - dialogical ideal of knowledge. In this context, it might be read as follows: the less we assume the more can be debated, the 'wider' will be the area of debate. And the 'wider' the area of debate, the greater the group of potential participants in the given debate.

In other words put, we can read the program of voraussetzungslosiphilosophy as an 'regulative idea' as determines the direction of a process, the process of looking for a 'possibly weak' set of presumptions. How much weak it actually can be (a relativization should be added: in the given context) cannot be decided in advance.

To shed some more light on this problem, I'd like to draw your attention to some analogies between the (phenomenological) idea of the Voraussetzungslosigkeit of cognition and some other epistemological ideals.

First, very brief remark on the ideal of perfect measurement, important for classical physics. This ideal claims that the imprecision of measurement may be - at least: theoretically - reduced to zero. This ideal was fundamentally impaired by the Heisenber's principle. However, in the limits determined by this principle, this ideal remains both theoretically and practically valid.

Second, more important analogy: with so-called Hilbert's program in metamathematics. This program could be re-interpreted, in the present context, thus.

If we want to demonstrate that mathematics is consistent, we should not use those concepts which are 'controversial' (as, for instance, the concept of innumerable set). We should limit ourselves only to the simplest ('finite') concepts. Of course, while availing of the concepts, we have to accept some theses. But the theses which involve only 'simplest' concepts should be evident; no doubts should arise as to their truth.

Due to Godel's theorem, it turned out that Hilbert's program is not realizable. Nevertheless, after the another four decades, it was demonstrated that, in its turn, the non-realizability conclusion calls for some qualifications. I think here about the program (initiated by Harvey Friedman in 1974) of so-called reverse mathematics [cf. Murawski,1995:135] Its main objective is to find possibly 'weak' ('finite-like') form of fundamental theory (mainly -arithmetic) on the ground of which other mathematical theories can be proven. According to a Polish mathematician and philosopher, the results obtained in the reverse-mathematics "demonstrate that a large and significant part of classical mathematics can be reduced to finitist mathematics. Thus, the original Hilbert's program can be, of only partially realized." [ibidem:136]

Availing of this example, we could maintain that a weaker form of the idea of Voraussetzungslosigkeit should be viewed as 'non-utopian'.

3.5.3. What about the assumptions of the idea of meta-philosophy? The presented here idea of meta-anthropology seems to have philosophical assumptions of two sorts. The first group comprises some assumption concerning such notions like 'meaning', 'sense', 'understanding'. Controversial as they might be, they are rather distant from those that are central to the (meta-)anthropology. So, even proponents of
opposing anthropologies should not find any special troubles with accepting them. - Thus might be summarized my position.

To this brief formulation, I'd like to add what follows. To claim that one's thesis is interesting manifests - in my opinion - quite proper, moderate dose of self-confidence. To claim that one's thesis is true manifests courage, acceptable - I think. But to claim that one's thesis is the only one being meaningful is, I tend to think, manifestation of the intellectual arrogance.

Therefore, even if - in a sense - the assumption that extremely different theses (in particular - metaphysical) are meaningful is very strong, it is - on the other side - very natural, being manifestation of an moral virtue, of intellectual modesty (and modesty is to be understood here as opposition just to arrogance, and not to courage).

If, for instance, Christian philosophers and theologians disputed the relations between human and divine nature of Jesus Christ, even an atheist has no reason to claim that he does not understand what the dispute is about. In consequence, he has no reason to maintain that this debate should be 'meaningless'.

In somewhat crude manner, my thesis could be formulated thus. If anything should be regarded by philosopher as 'given', it is philosophy itself, or - more precisely - history of philosophy.

To put it still another way. I'd say that in the case of the problem of meaning we are in a similar situation as in the case of solipsism. I tend to suppose that solipsistic metaphysics is quite consistent and can be, from the purely logical point of view, accepted. But, following a story told somewhere by Russell, we can say that any defense and propaganda of this standpoint must be seen as, so to say, 'pragmatically (though not logically) inconsistent'.

Assuming a different standpoint, we could perhaps divide philosophies into two classes. Any philosophy of the first class would be a logical/epistemological 'black hole': there is no (logical) way out of such a philosophy; it can only be abandoned. Such theories/philosophies do not allow for any inter-philosophical dialogue. And the second class: all these philosophies, however different, that allow for inter-philosophical dialogue.

It cannot be decided in advance, but it seems to me that the assumptions, shared by the philosophies belonging to the second class, are compatible with great many philosophies. (So, we return to a weak version of the \textit{Voraussetzunglosigkeit} idea.).

An analogy (not incidental, I believe) may be noted, namely between the idea of meta-philosophy and that of democracy: there is a set of various political doctrines/ideologies which are compatible with (the idea of) democracy. On the other hand, it is obvious that not all political ideas are compatible with the that idea.

As far as now, I've made some remarks concerning the first (logical') group of philosophical assumption of the idea of meta-philosophy. There remains still the second group.

The assumptions it comprises are - at the first sight - more troublesome: they are anthropological in their nature. From the point of view of a non-philosopher, they are much more controversial, and - important, than the 'logical' ones. And in the particular context of this meta-anthropological essay, they might appear particularly disturbing.

This impression, however not completely groundless, is rather not correct. The anthropological assumptions are - in a sense - less important (logically) than the former. More precisely, they have nothing to do with the very idea of (meta-) philosophy (meta-anthropology). They do not affect the logical possibility ('semantics') of meta-philosophy (Note, for comparison, that without the assumptions of the first type meta-philosophy is just not conceivable.)

They have to do with practical motives ('pragmatics') of this idea. But to accept it, you do not have to accept all the reasons I have given above. In particular, you can accept the hermeneutic reasons while rejecting the ethical ones, or any others.

It is to be also noted that, in the case of anthropological assumptions, we should speak about probabilities rather than of necessities. And if we are speaking about probabilities, we are to speak about risk. And here we arrive to a sphere of very individual, subjective decisions. Surely, some of us will take up a very risky action, if only its intended goal is of sufficiently great value.

As regards the practical motives and their anthropological assumptions, one could also try another way of grappling with this difficulty (a kind of circularity). We could say that philosophical activity can be, as any one, regarded as a field of 'verification/falsification' (I use here these terms in a broad and vague sense) of different anthropologies. So, if you morally accept this practical project you can try your hand, even if you are intellectually skeptical as to its theoretical (anthropological) foundations.
4. Some roots and analogies of this idea

The idea of meta-philosophy as presented in this essay has surely many sources of which I am possibly aware to a degree only. To my knowledge, they might be described as below.

This idea has also some interesting analogies in various domains of science and art. They might shed some light on this idea. They also seem to demonstrate that there is a trend in culture, and perhaps in social life in general, of which these various phenomena are reflections and manifestations.

It should be stressed that the only aim of this chapter is to offer a brief sketch of what may be regarded as a historical background for the ideas presented in the previous chapters.

4.1. Roots in philosophy

4.1.1. Let me commence this part with remarks on Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt of Roman Ingarden. If I am allowed to make a personal confession, it is just this work from which I drew some impulses to think in the way I had done before I started to write this text and am doing while writing it. And leaving this rather unimportant fact aside, I must stress that it is a work which remains the best, known to me, embodiment of the method of cultivating philosophy which, as I believe, deserves recommendation - for reasons I tried to present in chapter 2.

In this work, Ingarden took a very interesting and unusual way to solve the title-problem. He attempted to formulate and classify all possible solutions. Quite a considerable number of the solutions are formulated: in the 26 in which the tentative results are summed up, out of 64 initially taken into account cases 19 (resp.15) are presented as possible. [Ingarden,1987:183-185] Later on, further modifications are introduced - however without finding 'the' solution. Instead, the last third volume is devoted to the problems of causality and determinism. However interesting are the paths of Ingarden’s ontology, I cannot follow them here. Thus, without going into further details, I’d like to make still a few remarks about Ingarden’s method.

First, Ingarden is fully aware that the very formulation of the inaugural question is based upon many assumptions, including ones entailed by the basic notions [ibidem:20]. He does not exclude the possibility that, neither solution, given the assumptions, will turn out to be ontologically admissible. [ibidem:186]

Second, the relevance of the idea of ontology should be underscored. Constructing his specific notion of ontology, Ingarden assumes that it is possible to investigate "pure possibilities or pure relations of necessity" [ibidem:41] According to him, "ontological consideration consists in a priori analysis of the content of ideas". [ibidem:45] And it is metaphysics which "goes beyond the scope of ontological considerations…going into domain of actual being" [ibidem:44] It might be suggested that my notion of meta-philosophy corresponds, at least roughly, with Ingarden’s notion of ontology and my notion of a (! - this or that) philosophy - with Ingarden’s notion of metaphysics.

Third, the basic difference between Ingarden’s position and that of the present author consists in the fact that Ingarden tried to eliminate many solutions since he was looking for the solution, (even if he did not claim to have found any) and I am skeptical as to both possibility and desirability of such an elimination. It is also to be noticed that the method remains a method of one, if very important, work and had no systematic continuation in the subsequent writing of Ingarden himself.

Fourth, it is worthwhile to be noted that Ingarden’s ‘aprioric-combinatorial and eliminative (per contradictionem) method’ was interpreted as a ‘modified Ars Combinatoria of Raimund Lullus, the famous scholastic of the second half of the 13th century’ [Lubnicki,1972-99]. Saying these words, their author intended, I believe, to criticize Ingarden (the very term ‘scholastic’ has in Lubnicki rather negative connotation). This evaluation of Lullus’ ideas is, however, by no means obvious. For instance, a physicist and specialist in computer sciences is writing about "beautiful idea of Ramon Lull" and counts this idea among sources of informatique [Duch,1997:21] As for me, I would say here also of Leibniz and note that Lullus is viewed today as one of the forerunners of the heuristics, and Leibniz’s ideas - as just a continuation of those of the Spanish thinker. And these remarks on Ingarden may be supplemented with the cited above opinion about analytical philosophy which is said to be "not only a result of breaking with virtually all tradition of so-called modern times, but also of the return pre-Cartesian, classical thought - to Plato, Aristotle, scholasticism, and among the modern - to Leibniz." [Bocheński,1993:43]

And fifth, at the very end of these remarks on Ingarden’s magnum opus, a brief quote from the Preface: “War, of which the proper face manifested but in Poland, ... demanded not only fortitude and courage in making decisions but also unwavering moral attitude. And this attitude, in its turn, demanded that we should terminate the evading important theoretical decisions what has been so characteristic for many currents in 20th century philosophy, and particularly for neopositivism which was so flourishing with us in the 1930s.” [Ingarden,1987:12]

4.1.2. I would like to develop the above-made remark on Leibniz. In his early work De arte combinatoria, he tried to further the method originated by Raimund Lullus. Mathematical symbolism should serve as a basis for characteristica universalis, an universal language. And such a language was conceived of by him not as a goal for itself but as a way to universal knowledge that could be summed up in an encyclopedia. Incidentally, he not only outlined such big projects but was also active in practical undertakings which were effectuate them: Leibnitz participated in organizing scientific societies.

Very interesting was his view - in a way precursory to Hegel’s ideas - on the development of philosophy: “History of philosophy was for him perennial philosophy. One thinker may over-stress one aspect of the reality, while his follower - other aspect or other truth; still all systems contain the truth.” [Copleston,1995a:267]

Even in the domain of theology, in his Systema theologicum, he was looking for a common area for understanding between Catholics and Protestants. And these theological endeavors, published about four decades after the Treaty of Westphalia, had an obvious political dimension: A ‘union of the Christian princes’ was his vision, somewhat - unfortunately - untimely.

The socio-historical dimension of Leibniz’s philosophy is underscored in Toulmin’s study of ‘the hidden agenda of modernity’ (as the subtitle of his Cosmopolis runs): “Leibniz did not work at mathematics or metaphysics merely for their own interest: for him, they were also a means to more practical ends. His German origins and his experience as a diplomat lent encouragement to his lifelong mission as a theological ‘ecumenist’ /.../ Across Germany, the previous generation saw prosperous cities destroyed: some 35 percent of the country’s population was
slaughtered to the great glory of a Calvinist, Lutheran, or Catholic God. How could a man with Leibniz's background and diplomatic contacts avoid asking how one might prevent a recurrence of this catastrophe?" [Toulmin, 1990:161]

While citing Toulmin, let's not neglect his evaluation of Leibniz's project: "It was a noble dream, but a dream nonetheless. As we can now see, it rested upon two unrealizable assumptions: first, that the characters in such a perfect language could 'express our thoughts' without any need for conventional agreements on their meanings; secondly that, by substituting this artificial language for the natural languages of different countries, their people might avoid the breakdowns in communication that fueled the Religious Wars. Unfortunately, there was and is no way of doing what Leibniz hoped to do: viz. to equate the private 'thoughts' of people from different cultures, nations, Lebensformen, or language communities in wholly non-arbitrary ways. Nor absent some diviney assured 'providential harmony', can we guarantee in advance that the same thoughts are spontaneously evoked in people from different cultures when placed in similar situations. The project of constructing a universal language is not difficult, as Leibniz conceives, it is downright impossible. It assumes that the modes of life and concepts of people in all cultures are similar enough the yield the same 'ideal languages' as their end products: that is, it assumes at the outset what the enterprise was initially supposed to guarantee as its final outcome. Without independent assurance that different peoples perceive and interpret their experiences in sufficiently similar ways - as Leibniz said, that they have the same thoughts' there is no agreement about the 'meanings' of the terms in our artificial language; without such prior agreement, there is no subsequent guarantee of mutual intelligibility."[Toulmin, 1990:102-103]

As you surely guess, I do not agree with Toulmin. More precisely, I'd say that he granted us no 'proof of impossibility' for universal language. But of course the lack of such a proof cannot be regarded as a strong argument in favor of the 'possibility-thesis'; at best it can validate some positive expectation as to the demonstration of such a thesis. In my view, the problem can be reduced to the following two questions. First, one concerning the possibility of translating a culture into the language of its own logic and mathematics. And second, concerning the relations between culturally different logics and culturally different mathematics.

The second issue is an immense historical problem. Yet the superficial knowledge about logic and mathematics, at least in such major civilizations as Chinese, Indian, Arabian and Western, seems to confirm the thesis about similarities and points of convergence rather than about fundamental differences. The first issue is much more philosophical. And as to this very issue, I would maintain that it is - at least for now - undecided: thus we can try to develop projects being based on the assumption of 'mathematization of culture'. As suggested Lullus, Leibniz and others.

Commenting on Leibniz's works devoted to such issues as the idea of 'ars inveniendi', the concept of 'alphabet of human thoughts', the project of ideographic language, Marciszewski notes: "texts of Leibniz are historical bridge between ages-old tradition of formal logic and information-civilization which is starting in our times". [Marciszewski, 1992:164] And I would add, on my part, that if anyone of great thinkers should be elected a patron for meta-philosophy it is Leibniz who deserves it more than any other philosopher.

4.1.3. An instance of a method being to a degree similar to that of Ingarden may be found in a work of Bogusław Wolniewicz. In his book entitled Ontology of situations. Fundamentals and applications some ideas of Wittgenstein's Tractatus are developed. He continues also some philosophical ideas of Frege, Meinong, and Suszko. [Wolniewicz, 1985:13] And formally, he makes use of lattice theory and Boolean algebras.

His ontology is used first to explicate the sense of logical atomism as formulated in Hume's A Treatise on Human Nature and in Wittgenstein. Then he defines other algebraic structures which allow for modeling other philosophies. In result, we obtain an classification of various ontologies [[ibidem:92].

(And, incidentally, if we speak about a remark on post-modernism is perhaps to be made. Keeping in mind its 'anti-holistic' tendencies, two issues might be noted. First, it would be interesting to decide if metaphysics of post-modernism - that it has one is beyond doubt - assumes a form of logical atomism. If so, it would be quite interesting result...And if not...Who really believes in absolute monism of the Parmenides or perhaps Bradleian sort? And if most of us do not, what is all that clamor about? Thus, even in our debates on post-modernism we should avoid of Wolniewicz's ontology...) Some methodological reflections of Wolniewicz should not be neglected. He characterizes his work as a part of comparative philosophy. Translation from one philosophical language into another one is its basic procedure. According to him, the correctness of translation can always be objected. Yet, it is just he who is questioning this correctness who should demonstrate concretely what was translated imprecisely or falsely. [ibidem:131] Two systems should be compared through translation into a third one. Such a translation may be not possible for whole systems; thus we should translate - and compare - subsystems.

4.1.4. And now about ideas of Nicolai Hartmann, presented in his essay on Der philosophische Gedanke und seine Geschichte and in Systematische Selbstdarstellung They might be summarized as follows.

First: in the history of philosophy one can distinguish two great lines: the line of system-constructive thought, and the problem-investigating thought. According to Hartmann, the first one was represented - among others - by Plotinus, Spinoza, Hegel; the second - by Plato and Aristotle, partly Descartes,Leibniz, Kant. If we take a single philosopher, we should speak of relative wage in his thought of these two tendencies rather than of its absolutely systemic or problem character. [Hartmann, 1994:14-15]

Second: systems are changing and are rather ephemeral; problems have their historical continuity. [ibidem:16]

Third: problems are there; they are not produced by men an cannot be annulled. [ibidem]

Fourth: the progress in philosophy consists first of all in disclosing the content of problems (which is not always directly visible). [ibidem:17]

Fifth: "Problem-thinking is not non-systematic. It attempts to grasp the whole. It is system which directs it. But it does not assume it in advance". [ibidem:74]

Those ideas of Hartmann may be viewed as a continuation of the Marburg-school philosophy in which he started his philosophical activity. And, according to Czarnawska's presentation, this philosophy may be summarized into the thesis: "cognition is question" [Czarnawska, 1987:92] And, P. Natorp to be quoted after
Let us also note that while presenting a brief history of erotetic logic, and indicating some issues which remain to be touched upon, Koj and Wiśniewski point out to the "very important notions...cited by Nicolai Hartmann: Problemstellung, Problemilage, Problembewusstsein" [Koj&Wiśniewski,1989:v/v]

4.1.5. I would also like to speak here of a whole tradition which might be briefly described as 'voluntarist epistemology'. We should begin with St. Augustine and then pass to Duns Scotus who stressed the volitional and not only intellectual character of cognition. This tradition was continued by Descartes. In his fourth Meditation, we find the following analysis: "my own errors...depend...upon interaction of two causes, namely upon my cognitive faculty and choosing-faculty (a facultate eligendi) or freedom of decision (ab arbitrio libertate),i.e. upon intellect and upon will as well. With the intellect itself I grasp only the ideas of which I can formulate an opinion, thus in the properly conceived intellect no error - in the proper sense of the word - can be found." [Descartes,1958:74] He finds in himself freedom of decision which consists in 'confirmation or negation of what our intellect puts us forward" [ibidem:76] While speaking of Descartes, let's note that - according to Koj and Wiśniewski - it was he may be the first thinker "who developed some concern in problems and questions". [Koj&Wiśniewski,1989:v/v]

This idea was continued by Malebranche who wrote: "It is not our senses that delude us; it is our will that deludes us with its inconsiderate judgments." [Malebranche,5; cited after: Copleston,1995/a/:182] Ideas of similar kind we find in Husserl. In particular, his idea of phenomenological reduction seem to develop these Cartesian ideas we've just mentioned. And to make a step further, we could link the tradition in question with some logical considerations on assertion. The marker introduced by Frege (resp. its reversal introduced by Łukasiewicz) might be regarded as representing the Cartesian act of accepting (resp. negating) decision. Conversely, the Husserlian reduction might be viewed as procedure of removing the Fregean (or Łukasiewicz's) mark. Austin's distinctions (his classification of speech acts as locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary) belongs, in my opinion, to the same family of ideas.

Let me complement these remarks on Husserl with a few words on some ideas of Searle (presented in his book on Intentionality,...). Unfortunately I avail but of a brief presentation, given by Paśniczek (1994)). He distinguishes two elements of each speech act: its illocutionary power and its propositional content. We could avail of this distinction and say that each speech act may be represented by a complex proposition composed of a proper/neutral proposition and an epistemic functor: Ep (for instance 'I believe that God exists'). If so, it may be concluded that epistemic functor represents the illocutionary power of an act, and the 'neutral' proposition the propositional content, respectively. It might be also suggested that Searle's analyses are parallel to those of Husserl. In particular, I mean here the change of the natural attitude (natürliche Einstellung) obtained due to epoché.

Let me add that the idea of meta-philosophy draws also from R. Ingarden's considerations in his lecture Über die Stellung der Erkenntnistheorie im System der Philosophie [Ingarden,1971:381-406]. The main point of Ingarden's conception is that, according to him, epistemology and metaphysics are logically independent. Ingarden's position is of particular importance in the context of various skeptical (post-modernist one including) epistemologies. In the context of this theory, the following Ingarden's opinion is perfectly understandable: "Regardless of how the issue of the possibility that we - people - will obtain well justified solutions of metaphysical problems will ultimately be explained - metaphysical problems do exist and call for solutions." [Ingarden, 1963, 646]

I cannot continue this discussion. Let me only remark that meta-philosophy should be, in my opinion, on both analysis and phenomenological description. These two methods of meta-philosophy are both complementary, and as it has just been partly demonstrated or at least suggested, symmetrical.

4.1.6. If I should speak about 'ideology of philosophy', and if but one name should be invoked, that of Feyerabend were. First of all, his eulogy of tolerance and pluralism: "You can be a good empiricist only if are prone to work with many alternative theories rather than with one theoretical point of view and with 'experience'. This multitude of theories must not be regarded as the initial stage of knowledge to be replaced sometime in the future with One True Theory. One should not be satisfied with a pluralism which is but abstraction and which came into existence through negation of this or that element of prevailing theoretical view. Alternative approaches should rather be developed in so much detail so as problems already 'solved' by accepted theory can be discussed anew and possibly also - in more detailed way." [Feyerabend,1979:25-26]

And in the context of some our-day debates in which the word 'objective' is almost abusive one, his view that just "the variety of opinions is a necessary attribute of objective knowledge" [Feyerabend,1979:47-48] should be cited. And, in similar vein, the opinion that "realism...is a standpoint more recommendable than instrumentalism" [ibidem:181].

The historical dimension of this ideology is also interestingly commented: "The more increases the universality of our knowledge the more important becomes testing a theory...not through comparing single theory with experience but through arranging crucial experiments between theories which are mutually coherent and give quite different solutions concerning not yet investigated domains though these theories agree with all known facts." [Feyerabend,1979:104]

4.1.7. And a few words on an idea of P.F. Strawson. Author of Individuals distinguishes two types of metaphysics: 'revising' and - 'descriptive': "Descriptive metaphysics contents itself with describing actual structure of our thinking about the world, and revising metaphysics is occupied with creating a better structure." [Strawson,1980:7] According to him, it just descriptive metaphysics which should in a sense dominate: "revising metaphysics is in service with the descriptive one", though - historically - "metaphysics has often been revising and more rare - descriptive" [ibidem].

I would say that the idea of meta-philosophy could be regarded as a result of coupling some theses of cultural relativism and the idea of descriptive metaphysics. On the other hand, it might be said that meta-philosophy goes beyond the Strawsonian opposition: any description (if it is not a mere registration of some pre-philosophical declarations) is, to a degree, a revision of what is being described. And revisions are usually more or less 'conservative', preserving some pre-philosophical intuitions.
4.2. Analogies in science

4.2.1. As noted in the previous chapter the question of (in)commensurability of physical theories seems to be of some relevance for the problem of (im)possibility of meta-theory in general and meta-philosophy in particular. Some results obtained in philosophy of physics support, I think, my general conviction that meta-theory is possible.

It is interesting that, in opposition to the opinions held in philosophy of science, the methodology/philosophy of physics developed by physicists themselves emphasizes continuity rather than discontinuity, or commensurability rather than incommensurability.

In a paper on Three mechanics. From Aristotle to Einstein, H. Hadryś has shown that not only Newtonian and Einsteinian mechanics, but even the Aristotelian one (though somewhat reworked) can be regarded as specific cases of a more general theory. For instance, the basic difference between Aristotelian and Newtonian mechanics is characterized with the notion of class of distinguished movements. In the case of Aristotelian theory, it comprises but quiescent movements; in the Newtonian case, all steady rectilinear movements are included. This "enlargement of the notion of the natural state of an object" is held to be "the most important difference between Newtonian and Aristotelian mechanics, of which all others differences are derivable." [Hadryś, 1988:20] Concluding his analyses, he notices that he has obtained "axiomatic not of one theory but of a set of theories being characterized in a parametric way through a special shape of the function F" [ibidem:22].

In the quoted paper, of particular interest is the analysis of Aristotle's theory. Incidentally, it might be regarded as clear example of 'deconstruction': while formulating the assumption space-isotropy, Hadryś says that the cosmological thesis about the Earth as the central point of the Universe should be viewed as 'Aristotle's private view [which] is not entailed by his conception of movement." [Hadryś, 1988:13]

Basically the same approach can be found in the Michal Heller's book on Fizyka ruchu i czasoprzestrzeni [Physics of movement and space-time]. (This books ends up with Newtonian physics; analysis of relativity theory can be found in Heller's earlier essay on Ewolucja dynamicznych teorii czasoprzestrzeni [Evolution of dynamic theories of space-time].) [Heller, 1988:114-164] The most interesting philosophical result obtained in this book is, in my view, the following. "Newton believed that mechanics he created assumed the existence of absolute time and absolute space. It meant that he ascribed to space-time the same attributes which Aristotelian space-time had." [Heller, 1993:83] Yet, in spite of Newton's own opinions, "Newtonian mechanics does not allow for existence of absolute space" [ibidem:85].

Heller's analyses are summarized in an interesting (and, I would say, 'non-Spencerian') image of the evolution of physical theories: their 'development is going from more complicated to more and more simple" [Heller,1993:10]. As for the history of this approach, it turns out that the method of mathematical reconstruction of old physical theories was initiated already one century ago, in 1885, by German physicist L. Lange [Heller,1993:9-10].

Making methodological remarks, Heller stresses that "history of science consists not only in being faithful to original texts and in analysis of intellectual dependencies between authors but also in understanding of old theories in the light of later achievements." [Heller,1993:11] He also notes that "physical theories are often wiser than their creators", they usually contain ideas of which their creator did not think at all" [Heller,1993:10].

Quite similar results were obtained for relations between classical and quantum mechanics. Analyses in questions were originated by G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann and developed by G. Mackey. [Maćzyński, 1970:180] These analyses start from a general notion of physical system which is composed of 'observables' (observable magnitudes of the system), states of the system, and a probability function. Then a special set L is defined which is called 'logic of probability function p'. Many results are obtained without specification of the nature of L. And if we specify L so that it is an Boolean algebra, we will obtain a classical system. And if we assume that L is isomorphic with a family of subsets of a Hilbert space, we will obtain quantum system. [Maćzyński,195-196]

4.2.2. In more than one sense, cosmology is the most 'philosophical' of all natural sciences. And in the context of meta-philosophy the idea of Cosmology as theory of the ensemble of universes (as reads the title of a sub-chapter in Heller's book [1988:97-104]) is important. It would deserve more systematic analysis than possible here. I shall just note a few points.

First, an ensemble of universes may be generated by one theory; usually it is Einstein's general theory of relativity. What philosophically matters here is the fact that the various models are fundamentally, qualitatively different ("finite" vs. "infinite", "stable" vs. "evolving", etc.), though they all are resolutions of the same equations.

Second, there exist mathematical methods which allow for studying the general structure of the ensemble. As Heller puts it, "cosmologists are more interested in the way the given property...is distributed in the ensemble than in the structure of individual models" [Heller,1988:98]. Thus, speaking very informally, they can say which properties are 'typical' and which are not.

Third, the notion of ensemble can be used to depict the historical development of relativistic cosmology. In particular, it turns out that cosmology started with investigating of rather 'untypical' models to pass only later to exploration of more 'typical' areas of the ensemble. [ibidem:103-104]

Fourth, this notion is regarded as a means for coping with the epistemological paradox of empirical science (which cosmology is believed to be) having but one object. This very notion allows for 'multiplying' the object of cosmological investigations.

And fifth, it should be added that the notion of "ensemble of universes" arose from works of Dicke (1961) and Carter (1974). The latter used this notion while introducing the anthropic principle [Heller,1988:100]. (And to this issue I will return in the Final remarks, while debating the problem of anthropocentrism.)

4.2.3. Some interesting analogies can be also found if we cast our sight on mathematics. First of all, I mean the non-Euclidean geometry(ies). The first ideas were developed by Carl F. Gauss, Nicolai Lobaczewski and Janos Bolyai. This area, again, is a vast field even for philosophical investigations only. My attention will be focused on the methods of classification of various geometries.

Bernhard Riemann introduced (1854) the notion of n-dimensional topological manifold of which structure is characterized with a differential form. And the particular differential form determines character of the given space (or - its
geometry). As Struik puts it, “unifying Riemann’s principle allowed him not only to classify all the existing geometries, the still very unclear non-Euclidean geometries including, but to create unlimited number of new spaces, of which many found application in geometry and mathematical physics”. [Struik, 1963:245]

Felix Klein offered (1872) an other way of classifying geometries (known as ‘Erlangen program’). Each geometry is regarded as a group (i.e. an algebraic structure) of transformations of a space. Each group determines some invariants of transformations ‘allowed’ in the given geometry.

From geometry we can pass on to logic. In the perspective of meta-philosophy, investigations of intermediary logics (stronger than intuitionistic and weaker than classical) seem to be particularly interesting. The set ('cosmos') of all intermediary logics is innumerable. It is divided into ‘slices’. Individual logics are located in this or that ‘slice’. It has been proved that some logics are located in the last slice, while some others cannot be met there. [Kazbiński, 1987:379-381]

Also modal logics are interesting from the present viewpoint. In my very brief remark I shall follow the paper of Perzanowski on Modal logics and philosophy. In this paper, among many other results, we find a topography of modal logics. [Perzanowski, 1989b:278-285] In particular, ‘key logics’ (which are to play the role of orientation-points) are defined [ibidem:278]. Also three-dimensionality of the lattice of modal logics is demonstrated, and a ‘conical’ image of this lattice is presented [ibidem:281-282]. It demonstrates that the metaphor of ‘logical space’ (resp. space of theories) is not a mere word-play.

I suppose also that there are some interesting relations between the idea of meta-philosophy and Goedel’s theorem, and more broadly - the problems of (un)completeness of theories. This is a difficult issue since it is not clear what consequences can be drawn from this formal (in fact, mathematical) theorem for philosophies being usually formulated in natural language. Yet, if a domain of culture (here: mathematics) can be regarded as a source of intuitions, metaphors, analogies to be applied - in a non-literal way - in other domain (here: philosophy), it is just the area opened and explored by Goedel which should be studied if the analogies to be applied - in a non-literal way - in other domain (here: mathematics) can be regarded as a source of intuitions, metaphors, analogies to be applied - in a non-literal way - in other domain (here: philosophy), it just the area opened...

4.2.4. Undoubtedly, I should at least mention Modern Theories of Motivation, written by Danish psychologist Kristeb B. Madsen. Firstly, because it explores a part of anthropological domain, and much in the way I am going to follow in this essay. Secondly, besides general similarities between Madsen’s strategy and that of the present author, there are also some differences. Both should be instructive for making more precise the idea of meta-philosophy.

In particular, Madesen concentrates not so much on the ‘content’ of the respective theories as on their form: he tries to evaluate the empirical character of those theories, even mathematically - estimating ‘Hypotheses Quotient’ [Madsen, 1980:645] or M-H-D Index which is a result of the lexical analyses of the psychological texts and which characterizes the number of words which belong to various ‘layers’ of the investigated text [ibidem:647].

It is to be noted that Madsen gave rise to a computer technique of comparative analysis of theories (‘systemology’ - in Madsen’s terminology) [ibidem:655-659].

4.2.5. I would like to invoke here a text (I believe the term should be quite justified here) composed of two books produced by a Polish biologist, Marcin Ryszkiewicz. In the first book he develops the thesis which says that “in the history of life on Earth, there were many animal groups, out of which a thinking being might have been born” [Ryszkiewicz, 1987:7]. And in the second one he maintains that “in the history of life on Earth, there was but one group, the evolution of which had ended consequently though not directly toward creation of man” [Ryszkiewicz, 1989:5]. Of course, it has happened many times that this or that author changed his views. But in this case we face other situation: Ryszkiewicz deliberately wrote to books to demonstrate that the existing paleontological data may be interpreted in two quite different ways. He stresses that “formulation and defense of two opposite theses may be regarded as a therapy against ‘doctrinalization’ of one’s opinions” [Ryszkiewicz, 1989:6].

4.3. Art as a source of inspiration

4.3.1. Apart from philosophical and scientific ideas, I should mention an artistic idea developed by an eminent Polish writer (and philosopher) Stanisław Lem. I think here of such his works as Doskonała prętnia [Perfect Vacuum] and Wielka urojona [Unreal magnitude]; the first one is a set of reviews...of nonexistent books, the second - a collection of introductions to books that are still to be written....

I think that Lem’s own presentation of the latter book (but it may also be applied to the former) is so well formulated that I can but quote it at length: “I try to conceive of products of the future culture. [...]. It is literature on literature - but not in the sense of anti-novel, thus not confining to itself, to the process of writing literary works, but going beyond itself. It pretends to be a report on future men’s encounter with ‘very wise machine’ [...]. It pretends to be a future scientific discipline...investigating...texts...written by 21st-century computers. [...]. We do not know what will actually happen, but we should be being prepared to everything what is conceivable - provided that it will be coherent, logical, clear.” [Lem, 1975:11-12]

Let me draw your attention to only one point. Both Lem’s works are very interesting from purely artistic point of view. Yet, according to the author’s own words, it is the actual situation of the world-we-live-in, in particular its dynamics and the uncertainty as to its further trajectories, which inspired him to develop this form of, let’s use for a while this word, meta-literature.

In the present context, the name of Jose Luis Borges should be at least mentioned. That his work is philosophically fascinating need not to be stressed. But somewhat less evident is that, as I’d suggest, he anticipated in a way post-modernism and metaphysics of possible worlds.

4.3.2. Some words are worth to be said on an artistic trend which was described by Umberto Eco in his Open work of art.

Any work of art is, in a sense, open. This fact plays for instance important role in aesthetic studies of Ingarden (who, incidentally, does not use this word, but the notions of ‘scheme’ and of ‘concretization’ conceptualize a somewhat similar, if less ‘acute’, phenomenon). However, Eco’s ‘poetics of openness’ is more specific. Openness is regarded as more or less typical for the art of our century. And the specificity of our-age art consists in the fact that “today...multiplicity of meanings is getting...one of the explicitly formulated objectives” [Eco, 1994:6]. It is perhaps best
seen in the case of music: Eco describes openness of compositions of Karl Stockhausen, Luciano Berio or Pierre Boulez. [ibidem:23-24]. Yet as "most perfect instance" of "open work" is characterized *Ulysses* of Joyce [ibidem:23-24]. On my part, I'd like to point at Julio Cortazar's novel - incidentally, published but one year after Eco's collection - *Rayuela* (Hop-scotch) which is composed of elements out of which various texts can be constructed by the reader.

The contemporary openness of work of art determines a new type of relation between artist and receiver, and this relation "does open a new phase of culture; therefore it is a broad phenomenon, going beyond the competence-sphere of aesthetics" [ibidem:56]. Historiosophically most profound characteristics of this phenomenon is given in the words to follow. "Opening... is a warrant of particularly rich and surprising reception which is regarded by our culture as particularly precious value, since all elements of our culture impel us to comprehend, feel, and - thus - see the world in the terms of possibilities" [193].

It is noteworthy that in one of his subsequent works, *Lector in fabula*, while developing the ideas of openness, Eco introduces the notion of possible worlds [Eco,1994:179-254]. Though according to Eco "possible world is a cultural construction" [ibidem:190], and I tend to follow more objectivist interpretation of this notion, its cultural relevance seems to be undoubted.

Historically, it is worthwhile to note that the first presentation of the concept of 'open work of art' was given already in 1958, one year before Irvine Howe adapted in his literary studies the term 'post-modernity' inaugurating the debate which has already been going on for more than forty years [Welsch,1998:22]. It may be that phenomena analyzed by Eco and those labeled with the name of 'post-modernism' are but parts of still more broad and multi-faced cultural trend of which we still know rather little. (Some conjectures as to possible historiosophical interpretations of post-modernism I have offered in various places of this essay. Cf. Preface, and point 2.4)

### Part Two: OUTLINE OF A META-ANTHROPOLOGY

The present 'Outline of a meta-anthropology' consists of two 'preliminary' chapters and of five 'proper' ones. In the first chapter, I am considering the questions concerning the domain and the way of constructing a meta-anthropology. Since man is here conceived of as - first and foremost - acting subject, thus various anthropologies are viewed, roughly speaking, as different theories of action; therefore, in the second chapter, I am presenting and discussing a humanist interpretation, a theory of action which is held to be particularly suitable as a framework for reinterpretation of other theories of action (in broad sense). In the next three chapters, I am describing, accordingly to three 'aspects' of any action, 'syntax', 'semantics', 'decision-making', and 'pragmatics' (decision-performance) of action. In the last chapter, I am trying to sketch a description of a 'space of anthropologies'.

#### 1. On the strategy of the construction of the meta-anthropology

In this chapter I am going to discuss the following questions: 1) What is (meta-)anthropology about? 2) What are peculiarities of (meta-)anthropology? 3) How meta-anthropology may be constructed? 4) What problems may organize the (meta-)anthropological field? 5) With what language to describe this field?

##### 1.1. The scope of (meta-)anthropology

1.1.1. What is (meta-)anthropology about? The answer seems to be simple: about man. Still, this simplicity is somewhat misleading. It should be noted, first, that assuming a quite popular epistemological standpoint, one would have to admit that the notion of man (human being) has no meaning outside this or that philosophical framework, in our case - this or that anthropology in particular. In my view, this position has only a limited scope of validity.

At the point, we could make use of the following remark: "What is man? The only thing which can be said with certainty is that he is a material object. Human body functions in more complicated and strange way than any other material object, natural or artificial. In spite of this, man is material object. Therefore the question arises: Is man but a body? Can we determine him in purely physical categories?" [Amstrong,1982:7] One might say that Amstrong's thesis is not surprising since he represents a materialist stance, but beyond its limits this thesis need not be accepted. Logically, there is, in fact, no necessity to accept this thesis. Its importance goes, however, well beyond the borders of materialism. According to Wojtyła, "[human] body is an element of the definition of man - at least in an indirect way, as in the case of the one being most often used homo est animal rationale: in the concept of animal is comprised body and body-ness." [Wojtyła,1985:249-250] We could refer to Heidegger or Merlau-Ponty. We could also invoke Sartre and Levinas. The concept of man's face and of his look imply the concept of human body, irrespective of whatever else should they imply.
We could avail of the Husserlian distinction: Koerper - Leib. The word 'Leib' refers to a body that feels, senses etc. And, in my opinion, the problem of the metaphysics of man is not the question whether the man is thinking, sensing, feeling and acting. The question of metaphysics of man is whether thinking, sensing, feeling and acting should be accounted for in the language of physics, biology, psychology or still another. In other words, we can ask - and answer differently - what relations hold between 'physical', 'bodily', and 'psychic' or 'spiritual' attributes of man. But, to put it in a simple way, it is not the task of anthropology to discuss whether some phenomena exist at all. Let's assume that a John has headache. Having found no analgesics at home, he decides to go out to buy some pills. Such a situation can be interpreted in various ways, but - on a level - it is just a fact any anthropology should accept as given.

Following the thesis, it might be contended that virtually all of us can tell (some) human individuals from the other objects in the Universe. If it were actually so, man could be defined in the ostensive way. Personally, I would accept this strategy. Moreover, I would claim that even in philosophical-seminar rooms (not to say about other areas of our life) we know who // is a possible partner of the debate and what // is not.

Assuming what has just been said, we could make the following comments on some important considerations of Simmel. The German philosopher and sociologist analyzed the (in fact, old Aristotelian) problem of 'really existing' elements - 'ultimate' objects of cognition. He concludes his analysis thus: "Accepting the 'individual' as the limit ending the process of analysis is...of the most arbitrary character, for also the individual can be further analyzed as a cluster of the separate traits, accidentals, forces and historical determinants, which are - in relation to him - elementary realities to the same degree to which he is himself in relation to 'society.'"[Simmel, 1975:8]

On the one hand, I tend to agree with Simmel: the individual need not to be regarded as a coherent whole; quite contrarily, the intuition of Simmel, which found today a new expression in the idea of the 'decentration of the subject', deserves attention.

On the other hand, the moral, legal and ordinary-life concept of the 'person' should also not be dismissed. The intuitions it is associated with are too various and too important that they should be easily rejected.

And just in this context, the modified Armstrong's thesis may be useful. We can regard as given spacial-temporal unity and continuity of an individual. Therefore, we can maintain that such ideas as the set of one's thoughts (emotions, etc.) or the set of one's actions are well determined. But the question of the structure (the degree of their 'systemness') remains open. We could make even a stronger claim: we could say that, only assuming that individuals do exist, we can discuss whether individuals are (always, usually, ...never) 'integrated', 'coherent' etc. and their lives are 'homogenous processes' or, contrarily, 'tangles' of heterogeneous processes.

Continuing these considerations, I'd like to make the following remark on the supposed incommensurability of anthropologies. Or, risking some clumsiness, we should say 'potentially supposed': the domain of anthropology is rather seldom inspected by philosophers of science representing Feyerabendian-Kuhnian persuasion; if they would, they should find there more examples confirming (at least prima facie) the incommensurability-thesis than in the domain of mechanics: what could be more different, even as to its logical status, than - say - Skinner's model of man and that of Sartre.

Still, reading this remark other way round, we could say that just anthropology demonstrates the weaknesses of the idea of incommensurability. I would say that while developing his behaviorist theory the man Skinner thinks - among others - of such a man as Sartre, and existential phenomenology of the man Sartre is also about the man Skinner. And Freud's psychoanalysis is about the men Sartre and Skinner as much as about all other people. And so on.

To a degree, the just-said is a mere declaration of a faith. I hope that this faith should be proved plausible at the end of this essay.

Of course, it is clear that the ostensive definition of man does not eliminate all the possible doubts: the denotation of this term must remain (for a while or for ever - this may be a matter of separate debate) a fuzzy set: its core, but only it, is quite well defined but outside of it there is a field of controversial and difficult cases. At least two areas should be mentioned. First, the area determined by the theory of evolution: we are practically sure that we can speak of men while thinking of our ancestors who lived, say, 5.000 years ago. But if we speak of our much more remote ancestors, who lived 100.000 years ago, not to say 1 or 2 millions years ago, some doubts can and do - arise. This problem (which is of importance for theory of social change, philosophy of history, and particularly - for the theory of anthropo- and sociogenesis) will remain but indicated here.

Similarly so, the problem that constitutes the second area, namely one being determined by the question of the genetically human individuals whose brains have been deeply dysfunctioned. Somewhat related, and practically of utmost importance, is the issue of abortion which generates the question of the 'momentous' versus 'processual' character of individual's coming-into-being. This possibly most popular anthropological problem will also remain here but noted.

Only of historical importance, still worthy to be noted, are the debates waged in the 16th century concerning the 'ontological status' of the native dwellers of America. (The name of Bartolomeo de las Casas who defended the humanity of Indians is to be invoked here.)

To put it briefly. On the one hand, I believe that the 'hard core' of the denotation of the notion of 'man' is ostensibly, pre-philosophically, well established. On the other hand, the fuzzy border-area of this denotation is to be studied, and the results of this analysis would be of some importance for the understanding of those objects that deserve without any doubt the title of man. My focus in the present work is to be upon the 'hard core'. And (meta-)anthropology, as conceived in this essay, is not to indicate man among other objects in the universe (thus its aim is not to answer the question 'What is man?') but to address some more particular questions which arise from our pre-philosophical experiencing of ourselves and our fellowmen. (I do not disregard more fundamentally 'metaphysical' questions concerning man, or human being. Still, in my view, just the most fundamental metaphysical issues cannot be discussed outside of a framework of 'general' metaphysics. And such a discussion, of importance - I have no doubt about it, is simply impossible at this place.)

Thus, summing these remarks, I do not accept the idea that at the very beginning of philosophical anthropology "the word 'man' is to be defined". [Koenig, 1983:276]

Therefore, I think it is sufficient to say, at the very beginning, that philosophical anthropology is "an opinion on human nature, including the opinion that nothing of the sort of 'human nature' exists" [Wolniewicz, 1993:95]. I'd like to stress the importance of the second part of this definition. However to define (meta-
anthropology, it should - in my opinion - include such theories like theoretical anti-
humanism of Althusser or Sartre's existentialism. Without being too precise, we
could say that to maintain that man is but a Traeger of social relations or that he has
no essence, also means to maintain something about man, thus to pronounce
anthropological theses, thus - address, if indirectly, anthropological questions.

1.1.2.1 think it will be convenient to start the next block of these introductory
remarks with a list of such questions. Such a list was compiled a few years ago by
Antoni B. Stepien. Let me quote this list. It is opened with four (presumably most
important, according to the author) issues:
"1) uniformity or homogeneity of human being, the quantity of its elements (factors);
2) the character of links between fundamental elements (factors) of human being,
the type of his existential structure - substantialism or relationalism, materialism,
spiritualism, dualism (interactionism, parallelism), neutralism, identity theory,
hylemorphism (in various kinds)
3) the end of human being - mortalism or immortalism;
4) the place of man in the totality of being - optimality (optimism) and minimalism
(pessimism), rationalism and irrationalism of human being."

Then four "detailed questions" are formulated:
"1) the role of (self-)consciousness in human being;
2) freedom and, related to it, responsibility of man - indeterminism, autodeterminism,
determinism;
3) nature and person in man;
4) individual and society - individualism, personalism, collectivism."
According to Stepien, "it seems that at the very bottom of all those questions and
diculties being attached to them lies fundamental paradoxicalness of human being,
namely existence of particular unity of varied plurality" [Stepien, 1989:78]. This
plurality is characterized by a set of "oppositions existing...in human being:
1) between the psychical and the bodily;
2) between the conscious and the unconscious;
3) between the immanent and the transcendent;
4) between the subjective and the objective;
5) between the individual and the social;
6) between the monosubjective and the intersubjective;
7) between the directly-given (cognizable) and the being not given in this way;
8) between the superficial and the profound;
9) between the permanent and the changeable;
10) between the actual and the potential (virtual);
11) between the self-sufficient and the not-self-sufficient. " [Ibidem]
As those lists remind, the area (even the 'core' one) of anthropology is very wide,
and - at least at first sight - very messy. And it seems to be so not only in the case of
this particular presentation.

Let us glimpse at another one. The Philosophie. Ein Grundkurs, a collection of
essays edited by Martens and Schnaedeilbach, being both up-to-date and
comprehensive presentation of the philosophical problems, may be useful here. We
find in it an essay on Man which is devoted to philosophical anthropology;
psychoanalysis and behaviorism are discussed in the part on Consciousness and
freedom of acting and related issues are grouped under heading Practice. Not to say

that one finds anthropological questions in such chapters as Reason, Good, Justice,
Language, and Technology.

If we look at the chapter devoted directly to philosophical anthropology, the
general impression we may feel is that this branch of philosophy has been largely
oriented at self-elevation of man: at determining its particular position in the Being,
at giving reasons for his particular dignity. And this dignity is to manifest itself in
man's freedom [Paetzold, 1995:471-472, 481, 489] Freedom or autonomy of action is
also central for the theory of practice [Vossenkuhl, 1995:251, 153, 277-282]. The
related notions of free (resp. good) will will meet in the essay on Good
[Pieper, 1995:305, 313-314] Remarks on creativeness in language should be also
mentioned [Keil, 1995:641, 644]. And, in Hastedt's formulation, "with the notion of
consciousness is linked our understanding of ourselves as autonomous beings, ones
able to independent self-transformation" [1995:719].

In an introduction to philosophy, written by Arno Anzenbacher, chapters Man
and Ethics are preceded by ones on Reality and Cognition and followed by one on
God. Among issues discussed in the Man-section are problems of body-and-soul and
of immortality. In the section devoted to ethics, the problem of freedom of will is
discussed at its beginning.

What conclusions may be drawn out of the looking over this material? On the
one hand, the area in question is - if being looked at from a short distance - very
broad: much broader than the framework of this essay allows to be. On the other
hand, question of freedom, responsibility and the like seem to dominate the field, if
the latter being observed form a greater distance.

In other words, a circumscription of the area to be explored is necessary. For
many obvious reasons, it would be good if a possibly simple and clear method would
be find for circumscribing and ordering the area to be studied. It seems to me that
the differentiation of the 'substantial' and the 'functional', as drawn by Ernst Cassirer,
may be useful. And just in the area of the functional a great deal of the problem of
freedom can be located.

According to Cassirer, "philosophy of symbolic forms starts with the
assumption according to which if there is any definition of the nature or 'essence' of
man, then this definition can be understood only functionally and not substantially.
We can define man neither on the basis of any element being in him which should be
his metaphorical essence nor on the basis of any inborn capacity or instinct which
might be found in him through empirical observation. It is man's work which is his
mark - and not his metaphorical or physical nature. It is just work, just system of
human actions which defines and determines the concept of humanity. Language,
myth, religion, art, science, history are parts of this circle. Philosophy of man 'would
be such a philosophy which would give us an insight into the fundamental structure
of each of those human undertakings and which would allow us - at the same time
- to comprehend them as an organic whole.' [Cassirer, 1971:132]. And Heidegger's
position of Seiendes and Sein - if adopted to man (Dasein) - might convey similar
intuitions.

To be quoted here is also a thesis of Hegel: "the genuine being of man is...his
action. It is the action in which individuality is something real..." [Hegel, 1963:364]
Somewhat curiously, if it is quoted after Hegel, it was remarked that "when Watson
proclaimed, in a paper of 1913, that the subject matter of psychology should be
behaviour, not consciousness, his views found a ready acceptance which reoriented
psychology completely." [Stevenson, 1974:92] And the relevance of the theory of
behavior for the integration of social sciences was stressed by A. Malewski. 
[Malewski,1975:339] A Polish psychologist speaks of "activity as normal state of live 
beings" [Tomaszewski,1985:65], and a Russian one characterizes "activity as basis for 
personality" [Leoniew,1985:22] About "Action" [Handlung] as the central category of 
anthropological philosophy" speaks W. Ruegemer [1993:254]. Most extremely, opinion 
of this kind expresses Sartre: "a man is nothing else than a series of undertakings, that 
he is the sum, the organization, the ensemble of the relationships which make up these 
undertakings."[Sartre,1962:600] The fact "a man is acting" is regarded as the starting 
point in Karol Wojtyla's Osoba i czyn [Person and Act] [Wojtyła,1985:13] And more 
specifically, it is said there that "an act is a moment of a person's revealing. It allows us 
to make an insight into his essence and to understand him most completely." [ibidem:15] - I think that these 
names being invoked should sufficiently support the contention that definition of anthropology based on the notion of action (resp. behavior) 
is not confined to one philosophical tradition. And if so, it may serve as starting point 
also for meta-anthropology.

The distinction 'functional-substantial', as adopted here, may be also 
characterized in other ways. For instance, if you accept a metaphor taken from the 
computer science, the distinction between 'hardware' (the substantial) and 'software' 
(the functional) can also be useful.

A known specialist in cybernetics, Michael Arbib, puts it so: "We are not able 
to grasp some peculiarities of functions unless we have got knowledge of the 
constraints imposed by the structure being their substratum. We are not able to grasp 
the complexity of the structure unless we have formulated some hypotheses about its 
functioning. Therefore, in the theory of brain, the leading role belongs neither to 
structure, nor to function - the point is rather to investigate in a parallel way both of 
them."[Arbib,1977:22]

Or, we can characterize the two sub-domains of anthropology by giving some 
examples of the typical questions. The first sub-domain contains the mind-body 
problem, the question of (im)mortality of man; the second one - that of rationality of 
human behavior or of egoism-altruism as the basic attitude of individual toward his 
neighbors.

At this moment, the following comment seems to be necessary. But first - let 
me quote once again a passage from Stepien's paper. He writes there: "For a long 
time, philosophical considerations on man had been divided into two parts - 
cosmological and philosophical; the first concerned human body and the relation of 
man-as-organism to the Nature; the second - concerned soul, the spiritual life of man. 
It is a paradox that this division (so invoking Cartesian dualism) had been maintained 
until our time through numerous tomists - so strongly underscoring the psycho­ 
physical unity of human being. Only in the 20th century - in tomism also - has been 
accepted, almost completely, that integral philosophy of man should be cultivated - 
philosophical anthropology. Its contemporary shape is linked first of all with Scheler 
and also with Plessner and Gehlen." [Stepień,1989:77]

One may easily note that the distinction 'substantial-functional' repeats, in a 
sense, the dualism which predominated philosophy before our age. Still, it seems to 
me, the similarity is only partial, or - superficial. To grasp the key idea of this 
distinction, the following analogy might be useful. In the philosophy of biology the 
notion of life is the central one. According to the older 'monist' ideas (as expressed 
for instance in Engels' definition) life is to be linked conceptually with proteins. In 
our age some proposals have been formulated (in particular by great Russian 
mathematician Kolmogorov) to define life in the language of cybernetics without any 
references to chemical concepts. However, the cybernetic conceptions of life may by 
no means be viewed as a new form of vitalist ideas. Life obviously (provided a form, 
even a weak one, of scientism is assumed) does not exist without a material 
substratum. But the question whether given structure (of reproduction etc.) may be 'realized' in one kind of matter or in various ones (in other words: what relations hold 
between structural/cybernetic/ aspects of life and the chemical ones) should not be 
decided analytically but theoretically and empirically.

Or perhaps still simpler analogy might be useful. We may discuss the generic 
physical notion of a clock without specifying if it is a mechanical, electric or 
electronic device. And just having such a concept, we can discuss, for instance, 
which sort of clocks works best, or - more generally - of what substance any clock 
can be done and of what - cannot.

In this context, the following Wiener's words are noteworthy: "I am speaking 
of machines but not only of machines possessing brains of cooper and tendons of 
iron. If human beings are built in a system in which they play not the part of men 
fully bearing responsibility, but that of cog-wheels and levers, then it is without 
significance that flesh and blood is the substance of which they are made. What is 
being used as an element of machine is in its essence an element of machine." 
[Wiener,1961:202-201]

Now, a methodological comment on unitarian (resp. monist) theories is to be 
made. If someone is interested (as the present author is) in a unitarian theory of a 
domain which manifests prima facie various 'aspects' ('dimensions' etc.), he must 
be careful to preserve conceptual tools allowing for proper independent descriptions 
of those 'aspects'. If not, a tautological 'ideology' of unity of a domain will be 
obtained instead of a theory accounting for, to paraphrase Hegel's, the "unity of 
unity and difference". - The distinction between substantial and functional aspects is 
intended just as an application of this methodological prescription.

And still another methodological remark. Scheler once asked: "Is man a 
parvenu of the nature which is standing below him? Is he a 'dethroned king'?...? Has 
he become himself while ascending? Or has he become himself while falling? Do we 
need the idea of God to constitute his unity and delimit him from all other being? Or 
this very idea is itself a comparison and a product of man? /.../ There may be people 
whom this question seem to be 'outdated' not to be harmonized with our present 
intellectual status. They might be so if the figurative-mythical veil, in which they 
have been here or there couched, is taken for the very thing. They are not so if one 
goes beyond the veil." [Scheler,1987:4] Personally, I do not regard those questions 
as 'outdated', or 'metaphysical' (in the Carnapian sense). Still, if they are to be more 
precisely formulated and the answers are to be given in a discursive way (and not as 
an expression of this or that general 'mood' of being-in-the-world), they must be 
based upon more 'descriptive' (and less - than suggested by Scheler - 'evaluative') 
anthropology, one of the sort to be discussed below.

Having made all those comments and reservations, I would like to formulate a 
few (in fact: but two) anthropological questions being - in my opinion - of greatest 
relevance. But before accomplishing this intention, still a remark. This time, on 
formulating (philosophical, in particular - anthropological) questions.

I want to say what follows. The very formulation of theoretical questions is a 
difficult and complex task to be confronted in the subsequent chapters. However, the 
basic theoretical questions should not be formulated without any reference to pre-
philosophical understanding; in our case, to the pre-philosophical anthropological knowledge.

Of course, the pre-philosophical questions must be viewed as those in need of analysis, rectification etc. but in no case to be just neglected. Quite contrarily, actually we have no other real and applicable option than to start from crudely formulated questions and to work on them.

Personally, I see two pre-philosophical questions concerning man which can be used while more theoretical ones are being developed. The first of them could be put so:

(AQ1) Why do some men kill other men?

In other words, and formulating it more broadly, the question concerns the essence of human aggressiveness and violence, and their relations with the overall nature of man. We could ask if all people would be able, in a particular situation, to kill other man. Or, if some people are 'born murderers'. Or, if intended but unmotivated murder (murder for its own sake) is possible. And so on.

And the second question could be put in this way:

(AQ2) What is the essence of the human striving for material well-being?

Otherwise put, Are men 'greedy', insatiable in their desire 'to have more' or they are not? If not, how the 'upper limit' could be defined? Which things are most desirable objects? Why just those? Why do people want to 'have more'? Are there any other 'values' being desired as much as material well-being? And so on.

I believe that those anthropological questions are, in a sense, fundamental. I believe them to be so since I think that among the most important political issues we face today and will do in the coming future are the following two.

First: Is it possible to establish social world without war? Or, more generally, a world without violence, a world in which no one kills or torments no one. - After the century of two world wars, of Auschwitz and Gulag, of Hiroshima and Cambodia...the list may be prolonged, after the century which witnessed so many cruelties, in which the human kind might have been not very far from the eve of self-destruction - no other anthropological-social-political question seems to be more important and more urgent. And the link between this one and (AQ1) is obvious and needs no further comments.

Somewhat less obvious is the link between (AQ2) and the second political problem which could be worded so: Is sustainable global economy possible or not? Or so: can economic growth somehow 'limited' or 'restrained' (due to ecological necessities, for instance) or it cannot be? Here we confront problems we have been familiar for the last three decades. U'That's report to the UNO, Club of Rome's Limits to Growth - these and many other texts mark the beginning of the world-wide process of growing environmental concerns. Short-term, individual and group, economic interests bring serious obstacles to any long-term world-wide action. Yet virtually nobody would object the very existence and even seriousness of the ecological challenges. And these challenges imply the economical-political issues. In this case, it is less evident in which way particular answers to the anthropological issues determine answers to the political ones: too many steps are to be made. Yet the very existence of such links is, in my eyes, beyond any doubt.

Summing up: The task of this essay is to explore the second ('functional') area of (meta-)anthropology. Thus in the whole text man is to be conceived of as an acting individual (the borderline of these two areas is - as it has been noted - fuzzy, so it will be necessary to move also into the first area). This decision, though might not be legitimated by mere 'technical' reasons, is more strategically motivated: as I mentioned in the Preface, of focal interest for me is that part of anthropology which is relevant as the basis for social theory, philosophy of history, and political philosophy. Undoubtedly, the whole anthropology is relevant. Still, the 'functional' part more directly. Thus, being not able to explore the whole domain, I have decided to focus on this part of it which is more close to other fields of my interest.

1.2. On some peculiarities of (meta-)anthropology

In this passage I am going to touch upon five traits of (any) anthropology, being possibly its peculiarities. Briefly, they may be listed as follows. First, the variety of texts (or disciplines) in which anthropologies have happened to be expressed. Second, the relations between descriptive and normative aspects of the study of man (in other words: conflation of anthropology and ethics). Third, the role of self-reflexiveness: meta-anthropology is to be regarded as a part of any anthropology (to pronounce it here without logical precision) as a part of any anthropology. Four, meta-anthropology (in the sense of this essay) is to be seen also as a part of metaphilosophy in the Lazerowitzian sense. Fifth, some 'technical' peculiarities of anthropology as academic discipline.

1.2.1. A few decades ago, Scheler complained: "...we have natural, philosophical and theological anthropology, none of them caring for the others, but we do not have any unitarian idea of man. Moreover, the permanently growing number of specialized sciences concerned with man...much more overshadows the essence of man than illuminates it. And if we take into account that the three intellectual domains are seriously destabilized...then we will be able to say that in no period of history man has been so problematic as today." [Scheler,1987:47]

1.2.1.1. A hasty overview of the situation should be useful. Let's start with philosophy. Two different traditions - that of Scheler and other creators of 'philosophical anthropology', Plessner and Gehlen being the most prominent of them, and that of Wittgenstein ('old'), Danto, Davidson and other representatives of 'analytical theory of action' - with rather weak, if any, communication. Not to say of the anthropological content of broader philosophical systems, like Marxism (Gramsci, Lukacs...) or Christianity (Maritian, Mounier, Wojtyla...). And the whole, often conflicted, family sharing the common name of 'existential philosophy' - from Heidegger and Jaspers to Sartre and Camus...

And on a more practical level, look only at the list of sections at the last, 20th World Congress of Philosophy: Moral Psychology, Philosophical Anthropology, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Mind, Persons and Personal Identity not too say about - separated - Social and Political Philosophy...
And the various scientific disciplines: Psychology, social psychology and sociology; each is developing its own ideas while little communicating with the other disciplines. Also economics formulates its own model(s) of man. Perhaps linguistics (Chomsky) has most wide contacts - with philosophy and ethnology, with sociology and psychology.

There are various disciplines which more implicitly, what does not necessarily means: less importantly, are based on anthropological assumptions. The vast area of law and jurisprudence should be mentioned in the first place. The following remarks on the philosophy of law may be quoted in this context: "Philosophy of law is strictly connected with philosophy of man, though but few philosophers of law express their opinions on man. Mostly, the latter are tacitly assumed". [Szyzskowska, 1990:106] "Characteristic and common for the philosophers of law is conceiving man as an creature being not enslaved by the conditions of its existence. Those philosophers point out that higher values are in a sense more primordial than specific conditions of man's being. Therefore, man should behave in life as if everything would depend upon his will." [ibidem, 108] Various constructions concerning intention, degree of responsibility etc. as being assumed in penal codes and explicated by the jurisprudence deserve much more attention on the part of philosophers.

And with jurisprudence the broadly defined pedagogy is in a way linked: the idea of punishment is the main link. (And as regards punishment, the issue of capital punishment lies at the very heart of the knot of anthropology, ethics and jurisprudence/law) And from pedagogy we may easily move to other branches interested in elaborating various practical methods of affecting people's behavior. Theory of organization and management, public relations, theory of propaganda...And psychiatry, psychoanalysis, psychotherapy and the like...

Political theory, ideologies, and - in particular - utopias and counter-utopias should not also be omitted... They are always based, if only implicitly, on these or those anthropologies. The notion of 'human nature', the problem of its (un)changeability etc. are the crucial elements of any political ideology. As regards (counter-)utopias, they invoke important 'modal' issues which are important even for any empirical science (cf. discussions in physics and cosmology), and the more - for philosophy in general, and for anthropology - in particular. And a part of their theoretical importance seems to be strictly analogous with the relevance for physics of such concepts like perpetum mobile. (It may be noted that the last example demonstrates the importance of some 'Meinongian' assumptions: we distinguish between two kinds of perpetum mobile: the first [resp. the second] law of thermodynamics states the impossibility of the first [resp. the second] kind of perpetum mobile of which each is said to be 'physically impossible'.)

Let's end up this sub-point with a few words on belles-lettres. In the opinion I share with many philosophers, we can speak of the Dostoyevski's or Gombrowicz's anthropology as legitimately as of that of Aristotle or Skinner. And I do not mean only the essays or essayistic parts of novels (here Musil's Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften would likely be the best example); anthropology can be expressed by the vicissitudes of Don Kichots, Hamlets, Werters, Raskolnikovs and many many others.

Let me declare at this moment my deep conviction. I do believe that something interesting and important (though not always true) things have to say about man both Hegel and Dostoyevsky, Kierkegaard and Darwin, also Marx and Wilson, Heidegger and Ryle, Sartre and Skinner... - to mention but a few names, and only from the last two centuries. And I do believe that it makes sense to look for such a language into which those various theories could be translated and - debated, confronted, compared...

And from the historical-philosophical point of view, we should note that though some 'ethnocentric' tendencies are in anthropology as noticeable as in any other branch of philosophy, no non-traversable barriers exist. For instance, starting from Ricoeur's hermeneutics we are involved, on the one side, in debates with Heidegger, and with Husserl...while on the other side - with Levi-Strauss. And if the author of La pensee sauvage, then Bronislaw Malinowski. And mentioning Levi-Strauss, we might think about structuralism, thus - taking a road - about Piaget, thus about Chomsky, thus about Skinner...And taking another path - we could mention Althusser, and if him, thus G.A. Cohen (who stresses his debt to the French philosopher) and other analytical marxists, say J. Elster, thus von Neumann and Morgenstern...

To speak metaphorically, long-distance travels are not very popular in anthropology: but on the other hand, no closed, separated domain seem to exist. Therefore, it seems to have some sense to draw a map of anthropologies, including both Heidegger and von Neumann, both Skinner and Levi-Strauss, both Althusser and Kierkegaard... I wouldn't dare to claim that what is offered in the present essay could serve as such a map. I hope however that the sketches presented here can serve as materials for drawing such a map.

Presenting his book on Holocaust, Z. Bauman writes: "The goal of this essay is not to enlarge special knowledge or to enrich a marginal area of the interests of social-sciences specialists, but - to open a way for some special discoveries so that they would be generally applied in social sciences, and interpreted in a manner being relevant for the fundamental problems of sociology, so that they were introduced into the main current of our discipline, and that they were moved from the hitherto margin of interests into the main area of sociological theory and practice" [Bauman, 1992:16]

- In my view, these words confirm - in the most dramatic way - the necessity for the linking even very distant, sometimes - seemingly remote, areas of philosophy and humanities. The present work is to be a contribution to such efforts.

1.2.1.2. The multiplicity of theories/languages in anthropology (broadly defined) has various consequences. If only negative it might be (in view of the Lem's opinion) debated. Still, that there are also (!) negative ones, seems to be beyond doubt. I'd like to point two of such consequences; one 'internal', and one - 'external'.

It has been noted that "if the idea that what we are is determined by social conditions is expressed in sociology, it turns out to be a banality. A wide sub-branch of sociology is concerned with ways and mechanisms of such determination. It is other thing, if this thought should be expressed in psychology or physiology. Here it does not seem so banal and self-evident." [Paprzycka, 1996:205] I tend to suppose that if a comprehensive cross-disciplinary study would demonstrate that such a situation is rather common in humanities and social sciences. In result, a lot of intellectual energy (not to say about tax-payers' money distributed to various academic institutions) might have been wasted

And as to the second point, an interesting observation about the (Western) penal law might be quoted. According to it, "penal law is speaking at one moment in one language, at other moment - in other language. If society does not decide whether is interested expiation, or isolation, or education, or deterring potential
cannitals, it will achieve neither of those goals." [Wiener, 1961:120] We are approaching here the question of the hopeless lack of virtually any results in many public debates (abortion, capital punishment...). And the point is not the difference of viewpoints which in pluralist democratic society is/should be a norm rather than an exception. The point is that much too often the opinions are expressed in various languages, thus the prospects for real debate are rather poor. Thus, the task of finding a common language for debate between different anthropology's is not only of philosophical but, perhaps, also of practical importance.

I.2.2. There are many reasons for which in this introduction to meta-anthopology, the question of ethics should not be omitted. I shall mention three of them: theoretical, heuristic and political.

I.2.2.1. Theoretical reasons. Briefly put, from the point of view of meta-anthopology (and more generally - of meta-philosophy) we have no reason to draw a borderline between descriptive (in the broad sense) and normative part of anthropology. Or to put it in a different way, one line is to be drawn but in another than standard way.

While elaborating this issue, I shall avail of some results obtained by L. Nowak in his book on axiology. These results need to be modified if they should be coherent with the basic ideas of unitarian metahysics. (To be sure, one does not have to follow the theoretical development of an author; one may believe that his earlier proposals were better in this or that [or all] respect(s). It might be so but in the given case is not: I've already expressed my conviction that unitarian metahysics is in this or that form necessary for meta-philosophy.)

The key (at least in the present context) idea of this book may be conveyed with the following words: "...analogies between the structures of reality and the structure of 'world of values' leading to analogy between cognition and valuation leads in turn to analogy between scientific theory and axiological system (or more generally - between theoretical orientation and axiological orientation). All this is a symptom of existence of more profound regularities revealing common traits of the parts of the analogy." [Nowak, 1974:63]. And further: "...the fact that values happen to be also magnitudes, ideals - ideal types, axiological structures - significant structures, evaluation standards, strict evaluation - concretization, and approximate evaluation - approximation - all this indicates the validity of the thesis of antipositivist descriptivism." [Nowak, 1974:101]. Let me stop at this moment and let me introduce a notion of ethical system (in brief: ethics; say hedonist or ascetic). This notion is a tentative one and is but to convey some intuitions which are central (cf. remarks on Searle in ch.4, Part I). Both cognitive beliefs and moral opinions are to be obtained by adding to (anthropological) propositions some epistemic or axiological (ethical) functors (they reflect and express such moral attitudes as condemnation, acceptance, moral admiration etc. - a phenomenological study of those attitudes is necessary: some of evaluative attitudes are properly expressed in the standard deontic functors, like O [it is obligatory that...]; and F [it is forbidden that...]; still, from the philosophical and moral point of view, the list seems to be too short. For instance, we need a way of expressing our moral intuitions/emotions aroused by the act of M. Kolbe. Surely, most of us would refuse to say that such an act is morally obligatory. But, on the other hand, the formulation which says that it is simply morally allowed is far too weak.)

For instance, from an anthropological proposition (I make use here of an 'unrectified' example):

\[(ap) \quad \text{Each man is an egoist.}\]

we can obtain, among others, the following:

\[(ep) \quad \text{It is likely that each man is an egoist.}\]

\[(et) \quad \text{It should not be so that each man is an egoist.}\]

These crude remarks are but to draw a sketch of this problem-area. I'd like still add a comment, Pascalian (I mean here - once again - the 'Pascal's bet') in its roots. It is
an important (meta-)ethical question what relations should hold between cognitive and moral beliefs. Various opinions may be formulated. Still, the following opinions should be at least acceptable - in the most general sense of the word.

(ep/et) It is very unlikely that man is free; still one should act as if it would be true that man is free.

Let me declare that, personally, I actually tend to accept, with some reservations, this opinion.

This construction seems to have something to do with the distinction: normative versus predictive expectations [Paprzycka,1996:211] According to Paprzycka, "our practices of accounting for actions are directed at seeing an individual in the best possible way". [ibidem:215] Not necessarily so, or - perhaps better - not exactly so: this way of thinking need to be viewed as over-optimistic humanistic ideology. The rule I tend to accept might be validated as follows. It is a priori possible that the way people behave depends to a degree on our attitudes toward them. More precisely, on our manifested images of them. Someone acts as an honest man since is believed it be an honest man. Someone else acts as a thief since is viewed as being such a figure (cf.Sartre on Genet). If it is, or even - may be, so, thus we should manifest as far as possible optimistic attitudes vis-a-vis other people.

I will still continue the discussion of the intuition(s) suggested with this example. To formulate it in rather loose way, we could speak of various ethics (all other their elements equal) as differing with respect to the level of, say, heroism. Let’s assume that an anthropology (an image of man) is given. Some possible actions may be viewed, the given anthropology assuming, as very probable, some others - as being of little probability. Still, one ethics may recommend the first type of conduct, while the other - the second. To put the intuition still in another way, we could say that various ethics-construction rules may be conceived. On the one hand, rules which express the conviction that only most beautiful moral ideals are worthy to be formulated and propagated, irrespective of their ‘realism’ (heroic/romantic ethics). On the second hand, rules that express just ‘realism’: only such ideals should be formulated and propagated which may attract a sufficiently great number of people. (If ethics-construction, and - still more - ethics propagation /through education, mass-media etc./ is to be, and why should not?, a rational activity, then such questions should be discussed - on the level of ethics /again vitius circle so familiar in philosophy/, philosophy of History and sociology, psychology....)

And still another moral intuition, in a sense - a concretization of (ep/et). I tend to believe that - if constructing our actions more deliberately - in different situations we should accept (hypothetically) different models. The basic intuition is following. In the face-to-face relations we should take the risk of accepting an ‘optimistic’ (‘idealistic’) model of man; in public affairs (while for instance adopting a criminal policy) we should be more prudent and cautious, and adopt rather a ‘pessimistic’ (‘realistic’) model. I would say that an - in my opinion - important, if poorly explored, area has been inspected. This area might be, somewhat clumsily labeled thus: ethical foundations of theory of epistemic decisions. (cf. mathematical statistics). And some conclusions stemming from the reflections on this area seem to be supportive to the idea of meta-philosophy being developed in this work.

As we have seen, anthropology is in various ways of importance for ethics. In one way, it helps to evaluate the ‘realism’ of various norms, ideals etc. (And this is of importance, since among some ‘formal’ norms of ethics we may find - as noted above - a postulate of realism of norms: do not formulate norms which cannot be obeyed). - This is the case with such norms like ‘love your enemy!’ - the meaning of the postulate is rather obvious, the question is whether, to what extent, and by how many people it can be observed. We touch here a problem which is to be found not only in the domain of philosophical speculation. In the famous book of E. Wilson, one in which he presents the main ideas of sociobiology, we may find the following theses: "In order to find new morality, based on more close-to-the-truth definition of man, we must turn to his interior, to analyze in detail mechanism of mind and to investigate the history of its evolution. However, I predict that undertaking this effort will reveal second dilemma which is connected with the choice to be made between assumptions of ethics included in the biological nature of man." [Wilson,1988:31]

But there is also different situation. In existential ethics one may find a postulate of ‘authenticity’. Whatever your moral intuitions might be, you will I believe agree with me that the sense of the command 'be authentic!' is much less clear as that of the formerly quoted. In this sense, existential ethics calls for analytical support on the part of (meta-)anthropology. Still, such a support is of importance for the anthropology itself. Here, we may pass to the heuristic importance of ethics for philosophy.

I.2.2.2. Any ethics contains, in this or that form, an anthropology. Therefore, an philosophical investigation of a moral system, or an philosophical ethics as normally presented, may be regarded as a heuristic leading to discovery of an anthropology (in the strict sense). (Take for instance, the Christian model of man reconstructed on the basis of the analysis of the Christian ethics of ‘love-of-neighbor’.)

Second, surely there are various heuristics. And there are various anthropologies. One of the critical points of the idea of meta-philosophy is the problem of commanding over the multiplicity of possible theories. Though some strictly theoretical methods may be found, there are also some more ‘practical’ ones. I would sketch such a method as follows. Let’s assume that in the space of anthropologies we can indicate one which is, we believe, the most faithful image of actual men (we are interested here, I assume, in the world we // live in and in the actual men /whom we are/). On the other hand, we reconstruct an anthropology which ‘validates’ our ethics. Thus, we obtain two ‘points’ in anthropological space, and - in the next step - we may focus our attention, one the ‘minimal subspace’ containing these points (this must remain a vague image as long some topological or algebraic structures are not define in the space of anthropologies).

I.2.2.3. At the end of these considerations on ethics-and-anthropology, some words on Ingarden’s work Ueber die Verantwortung. Ihre ontische Fundamente will be useful. He starts from the moral intuition which lies at the ground of every-day morality as well as of legal systems. This intuition says that people are responsible for their actions. Subsequently, he analyzes what should be the ontical structure of the man and the world, if man is to be viewed as actually responsible for his actions. Of course, theoretical analysis may demonstrate that our moral intuitions are invalid, provided some other intuitions/experiences being accepted as valid. It might also be (sociology of law should be consulted here) that the philosophical ideas reconstructed by Ingarden are not necessarily foundations of any legal system.

And if to follow Paprzycka, one should say that Ingarden proposes a metaphysics to ground man’s self-delusion. - But have we to follow her? It depends
on intuitions one starts with. If the basic intuition presents us an image of well-bred man who without deliberations kindly responds to our question about time, then one would even accept the suggestion that intentional model is a device for embellishing the image of our behavior. But if we start from the intuitions related to analysis of the actions of, say, Eichman and his companions [Arendt,1987], then just the non-intentional ('expectational') theory turns out to be 'ideological' in this sense that offering a way of self-justification (a form of Sartrian mauvais foi).

The socio-epistemological moral of this might be summed up in those words. Virtually any anthropology (or just philosophy) may be - in a social context - serving for an ideology. If so, the only point is to be aware of the fact in general, and to develop various philosophies, or - if you share some of the arguments presented here - just meta-philosophy.

And if I am allowed to make more personal confession, if I am to choose between risking to support some moral illusions and risking to reinforce 'bad faith', I definitely choose the first option.

1.2.3. I'd like also to mention a specific importance of the meta-theoretical approach just in the anthropological domain. This importance has its roots in the "self-reflexiveness" of a sort of the anthropology. Let's follow an author who contends that "there is an important and interesting for a humanist difference between such acts that are performed by a man while accepting some assumptions concerning conduct of the other people, and these acts which he performs not accepting any assumptions of that sort." [Nowak,1970:126] If so, the situation of anthropology is in one respect very different from that of, say, cosmology (though even here, if we would consider so called 'anthropoid principle', the image of the situation would not be so perfectly clear). Here, let's assume, the understanding of other cosmologies is for many reasons instructive for the given one, but it does not constitute a part of it. But meta-anthropology must be seen as a part of (any complete) anthropology.

This is said in rather a crude way. To speak more precisely, if we want to avoid contradictions, we should adopt here some logical 'tricks'. We should, for instance, distinguish between meta-anthropology and its representation that were to be embedded into any single anthropology. I'd say that any anthropology comprises such statements like "Few people believe that 'p'", "Most adult women believe that 'q'", 'Virtually nobody believes that 'r'" (p, q, r etc., represent various anthropological statements). Some logical troubles may be caused by the possible iteration of such operations: 'Few people believe that many men think that most adult women believe that 'q". I confine myself to noting only this problem. What seems to be substantially more interesting is the question of what role (if any) play such iterations, or how 'long' (or 'deep') they happen to be.

This problem of self-reflexiveness of meta-anthropology is of broader importance. The reason why is so is given by Mannheim: "The notions of state, of sovereignty, power, property, law etc. are undergoing constant changes in history. Not only the scope of political notions in the narrower sense is being modified. All the notions which may be called historical since they belong to the culture of the given epoch, are changing in a parallel way to the changes in the way of comprehending human nature and in the accompanying changes in ethics and psychology. Invalid would it be to suppose that those notions are changing since political, moral, and psychological thinking is less scientific than in natural sciences. In each epoch those notions are defined anew, since in historical sciences new empirical material may be obtained only due to changes taking place in history." [Mannheim,1974:15]

1.2.4. As already noted, there is a link between Lazerowitzian metaphilosophy and (meta-)anthropology. Philosophy of philosophy is to a degree just a part of anthropology. To a degree - since philosophy is about the man-who-lives-in-world, then the philosophy of philosophy is just a part of the story about relation between man and the world, thus of philosophy tout court. Therefore, philosophy of philosophy is not and cannot be any 'external' justification of philosophy. It is 'internal' confirmation of the logical coherence and perhaps 'completeness' of the overall system: The reasoning would run somehow like this: "if the world happens to be so-and-so, and the man happens to be so-and-so, and the place of man in the world happens to be so-and-so, then the role, possibilities and limits of philosophy are as follows..." Any complete image of the world and man should offer a thesis to be subsumed under this scheme.

Meta-physics (general; anthropology is - 'in the last instance' - also a part of it) aside, the crucial - from the anthropological viewpoint - question of metaphilosophy is: "Why, and - what for, philosophy?"

For the anthropology itself, various starting-points may be assumed. Among them, the idea of man as 'philosozphizing animal'. According to Dilthey, who takes a stance of this sort, "philosophy is assumed in the structure of man; every one, irrespective of situation, approaches it and all human activity is driving at philosophical self-consciousness". [Dilthey,1987:54]

A seemingly similar opinion was formulated by Heidegger in his Uberwindung der Metaphysik: "Metaphysics belongs to the nature of man." However, this thesis appears in a section which is opened with the question: "To what extent does metaphysics belong to the nature of man?" This thesis, also, is immediately followed by a number of questions: "What is this very nature? And what is metaphysics? Who is man in the domain of this natural metaphysics? Is he but an 'I' who actually confirms itself by reference to a 'Thou', for it creates itself in the relation T—Thou'?[Heidegger,1977:287]

Such a position may be developed in various directions. Some of them would be rather flattering for the self-esteem of our species, some perhaps not. The remarks formulated by Kolakowski do not seem contradict the logical content of Dilthey's thesis but their 'mood' is somewhat different to that to be heard in the latter's words: Developing the Platonic idea of philosophy as arising from the surprise and the Marcus Aurelius' idea of philosophy which should teach us to be surprised at nothing, Kolakowski says: "the need for philosophy comes out of a perturbation in homeostasis between man and nature, and philosophy itself is an artifact...which attempts at restoring it, impossible with biological means, by intellectual means. It is therefore assumed that there is a degree of alienation - either between two sides of man as expressed in the phrase 'rational animal', 'human being as the symbolic thinking and man as bipedal mammal, or between 'human nature in its whole' and extra-human nature, or between peculiarly human, social form of life and natural environment subjugated by human groups. Moreover, it is assumed that this alienation cannot be overcome by any 'return to the Nature'. "[Kolakowski,1967:16]

1.2.5. Let me end these considerations on particularities of anthropology with the supposition that the 'meta-' approach is of particular importance just in the
antropological domain. To validate this thesis, let me quote an opinion by a logician and philosopher J. Perzanowski. In his essay (already quoted above) on Logika i filozofia. Uwagi o zasięgu analizy logicznej w naukach filozoficznych [Logic and philosophy. Remarks on the scope of logical analysis in the philosophical sciences], he divides philosophical disciplines into two groups: general and anthropo-philosophical. And about the latter, he says what follows. "From the general disciplines they differ in great variety of the languages in use, in the diversity and imprecision of methods and incompleteness of the proposed theories. They form an array for the activity of various philosophical schools, often self-enclosing in the domains they (re)construct, prone to substitute substantial discussion with presentation of their own standpoints, and in discussion with other schools - linking lack of substantiality with praising merits of the their own schools. This autism of the schools acting in anthropo-philosophy is the main cause of the retardation of its disciplines in comparison with other philosophical sciences" [Perzanowski, 1971:46-47]. Perhaps these words are too sharp. Perhaps Perzanowski's expectations, expectations of a logician anyway, are too high...

But compare Perzanowski's opinion to the description made by Ernst Cassirer; he was not a logician, he cannot be said to have not understand the specificity of anthropological reflection. In An Essay on Man, he contrasts the history of what he calls 'anthropological philosophy' with the history of other philosophical domains. In his view, anthropological philosophy is not - in contrast with other domains - "slow and continuous development of general ideas. Extremely opposite views are to be met even in the history of logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of nature. Availing of Hegel's terms, we can describe this history as a dialectical process, in which any thesis is followed by an antithesis. There exists yet an internal/logical order which links various phases of this process. Anthropological philosophy displays a very different character. If we want to grasp its true importance...we have to choose dramatic and not epic style of description. We face not quiet development of concepts and theories but the contest of antagonist spiritual forces. History of the anthropological philosophy is burdened with the most profound human passions and emotions. It is not concerned with a single theoretical problem, even of the largest extent; the whole destiny of man is here at stake, demanding for the ultimate solution." [Cassirer, 1971:46-47]

Thus, if there is some truth in Perzanowski's (and Cassirer's) description, and I believe there is, and if we believe, as I do, that there are some non-theoretical reasons for promoting development of (social) philosophy, then various strategies for this promotion should be searched. I tend to believe that the 'meta-' strategy is quite promising. I may be wrong, but 'the taste of porridge'...

### 1.3. Two ways of constructing a meta-theory

I think that two ways of constructing a meta-theory are generally possible. One could be named 'quasi-deductive', the other - 'quasi-inductive'. If one assumes the first way, one has to construct a language, then to formulate in it a set of questions, and to invent possible answers to each question. Then, one has to study the logical relations between different propositions.

The other way is by no means completely different. The basic difference consists in the fact that we are starting from a particular theory. Then we are looking for an opposite theory, and - at the end of the first step - we are looking for a
generic theory of which these two (and all the 'intermediate' - if possible) are but 'concretizations'. And to this generic theory we can again apply this procedure. And perhaps we can apply it once more, or twice, or..., or k-times.

Speaking metaphorically (its 'de-metaphorization' is, I believe, possible though difficult), the difference between these two strategies could be intuitively depicted with the following image. The first strategy could be viewed as based on the construction of a multi-dimensional (virtually infinite) space in which we locate known theories. If the second strategy is applied, at the outset we determine a 'point', then we locate it on an interval (or on a line), this interval (line) is located on a plane, this plane - in a 3-dimensional space, etc. As long as it's necessary.

I think that both the strategies have their specific pros and cons. Both should be tried. To my intuition, if one wants to be in touch with the philosophical tradition, it is reasonable to start with the second strategy, and only latter to try the first one. So, just the second will prevail in this work.

The 'quasi-inductive' strategy deserves its name also due to an other fact. I am not going to pretend that nothing, except for what is theoretically assumed, is known about man. Quite contrarily, I shall avail of pre-philosophical knowledge. It may be reformulated, it may be rejected - but never completely.

### 1.4. Some intuitions and questions: death as a central anthropological issue

I am going to overview a collection of reflections, intuitions and observations. Out of them a 'yardstick' is to be made. With this 'yardstick' the 'substantiality' of (meta-)anthropology is to be measured. It should be obvious that other 'yardsticks' may be delivered.

With some Heidegger's words from his Bauen, Wohnen, Denken I am going to commence this overview. Heidegger says there: "Mortals are men. The are called Mortals since they can be dying. To be dying means: to weather the death as death. Only man is dying, and is permanently so, as long he is staying on Earth, under Sky, in face of Divinities. Saying: Mortals, we are already thinking of Earth, Sky and Divinities, we are not taking into account the simplicity of them all. The simplicity is called quadrangle. Mortals are in quadrangle, while dwelling" [Heidegger, 1977:321-322]. In this paper, presented in 1951, Heidegger restates, if in other words, the basic intuition, expressed - twenty four years earlier in the Sein und Zeit - with the phrase 'Sein-zum-Tode'. Whatever might be said about particularities of Heidegger's philosophy, this fundamental intuition seems to be valid: if there is any single ('the') experience/problem from which philosophy might commence its work, it is death. In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger demonstrates the general metaphysical (ontological) importance of death. This issue will be left untouched here. But, a part of this demonstration consists in the description of the relevance of death in understanding of Dasein. The awareness of one's death is the constitutive moment in the process of gaining the awareness of one's life as a whole [Heidegger, 1994:332-375]

Heidegger exposes here the possibly most fundamental aspect of death. Still, there are many others. Making a few steps back, we may point out at death as a link between Heidegger's concept of Dasein and the problem of evolution and 'threshold' between pre-men and men. As Plessner says, "only man knows that he will die" [Plessner, 1988:99]. And according to Morin, "grave of the Neanderthal man
demonstrates not only that death intruded into human life, but it reveals the anthropological changes which made possible and caused this intrusion.” [Morin,1977:134]

And starting from Heidegger in somewhat different direction, we might say that the awareness of death brings about the problem of the sense life, and the value of life as such. And this problem leads us further toward that of religion. Quite recently, the link between religion and death has been underscored most clearly by Wolniewicz: “...what religion comes out, what makes it indestructible and reality of what is to be undoings, will be called ‘the root of religion’. This abbreviates allows us to summarize all our philosophy of religion into one main thesis...death is the root of religion” [Wolniewicz,1993:168] Two points should be added. First, more precisely it is ‘the certainty of death which is the root of religion’ [ibidem:187]. And second, on the way the awareness of death influences man: “Fear is one of the emotions arisen by death, but not a sole. Dread is an other, and still other is sadness, and other yet - respect.” [ibidem:173]

From religion we may pass to a broader notion of transcendence. The transcendence, as conceived here, denotes anything what is - for a given individual - valuable, and what transcends the scope of his life. It can be, for instance, a human community. Let’s quote in this context a passage from a book on nationalism. Its author, Benedict Anderson ends the introduction to his book with the following words. “Nation is imagined as c o m m u n i t y, for - despite the actual inequality and exploitation prevailing in it - is always regarded as profound, horizontal system of solidarity. It is just this solidarity which has for the last two hundred years made millions of people not only to kill but also to die voluntarily in the name of imaginations having their own boundaries. Their death faces us with the principal problem of nationalism: what makes these imaginations, being but two hundred years old, to yield such sacrifice? [Anderson,1997:21] We could make here a reference also to Marx’s philosophy. According to the interpretation given by Walicki, in communism, conceived as positive abolition of private property, individuals “remain mortal, yet it will not be a serious problem. /.../ The death of an individual is not important if the species - to which he belonged and with which he identified himself - continues to exist. Marx hoped that the abolition of individuals’ enfrangement from their species-being, therefore their full communist socialization, will liberate individual mortality from its tragically character.” [Walicki,1996:57].

This problem has its second side. I mean the fact that relations between people (or perhaps better in this context - attitudes toward other people) tend to outlive the life of a part of them. I put aside the funeral/cemetery celebrations determined mainly by the relations with those being alive and not with the dead. But there are relations/attitudes which seem to be independent. In particular, it happens that we feel obliged to keep our word given to a dead person, even if nobody (even God?) knows about the promise we gave.

Some forty years ago, at the time of cold war, debates on conflated moral, anthropological and political issues took place. They were centered around the problem of the relation between value of life/death and other values. In one of such debates (on Western Values and Total War organized in May 1961 by the editors of Commentary) Sidney Hook pronounced such an opinion: “As I read the history of Western culture it seems to me survival at all costs is not among the values of the West. It was Aristotle who said that it is not life as such, or under any conditions, that is of value, but the good life. The free man is one who in certain situations refuses to accept life if it means spiritual degradation. The man who declares that survival at all costs is the end of existence is morally bad, because he’s prepared to sacrifice all other values which give life its meaning.” [Hook et al.,1962:1202] And H. Stuart Hughes maintained: “…we have to face the old ‘Red or Dead?’ question, as Bertrand Russel and others express it in England.” While declaring that he himself is “on the red side of this”, he continued: “We believe that the enemy should be met with real force, but real force on a human scale which would give men the old alternative of making a personal choice as to whether they wanted to die” [ibid., 1203]

Somehow related with the just noted problem is one about which Camus wrote: “there is but one philosophical problem really serious: suicide. To decide if life is worth the toil to be lived, or is not - it means to answer the fundamental question of philosophy.” [Camus,1971:91] And according to Hegel, an individual “who never risked his life may be recognized as a person, but he does not achieve the truth of being recognized as autonomous self-consciousness.” [Hegel,1963:1:218-219] It has also been said that “suicide is...a privilege of man” [Plessner,1988:118]. While speaking about suicide we should not neglect Durkheim’s work which links the existential problems with empirical methods of sociology. Besides, Durkheim distinguishes between egoistic and altruistic suicides. Thus, it can be said, the problem of suicide reflects the question of egoism/altruism, and - in particular - the very validity of this opposition. Interestingly, a thinker of a quite different philosophical persuasion noted: “For society the question of social order is always the most important. And for individual, in each social order it is death which is the problem of problems” [Elzenberg,1963:354].

Also known American psychologists - Miller, Galanter, Pribram - note that “one can find may specifically human problems; but solutions can be presented in sufficiently clear way taking death as an example. Man is the only animal which knows that it has to die. Is this fact to be considered as a new and important psychic process which is developing owing to the language? Or is it but perfecting of nonverbal processes? Man can make death a part of his plans” [Miller et al.,1980:181].

At the end of this passage, it should be noted that the above discussed questions (AQ1) and (PAQ2) may be seen as related to the problem of death. As regards (AQ1), the link is obvious: the attitude toward death as such, toward one’s own death and toward other people’s death determines the possibility or even actuality of murder acts; we can discuss the specific mechanisms of this determination: various opinions are possible, the very existence of those mechanisms cannot be questioned.

As regards the second question (PAQ2), the relation is less obvious. Yet, in my opinion, it does exist. The very awareness of a faintned of human existence has to co-determine the efforts oriented at protecting one’s life. This awareness should determine in a way man’s self-image and self-understanding, and those - in their turn - to co-determine the scope and intensity of the human ‘possessiveness’. On the other hand, the ability to sacrifice one’s life for this or that supra-individual goal should say something about the limits of human fondness in material well-being.

Therefore, these two ways of organizing anthropological problems - the first consisting in formulating rather simple questions, and the second consisting in determining a central “problem” (or just concept with which some problems are expressed) or ‘point’ in which various problems intersect - should be viewed as complementary rather than opposing.
1.5. Linguistic/semiotic metaphors

One of the tasks of a meta-theory is to construct a common language into which the relevant theories are to be translated. Two strategies are possible (this alternative is somehow related to that described in 1.3). First, we could start with a formal language. But, as one may suppose, to accomplish such a task one would have to confine oneself to it: if we thought seriously about such a language, we should refer to mathematical linguistics, theory of probability etc. and make of various theories a coherent whole. It would be a quite interesting job. Yet, personally, I do prefer more substantial work. Moreover, I believe that the following methodological/heuristic rule is quite plausible: intuition first, formalism next. Thus I choose the second possible strategy: the language will be constructed but only on an intuitive level. On this level, the use of metaphors plays the crucial role. In this essay, they will mainly be taken from linguistics and related domains. Below I am going to account for this decision and to list those metaphors.

1.5.1. There are a few reasons for such a decision. First, as it has been said, my focus is on man as a subject of actions. But today - after 'late' Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations), Austin, and Searle - there is no doubt that speech-acts constitute an important part of human behavior. These acts are particularly interesting as - usually - being oriented at other people. One their feature is specially intriguing: almost all of them in general, and their sophisticated type (literature) in particular, seem to be the best examples of 'humanistic' actions (as opposed to those more instinctive). Still, as I will suggest below, they do not fit very well humanistic interpretation'. So, they confront us with an interpretative challenge.

Second, as N. Chomsky's linguistic theory and philosophy demonstrates (cf. in particular his debate with Skinner), there is a profound - and well discussed (thus to be rather easily exploited) - link between general philosophical model of man and interpretation of actions described by linguistics.

Third, I think that the metaphors taken from the computer science can be quite illuminating. To accept this opinion one need not, I believe, to be a proponent of the 'strong AI thesis'. And computer science is strongly linked with linguistics.

Fourth, some interesting results have already been achieved. I mean in particular Miller, Galanter, and Pribram's book Plans and the structure of behavior, and - in Poland - M. Nowakowska's Action theory.

1.5.2. There are several metaphors that may be taken from the domain of linguistic, semiotics and other disciplines studying lungen and various language-based practices. Let me list and characterize some metaphors I believe to be of importance for the theory of action/anthropology.

Linking the problem of language of meat-anthropology with the substantial issues grouped around problem of death, I'd like to mention first the metaphor of BIOGRAPHY. The reason is rather obvious: It is death which makes individual life a closed whole. And it is (perfect, complete...) biography which reflects one's whole life. Putting it in other words, we might say that an individual is represented by a biography, or that is identical with a set of possible biographies.

Biography can be viewed as a special type of text. And just the metaphor of TEXT is second to be listed here. This metaphor has been suggested by Paul Ricoeur. I follow the presentation of Ricoeur's ideas given by H. White. We can speak of 'reading' of actions. There is a resemblance between 'reading' of actions and reading of a text.

The idea of Ricoeur may be linked with the opinion of MacIntyre. The latter contends that the "notion of comprehensiveness becomes a conceptual link between the category of action and that of narration" [MacIntyre, 1996:331] MacIntyre's 'central thesis': "man is, in his conduct and in his practice, as well as in his fantasies, a stories-telling animal" [MacIntyre, 1996:387] To my knowledge and appreciation, the most interesting remarks on the relevance of the theory-of-literature notions for theory of man may be found in MacIntyre's After Virtue.

Following this(ese) metaphor(s), one could also draw upon some ideas taken from esthetics and theory of literature. In particular, one could note a close relation between the semantics/syntax linguistic distinction and that of substance/form in the theory of the work of art (of a text in particular). Making a step further, one could guess that some lessons are to be learned from the aesthetic of music (since human life is a process - in this respect it can be best modeled by a piece of music, or - a theater performance).

Since one individual's life overlaps with others' lives then the metaphor of text could be transformed into that of DRAMA. And the latter constitutes a family of metaphors: one including also that of ROLE and that of THEATER. The metaphor of role was introduced by G.H. Mead, developed by numerous sociologists (Znaniecki, Parsons, ...) and enlarged and elaborated into metaphor of theater by Goffman.

And an important part of virtually any drama is DIALOGUE. Strictly speaking, the notion of dialogue is to be used more or less metaphorically, but sometimes - quite literally, in the sense of normal (spoken) conversation: "Conversation is all-pervasive trait of human world, usually evading attention of philosophers. /.../ the ability to understand...a conversation entails the ability to subsume it to a description which allows to reveal the degree and kind of the coherence of this conversation: 'drunks' gibber', 'serious scientific polemic', 'tragic mutual misunderstanding', 'comic, farce-like misunderstanding as to each other's motives', 'penetrating exchange of opinions', 'struggling aimed at gaining dominance', 'trivial exchange of gossips'. /.../ talk is a dramatic genre /.../ talks as literary works have beginning, development and end. /.../ the same mutatis mutandis, concerns battles, chess games, philosophical seminars, families sitting at dinner-table, businessmen negotiating deals - it means all the processes of inter-human exchange. Talk, properly widely understood, is a form of all human exchange". [MacIntyre, 1996:376-7]

This metaphor is probably the most important of all. Let's start with the simple description. There are two talking individuals. It may be claimed that the relation is symmetrical. In general, it need not to be so. But even if in the given case it happens to be so, we can fix our attention on one individual whom we will regard as the 'subject' of the situation. Viewed from the standpoint of the fixed participant, the dialogue (conversation) is a sequence of received and emitted utterances. As regards the metaphorical use of the concept of dialogue, the names of G.H. Mead and Bakhtin should be mentioned.

This metaphor leads us out from the strictly linguistic domain into the domain of GAMES. Theory of games is among the most important conceptual tools for the anthropology. It should be remembered that it is not so distant from linguistic as it might seem at the first sight. Two ideas should be mentioned here. First, the idea of
The sphere of 'unconscious' need not to be a realm of 'dark', 'irrational' forces. These double relations both with Cartesian and Freudian philosophy are relevant here. They demonstrate that we need not to equate the 'rational' with the 'conscious'.

Convergence between Chomsky's theory and Freud's psychoanalysis: grammar is located in the domain of the 'unconscious' rather than in that of the 'conscious'. It is held, also by Chomsky himself, to be a contemporary variant of Cartesianism. It seems to be generally correct identification. However, one could detect a metaphor. In particular, to the importance of Chomskian philosophy of language. It is interpreted in the well known book of Miller,Galanter,Pribram [1980] from which I have drawn many ideas used in the present work. The notion of program is taken from computer science and its application in the domain of anthropology may be (at present, in the future the situation may change) of metaphorical character only. And its application does not imply any opinion as to man-computer (non)similarity. I would rather insist on the fact that this metaphor seems to be quite close to that of role: some, in particular, social roles (let's think of that of Venetian doggies) may be viewed as almost algorithms (known, say, as rules of the court ceremonial) determining precisely behavior in virtually all situations.

As we have seen, the listed metaphors makes up not just a set but, so to say, a network of metaphors. I do believe that this network will turn to be sufficient for the analyses to be accomplished in this essay, and in the future will provide a good base for a more formal language.

Ending these remarks, I would add still one. Just on the language. And expressing an ideal rather that announcing what is to be achieved in the work.

The multiplicity of anthropological languages is by no means incidental. But, on the other hand, it is not necessarily manifests various theoretical positions, if the latter are conceived as various resolutions to the same problem. Rather, it reflects the variety of Weltanschaungen: some present 'drastic' vision of human existence - Eternity, History or Universe being its stage. Some others offer very 'prosaic' image - a shop in one buys bread-and-butter, a factory in which one earns one's wage, a pub in which one discusses the results of a football match are the scenery of human life. But human being is at the same time 'metaphysical-existence' and 'everyday-life'. And the task of any (possibly!) complete anthropology is to account for both aspects of human being, and for all the others - 'in-between'. Of course, various anthropologies may in different ways characterize the relative importance of various 'aspects' or 'dimensions' of our being. Yet the very existence of those aspects should be a challenge to anthropology rather than a question.

In professional philosophy, I do not know any work which could be regarded as embodiment of such comprehensive vision. But in the domain of literary art, we could find some works comprising vision of this type. In my opinion, James Joyce's Ulysses is the best actualization of the ideal I am speaking of. The task of meta-anthropology is to follow this example.

I would like to point to the special substantial importance of the linguistic metaphor. In particular, to the importance of Chomskian philosophy of language. It is held, also by Chomsky himself, to be a contemporary variant of Cartesianism. It seems to be generally correct identification. However, one could detect a convergence between Chomsky's theory and Freud's psychoanalysis: grammar is located in the domain of the 'unconscious' rather than in that of the 'conscious'. These double relations both with Cartesian and Freudian philosophy are relevant here. They demonstrate that we need not to equate the 'rational' with the 'conscious'. The sphere of 'unconscious' need not to be a realm of 'dark', 'irrational' forces operating in human soul. Of course, it does not mean that such 'forces' do not exist at all.

2. The starting point: humanistic interpretation

In this chapter I am going to present briefly a model of human action, namely humanistic interpretation, to argue why it is to be regarded as a starting point for construction of a meta-anthropology, to present some critical comments concerning this model, as well ad to outline the way of further proceeding.

2.1. Why to start just from here?

A few words should be said about why I've chosen just this model as the starting point for the meta-anthropological construction.

First, I think this model is - to an extent - simply true. In my opinion, neither philosophical speculation is needed nor empirical investigations to confirm its (partial) truth likeness. A simple reflection on our daily activities should confirm it. Decisions what to buy or what to prepare for dinner are being routinely made. And decisions where to spend summer holidays or whom to invite to a party make up a considerable part of our everyday life. And more spectacular decisions as whom to marry or whether to (dis)join a political party seem also to fit this model not too badly.

Thus I would claim for the following meta-philosophical thesis. (Some) actual controversies between anthropology concern the model-elements rather than the model as such. For instance, I'd say that not the important role of preferences as such is mainly debated but their 'content', origins, stability etc.

Second, on the other hand, not all types of human conduct can be regarded as actions in the sense of humanistic interpretation. Nevertheless, it is analytically convenient to regard them as a special case of deliberate actions, namely actions of - so to say - 'zero-degree' of 'deliberate-ness'.

Third, this model can be generalized. For instance, we may modify the notion of knowledge, moving away - in this or that direction - from the Cartesian ideal of knowledge which lies at the bottom of the most idealized model of humanist interpretation. At this moment, an analogy might be useful. As today we know, among all continuous functions one may find some intuitively very surprising. Still, each such a function can be approximated with a 'combination' of the most simple (and intuitively perfectly conceivable) linear function. Using this picture, I'd say that the humanistic model is to play the part of the linear functions; anthropologies would differ one from other as to the set of functions that are believed necessary to describe and explain human behavior and as to the rules of generating them from the simplest ones.

Fourth, it has been said that "the man's act of decision-making is a particular case of a procedure being of fundamental importance for all life processes. Life demands exploiting all available information in order to achieve the ultimate goal - continuation of life. Each organism contains in its DNA 'instructions' how to cope with various situations. Each live being , and actually each cell has to make incessantly choices among various acts provided for given situation. The analysis of principles that determine a sequence of such choices demonstrates explicitly that conscious choice, being characteristic of man, is a stage in the development of this common trait of living beings." [Young, 1984:25]
Surely, a philosopher does not have to accept an opinion of a biologist. Yet, this opinion seems to be philosophically quite interesting; it opens a perspective which allows for unitarian analysis of man, other living creatures (the simplest including), and technical systems (computers). And if the model is valid for simple animals than, in this particular case, should be *a fortiori* valid for men. And we return now to the first argument.

Fifth, I do agree with Elster, who says what follows. "The elementary unit of social life is the individual human action. To explain social institutions and social change is to show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals. This view, often referred to as methodological individualism, is in my view trivially true." [Elster,1989:13] Thus, it just human action that is the most fundamental (conceptual and actual) link between individual and society/History. And as I've already stressed, I am interested in anthropology regarded as a basis for philosophy of History.

Sixth, the language of rational actions, or rational decision-making, is quite popular; I would even say that more popular that it might at first appear. It is a part of sociological tradition: first of all in Weber, but also (to a degree) in Simmel, in Parsons, Homans... It plays a role in the mainstream economics, and in particular in marginalism of Jevons, Menger, Walras and Marshall. It is present in the analytical philosophy of action (Danto, Davidson...). And in such different currents in marxism as the social ontology of 'old' Lukacs and analytical marxism in its Polish (Kmita,Nowak,Topolski) and Anglo-Saxon/Scandinavian version (Cohen, Elster...) Some orientations in psychology (Galanter,Ekel...) who maintain that 'psychological decision-theory is a theory of highest degree of generality' [Kozielecki,1977:29] Also mathematical theory of (optimal) decisions is the last on this list but not the least in its importance.

If the situation is actually so as described here, then it might be unreasonable to start at any other point.

### 2.2. Presentation of the model

2.2.1. The presentation of the humanistic interpretation will be based upon Patryas' book *Idealizacyjny charakter interpretacji humanistycznej* [Idealizational character of humanist interpretation] I shall also avail of a shorter presentation given in an English paper of the same author.

The basic notion of this model is that of situation. Situation is defined as "the set of properties indispensable for performing various actions". [Patryas,1982a:99]. Thus we can say that a subject (an individual, a human being) X may perform in the given situation each of actions C1,...,Cn. This is the only realistic assumption of the principle of rationality. Then a list of idealizing assumptions is given. It runs as follows:

(A1) X uses merely his own belief in a period of time T.
(A2) X takes into consideration merely his preferences in period of time T.
(A3) X's belief at moment 't' is true and at the same time moment 't' is a certain moment of period of time T.
(A4) X's belief and preferences are constant in period of time T.
(A5) X believes at moment 't' that actions C1,...,Cn are jointly exhaustive.

(A6) X believes at moment 't' that he is able perform only and exclusively each of actions C1,...,Cn in period of time T.
(A7) X believes at the moment 't' that actions C1,...,Cn exclude each other mutually.
(A8) X knows (in the sense believe) at moment 't' how to perform each of actions C1,...,Cn.
(A9) X believes at the moment 't' that the only results of actions C1,...,Cn are their effects.
(A10) Utilities of effects of actions C1,...,Cn are linearly ordered at moment 't'.

Eight of those are held to be so-called *quasi*-idealizing assumptions, and as to (A6) and (A9), their strictly idealizing character is suggested.

Therefore, the principle of rationality is an idealizational formula (formula, since free variable X occurs). Is says that "if a given person is able to perform each of actions C1,...,Cn in period of time T and in addition the above ten idealizing assumptions are satisfied then in this period the person will perform this one of actions C1,...,Cn whose effect is of the greatest utility." [ibidem:102]

Patryas offers us a number of concretizations of the principle of rationality. First, he considers a modification of the (A10). Now, according to (A10'), the utilities of effects of actions C1,...,Cn are but partially ordered. Accordingly, the consequent of the principle is modified and tells us that X will perform one and only one of those actions whose utility is maximal. [Patryas,1979:22] Which of them? It depends on a supplementing determinant, such as habit or custom. [ibidem:23]

Second, (A9) is replaced with (A9') which assigns to the agent knowledge of sets of results of each action. For each action, its global utility (as a function of the utilities of the particular effects of the given action) is defined. Now, the subject is said to perform any of actions being of maximal global utility. [ibidem:25] Here the question of various possible shapes of the function in question is mentioned. It is suggested that personality ('characteristic of a person') may be conceived, in the given context, as a description of the way (specific for the given individual) of determining global utility of his multi-effective actions.

Third, (A8) is modified. (A8') holds that X knows that his actions will bring some effects of his actions with a degree of probability. The consequent of the principle of rationality is modified profoundly. Firstly, it claims only for probability of performing an action of maximal utility. Secondly, it is held that that action (of those of maximal utility will be undertaken which is characterized with maximal probability of its actualization. [ibidem:29]

Fourth, the (A7) is rejected. The modified assumption (A7') says that the set of all actions is divided into subsets composed of actions being mutually exclusive. The modified principle of rationality holds that the subject will perform no more than one of the action of each of those sets (each one being of the greatest utility). [ibidem:30]

Fifth, the subject's knowledge about his abilities is taken into consideration. The modified assumption (A6') distinguishes a subset of actions consisting of those actions about which X knows that he can perform them. This modification of one the assumptions of PR leads us to a modification of the consequent of PR. Now two patterns are possible: of 'risky' and 'cautious' behavior. In the first case, the consequent remains unchanged. In the second one, the action of maximally preferred result will undertaken, but chosen only from the subset postulated in (A6). [ibidem:34]
Sixth. The assumption saying that the actions C1, ..., Cn are jointly exhaustive is modified. Now it is claimed that X knows that some other actions are possible in the given situation. If it is so, X is said to perform the maximally preferred action only if the utility of its effect is higher than a threshold N. [ibidem:37]

Seventh. The inconstancy of belief and preferences is taken into account. A sub-period T is introduced, and the constancy of belief and preferences are confined respectively. The modified principle or rationality maintains now that X performs an action being a part of this action which is maximally preferred in T'. [ibidem:39]

Eighth. If the knowledge of X is not by the definition true then the principle must be modified and in the place of the formulation "the action of which the effect is of greatest utility" must be inserted more elaborated phrase "the action about effect of which X thinks to be of greatest utility". [ibidem:40]

Ninth. (2') introduces preferences of other persons. It is assumed that a function may be defined which 'aggregates' all the individual preferences. Then it is claimed that there is undertaken any of those actions undertaken which maximize this function. [ibidem:42]

Tenth. The modification of the (A1) leads to a modification of the consequent of PR being analogous to that introduced in the eighth step. Now X is said to perform an action being the 'best', according to the knowledge of Y whom X trusts [ibidem:44].

2.2.2. It may be useful to compare Patryas' reconstruction of the principle of rationality with an image outlined by a leading exponent of rational-choice theory. In Elster's words, "a simple scheme for explaining an action is to see it as the end result of two successive filtering operations. We begin with a large set of all abstractly possible actions that an individual might undertake. The first filter is made up of all the physical, economic, legal and psychological constraints that the individual faces. The actions consistent with these constraints form his opportunity set. The second filter is a mechanism that determines which action within the opportunity set will actually be carried out." As the main mechanisms making up the second filter, Elster considers rational choice and social norms. [Elster, 1989:13] And the summary: "When faced with several courses of action, people usually do what they believe the best overall outcome. The deceptively simple sentence summarizes the theory of rational choice." [Elster, 1989:22]

I do not think that any elaborate comparison is necessary. The basic idea is common to the both authors. The only difference lies in the fact that Patryas is aware of the idealizational character of this theory, and - consequently - formulates the idealizational assumptions, and subsequently - while revoking them - gives more concretized formulations of the initial principle. For this reason, Patryas' model of rational behavior is particularly convenient as a starting point for further considerations. In particular, some its shortcomings are easy noticeable and can be eliminated. And just this is to be done in the next point.

2.3. A critique of the model

At the beginning of the point, a remark on this critique of Patryas' model. I'm not going to discuss the empirical (more generally: substantial) validity of this model. Such a task is beyond the scope of any meta-theory. The critique will be of analytical character. This critique will consist of the following points.

[1] The effective conceptualization of action is based on the notion of a 'result' and the 'effect' of an action. Patryas follows here von Wright who speaks of "subsuming an action under another name" when we decide to determine as the 'effect' of an action a different element of the set of its results. Doing so, both von Wright and Patryas transform into merely technical issue a problem that under the name of 'alienation' was crucial for Hegel and Marx, and that was also referred to as the 'tragical aspect' of human existence.

[2] The notion of situation has not been discussed. Perhaps this notion works as well as a representation of a 'fundamental situation' (in the sense of Jaspers) as that of a 'seller-buyer situation'. It might be so, but it should be discussed, at least briefly.

[3] The assumption of the constancy of the agent's knowledge and preferences is probably formulated too strongly. It would have to be so formulated only if one accepts an epistemological (resp. axiological) 'absolute monism'. But if not, then it is sufficient to speak of the constancy of the 'relevant part' of knowledge (or system of values). The weaker formulation is more complicated, thus - for the sake of simplicity - the stronger version could be accepted. But a comment on this problem should be given.

[4] One of the assumptions tells us that "X...takes into account but his own knowledge". This formulation lacks analytical precision. In a sense it is a tautology: any knowledge taken into account by an agent has to be - in a sense - his own knowledge. Viewing from another angle, it is so that one's knowledge varies as to its sources and subjective certainty (it can be - but by no means: has to be - so that subjectively most subjectively certain knowledge is that rooted in the 'immediate experience'). But it is not obvious that the dichotomic classification 'own - not own' is sufficient. And if one accepts a strong interpretation of the concept 'own knowledge', then one should admit (I can't see here any matter for an actual theoretical controversy) that this assumption is totally false - is a very strong idealization. But if we introduce such assumptions, we should - I think - to demonstrate how it works. But Patryas did not. (On the other hand, it should be noted that in his later work on Assenting Sentences [1987], Patryas discusses those problems at length.)

[5] The assumption "X...takes into account but his own preferences" almost completely neglects the complex issue which is covered with this phrase. First, Patryas mentions only an interesting idea of the first-order and second-order preferences but he does not discuss it in any detail. Second, this idea, however interesting, does not exhaust the complexities of this issue. And even if he rejects this assumption and formulates a concretization of the PR, Patryas speaks but of the 'global utility' of an action. It's true that in a footnote he mentions Arrow's as crucial for Hegel and Marx, and that was also referred to as the 'tragical aspect' of human existence.

[6] The case discussed at the end of [5] can be put into the context of the assumption that claims for the linearity of X's order of values (let's note that this assumption is also too strong: it is sufficient to assume that the ordering has but one maximal element). If there are two or more maximal elements, agent is said to
perform any action that brings about one of these elements. Again, the most interesting question is passed by (if a result of an action is obviously better - from agent's point of view - than that of another one, then it isn't surprising that he undertakes the former and not the latter; the point is what he does if there is no such clear distinction).

[7] As regards the mechanism of the decision-making, the following, rather specific but important issue, is to be at least mentioned, or even more widely discussed. I mean the thinking-speaking (thought-language) problem. If we assume that a description of situation, an articulation of knowledge and a wording of values (preferences) is given, then we can depict the process of the decision-making as a (quasi-)deductive one: the decision being (represented by) a conclusion interfered from the premises composed of the just mentioned sets of sentences. The point is that the general possibility of the translating of thinking into a lingual form is often called into a question. Of course, in some simple cases a rational decision might be undertaken without any lingual articulation (let's look at the following - imagined - conversation: "Do you really want to buy this dress? It's ugly. What do you see in it? - Actually, I don't know... - But you are sure you want to but just this one? - Definitely so. I like it most.") But what about political decisions? Or business ones? Here the problem of lingual representation of the decision-situation may matter. Still a remark seems to be of some importance. On the 'the bald's paradox', Quine and phenomenology. Briefly put, I believe, contrarily to the quite popular since1950s (but still today?) philosophical opinion, that there is a difference between so called observation-statements and theoretical statements. In other words, I tend to accept the 'dogma of empiricists' [Quine,1963:37-42] and reject Quine's criticism of the alleged 'dogma'. An example. In many presentations of special theory of relativity 'paradox of twins' is being discussed. To understand why we should expect the situation presented in this paradox, we need to understand the theory in question. But to understand the description of the paradoxical situation, one does not have to know anything about modern physics. The very sense of paradoxicality arises from the discrepancy between the description of a strange, yet easily understandable on the most 'surface' level situation, and the more profound its comprehension. Nevertheless, I do not think that Quine's criticism is simply false. If we avail of the metaphor of white, black and gray, we could say that a 'observation-theory' spectrum does exist in the same sense as the 'white-black' one. But the continuity of the 'white-black' spectrum cannot, in my view, justify the rejection of the white-black contrast even if we agree that 'perfect white' and 'perfect black' themselves are predicates that cannot be applied to any material thing. In other words, the 'the bald's paradox' does not invalidate the 'bald-hairy' distinction.

As regards phenomenology, I mentioned it for two reasons. In a sense, Husserl followed this same path as Schlick or Carnap. But his conception of 'experience' seems to be much more suited for the meta-philosophy than that of the Wiener Kreis. The latter is - paradoxically - much more metaphysically-loaded than the former. But it is not the business of the theory of experience decide the metaphysical issues. Hence, it is not the business of this theory to decide whether we are able to 'experience immediately' God or we are not. Just at this point we can grasp best the moral relevance of phenomenology: if someone declares that he met the God we should, at least at the starting point, take this declaration seriously. If we do not, we manifest our disrespect for him, and we say, or suggest, that our experience, one that does not any 'encounter with God', is better. But in what sense it should be better? - That is the first reason for regarding phenomenology as being of some relevance for meta-philosophy. And the second might be summed up as follows. For neopositivists, the 'basic statement' (Protokollätze) seemed to be something rather obvious, something, so to say, 'easy attainable'. On the other hand, the description of the phenomena 'immediately given' is the main objective of (a key part of) phenomenology. In other words, to use a term once proposed (in a rather different context) by W. Mejbaum, the 'pure experience' is a result of a process of 'rectification' (perhaps never fully completed).

(While speaking about peculiarities of anthropology, I mentioned the importance of the literature. Now, after the comments on phenomenology, let me cite some remarks on Novel and phenomenology to be found in Ernesto Sabato's Writer and His Ghosts: "Philosophy and contemporary art of novel express the synthesis of oppositions: something as if linking of lyrical poetry and sober reasoning. /.../ What is literary description if not a pure phenomenology? And this philosophy of concrete man, created in our age, where body cannot be separated from soul, consciousness from external world and one's own 'I' from the 'I' of other people co-living with me - is it not a tacit (if imperfect and adulterated by scientific Weltanschauung) philosophy of a poet and a novelist?" [Sabato,1987:134-136])

To give you only one but important example (And - first of all - example which should make it clear why I am considering here these problems.) The phenomenon of 'internal freedom'. It can be qualified by this or that metaphysics as an 'appearance' (Hegel's Schein). Still it cannot be just discarded. In my opinion, any anthropology that does not account (in this or that way: either accepting it as a 'real' attribute of man, or rejecting it as an 'appearance' being a manifestation of another mechanism) for this phenomenon, cannot be regarded as a 'complete' one (e.g. addressing all the questions that 'should be' addressed by any anthropology). Thus, for instance, according to my general position, I do not reject behaviorism. But, to be regarded as a serious theory it cannot simply reject the very existence of the feeling of being free. It must to (try to) demonstrate that we may account for our actions without the concept of freedom and to explain how and why this feeling arises. An example (I do not want to decide how much successful) of such an attitude may be found in sociobiology. The very existence of the phenomenon of altruism is not rejected but is being explained as a 'manifestation of a 'deep' (familial-genetic) egoism.

2.4. The way of the further proceeding

Before starting the intended construction of meta-anthropology, let me stop for while in order to outline the way of the further considerations.

Two basic stages of this way might be distinguished. The first stage is to devoted to various aspects of human action and questions which arise when those aspects are being described. In the second stage the question will be arisen as to factors determining actions as possessing these or those traits. The first stage is covered by four chapters. Two of them are devoted to 'syntactical' and 'semantical' aspects of human actions. Theses aspects constitute commonly the 'deep' structure of actions or - 'competence' of the acting individual. The third chapter is about the possible mechanisms of decision-making, and the
fourth about actions' 'performance' (both 'competence' and 'performance' are to be understood - as far as possible - in the way known from Chomski's theory).

The second stage is covered by only one chapter, in which a tentative 'topography' of a space of anthropologies will be presented. In that chapter, various anthropologies are understood as different theories accounting (in their own specific ways) for human actions.

3. "Syntax" of act(ion)s

The main goal of this chapter is to deal with the 'formal' aspects of human actions. The main intuition which is being developed further may be described thus. There is a difference between such actions like adding two natural numbers, singing a pop-song or dancing in a discotheque on one hand, and solving a differentiated equation, singing a role in a Wagner's opera or dancing the main part in Swann Lake on the other. These aspects of actions which allow for grouping some intellectual or artistic actions in one set and some other actions of the same types in other set are labeled here 'formal' or 'syntactical'.

I shall proceed in this chapter as follows. Firstly, I shall make two distinctions. The first one is that of behavior and act (the latter being conceived of as a special case of the former). The second one is that of act and action. Here also the notion of negative actions (forbearance) is introduced.

Secondly, the issue of ordering of actions (as generated by the relation of instrumental subordination) will be discussed. Here also the notion of collective action will be mentioned. And, thirdly, the last part of this chapter will deliver an overview of those anthropological issues that may be expressed in the 'syntactical' terms (without reference to the specific 'meaning' of actions).

3.1. Behavior and acts, acts and actions

The basic intuition I am starting with is very simple: human beings are parts of the world. As Segerberg puts it, "to act is to influence the course of history, in the words of von Wright 'to interfere with the course of nature.'" [Segerberg, 1988:348] The world happens always to be in a state. This ('global') state is composed in a way of some other ('local') states. Human actions can be characterized in two ways: first, as a sub-class of the states of human beings; second, in their relations to the other states of the world (in particular: other states of the human beings). We surely could go deeper and analyze this intuition in more detail. Still, if we are interested (and we are, in accordance with the decision of the author of this words) in the developing of (meta-)anthropology, and especially - as the basis for social theories, we have to resist the temptation to be involved in an exercise in formal ontology (an adaptation of the construction given by Wolniewicz would be necessary).

3.1.1. Man's states, behavior and acts. The main line of the analysis may be sketched like this. Let's define a chain of sets, ordered linearly by the relation of inclusion. We start with the set of states of a human being. Any element of a subset of it can be defined as behavior. They are some states of human being that cannot be regarded as behavior. For instance: the temperature of the human body, or - a dream. And acts make up a proper subset of the former. Acts can be characterized by their voluntary (at least prima facie), hence conscious, character. Two remarks. First: non-action behavior can be, and perhaps most often is, conscious; for instance - weeping while being in great despair. And second, 'conscious' or even 'voluntary' does not necessarily mean 'purposive' (goal-oriented, teleological, etc.). As to this classification (state - behavior - act), some further remarks are necessary.
First, on the distinction: states of human body versus behavior. Behavior is to be regarded as a sub-class of the set of states of human body. The analytical question is: Which states are to be classified as behavior?

An answer may be approached, for instance, if we follow Elster insisting that, "the opportunity set rarely reduces to literally one physical option." [Elster, 1989:15] Statistical estimations letting aside, I would say that (any) anthropology starts with an assumption (if metaphysically 'naive' or not, it does not matter here) that there are situations in which various physical states of human body are possible. (In the context of a Laplacean metaphysics no 'genuine' anthropology is possible.) If a man's body is completely bound, then we can speak of total (and not metaphorical but quite real) reification of man. And reified man cannot behave or act in any way.

If someone is fasten to a pole, in order to be shot by a firing squad, but he can open his mouth, we still can speak of his behavior or action and ask why he doesn't say any word, or praises his oppressors, or curses them, or sings national anthem... Yet, if he is fasten, and his mouth and eyes are tied, he has actually been reduced to a thing. Though, if to take a more specific metaphysics for a framework, his internal states like hate toward oppressors or, contrarily, forgiving, could matter and allow for speaking about various alternative actions. I would not like to be read as manifesting any disrespect for such a metaphysics. Nevertheless, keeping in eye the social-historical orientation of meta-anthropology constructed here, this possibility must be omitted.

Therefore, man is believed here to be - usually - physically free. And insofar he is physically free, we may speak of his behavior and acting. To put it in other words. The very existence of a 'mediating link' between environment of man and some of his states (behavior) is regarded here not as a matter of anthropological debate but as an assumption constituting the field for such a debate. And this debate is about its genesis, structure, functioning etc., of this link.

Now human acts are to be characterized. They are to be seen as a sub-class of the set comprising all types of behavior. If the sub-class is proper or not will not be decided at this moment.

The following quotations from Plessner seem to be useful as a starting point for the discussion of the behavior-acting relations: "Laugh is a remnant from the monkey-time, repugnant and shameless sound from false larynx. If they tickle my chin, it is proceeding from somewhere in my body" - wrote Knut Hamsun, and perhaps only due to his respect for painful circumstances with which crying is accompanied, he did not condemn the latter. Laugh and crying do not fit the image of tempered, eloquent man who attempts at submitting his physical existence to the rigors of culture, and - according to the words of the Bible - is ashamed of being naked. /.../ These reactions befit man, even if it not always befits to manifest them freely. /.../ Laugh and crying are reactions to the limits our behavior meets./.../ With laugh and crying, man confirms that he arrived at the limit of possible behavior." [Plessner, 1988:94-95] And the following. "Laugh and crying are manifestations of the blocking of embodiment as a means regulating human behavior. They are sensible defecting reactions in a situation in which one cannot secure such a relation between a person and his body to which a behavior corresponds. Distance, this mediation of the relation, manifests itself as lose of self-control - related to the normal order of things and base upon it. It cannot happen to a being without distance, lacking ex-center. Thus animals can neither laugh or cry. But to man the summit is accessible from which he may fall down. And but man knows together with sense also double sense, nonsense, and what goes beyond them." [Plessner, 1988:97]

The remarks on such phenomena like laugh, crying etc. provide us with opportunity for discussion of a subtle relation between behavior, action and forbearance. The simple physical behavior gives us the first examples. In a situation (a standing-party, meeting a friend in park...), it may be completely unintentional (simple unconscious reaction to the physiological state of organism) to stand at a place or to move. Still, if one is to stand without any movement for an hour (as the guard at the Unknown Soldier's Tomb), is must be viewed as an action. The rules of 'good manners' provide further examples; a part of them consists of rules which forbid some forms of behavior which often are completely unintended (though conscious).

The distinction between 'behavior' (Verhalten) and 'action' (Handlung) is said to be based upon pre-philosophical experience which metes it purposeful to distinguish between behavior of animals and actions of man. [Koenig, 1983:276]

First, I do not attempt at any definition of behavior or act. I only say that it makes some sense to distinguish these three sets, even if we don't know how to draw a precise borderline.

Second, the question whether all these inclusions are proper ones is not only an analytical one. To give an extreme example. If we would take seriously (I wouldn't like to discuss now if we should or not actually do it) the information about Indian fakirs who are allegedly able to stop and to set again in move their hearts, and if we would contend that the only difference between them and us consists in the presence or lack of proper training, then we could claim that virtually all our states are in fact acts.

Here I am going but to glimpse a field which has been explored fruitfully by the jurisprudence. Thus only a set of images/scenes. In each case it is so that a consequence of an X's act is Y's being dead.

[1] The case of Raskolnikov: the murder is a realization of a deliberate plan.
[2] The case of Othello: the death of Desdemona is no doubt intended, yet the intention is not deliberate as in the former case but rather 'spontaneous' (is a consequence of an emotional reaction to the supposed adultery)
[3] Someone is driving a car, a person is appearing on the road - the distance is sufficient for stopping, still the possibility is not used by the driver. The agent accepts (if 'passively') an obvious consequence of his action
[4] Someone is driving a car at a high speed; in result he is not able to stop his car and hits a passer who dies.

These example suggest that perhaps the problem is not where to draw the border-line between actions and 'non-act' behavior but whether drawing it has any sense at all. It may be that set of actions is a subset of acts of behavior, yet not a Cantorionic one but a fuzzy one. Saying it differently, it may be that we should speak rather of various degrees of intentionality. The degree of intentionality is somehow correlated (I cannot offer any precise characteristic of this correlation) with the degree of individual's control of his behavior.

At the moment one comment is necessary. It should be remarked that there is no obvious link between the degree of intentionality and moral responsibility. Surely, many ethical systems would accept that in some specific situations to kill someone is not only allowed but not to do it is a moral crime. And even Othello's behavior might be met with greater moral indulgence than the behavior of a permanent 'road pirate'.

[250x101]
Of analytical importance is (meta-)anthropological question as to the theoretical character of the scale of intentionality which I have only indicated here. And this analytical question, if answered, opens way for further investigations and various stances as to 'standard level' of intentionality and factors which determine it.

### 3.1.2. Acts and actions

A quotation from MacIntyre offers an opportunity for a discussion which will lead to another important distinction: "The question 'What is he doing?' may be given with several answers being equally true and correct, for instance 'He is digging', 'He is taking exercise', 'He is preparing for winter', 'He is giving his wife pleasure' /.../ whatever answer is given to the question of how to understand or explain the given fragment of behavior, it necessarily assumes an answer to another question, namely that of how all the different answers to the question 'What is he doing?' are interrelated. /.../ we cannot characterize behaviors independently of intentions and we cannot characterize intentions independently of social systems that make those intentions comprehensible to the subjects themselves as well as to other people... 'system' may be an institution, may be... a practice or any other human surrounding. The most important is that, in my view, system has its history which not only comprises but has to comprise the histories of particular men... the same act of behavior may belong to more than one system. It may be so in two ways at least..." [MacIntyre, 1996:368-9]

As you see, MacIntyre discusses the problem which, according to Segerberg [1988:350] was "first raised by Anscombe" - "how to describe what an agent does."

From the general philosophical point of view, one thing is noteworthy: any anthropology assumes at least a weak form of determinism; perhaps 'local' and 'phenomenal', still - determinism. Briefly speaking, any anthropology has to assume that man can bring about some changes in the surrounding world.

This simple fact has some non-trivial consequences for theory of action; as J. Kmita noted, such a simple act as 'letting to fall down' a physical object may be variously defined, according to physical theory being assumed. [Kmita,1980:126] This issue must remain just mentioned. At this stage of meta-anthropological investigations, the framework of a 'natural' metaphysics will offer satisfying number of complications.

Having said this, I can pass on to the notion of action. Formally, an action will be defined here as an ordered pair composed of an act and of a result/consequence (actual or possible - this remark is very important for further considerations, in particular those on orders of actions) of this act. (Hence an act belongs to an action in the set-theoretical sense.) I think it can be useful to apply here the image of graph: points represent 'states of the world', acts being peculiars states of the world, namely of human beings, and (some) graphs represent - actions. Following this image, we can note that that at one point great many graphs can start. And all these graphs represent different actions. A few words of comment are necessary.

First, in general there is no way in which we could tell the action from all the other that are, so to say, based upon one and the same act. Basically, they all are 'equal in their rights'.

Second, two different relations between 'co-actions' should be distinguished. The first relation connects these actions which are defined by a chain of effects of an act. Let's take into consideration the following example: X presses the trigger of his gun (an act A); the bullet goes out of the gun (the effect E1), the bullet hurts a person (the effect E2), after a time this person dies (the effect E3), an other person who loved the former gets mad (the effect E4)... We probably could go further and further... How far? One would argue that the further we go along this chain, the less an effect depends upon the initial act and the more - upon other factors. This observation seems to be valid. But, if one would like to be very consequent, the very existence of any action could be objected(!): Even these effects of an act that are 'very close' to it are (almost) always co-determined by some other states. One could propose to decide that an action is to be defined by its 'first effect' (cf. Danto's notion of 'basic actions'). This proposal arises two doubts. Firstly, it is a matter of dispute if all chains of effects necessarily have the first elements. Secondly, even if some chains would have the first elements, it were highly non intuitive - at least at some cases - to confine oneself to these elements. Or, to put it more acutely: if anthroplogy is conceived - among others - as a basis for ethics, it cannot be so that the problem of the moral responsibility of a Stalin, or a Hitler or a Pol Pot for the death of millions of people, should be decided (probably, with violation of all our moral intuitions, in the negative way) analytically. Obviously, at this moment it is impossible to discuss this problem substantially. I only want to declare that such a discussion ought to be analytically possible. Hence, the very possibility of such a discussion is to be regarded as a criterion of adequacy of the analytical construction. This decision should be supported by this quote: "A few years ago, John Lachs described [in his book on Responsibility of the Individual in Modern Society, 1981 - WCz] mediation in action (phenomenon in which an action of one person in performed by the other who 'stands between me and my action preventing me from direct experiencing its effects') as one of most distinctive and effects-abundant traits of modern society." [Bauman,1992:49]

The other point to be made here is the following. Let's commence with the widespread intuition which says that people want to be happy, thus that happiness is an ultimate goal of individual's actions. It might be so. Yet it is often maintained that consciousness orientation toward one's happiness is counter-effective: more happiness is - according to this claim - usually gained as a 'by-product' of more specifically oriented actions. The same might be said about such goals as 'being loved', 'being famous', 'being respected person' etc. Of course, this claim need not be true. I do not want to discuss it here. I only insist on the usefulness of such analytical construction which allows to put a question which might be formulated thus:

[Q1] Is always conscious action most effective, other factors equal; or it happens that some types of actions are more effective if being unconscious (thus, by definition, being co-actions of some conscious ones)?

Now, I would like to demonstrate that two known theoretical ideas may be formulated in the 'act-action' language.

First, more complex task, a reinterpretation of Freud's theory of unconscious motives for acting, or - perhaps it would be better to put it so - of what is common to Marx, Nizetsche, and the great Austrian philosopher and physician (putting together after Ricoeur - the three 'masters of suspicion').

A preferred state-of-the-world as prima facie motive, and an other state, being a result/consequence of the former, as the motive; even if the last one is not conscious and the former is.

This formulation helps us to confront with the standard critique of Freud (and others 'masters of suspicion') which objects the allegedly Freudian image of man as being who does not know what he actually wants, or as a total hypocrite (being him
even vis-a-vis himself). In the presented here formulation, man it said to know his preferences but not necessarily all of them.

This formulation allows us also to see, perhaps more clearly than usually, that Freudian theory of unconscious motives contains two theses; the first might be labeled 'genetically', the second - 'structural'. The first one is about mechanisms of formation of preferences and says, in particular, that individual is now aware of these mechanisms. The second describes just the complex structure of preferences.

The second illustration is taken from the linguistic phenomenology of Austin. I mean the theory of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts. The only correction (of terminological character) being necessary is - speaking not about acts but about actions (locutionary, illocutionary, perlocutionary) 'founded on' one and the same speech-act.

If we accept that those interpretations are not only admissible, but also - useful, we should find the idea of 'act-action' distinction more justified.

And now, some words on collective action. Great American economist K.Arrow has asked. "Why collective action? Why society is needed, or at least why it should play significant economic roles? From economist's point of view, it is so since collective action may enlarge the area of individual rationality. Collective action is a means of power, a means with which individuals may actualize their individual values more fully. At the first sight, this statement seems to be banal and according to economists it does not deserve comments." [Arrow,1985:9] Well, what is banal and what is not, surely is not a banal question. In my opinion, the thesis put by Arrow deserves attention. Of course, the problem of collective action is too complex to be discussed here at full length. I am going to confine my attention to a few examples.

I am going to say some words on the notion of collective action viewed 'from below', i.e. as a context (frame) of the individual action. Let's take the following examples.

First. Let's take two chess-players. Incidentally, it is an interesting example of ('dialectical' if you will) unity of conflict and cooperation. One cannot, even if being a Kasparov or a Karpov, win the game if the other person does not make moves according to the rules of the game.

Second. Football team - generally, any action of an individual player is meaningful only if interpreted in the context of the other ten (or, to follow the previous example, the other twenty-one) players.

Third. Partly similar, partly different situation we face in the case of an symphonic orchestra (or a rock-group).

An individual can be interested in the most distant results of his actions. Still, it may be argued that the more distant results then the more they depend upon results of other people's actions.

In this context, a paradox formulated by Margolin [1982] must be mentioned. Margolin starts with the situation of a voter participating in, say, parliamentary election. S/he is voting, therefore using some time, perhaps money etc. In voting, s/he is performing an act(ion) which is - according to the knowledge of an agent 'unimportant': if there are millions of voters, any single vote does not determine the final result.

The discussion of this problem allows to cast some light upon the problem of commitment. One explanation is based on the idea of 'ego-ism(-centrism)': the individual is normally focused on his/her 'own' problems. The other (not necessarily opposed to the former), suggested by the problem discussed here, may be solved by reference to the degree of 'causal import' of one's action (the smaller import, the lesser - ceeteris paribus - engagement). This issue seems to be related to one studied in social psychology/sociology (the famous Kitty Genoves case).

Incidentally, it might be suggested that a confinement of the scope of possible outcomes of an individual's actions seems to be linked with the role of the notion of the individual action in the political philosophy of liberalism. In this philosophy, the distinction between individual freedom and the collective one (the term 'individual freedom' is to be regarded in the liberal perspective as a sort of abuse of the word 'freedom') Still, if someone regards his own actions as a part of History, this distinction ceases to be so obvious as it would at the first sight seem. Thus, we need the notion of a specific sort of the individual action, namely an individual action being a part of a collective action. There are various examples to be used in such an analysis. Football team, symphonic orchestra, bridge players and many, many others...

But we don't have to go so far. In order to accept this construction should be, in my eyes, sufficient to follow an observation made by Elster: "We may wish to be esteemed and admired by others but actions that we or others undertake for the sole purpose of achieving this end will undermine themselves." [Elster,1989:24] Rephrasing Elster's observation, we could say that there are such goals which, however important for the agents, may be just-by-products of other actions.

Ending these considerations, I'd like to say what follows. We should assume that an action initiates at least one chain of actions that is - theoretically - infinite. In many, if not all, practical situation such a chain can be regarded as a finite one. But when and how - this cannot be analytically decided.

And still a remark on the notion of value in the Ricardo-Marx's labor theory of value. What has been often regarded as a paradox of this theory, namely the fact that a part of ancient labor is transferred into indefinite future, is - from the present point of view - not a paradox at all. Contrarily, it fits well into the scheme developed here. To speak metaphorically, one's actions go and go - like waves - without end, well beyond the life-time of the agent. Even if they become smaller and smaller. (I would say that the situation is somewhat similar to that in classical mechanics: according to the law of gravitation any body in the Universe is under gravitational influence exerted by all the bodies; still practically we decide to take into account but relatively few bodies.)

Now, the second type of inter-action relations. Let's start with an example. If I hammer a nail into a wall, one of its possible (and surely intended) effects is the fact 'the nail sticks in the wall'. The fact may possibly cause destruction of the wall, and it may have some further consequences. The comments made above were devoted just to this aspect of the situation.

Yet, there is another one: Perhaps, while hammering, I hit myself into a finger. This hit caused some medical troubles, etc. If I am unlucky, I can, with the noise I produce with the hammer, make my neighbor nervous. And it can have very long-
lasting consequences... So, an act can initiate more than one chain of effects. Hence, it can generate some independent chains of actions. So, to return to the graphical image, we can think of actions as parts of branches of a tree, and of an act as a 'root' of such a tree.

To sum up, in order to represent the main ideas of the 'formal' theory of action graphically, an image of double-cone, i.e. a pair of cones having common apex, might be intuitively helpful. The apex may represent an act, ontologically - an (not necessarily momentous, but normally - spanned over a time-interval) event; the first cone may depict the set of events co-determining the given event; the second cone - the set of events being (co-)determined by the given act.

Third comment on the pair of concepts 'act-action'. In my opinion, the problems I try to grapple analytically with the help of this pair cannot be closed with a few words about 'unintended consequences' or 'arbitrariness of the definition of action'. In my perception, we have here to do with issues that are central for ethics and jurisprudence; such notions as 'alienation' are also related to them. Even whole theories have these issues at their ground. There is, for instance, a strict link between the present idea of actions (various - as generated by a single act) and the sociological idea of manifest and hidden functions. [Merton,1982:134-150] It is also so in the case of Marx's theory of twofold character of labor.

Acts are - according to the convention adopted here - always conscious. Actions may be conscious but not necessarily have to: we say that an action \( A = <A,E> \) is conscious iff its agent is aware of the effect \( E \). So, it can be so that an action \( A = <A,E> \) is conscious, and an action \( A' = <A,E'> \) is not conscious. It should be also noted, that according to the convention proposed here, whether an behavior is conscious (hence can be an act) is decided \( ex\ ante \), and the conscious character of an action is decided \( ex\ post \).

There is still other aspect of acts which needs to be debated. I mean here the problem put recently by K. Papzycka. She formulated a thesis presenting 'non-intentional forbearance' as 'paradigmatic instances of actions'. Partly I do agree with her, partly I do not. I do agree as to the importance of forbearance. I do not as to the importance of those being non-intentional. I believe that intentional forbearance are most interesting. I do not think that it is purely theoretical issue. Well, to miss a lecture through oversleep may be unpleasant thing (or not, if the lecturer turned out to be dry as dust). Still, to ground theory of action upon such cases is, in my opinion, to remain in the domain of trivialities rather characteristic for the analytic theory of action. But if we are interested in the theory of action which might serve as foundation for ethics and social philosophy, we should pay our attention to more complex actions. And here the forbearance are very important, yet - intentional ones.

According to the penal code (and - I risk to say - standard morality), if I see (!) an accident I should help the victim. If I do not I am responsible for my decision not to help. But if I am really aware of the situation, my decision not to help cannot be called 'unintentional'.

Still two examples. First, if someone is suggested to join this or that organization and he refuses - we may speak, at least prima, about forbearance. (From a point of view, such an attitude may be positively evaluated.) And second one. A standard action may gain some additional meaning if viewed against the background of a collection of forborne actions of this sort. Let's say that for some opportunistic reasons neighbors stop to say 'good morning' to a person. And only one of them (to make the picture clear, let's assume he is fully aware of the very fact and of its causes) continues to greet this person. Incidentally, if you do not say 'good morning' to a person you have greeted for years it m must be very conscious action (you have to concentrate your attention on not saying the habitual phrase...).

Let me add a quotation which should additionally validate the conceptual construction presented here: "If I am a workingman and choose to join a Christian trade-union rather than be a communist, and if by being a member I want to show that the best thing for man is resignation, that the kingdom of man is not of this world, I am not only involving my case ...if I want to marry...I am involving all humanity in monogamy and not merely myself. Therefore, I am responsible for myself and for everyone else. I am creating a certain image of man of my own choosing. In choosing myself, I choose man." [Sartre,1962:592] Of course, you can reject Sartre's ethics. Or you can agree with him with reservations. Or you can subscribe yourself to his views... It doesn't matter here. The point is that we should be able to discuss these possibilities. And formal theory of action should be constructed so as to facilitate such debates and not to decide them, pretending that only analytical decisions are being made.

And the following words of Plessner may close the considerations of the present section: "Man's hiding from himself and from his fellowmen - homo absconditus - is the dark side of his opening to the world. Never he can recognize himself in his acts - only his shadow which he cast before and after himself, a reference to himself. It is why man has history. He is making it and it is making him. His acting, to which he is forced - since only it makes possible his way of life, opens itself to him and hides from him. His history has neither beginning nor end, since the interpretation of events depends not only on the initial situation but also - to an equal degree - on heir effects that may last until the unforeseenable future." [Plessner,1988:114]

### 3.2. Order(s) of act(ion)s

According to the assumed concept of action, any particular action is not necessarily intentional. Yet, some actions are - and have to be - intentional. In this subchapter my attention will be confined to intentional actions only: I am going to analyze here some relations between actions while studying relations between goals (intended effects of some acts).

#### 3.2.1. Anthropologies are (should be) concerned with acts rather than with actions.

To some extent, it is obvious. It is the task of an anthropology to explain, for instance, why someone has pressed the trigger of a gun. It is no task of any anthropology to explain why the bullet reached the victim after 0,9s, or why it caused (some - not all) acts oriented at other people. Of course in such a situation both the act and some its effects are to be explained by an anthropology.

On the other hand, the situation is not so clear as it appears at the first sight. In this context, P.Winch's essay on Trying is of relevance. According to him, "If someone is trying to accomplish something wrong but fails, then he does not become the person who he would become, if he succeeded." [Winch,1990:253] (Later on, I
am going to return to this issue.) Thus, it should be said that there are two different issues. One is of the causes of success or failure; these issues belong mostly to specific branches of knowledge. And the other one is of consequences of success or failure for the further acts of a subject: it is an important anthropological issue.

3.2.2. Let me again commence with an example. Except for some peculiar situations, speech acts seem to be acts par excellence. But if we ask what is speech act, we will be in trouble. Is an act to tell a story about one’s holiday? Or, - about a particular event during this holiday? Or, - to utter a sentence? A word? A vowel? My answer is: possibly all of them.

Consequently, we should speak of an ordering of acts. Such an ordering reminds somewhat Russell's type-theory. In the simplest case, we could say that an act A is composed of (or decomposable into) a sequence of acts: A = (A1,A2,...,An). This construction faces at least two difficulties. One - fundamental, and one - rather 'technical'.

As to the first difficulty, it consists in the controversial status of any 'atoms' of acts (it is debatable if we can define such acts that could not be further decomposable into simpler ones). I am not going to come to grips with this difficulty: I simply decide that we should assume the existence of 'atomic' acts. The reason for this decision is following. Though the problem is rather substantial (not purely conceptual), it seems to be theoretically 'isolated': I do not see any differences which this or that solution would force as to the decision of any other anthropological issue. Hence, we can opt for more simple solution. And there is rather no doubt that the 'atomic' one is much simpler than the 'non-atomic'.

And now, the 'technical' difficulty. If we introduce the notion of the 'depth of an action' (the name is deliberately chosen: it is to remind the Chomskian notion of the 'deep structure' of a sentence; in fact, if we say about a speech act that consists in uttering a sentence, and we ascribe to this sentence its 'depth' as it is being done in the generative grammar, so we can ascribe - quite naturally I believe - to this very action, as its 'depth', the same number that has been ascribed to this sentence; and having defined the 'depth' of a speech act, we could try to generalize this notion for all acts), we can note that a sufficiently deep act can be composed of acts of different depth. So, an act could be 'typically heterogeneous'. So, it means that if we know that an act A = (A1,A2,...,An) has the depth 'n', then at least one of the Ai is of the depth 'n-1'; but for any of Ai considered separately we only now that its depth fulfils the condition: 1</= d(Ai) </=n-1.

Having sketched the formal construction, let's now discuss more substantial issue. I see it as follows. Since it has been assumed that there are 'atomic' acts, then we can define - for any individual - a set of all 'atomic' acts performed by him/her during his/her whole life. The problem can be worded as follows: to what extent the grouping of the 'atomic' acts into complex ones is arbitrary and to what extent it reflects an 'objective structure of one's life'. It seems to me that to answer this question we have to pass from acts to actions.

3.2.3. The complex acts can be defined by a ordered set of goals. This general formulation allows for different specifications. Let's look at some examples. Let's assume that one is going to make a piece of furniture, say a table; so one has to accomplish a number of sub-goals, say to turn a leg. And to turn the leg one has, say, to fasten piece of wood in lathe. Etc. The complex act of 'making a table' is quite well defined, and its structuration is quite well determined (in this sense that anybody else would probably structure his complex act of this sort quite similarly).

Let's now look at rather different example. Say, someone is creating a work of art. The painting to be created is to be in the style of 'expressionist abstraction' (à la John Pollock, say). If we look at the sequence of the moves of the artist's paintbrush, we cannot be sure if he accomplishes his artistic vision or just plays with colors and brush. In this case both the borders of the set of simple acts (on which the complex act is based) are not defined (the number of the movements of the brush is practically 'infinite'). An 'internal structure' of this act is completely invisible. We could be convinced by the artist who is describing the 'internal logic' of his painting, we could be not. Any external criterion is hardly imaginable.

An interesting in-between example can be taken from the game of chess. Let's assume that a standard player wishes to win the game. So, the complex act can be defined as the set of all the movements performed in a game. And as 'atomic' we can regard the single moves. The very existence of the internal structuration of this act can be to some extent - stated on the basis of the observation of the game. This structuration is, on the other hand, never so strict as in the case of the carpenter's activity.

But perhaps the most interesting example can be taken from the domain of speech acts. On one hand, let's take a well prepared lecture on, say, algebra. In this lecture a difficult proof of a theorem is being given. The proof is, say, based on a number of lemmas that are also proved. Here we meet almost 'architectonic' construction of a (very complex) act. On the other hand, let's take the monologue of Scagnarel in which he scolds his master, Don Juan (in Molier). Here we meet a sequence of sentences which could be as long as a mathematical proof: but it has almost no internal structuring at all.

3.2.4. I think that, though there is a link between goals (hence: intended actions) and acts, it is necessary to make a distinction as to the ordering of acts and intended actions. I see it as follows.

Consider the following examples. On the one hand, let's take the example of a young person who wants to buy, say, some electronic gadget and hasn't enough money for it. She can undertake very different activities (each being a complex act), which nevertheless could be seen as sub-acts of one action oriented at gaining money and - buying the gadget.

On the other hand, let's look at someone who - in a critical moment - makes a speech to a political body (for instance Lenin in October 1917 at the CC's meeting). There is no doubt that it is - in a sense: as an act - much simpler than that - very complex - of the money-collecting girl or boy. There is no more doubt that as to its goal, as to the considerations taken into account, the political act is much more complex than any of mentioned before.

And if we wanted to compare biographies as to their relative complexity, we would also face serious difficulties. Let's take, on one side, an instance of so-called 'interesting life' of a poet: writing poems, love-affairs, voyages, social-life... And, on the other side, a hard-working farmer's life: in a sense monotonous, yet in other sense also very complex - land cultivation, cattle-breeding and poultry farming, mending farm buildings and machines, keeping accounting books... I think that it would be very difficult to offer a measure of 'life complexity'. On the other hand, as it will be suggested below, it would be convenient to have such a measure.
3.3. Some problems in the 'syntax' of act(ion)s

The considerations presented in the previous two sections were mainly of analytical character. It is time to demonstrate that in the 'syntactical' language some interesting substantial problem can be formulated.

3.3.1. To formulate one of them, I shall start with a quotation from a book of Antoni Kępiński's, Schizophrenia (the title does not render the comprehensiveness of its philosophical content.) The following part of his description of the 'world of schizophrenia' is of importance in the context of this point: 'The schizophrenic emptiness consists in the impossibility of saying 'I want' /.../. The 'I want' is most often hesitating. /.../. Even in such simple acts, which normally become automated, as walking, speaking, shaking hands while greeting, manifests itself hesitation between different forms of activity; the ill person is not able to make the decision as to which of them to choose. /.../. While speaking, he thinks over separate words, over their proper meaning... While walking, he sometimes considers how to set his foot' [Kępiński, 1974: 198]

To avoid premature conclusions, read the following (in my eyes - quite terrifying) description. "Frederick Taylor, the creator of 'scientific management' was a man completely obsessed with the question of control... Everything, what he was doing, was subordinated to programs, schedules, planned in minute detail, and performed in strict accordance with plan. He was planning carefully every afternoon walks... And not without participation of consciousness, he was observing his movements, and measuring their separate phases, and even counting his steps.../. During his walks... young Frederick permanently controlled the efficiency of his legs" [Morgan, 1997: 238]

The analysis conducted by Kępiński and the description of Taylor's behavior suggest a number of questions.

[Q2] Is it possible to make decisions (at a given moment of time) as to acts of any depth? In other words: Have we to focus our attention on acts of a fixed depth, or do we not?

[Q3] Is there a minimal level of 'automation' of relatively simple acts, common to most of people?

[Q4] Are different people more or less tolerant to the lack of automation?

I would suggest that the idea of Kępiński may be used to account for some phenomena which inspired K. Paprzycka to construct non-intentional theory of action. In fact, if someone asks me to tell him what time is at the moment, I simply react with giving the wanted information without any considerations. But if someone asks me to lend him considerable sum of money, my reaction to this request is much more 'intentional' (as long as the sum is not so large that I can react with ironic words only)

3.3.2. It was said that "it is clear that it is impossible to conceive all life of a concrete person as...maximally complex action, action of the highest degree. We would have to assume that for all his life s/he accepts one consistent system of knowledge and a fixed set of preferences and that s/he is acting all his/her life rationally. So strong idealization assumptions are not assumed in humanities." [Nowak, 1974: 117]

This complex thesis should be commented in several ways. First, methodologically. If one rejects this understanding of idealization which was once proposed by Wójcicki (idealization as a consequence or tool of approximation), one can put no 'upper limit' on idealizational procedures except for arbitrary ones. (One might note that the a formulation of the principle of inertia postulates that in the whole Universe there is only one particle - it is rather strong idealizational assumption, and - it seems to me - humanities need stronger idealizations than natural sciences do).

Second, more substantially. We could modify the initial intuition introducing the notion of 'threshold of maturity'. And then we could claim that some people maintain their system of knowledge and axiology after having passed over this threshold.

Third, unfortunately some people's lives are relatively short (in comparison with the average life-span). And, in particular, some of them die tragically while struggling for their highest goals. One could say that the Fate did not gave them enough time to reconstitute their knowledge and values.

Fourth, the model of life as a single complex action seems to be - in some particular cases - not a very strong idealization but rather an approximation of the actual life of this or that, surely exceptional, person. Mother Theresa or, to take very different example, Lenin might be regarded as exemplary here.

Fifth. At least in one anthropology an idea of totality of individual life plays an important role. I mean Sartre's phenomenological ontology as presented in his Being and Nothingness. Incidentally, he makes an interesting and perhaps important comparison: "in each inclination...the person expresses himself completely...a little as Spinoza's substance expresses itself completely in each of its attributes." [Sartre, 1989: 563]

Following these remarks, we can put several questions. Among them, this:

[Q5] In what sense, if any, can we speak of the "sense of life"?

If we read: sense (of an act) = (its) goal, then we might suggest that the meaningfulness of the concept of 'sense of life' depends on the possibility of regarding all (? most?, a considerable fraction?) acts performed by an agent as one (very) complex act.

Let's note that on the syntactical level we can discuss the question of the very possibility of the regarding life as a/n (very complex) action. Only completely negative answer closes the problem. If the very possibility is viewed, even if with some reservations, as acceptable, some new problems arise: It is one thing to say that life is a whole, and very different to appreciate the relative importance of the wholeness.

This question seems to have something to do with the Miller's problem as well as with the cognitive psychology (in particular with the studies on memory - see below). If the question is settled positively on the syntactical level, we will be able to pass latter to the semantical level to discuss the question of the actuality of this perspective.
3.3.3. If we combine the thesis inferred from Kępiński with that stated by Nowak, we will be able to speak about lower/upper limit of intentional actions, or about lower/upper limit of rationality. It is my meta-anthropological thesis that, perhaps in contrast with first impression, we touch here problems of considerable importance. I’d like to validate this meta-thesis making a few remarks.

Additional light on this issue might be shed if to draw upon some psychological and linguistic investigations: In the paper entitled The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity for processing information, George Miller formulated a law determining limits to our capacity of remembering. Developing his ideas, Vistor Yngve put hypothesis of depth and spoke about ‘maximal depth’ of a sentence [Greene,1977:198-199].

According to Lyons, this hypothesis is “almost certainly false” [Lyons,1975-99] However it could be in this particular case, it seems to me that it is one points in which psycho-linguistic debates may be directly inspiring for anthropology.

The notion of ‘depth’ of acts, though worded in the Hegelian jargon of the ‘mediation’, plays an important - and in my personal view: interesting and valid - part in Lukac’s anthropology and philosophy of history sketched in his last work Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins. This part of his views may be summarized into the following points: [1] The more complex actions, the more important ‘abstract’ (say, ideological) motivation of actions. [2] There is a historical trend of growing complexity of human actions. [3] Hence, the there has been a ‘growing role’ of ideological production.

A few decades earlier, the role of ‘mediation’ and ‘tool’ (of which money is said to be ‘the purest example’) was emphasized by Simmel [1997:176-179].

Also in Freud we come across a quite similar idea: “...the principle of pleasure is characteristic of primitive way of action of psychic apparatus... Influenced by the instinct of self-preservation, it is replaced by the principle of reality, which results in deference of its satisfaction...and temporal tolerance of unpleasantness on the long way toward pleasure.” [Freud,1975:24]

3.3.4. Possibly the most important application of these ‘syntactical’ considerations is that of will and self-discipline. Russell’s presentation of and comments on moral views of his friend, Joseph Conrad, can introduce us into this problems: ‘He [Conrad - W.Cz.] was very aware of various forms of passionate craziness people are prone to, and just it raised in him so profound conviction about the relevance of discipline. One might say that his point of view was an anti-thesis of the following one of Rousseau: ‘Man in born in fetters but can be free.’ I think that Conrad would have said that man is getting free not through indulging his impulses, not through his being light-spirited but through subordination his unpredictable reactions to a prevailing goal. Conrad’s views were by no means modern. In the contemporary world there are two philosophical orientations - one which goes back to Rousseau and rejects discipline as needles, and second which finds its best expression in totalitarianism and regards discipline as externally imposed. Conrad adhered to an older tradition: discipline should be internal. He despised lack of discipline but hated mere external discipline.” [Russell,1971:288-289]

Putting aside the moral aspect of these opinions, we can ‘extract’ from Conrad-Russell’s views the following analytical intuitions: [1] Human actions can be oriented either at more general (‘global’) or at more particular (‘local’) goals. [2] There can be a contradiction between a ‘local’ and a ‘global’ goal. In other words, complex situations are not in general (though perhaps they can be) ‘additive’: an action being the best if considered in the framework of a situation S need not to be the best if viewed in the framework of a situation S’ of which S is a proper part. [3] There is individual’s ‘moral quality’ that determines whether she undertakes an action having considered a situation S or more wide situation S’.

The first proposition just repeats the already formulated comments. The second one brings in a new element: ‘top-down’ determination of the ‘best’ action. The third one indicates an issue that will be discussed in more detail in the chapter on pragmatics of actions.

Indicated by Conrad-Russell problem may be of importance not only for analysis of individual behavior but also for sociological reflection. In his fundamental work on democracy, August de Tocqueville wrote: “The men of democracy have no sufficient understanding of usefulness of forms; they disregard them instinctively. [...] Forms arouse their scorn, and even hatred. They strive after easily achievable pleasures, vehemently reach for object of their desires, and they are irritated by the least delay. In the political life, this temperament makes them to reject forms as delaying the moment of achieving their goal.” [Tocqueville,1976:476]

It might be noted that Toqueville registered a tendency that may be viewed as opposite to the ‘Lukacin’ one (of which I’ve spoken above in 3.3.3.)

Let’s note that, assuming validity of those ideas, we can ask another question of sociological importance. Namely, we can consider whether there is any correlation between formal quality of one’s complex actions (as being more or less ‘self-disciplined’) and its substance. Prima facie, it seems that both a saint and a criminal may be strongly self-disciplined persons. This issue has some far-reaching consequences.

In particular, it is to be found at the bottom of Norbert Elias’ theory of ‘civilising process’. This process is conceived of as “regulation of drives and of the whole emotional life” which is getting more and more comprehensive, more uniform and stable.” [Elias,1979:368] This process is interpreted as being in a way related (perhaps - just as reflection) to that of monopolization of the physical violence which “makes it necessary that cooperation is free from any passion” [ibidem:389]. It might be noted that, in Abram’s summarizing words, “the creation of the civilised individual was”, according to Elias’ theory, “the creation of the stratified society.” [Abrams,1982:233]

The Elias’ theory is not only an interesting vision of global history. It is also involved in the debate over specific historical issues, in particular - over Holocaust: according to Zygmunt Bauman, Elias’ theory is a manifestation of a ‘myth profoundly rooted in the Western consciousness’; “history of gradual outgrowing the pre-social stage of barbarity” is said to be the content of this myth. [Bauman,1991:33-34]

Having mentioned debate on Holocaust, we should mention an author who formulated fundamental anthropological issues while analyzing Nazism. I think of course of Fromm and his Escape from Freedom. This book contains various analyses and ideas which cannot be even noted here. In the context of this essay, but two points are to be discussed. One of them will be discussed in the next chapter: freedom as a value. The other will be discussed here. To be specific, I am going to discuss now a problem deceiving, in my view, the name of ‘paradox of freedom’. Where is this (alleged) paradox to be located?
On the one hand, we have Fromm’s thesis: “modern man freed from the bonds of pre-individualistic society, which simultaneously gave him security and limited him, has not gained freedom in the positive sense of the realization of his individual self: that is, the expression of his intellectual, emotional and sensuous potentialities. Freedom...has made him isolated, and thereby, anxious and powerless. This isolation is unbearable and the alternative he is confronted with are either to escape from the burden of his freedom into new dependencies...or to advance to full realization of positive freedom which is based upon the uniqueness and individuality of man.” [Fromm, 1969: viii]

And not only Fromm’s thesis: At almost the same time the image of man being ‘condemned to be free’ was created by Sartre. And about one hundred years earlier, somewhat similar (more precisely: much more univocal) ideas were formulated in Peter Chaadaev’s Philosophical Letters. To follow Walicki’s presentation, “Czaadaev maintained that natural aspiration of man is not aspiration for freedom - man drives at subordination, the structure of being is hierarchical” [Walicki, 1973:128] And that “moral autonomy of individual is an absurd” [ibidem:129].

Tracing the history of this image of freedom far back, we might perhaps say that even Epictetus was not the first to regard freedom as burden rather than anything else. Still, writing such a history is not my aim, thus, let’s for a while shift our attention to the Fromm’s standpoint.

This aspect of his theory which is here of relevance is well grasped in his characteristic of the masochist person: “whether his master is an authority outside of himself or whether he has internalized the master as conscience or a psychic compulsion, is saved from making decisions, saved from the final responsibility for the fate of his self, and thereby saved from the doubt of what decision to make. He is also saved from the doubt of what the meaning of his life is or who ‘he’ is. These questions are answered by the relationship to the power to which he has attached himself. The meaning of his life and the identity of his self are determined by the greater whole into which the self has submerged.” [Fromm, 1969: 177-178]

So much for Fromm. Let’s take a view of the other side. First of all, our common experience seems to confirm the thesis about freedom as aspiration of virtually all men, irrespective of time and place. But also some special empirical investigation support our pre-philosophical experience. It was demonstrated that children appreciate freedom.[Kozielecki, 1987:260] And even in the case of animals, situations with alternatives are preferred in comparison with those without alternatives. As Kozielecki writes: “Individual freedom is a value not only for man but also for animals. Already Pavlov wrote that they have ‘reflex of freedom’. The results of investigations are consistent; animals, such as pigeons, prefer situation in which they can choose from a set of possible reactions to that in which there is one reaction, equally attractive as the former.” [ibidem:259] On the basis of these researches, A.C. Catania formulated a hypothesis about biological determination of the value of freedom” [ibidem: 260].

It is not my aim to suggest any particular solution to this paradox. I would like only to demonstrate how the problem can be reformulated and what are possible answers to the reformulated problem. My thesis is that the complexity of actions should be taken into account if the value of freedom is to be discussed. Prima facie, there is no reason for which the freedom of deciding whether to eat strawberry or rather chocolate ice-cream and of deciding whether to be a Christian or rather an atheist - should they be identically appreciated. Of course, one can claim that freedom is positive value in irrespective of complexity of actions, and one can maintain that any choice is a burden. But once the problem is formulated in this way, it can be easily noticed how many various answers can be discovered.

It should be noted that the problem defined here as ‘paradox of freedom’ is closely related to the Kepiński-Nowak problem.

While speaking of absolute power bearing no responsibility for its actions, Kenneth Arrow notes that the thesis about negative effects of being aware of being in touch with such a power “gained strong support due to the results of researches having been conducted by Elton Mayo...; researches which resulted in the human relations movement...But Erich Fromm’s Escape from Freedom...was created in the very same time as was Mayo’s work.” [Arrow, 1985:68] Commenting upon the considerations conducted in this chapter, I’d say that some questions concerning formal structure of human actions (in general, and action-complexity in particular) have been formulated, and - what is from my point of view particularly important - it has been demonstrated that these questions are not purely ‘philosophical puzzles’, but are also relevant for ethics, and social philosophy, or even historical sociology.
4. 'Semantics' of (action)s

A systematic (not to say - complete) 'semantics' of actions should comprise two basic parts: one devoted to individual's knowledge, the other to individual's values. This distinction, it should be stressed, is by no means of technical (instrumental) character.

Contrarily, it reflects the fundamental characteristic of action as being a result of a choice. And let it be repeated: the idea of choice defines, according to the view assumed here, the field of anthropological debates; but playing this role, it is not itself a matter for debate. Put in other words, anthropologies should offer alternative views on the ways people make their decisions (choices), about mechanisms determining them, etc., but should not debate if men make any decisions at all. Still shorter put, if men are men, they make decisions. And anthropologies are about men, thus - about decisions.

The idea of choice entails two other. First, of a set (of the possible states of the world) and, second, of an ordering of this set. With the concept of a set of possible world-states corresponds the notion of knowledge (a decision-situation is determined - in the first line - by the recognized possibilities), and with that of the ordering of the recognized possible states - the notion of values.

The first part is almost completely omitted in the present essay (the last sub-chapter devoted to the problem of the cognition of the Others, is the main exception). For strictly practical reasons; this part of (meta-) anthropology can be made only by, roughly speaking, a reformulating of epistemology - a big task not to be undertaken here. On the other hand, some classical anthropological problems, like egoism or altruism, can be properly located in area designated with the heading 'values'. Thus, my presentation of 'semantics' of actions concerns mainly this very area, though some remarks on the cognitive aspects of acting will also be necessary.

The field of axiology, or philosophy of values, is very broad. A relatively small part of it is to be inspected here, even if cursorily. Yet, at the very outset of this chapter, a few general words about values should be said. As it is well known, there has been a great debate on the ontological (metaphysical) nature of values. A whole range of theories were formulated, from Plato's radical objectivism to Ayer's radical subjectivism. (A useful overview of different theories was offered by R.S. Hartmann. - For presentation, see Strózewski [1981:65 - 67]). For the sake of (meta-)anthropological analysis, we can or even should to leave these metaphysical controversies aside. In (meta-)anthropology it suffices to assume a 'subjectivist' notion of values. Let me stress that such a decision does not necessarily entail any particular metaphysical standpoint: We do not have to agree with Sartre when claims that moral agent "is the being by whom value exist" [Sartre,1989:627] We can accept rather Plato's, or Moore's, stance. But even if one assumes in his metaphysics a Platonic view on 'objective' values, one can always regard the 'subjective' ones as either 'true' or 'false' reflections of the former ones. And the subjective values (either 'recognized' - more or less correctly - or 'invented', more or less autonomously) determine directly human actions.

But even from metaphysics of values apart, the subject is rather messy. Only a few years ago, the editors of a collection of essays entitled The Origin of Values in the following way characterized our theoretical situation: "In one guise or other, values play a leading role in nearly every explanatory behavior theory. In biology, values can be construed as products of instincts and drives that help channel the organism's motility. In psychology, values are the motives for action, and, as such, they ultimately determine the specific consequences of known reinforcers. In economics, values generally known as utilities and/or preferences - are one of the two fundamental determinants of all action (constraints external to the agent being the other). In sociology and anthropology values are considered to basic determinants of social action... despite their undeniable theoretical centrality, values are perhaps the greatest black box in all of behavioral science." [Hether&Nadel&Michod, 1993:ix]

Stressing that no definition of value is widely accepted, one of the editors of this collection, characterizes this notion's position among others thus: 'Values are relatively general and durable criteria for evaluation. As such, they differ from other concepts such as preferences (or attitudes) and norms. Like values, preferences (and attitudes) are internal; unlike them, preferences are labile rather than durable, and particular rather than general. Whereas norms are also evaluative, general, and durable, they are external to actors and - in contrast to values - require sanctioning for their efficacy'. [Hether,1993:3]

I am not going to be involved in a long debate on proper definition of values. In my view, social norms constitute an object of investigations being very different from values or preferences. From (meta-)anthropological point of view, norms are just a part of the world man lives in. They may exert some influence on the individual's values; they may also be regarded by an individual as parameters of the world which have to be taken into account, as some physical parameters are, when the individual is planning and effectuating his actions.

And as regards the distinction 'values-preferences', there might be some sense in making it. Yet, the oppositions 'durable-labile' or 'general-particular' are, in my view, not only vague but also concealing substantial questions. Roughly put, individual's preferences may be more stable, or may be changing in the long run but also overnight... They may be changing completely or only partly; and if partly then... - you could continue this reasoning for long, but it doesn't seem to be necessary... Similar is the case with the second pair: preferences may be not only more or less specific; they may also be becoming more general or more particular in the life-time; they may be very specific in one domain in very general in another... And so on, and so on...

Therefore, in this essay I just assume the definition of values based on the concept of preferences of an individual [Nowak,1974:13-16; I generally follow this construction, still I regard the subject of preferences as individual and not social]. I believe that this concept is, generally taking (allowing for one modification: introduction of fuzzy sets, fuzzy relations and fuzzy preferences), sufficient for construction of the axiological part of (meta-) anthropology.

On the other hand, even if we limit ourselves to the values-preferences, the task of constructing axiology will still remain broad and complex. I would say that it is, in a sense, identical with the task of constructing something what might be termed 'ontology of the everyday-life world'. Instead of an abstract debate, consider the following list of examples. John prefers sweet apples to the sour ones. He prefers brown curtains to the pink. He prefers Mann's novels to the criminal stories. John prefers also more-leisure to 'sedentary' holidays. But - permanent and stable job to 'wandering' from one institution to another. He also prefers 'philosophical security' to 'chasing' after unattainable ultimate truth. As regards other people, he likes more blondes to black-hairs, but intelligent ones to 'chicken-brains'. He prefers fundamentalists to cynics; and these who like people to misanthropes. - A good deal of issues, both analytical and substantial, lurks behind this apparently simple notion of preferences.

In the present chapter, my line of analysis runs as follows: I start with the problem of relations between knowledge and values (this distinction, being valid and important, allows for various opinions on their mutual/independence). Then some formal properties of individual's axiological structure are discussed (among them, the concept of 'axiological
zero', the idea of values/meta-values and that of fuzzy-values). In the next step I consider the axiological relevance, for the given individual, of the Others. Subsequently, the structure of 'axiological system' is being analyzed. The chapter is concluded with some remarks on the problem of the cognition of the Others.

As you can see, even the axiological sub-domain of the 'semantics' of action is to be only partly studied. Many other important issues must be left for another occasions. Ending these introductory remarks, I would like to stress the specific character of the meta-theoretical (and 'possiblist') strategy in the domain of axiology/anthropology. Anthropology is viewed here, on the one hand, as a philosophical discipline in its own right, but on the other - as a basis for historiosophy and political philosophy. And historiosophy is seen as comprising some theses about the future. Thus, even if we agreed (personally, I would do but with many reservations and qualifications) that, putting it in the ordinary parlance, all the hitherto history has most often seen the ugly face of the man: man striving for money, power and sex; even then we were not obliged to accept the thesis that so must remain for ever. And, it should be noted, such a possibility does not entail any 'human engineering': self-education may be another possibility.

4.1. A few remarks on knowledge and values

As I've just said, the problem of individual's knowledge is, in general, to remain untouched here. Yet, at least a few remarks on relations between knowledge and values are necessary. It seems to be obvious that the concept of values assumed here is analytically dependent upon the notion of agent's knowledge. The notion of values as based on preference relation assumes implicitly the notion of knowledge of some states of the world. To say that X prefers a state S1 of the world over the state S2, it must be assumed that X knows that world happens to be (can be) in such states. Or, to put it somewhat differently, one has to be able to distinguish two states of the world in order to be able to say if one prefers any of them or is just indifferent.

Are there no difficulties here? Surely there are some. Read, for instance, the following passage: 'the opinion about primacy of description vis-a-vis evaluation (and consequently of theory vis-a-vis practice) is fundamentally incoherent with the fundamental assumptions of marxist philosophy. /.../ many easily noticeable facts speak against this opinion. I think here of all these cases when getting in touch with a new situation immediately results in the formation of new stereotypes of behavior. A child, who for the first time gets burnt, does not formulate any descriptive propositions of the following sort: 'it happens that fire burns', to look only afterwards for inference rules necessary to interfere the rule 'beare of fire!'. [Mejaubm, 1983:99] Still, however values and knowledge are being formed and interrelated, the simple fact remains that one has to be able to distinguish between, say, various temperatures if is to prefer holidays in Norway rather than in Maroco (or vice versa).

And still a quote: "...as painters are teaching us to look, are making sensible to 'values', to contrasts of colors and play of light, which are not perceived by uneducated eye, so moralists help us to notice in ourselves and in others subtle shadows of emotions and passions. We would not know it or would have but very vague idea of it, if was not there their description." [Levy-Bruhl, 1961:124] Let's draw a simple conclusion from this observation: if our perception of the world is changing (in particular: if the resolving power, or 'subtlety', of our perception is growing), than the axiological structure has to be changing too: newly perceived states must be somehow evaluated.

Let's supplement this general remark with an example. Someone who has known but realistic painting visits for the first time in his life a gallery in which he meets in this same room two very different paintings, say Rembrandt's and Picasso's. He may simply reject the latter's painting, he might perhaps accept it at once, but probably he will be confused. This confusion reflects incompleteness of his axiological structure. - It can be supposed that in the modern world any individual's axiological structure turns out to be more or less incomplete. If this supposition is true, it might be an alternative (to the given above) or just another part of an account of the phenomenon described by Fromm as the 'escape from freedom'.

4.2. Some formal properties of axiological systems

In his overview of value research in social science, Michael Hetcher discusses - among others issues - 'four impediments to the study of values'. As one of the impediments is regarded the fact that processes generating values are unknown, thus postulating values should be unconvincing. The other is generated by the alleged ineffectiveness of the existing theories to account for value-behavior relations. And the fourth consists in the abundance of values-measurement problems. These three are, in the context of this text, to be omitted (for instance, being interested in philosophical-anthropological models, I can dispense with problems of measurement). But a discussion of the first of them can be useful here. This impediment consists in values taking many unobservable forms. Values differ in a number of ways. In particular they differ, according to Hetcher,

1. with respect to their scope of control (under or beyond individual actor's control);
2. in their scope of application (applicable in virtually all social situations or in specific ones);
3. in the degree they are shared socially (pervasive in groups or rare);
4. in the level of analysis in social scientific explanations (at micro or macro levels).

[Hetcher, 1993:3-5]

Let me comment on these four points; however, in the inverse order. The point [4] is just to be neglected; my focus is on the 'micro' level only. As regards point [3], it is to be discussed later on; pervasiveness (or lack of it) of a value in a group is seen here just as a factor possibly influencing relations (acceptance, adaptation, rejection...) between one's preferences and this very value.

In the context of this chapter, and specially of this section, of particular interest is the point [2]. Thus, I will cite Hetcher's characteristic of this problem: "Values differ in their scope of application. Some (for example, the altruism that often is considered responsible for behavior in nuclear family) are evoked only under specific social situations, whereas others (for example, the reciprocity implicitly expressed in the Golden Rule) may be acted on in nearly all social situations." [Hetcher, 1993:3] Following these remarks, we could say that it is not a single preference relation which should be considered but an individual's axiological system, its structure and dynamics.

And the point [1], though in itself interesting, is of little relevance here, since it is just acting individual which is here in focus (though in more comprehensive overview it would deserve some attention: accepted values may influence the way in which individual perceives his sphere of control, or - possible effective action).

So much for Hetcher. Besides the problem of the structure of axiological systems, I am going to discuss in this section two groups of formal axiological problems: 'metrical' issues and 'fuzziness' of values. All those issues (though interesting in themselves - are,
4.2.1. The existence of 'axiological zero'. And other 'metrical' issues

4.2.1.1. Does axiological 'zero' exist or not? - This question could be formulated less formally thus: is there a non-arbitrary way of dividing values into 'positive' and 'negative'? I tend to say 'yes'. Or even I would say that this assumption seems to belong to those assumptions which delimit rather the anthropological area of controversies than are elements. If there are specifically meta-anthropological (and not just anthropological) questions, the following may be an instance: does this assumption actually play this role or does not? Also to this question I am prone to give a positive answer. To account for this decision, I will list some intuitions related to the opposition and question, and then, I will overview some wider problems which in their formulation assume the existence of axiological 'zero'. Thus, intuitions:

First, one of the oldest anthropological theses, that of Aristipus - having been repeated by many, most prominently and consequently by Jeremy Bentham, and in our age by behaviorists, says that pleasure is the only good and unpleasantness the only evil. And instead of unpleasantness, we could speak of pain or suffering. And we could also juxtapose this opposition with that of joy and sadness...

Second, assuming a behaviorist perspective, we could say that positive states - ceateris paribus - attract an agent, negative ones - ceateris paribus - make him to ‘escape’ a situation, and the neutral cause no reaction.

Third, we could draw upon deontic logic: (some) positive states (values) are - ceateris paribus - 'obligatory', (some) negative ones are - ceateris paribus - 'forbidden'; as 'axiologically neutral' (or rather - 'legally', if we remember the problem of heroic actions) could be defined states that are neither 'obligatory' nor 'forbidden', or 'permitted'.

And now, I'd like to demonstrate that the assumption of the real (not conventional) nature of the distinction positive - negative values is of actual theoretical importance.

Firstly; a hypothesis can be formulated that people much more often agree - across time and space - as to negative values than to the positive ones: most people - however their life-orientations differ in other respects - try to avoid death, thirst, hunger... It would be difficult to indicate any positive values so widely shared by majority (at least) of people. Neither money, nor power, nor prestige... however popular as life-goals - are so generally accepted as positive values.

Secondly; this hypothesis can support (to a degree; to what degree precisely should be separately discussed) a political (ideological) prescription - probably stated most clearly by Popper - which says that purposive social changes ('social engineering') can be accepted if being oriented at elimination of an instance of concrete evil, and rejected if oriented at some good.

Thirdly; somewhat similar in vein; the distinction between positive and negative values seems to be of importance in defining a libertarian stance. In Nozick's formulation: 'a minimal state, limited to the narrow function of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contract... is justified; any more extensive state... is unjustified... the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others.' [Nozick, 1974:ix]

Fourthly; in part complementarily to the problems raised by Popper and Nozick, an ethical issue should be noted. I mean the problem which was raised by Henryk Elzenberg...
The synthesis of the above assumptions is the market, where trade between producers and consumers takes place and each agent is induced to maximize his interest. The consumer is out to achieve the greatest possible satisfaction, while the producer seeks the greatest possible profit. Analytically speaking, the consumer maximizes utility function and the producer a production function." [Buergenmeier, 1992:37]

While constructing (meta-)philosophy of History, we should discuss what role actually plays the first assumption in the whole reasoning. This problem, however important, is beyond the scope of this essay. But whatever the detailed results of such a discussion might be, it is clear that this assumption plays a role which cannot be neglected.

Moreover, somewhat similar ideas we can find in domains rather distant from classical economics. For instance, Gordon A. Allport, the precursor of humanist psychology, says that "the most important trait of personal endeavors - their goals are, strictly speaking, unattainable" [Allport, 1988:57]. As we will see later the idea of 'insatiability' seems to play a part in so-called transgressional model of man and in sociological interpretations of modern times. All this should justify the considerations to be conducted.

The general problem can be, I think, divided into following sub-problems.

[Q7] Do all preferences have maximal elements, or only some of them? Or in other formulation: Which preferences (types of preferences) have maximal elements?

[Q8] If maximal elements exist, are they individual or common for all people?

[Q9] If it so that some preferences have maximal elements, what accounts for this fact?

Let's look at the content of those questions. As regards [Q7], first should be noted that the existence of maximal elements is in some cases almost obvious. We can take as an example preferences concerning eating in the simple sense of nourishing. For virtually every person, there is a point of full satiation. On other hand, if we take preferences concerning money, it is plausible hypothesis that at least some people would like to advance financially beyond any fixed limits. Perhaps the same might be said about preferences expressing 'lust for power'. In this context, one might speculate whether the figure (known from some second-sort SF movies) of a man who would like to be an 'emperor' of the Galaxy or, perhaps, even of the whole Universe, is telling something about possible human aspirations or is it a pure fiction? (Be astronomical meaningfulness, or rather meaninglessness of such an image, set aside.) In brief, I believe that for some extreme cases we can decide the issue formulated in [Q7]. But for most types of preferences the answer is much less trivial, thus alternative theories are welcome here.

Question [Q8] is of importance for any theory/philosophy of History as on its solution depends to a degree answer to the question about possibility of steady-state global society (and the last question is of practical importance today). Even if we assume that for given types of preferences (in particular: all types) and for each individual does exist maximal element, we are not able to maintain that the 'level of aspirations' will not be increasing. If we would like to claim for the possibility of constant 'level of aspirations', we should assume the existence of collective upper boundary for given preferences. (In the particular case of nourishment, such boundary seem to exist, assuming that some physical parameters characterizing human individuals are given and five meter high giants are not taken into consideration).

As regards the third question [Q9], the following possible answers are at hand. First, that of Plessner. According to him, "The fact that...we can be directed by craving does not differentiate us from many animals. But transformation of craving into passion is the exclusive possibility of man, since his unlimited 'I' is never satiated and is burning in the struggle of passions.../. . . Spengler's comparing man with predator is unfortunately senseless and false. If it were so, he could be tamed. Man is not a product of taming, even he himself should have been his own breeder, just because he is not suitable for it.../. . . Predator's life is limited by its instincts, the satisfying its instincts is its measure. Imperialism, rapacity, bloody wars can be compared with predators' behavior only in a book for children. It is only man who does know the measure. It is only he who falls a victim to his own dreams and their consequences." [Plessner, 1976:259]

A different interpretation of this phenomenon (so vividly described by Plessner) can be found in Sorokin's studies on social mobility: "there is also a functional relation between mobility and the phenomenon which may be styled as a hunt for pleasure, on the one hand, and as psychological restlessness, on the other. It is scarcely erroneous to admit that our epoch in Western societies is marked by an increase of the 'hedonistic' trend and Epicureanism. It is manifested in the progress of a materialistic conception of life and ideologies, in the direction of human efforts to an increase of comfort, in a reinforcement of the social struggle for economic objects, in a domination of wealth, in a money criterion of all values, in an increase of sexual freedom, in a hunting for pleasure in different forms, in jazz and dancing, and in many similar facts." [Sorokin, 1964:524] Sorokin's interpretation is one combining, in rather unclear way, some bio-psychological factors with the sociological.

A possibly more sociological interpretation can also be given. It might be claimed that people (some?, many?, all?) prefer, other factors being equal, situations in which they found themselves being 'better' than their fellow men. And normally, people feel 'better' than their neighbors if they have more money, more power, more beautiful wife (handsome husband), more intelligent children, etc., etc., than those neighbors do. Still, if sufficiently many people want to be 'better' than others, we are facing permanent race: the participants - if they only want to continue their participation - have to want more and more; theoretically - without any limit. What is important here is that even if we assume that there exists common upper boundary for the 'be-worse/be-better' preference, we obtain for some particular goods the effect of wanting-more. Ending, one should still note that the anthropological idea, so briefly summarized here, lies at the very basis of such theories as Veblen's theory of conspicuous consumption, Packard's theory of status, or Hirsh's theory of social limits to growth.

These three interpretations may not exhaust the set of possible answers to the discussed question. Still, they are all I have found.

And still two issues I'd like to just to note. First, it is the problem of 'value of life'. Here we face perhaps the most acute instance of conflict of two perspectives, namely of the subjective (of an agent) and the objective (of a group). Virtually each of us tends to think of his own life as being of 'infinite value'. Some of us tend to generalize this attitude in a moral discourse; they maintain that each person's life is of such a value. Yet, if we go beyond the veil of lofty moral phraseology, the situation will somewhat change. If we consider for instance the amount of money spent by a given society for medical care, we will have to admit that the alleged 'infinite value' may be estimated in dollars. And actually, some economists try to give theoretical ground to such estimations.

And secondly, the problem of the lower boundary. I have very little to say about it. I'd like rather to note a few questions. Is death the greatest evil man can meet? And if not (and the fact that some people commit suicide - more specifically: egoistic suicide, as opposed to those being committed as a heroic consequence of prudence and sense of moral duty - seems to confirm the negative answer to that question), then what - if anything -
4.2.2. On values and meta-values

At the beginning, let's read the following three quotes. First, a remark on an Engels' thesis:
"If we are repeating after Engels the aphorism about the leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom, it is worthy to be noted that the point could be not only in the coming into being of a situation in which man gains the possibility of effective realization of the desired goals, but also in the coming into being of a situation in which man will learn better than it is now to choose goals being worth of realization." [Mejbaum, 1983: 101-2]

Secondly; Norbert Wiener's one. In his essay on cybernetics and society he emphasizes that "there exists an attribute which that is more important than know-how...It is know-what, thanks by which we decide not only how to achieve our goal, but also what is to be our goal." [Wiener, 1961: 199] And later on, Wiener adds that "modern man, and particularly modern American, irrespective of the know-how he may possess, he has very little know-what." [ibidem: 200]

Third. Erich Fromm remarks that "not only medicine, engineering, and painting are arts; living itself is an art - in fact the most important and at the same the most difficult and complex act to be practiced by man. Its object is not this or that specialized performance, but the performance of living, the process of developing into that which is great in Man with contempt or even just mercy for what in people does not reach the level of greatness." [Elstein, 1992:272]

It is rather obvious that in the most interesting cases, like the moral ones, it is impossible to (re-) construct any scales that would be stronger than the ordered ones. Still, we should somehow to introduce some 'thresholds' between 'great' and 'small', either positive or negative values. A threshold that would allow distinguishing just between 'decency' and 'heroism'. I do not know how to do it. Thus I must to remain this problem open, restricting myself to underscoring its importance.

4.2.3. If only very briefly, an issue I'd dub 'threshold problem' should be mentioned. The following quote is to show how this problem arises. "I consider that what might be called anti-maximalism to be an important aspect of humanism. To a humanist, alien and repulsive is an attitude which links dedication of what is great in Man with contempt or even just mercy for what in people does not reach the level of greatness." [Elstein, 1992:272]

Yet, at first, it might seem an abstract question (not a matter for real - in this case: anthropological - controversies): is it not obvious that real values can be if not of zero-order, than of the first, or - at best - of the second-order? Before deciding this problem, I would suggest to glimpse at a "complicated example: I wish that I didn't wish that I didn't wish to eat cream cake. I wish to eat cream cake because I like it. I wish that I didn't like it, because, as moderately vain person, I think it is more important to remain slim. But I wish I was less vain. (But do I think that only when I wish to eat cake?)" [Elster, 1989:37]

Can it be said that the way of reasoning - as described by Elster - does have anything to do with no man's actual thinking? And more, that it is obvious that it is so? I am not sure what the answers should be, but I think that rather negative. Therefore, a next anthropological question may be formulated:

\[ \text{Q10} \text{ Does exist any finite upper boundary for orders of individual axiological systems?} \]

(By the order of an axiological system, we can understand the order of its 'highest' /according to the 'order-stratification'/ value/s/; assuming finitness of the system, the correctness of this definition is obvious.)

Even if we agree that \[ \text{Q10} \] is a 'real' anthropological question, we can ask of how it is linked with other problems.

It seems to me that \[ \text{Q10} \] is related to the following issues. First, - to the problem of irrational desires. As it's been noted: "...our lives can go badly for us because our desires are irrational. /.../ [it can be given] a definition of rational desires: they are desires such that given our opportunities, they make us as happy us possible." [Elster, 1989:39]

Second, - to the problems of man's self-image, its structure and role it plays in regulating behavior. And third, - to the problems of pragmatics, in particular: of strong/weak will. And fourth (following Fromm), - to the problem of self-creation, or self-transformation. These links will be discussed in more detail at other places.

Now, still one suggestion. It might be claimed that different ('dynamic') anthropological theories tacitly assume this or that answer to this question. To give now but one example. Simple behaviorism could be re-phrased (in this context) as a doctrine that holds that 'society' determines the actual (zero-order) choices. A version of the 'economic model of man' (of the rational-choice theory) could be re-phrased as stating that 'society' determines the first-order structures. Etc.

And the final remark. The problems of the stratification of values, as being discussed in the present section, is undoubtedly related to that discussed in the section 3.2. (On orders/s of action/s). This relation, contrarily to what might first appear, is by no means simple; it is too complex to be studied here systematically. Thus, I only want to demonstrate that one's stratification of values cannot be regarded as a simple one-to-one function of the ordering of one's (intended) actions. Let's consider following example (I believe that - in the case of some individuals - it might be regarded not as a strong idealization but a good approximation of actual conduct). Let's say that someone is completely obsessed with getting more and more money. His set of (non-instrumental) preferences is thus composed of one element. He also does not evaluate his preferences; thus his axiological structure is composed of one stratum. On other hand, it may happen
that such an obsession does not exclude being - the case of particular actions - perfectly calm, precisely calculating etc. In such a case, we could speak of extremely complex and of high order actions. - It is perhaps noteworthy that the possibility just described in theoretical language might be rendered in more common parlance in such, say, words: Practical intelligence can coexist with 'moral primitivity'.

4.2.3. Fuzzy-values

I will open this section by quoting some comments on the 'humanist interpretations'. Their author, Waclaw Mejbaum, draws some, I believe: non-trivial, conclusions from the rather trivial fact that axiological structures happen to change. He claims that human life can be presented as "a sequence of sub-processes of two kinds: stationary and non-stationary. Let's assume that in the stationary sub-process values are fixed, man is only looking for the means for their realization. Thus in the stationary sub-process, the humanist-interpretation assumption is satisfied. In the non-stationary sub-process, we are observing values in statu nascendi. Action in such periods precedes valuation, and for that reason man's behavior cannot be predicted on the ground of his verbal declarations. It does not mean that these declarations are not frank: man may actually want to realize the goals accepted in the previous stationary period, and at the same time he may yield to a tendency that leads him toward negation of these goals. These periods are those of disarray and devaluation." [Mejbaum, 1983:182-3]

Subsequently, Mejbaum distinguishes two sub-classes of the non-stationary processes: 'evolutionary' and 'revolutionary' [idem:184]. As regards the latter ones, we might speak of 'momentary leaps' (one would like to say metaphorically: 'quantum leaps') from one ('old') axiological structure to another ('new'). Mejbaum himself does not decide if such 'jumps' actually happen. But even if they do, the evolutionary changes seem prima facie at least at most. But what seems to be perfectly comprehensible if seen from one observation-point turns out to be puzzling when being seen from another one: if we are to take into account the evolutionary changes of axiological perspectives we have to accept that at least at some periods of life one's axiological structure is more or less fluid (ambiguous, fuzzy etc.) To be more precise, one may guess that in fact all actual individual axiological structures are not perfectly defined and stable. Yet, in many cases to assume that they are so, is not a strong idealizational assumption. But in some cases (in the non-stationary periods), it is just the fuzziness of axiological structures which does matter.

At this moment, I'd like to introduce some ideas of Turgenev presented in his essay *Hamlet and Don Kichot*. Unfortunately, it will be second-hand reference. Still, I believe that even in this form they can be useful here. Andrzej Walicki summarizes them thus: "the tragic character of human life consists in the impossibility of combining the faith and enthusiasm of Don Kichot with the critical consciousness and intellectual comprehensiveness of Hamlet. Don Kichot is a man being able to act, monolithically integral, still these facets are due to his domatic faith eradicating all doubts: Hamlet is 'devoured by reflection', analytical thinking is paralyzes his spontaneous ability to acting, and introduces disharmony between 'immediacy' and 'understanding', thus causing disintegration of personality." [Walicki, 1993:171-2] Let's add, now in Turgenev's own words, that "in Hamlet, the principle of analysis is brought to tragedy, as in Don Kichet the principle of enthusiasm is brought to comedy; while in life both pure tragedy and pure comedy happen rarely" (cited after Walicki [1993:163])

If we have met on our way this famous and emblematic figure of Hamlet, let's note that somewhat different view was outlined by Ossowski [1967:115-116],

It seems to me that quite a few intuitions are tangled in the just quoted opinions. For now, let's try explicate but one of them. To accomplish this goal, let's adopt a notion introduced by Mejbaum and Zukrowska. I mean the notion of 'axiological determinism'. The cited authors characterize this notion as follows: 'Let's imagine that an actor is aware of a number of possible actions that lead to new situations. Axiological determinism is a thesis which claims that to each of those possible actions is assigned a determined value.' [Mejbaum&Zukrowska, 1985:46] (Incidentally, it should be noted that - as Mejbaum and Zukrowska remark - there exists "profound structural similarity: these same fundamentals of immutable laws; in the first case - of laws of Nature, in the second one - of the ethical laws of 'human nature'" [ibidem:49])

We can reject axiological determinism. Therefore, we assume that to some actions are not assigned determined values. It should be stressed that it doesn't mean that the actor is indifferent in respect to these actions. Indifference is represented by the 'axiological zero'. And 'zero' is a well determined value.

To reject axiological determinism may mean to agree that values are of fuzzy character. But it may also mean that values are not stable. And fuzziness and lack of stability are two, mutually independent aspects of axiological systems.

Some examples we could take from the sphere of interpersonal relations. It happens that we love a person, and - at the same time - we hate her. Or, at least, some of us claim to be in such a position.

If we wanted to explore further this problem, we would have to plunge profoundly into fuzzy-set theory. This would push us into another domain and another style of considerations than assumed in the present work. Thus, instead of studying formal details, say more about significance of this problem.

A very good opportunity for such a discussion offers one of the recent work of Z. Bauman *Modernity and Ambivalence*. Bauman tries to demonstrate there that fear of ambivalence has been characteristic for the modern epoch and that only today, in the supposed 'post-modern' age we are starting to learn how to live with ambivalence [Bauman, 1995:32-33]

4.3. The Other(s) and the agent's values

"Emotions are the stuff of life. Anger, shame, fear, joy and love are immensely powerful states of mind... /.../ Hope and surprise, disappointment and regret, wistfulness and longing, envy and malice, pride and contentment: these are the hues of everyday life." Yet, according to the quoted author, "the importance of emotions in human life is matched only by the neglect they have suffered at the hands of philosophers and social scientists." [Elster, 1989:61] Of the emotions listed by Elster, shame and love, envy and malice, and pride - they can be defined (not to say described in detail and accounted for) in the context of inter-human relations only.

Just about these relations, the somewhat forgotten classic of French sociology, Gabriel Tarde, wrote: "The relation of one mind with another is...a distinctive event in the life of each; it is absolutely different from all their relations with the rest of the universe, giving rise to certain most unexpected states of the mind, that cannot be explained at all according to the laws of physiological psychology." [Tarde, 1963:109]
In a similar vein, a great Polish writer, a philosopher also, noted in his Diary: "to realize the cosmic importance of which is a man to a man, one has to imagine the following: I am quite alone in a desert; I have never seen any man, nor I guess that other man is possible. At once an analogous creature, yet one not being me, appears in my field of view - the same principle embodied in a strange body - someone identical yet strange - and I am experiencing wonderful complementation and painful split. And over this dominates one revelation: I have become unlimited, unpredictable for myself, multiplied in all my possibilities by this strange, fresh, yet identical force which is approaching me as if I would be approaching myself from outside." [Gombrowicz, 1971:31]

The two previous declarations and the Gombrowicz’s thought-experiment introduce us into problem-area to be discussed in this section. We are going to touch upon some of many complexities of the man-man relations. As the first step, it is necessary to try to disentangle some strands of this complex issue.

### 4.3.1. An overview of the problems to be analyzed in this chapter

An overview of the problems to be analyzed in this chapter, to be outlined in this point, is to be the first step toward bringing some order into this rather messy area. At the outset, return for a while to the Patryas’s model. As we remember, the most idealized formulation of the principle of rationality is based, among others, on the assumption that individual’s action is directed exclusively by his or her ‘own’ preferences. In a further step, this assumption is removed. Yet, a utilitarian formula is proposed which simply ‘aggregates’ preferences of (an unspecified group of) individuals. As noted earlier, this approach seems to entangle several rather different problems. I will be trying here to unravel those various strands.

In particular, I shall try to demonstrate two things. First, that the phrase ‘to take into account Others’ values’ is a label attached to a set of quite various and distinct relations. Second, the nature of the particular values ‘being taken into account’ may matter - it is not necessarily so that one either takes into account Other’s values or merely does not, irrespective of their substantial nature.

In more detail, we might put it thus. The Others can be viewed (experienced, regarded...by the individual in two ways. First, Others can be experienced as having their own needs, desires, preferences. Others happen to be hungry, ill, homeless... And the individual takes this or that position toward these states of his fellowmen. And second, Others can be intellectually attractive, can like to be with the individual, can admire him etc. I think that in the first situation we can speak of ‘Others-qua-subjects’, and in the second - of ‘Others-qua-objects’ (perhaps we should say more precisely - be the clumsiness of this phrase absorbed - about ‘subjective objects’).

Again, we are facing here an instance of the difference between analytical distinction and substantial relations. To grasp intuitively this distinction, consider two hypothetical individuals. First, someone who is prone to help - it's his need - anybody, unknown people including, but who is perfectly happy living the life of an eremite. And second, one who is cruel towards his neighbors, still he cannot stand, even for a short time, loneliness.

Whether and why such hypothetical, imaginable and logically possible, figures should be also empirically (metaphysically...) possible, or contrarily: impossible, is an important anthropological question which could be answered in various ways.

Further specifications are necessary. Firstly, one can take into account Other’s values either directly or indirectly (inversely, in a pervert way): punishment or intended offense depend, in a pervert way, on the Other’s values; your intention to punish or offend someone can only accidentally be effective unless you have ‘taken into account’ the values of the person to be punished or offended.

Secondly, there is a problem of the traits the group of people whose preferences are taken, by the given individual, into account. Just here a set of questions arise which belong to the border-area of anthropology and (micro)sociology. In the simplest case - the role of the distinction: stranger-fellowman plays in determining attitudes toward Others.

Thirdly, there is an important difference between, let’s say, respecting (which in its turn can be more or less ‘intensive’, ‘consequent’ etc.) for Other’s values (manifested, say, when John cares for Peter’s being not hungry) and ‘acquisition’ of Other’s values (if Mary follows the way in which Betty wears). To give a simple example: I can read a book in order to make someone happy (he expected me, for this or that reason, to have read it), or I can read a book since I believe him to be an expert in literature. Still in other sense a Bill ‘takes into account’ Others’ values if he does something what he dislikes since he wants to be ‘accepted’, ‘respected’, ‘admired’ etc. by a person or group of persons.

Fourthly, so far, I have left untouched the question of the character of values. But it may also be relevant. For instance, a parent may allow a great sum of money for buying books for his child while refusing much smaller sum if it were to be spent for CDs (not to say - for alcohol or drugs).

In this sub-chapter, I am going to proceed in the following way. In the first step, I will analyze such phenomena as egoism, altruism, malice and the like. In this analysis, I will draw upon a Schopenhauer-Wolniewicz’s theory and upon L. Nowak’s ‘non-Christian’ model of man. In brief, positive or negative attitudes towards the Other(s) and their values will be discussed.

In the second step, I will focus on such phenomena as love or friendship. Most briefly, the problem could be indicated with the following phrase: Other as a value. Or, perhaps more precisely, Other’s attitudes and some special relations with an Other as values.

In the third step, I shall take up the issue of the variety of Others. The position of an individual in the ‘social environment’ of the given agent may determine whether and in which way the values of the individual are ‘taken into account’ by this agent.

### 4.3.2. In this section I will be concerned with attitudes toward the Other and his values.

Differently put, I will deal with phenomena which might be very briefly, if not precisely, described as (not-being-indifferent towards the Other’s (un-) happiness.

I shall start with some methodological comments focused on the notion of egoism. Next, I shall present some ideas of Schopenhauer-Wolniewicz and of L. Nowak which cast some light on the problems of egoism, altruism and related attitudes. After the presentation, I will make some critical comments on them. Subsequently, a re-formulation of those ideas will be offered.

#### 4.3.2.1. At the beginning of this section, I find necessary to make two remarks on the notion of egoism.

For this sake, I’d like to discuss a thesis once formulated by Jon Elster who claimed for the ‘(logical) primacy of egoism’. Elster put it so. "There is a sense ... in which self-interest is more fundamental than altruism. The state of nature in which nobody cares about other people - W.Cz., although a thought experiment, is a logically coherent situation. But we cannot coherently imagine a world in which everyone had exclusively altruistic motivations. The goal of the altruist is to provide others with an occasion for selfish pleasures - the pleasure of reading a book or drinking a bottle of wine one has received as a gift. /.../ If nobody had first-order, selfish pleasures, nobody could have higher-order, altruistic motives either. /.../ The point is just a logical one. If someone are to be altruistic, others must be selfish, at least some of the time; but everybody could be selfish all the time." [Elster, 1989:53-54]
In a sense, I agree with what I believe to be the core of Elster's thesis. Yet, I think
that the way in which he put it is rather misleading. More specifically, three points are to
be made here. First, there is no doubt that if we can speak of either egoism or altruism (or
any other attitude of this kind, but let's confine for a while our attention to this common
distinction), it is so because human beings do have some needs that are, say, reflected by
some emotions and values. If they hadn't, if they felt neither pain nor joy, it would not be
possible to be either an egoist or an altruist. So far Elster is, I believe, right. The problem
is, at least partly, of 'technological' character. It is the problem of efficient terminology
(incidentally, it might be noted that terminological debates need not be completely
unproductive; theoretical terminology can be more or less praxisologically effective):
should we use the term 'egoism' in such a way in which the thesis 'each man is an egoist'
trivially true, or it should be given more restricted sense?

In my opinion, it is not very useful to use the term 'egoism' to describe the rather
obvious fact that people want some bread, water, shelter and perhaps still other things.
Rather, the point is in describing the way in which a man makes a 'trade-off'
between his own and other peoples' wants. To give a simple illustration. It happens
(still today not so rarely) that there are some hungry people and someone (either himself hungry
or not) who has some bread at his disposal; the dramatic question is whether he eats all this
bread himself or shares it - more or less generously - with (some of) the hungry
individuals. And here the notion of egoism can (or cannot) be applied. Otherwise it
becomes a mere toy to be played with in (anthropo-) logical games.

Second, altruism happens to be said to be but a form of egoism (in the anthropology
of some economists we could find best examples of this way of thinking); it should be so,
since - to put it briefly - "one cares for another person's happiness since one is (un)happy
if this person is (un)happy". Here two remarks can be made. Firstly, I tend to think that it
is actually so but it does not affect the distinction between egoism and altruism. To refer
to some pre-philosophical moral and psychological intuitions: egoism is - to a degree-
conceived as an emotional attitude that could be characterized as 'callousness',
'indifference', 'heartlessness' as opposed to 'sensitiveness', 'responsiveness', 'being
compassion-nate/sympathetic' etc. - being characteristic of altruism. And just 'callousness',
say, is usually negatively appreciated while, say, 'sensitiveness' is appreciated positively.

It is worthwhile to note at this moment that in daily life there is a fairly common
tendency to evaluate the others' 'selfish' (egoist) preferences. And not only the moral ones
but also the most elementary. Someone would say, for instance, that Peter's taste as to
food is 'primitive' and Paul's - 'subtle', someone else - that John's taste is 'simple' while
Graham's - 'oversophisticated'. Thus, there is nothing unusual that we evaluate the moral
preferences of our fellowmen (thus: their preferences). And Graham's - 'oversophisticated'. Thus, there is nothing unusual that we evaluate the moral
preferences of our fellowmen (thus: their preferences). And not only the moral ones
but also the most elementary. Someone would say, for instance, that Peter's taste as to

way - motivated to do it. Thus, the actual anthropological question is not whether people
can act without being motivated in a way, but that of to what kinds of actions they happen
to be motivated and in which ways. To give a simple example. The question is whether I
am happy (joyful, satisfied... - it doesn't matter now which word we apply here) because a
child is enjoying a toy I've given him or I am happy (joyful...) because I hurt him
intentionally and she is crying.

Third. In this point I follow - in advance - Wolniewicz. He informs us that
Schopenhauer himself defines egoism as "der Drang zum Dasein und Wohlsein". He also
stresses that this definition is too wide. Not to take even little care of himself means
sometimes to bring about some serious troubles for others. (Personal hygiene would perhaps
be the most evident example.) If so, taking some care of himself could be to some extent
regarded as a moral imperative. But 'Be an egoist!' doesn't sound like a serious
imperative. (Though a prescription that at first sight seems to be in the same vein can be
found in Fromm who says that Not self-renunciation ...but self-love, not the negation of
the individual but the affirmation of his truly human self, are the supreme values of the
humanistic ethics." [Fromm,1967: 17] Yet, Fromm's ethics cannot be regarded as a form of
ethical egoism, if the latter word is to have any discriminating meaning.) If it is really so,
the disparity between 'Be an egoist!' and 'Care for yourself!' validates the option to assign
to the word 'egoism' more specific denotation than that determined by Elster.

Fourth. It should be remembered that the second of the two Greatest Commandments
says: "Love your neighbour as yourself" [Mt, 22:39; Bible:1234]. Thus, it does not say
"love everybody except for yourself"! I would risk an interpretation saying that this
commandment calls the individual not to go beyond his Self but, so to say, extend the
limits of the Self so as to encompass as many men as possible, ideally - all the men.

To sum up these comments. It seems to be fruitful to avail of a division suggested by
Kymlicka (who himself follows Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously): preferences are
divided into 'internal' and 'external'. 'The first ones concern goods, means, possibilities we
want for ourselves. The second are related to goods, means and possibilities we want
for others." [Kymlicka,1998:50] The question is, what substantial relations hold between
'internal' and 'external' preferences. That 'external' can be defined only if some 'internal' are
assumed is logically evident and needs no further comments. - So much for the notion of
egoism.

And now the second, very brief, general remark. On one of the perennial
anthropological questions having been debated since Protagoras: on - axiological
relativism. It involves profound metaphysical and ethical issues which have to be left aside
here; yet one assumption must be made. Shortly put, we have to reject the most extreme
relativism: If the considerations on egoism, altruism etc., are to be meaningful, we have to
assume that individual preferences are - at least partly - comparable. We must assume that,
say, to be cured of - mortal disease is of greater value than to have heard favorite song. If
we don't make such an assumption, we will have to admit that a tyrant sending tens of men
to death during - say - a ceremony may be a tender-hearted person but desiring seeing this
ceremony much more intensely than many people want just to live...

On the other hand, it is rather obvious that the same goods may be of different value
for different people. Best and in a simple way it is visible in the case of money: the
individual value of a given amount of money tends to depend on the amount of money the
given individual already has in his possession.

In short, in anthropology we need a theory of (subjective, individual...) values
allowing both for interpersonal comparisons and for inter-personal differences. The
question is what scuba theory should be like? To my knowledge and perception, this question is for the present moment open.

4.3.2. In this point I'm going to present and briefly discuss two theories which are relevant for the questions of egoism, altruism and the like: Schopenhauer's anthropology (as reconstructed by Wolniewicz) and L. Nowak's so-called 'non-Christian model of man'.

4.3.2.1. Thus, a presentation of a construction that might be called 'Schopenhauer-Wolniewicz's tetrahedron' (Wolniewicz himself speaks of 'Schopenhauer's triangle' composed of three elements; yet he adds a fourth one, thus the name of the construction needs to be modified.) It is a part of Schopenhauer's anthropology (as interpreted and slightly corrected by Wolniewicz). Since at this moment I make use of this very fragment only, the following reservation should be made.

The notions to be discussed below are regarded by Schopenhauer and Wolniewicz as denoting different 'types of character'. The latter notion is central in the Schopenhauer's anthropology and conveys the idea of inborn and constant nature of the respective attitudes. [Wolniewicz, 1993:107] In my opinion, the 'deep' ('ontological') nature of these attitudes should be separated from their more 'surface' ('phenomenological') manifestations. (Later on, I'll comment on this problem more extensively.)

Having made this separation we may avail of Schopenhauer-Wolniewicz's classification without necessarily accepting some theses constitutive for this anthropology. This classification is, in my view, very useful and may be applied in order to formulate some anthropological questions, such as "Are, basically, all people egoist?" or "Why people happen to be egoist (malicious, etc.)?" The original Schopenhauerian answer is but one of all possible. Yet all of them assume the Schopenhauarian classification.

In the Schopenhauer's model we find three basic ('pure', simple) types of attitudes:

- egoism,
- malice,
- compassion [ibidem:108].

According to Wolniewicz, this list should be supplemented with a fourth type, namely that of

- justice [ibidem:116]

Let's characterize, following Wolniewicz, those attitudes. First, egoism. Schopenhauer defines it as "der Drang zum Dasein und Wohlein" [ibidem:109] According to Wolniewicz (and I share this opinion; cf. above, the discussion in the point 4.3.2.1.), this definition needs some reservations. In his view, it may be made with the help of the Kantian notion of Selbstliebe. There is a 'normal level' of this self-care. If man does not go over (or, perhaps also, below) this level, there is no reason to speak about egoism (thus E=0). Wolniewicz's reservation seems to be in line with an aspect of the Christian ethics, as interpreted by Scheler: 'to sacrifice his own 'salvation' is, in the Christian eyes, a sin. For this reason, 'salvation' plays for him a role being no less significant than the love of his neighbor. Love your neighbor as yourself' says the Christian rule. It is characteristic that one the main proponents of the modern humanitarianism, August Comte...is shocked by this sentence, and even more, he accuses Christianity of perpetuating 'egoistic reflexes' and wants to replace this sentence with the new positivist rule: 'love you neighbor more than yourself'.' [Scheler, 1977:145]

Second, malice (Bosheit) is defined, in Schopenhauer's words, as uneigennutzige Freude an Fremden Leiden. [ibidem:111] Contrarily to some intuitions, malice differs from egoism no less than from compassion. In Wolniewicz's words, "'egoism is interested' while (pure!) "'malice' is disinterested; it does not care its own advantage. Malice' cares but stranger's disadvantage." Hence, "there is no malice in egoism, and there is no egoism in malice." The devil (the personification of malice) does not acts from lower motives. "Egoist thinks but of his own interest. Devil does not think of himself, he think but of others - how to harm them." [ibidem:111] We might even say that malice is "in a murky sense, a driving-force of equal purity as piety, and in result, being for egoism equally difficult to be conceived." [ibidem:111]

It is interesting that the same intuition we find in a work of a figure who could be regarded as an 'expert' in the field. I mean here the French writer and thief, the hero of Sartre's biographical work, Jean Genet. The author of a monograph of Sartre's philosophy summarizes Genet's opinions thus: "Genet thinks that genuine wrong-doer should act in the disinterested way, professing Kantian morality a rebours. He should be guided neither by material motives nor by spontaneous polarization of consciousness toward the Evil. The evil will, if it is to assert itself, has to be aware of its being evil." [Gromczyński, 1969:309]

Third, piety, or rather - compassion (Mitied) Interestingly, it is defined very briefly as an attitude oriented at fremdes Wohl [ibidem:108]. Perhaps this attitude is viewed as self-evident.

And fourth, justice. Schopenhauer himself derives justice-directed (oriented) attitude from compassion: Mitleid ganz allein ist die wirkliche Basis aller freien Gerechtigkeit. [ibidem:115] But, as Wolniewicz remarks, it happens that "justice calls for causing someone's pain". [ibidem] He notes also that "The essence of justice is not the sensitiveness to the other's suffering, but - appreciation of the objective value - order or of the 'God's law'". [ibidem:117] He also maintains that "the idea of revenge is the oldest form of that of justice" [ibidem]

With the Wolniewicz's opinion, the following one of Scheler should be compared: the idea of justice - if goes beyond the rational obligation which says that 'the equal should be equally done', and if it comprises a determination of what is due to somebody - has love as its premise. In the rational sense, 'just' would be also a man who would make equal harm to everybody, shakele them, and kill, though he would not have any title to the moral virtue called 'justice'. [Scheler, 1977:93]

This latter thesis demonstrates that an analytical distinction is necessary: 'social (collective) justice' should be distinguished from 'individual justice'. I would say that Scheler considers 'collective justice'. But this aspect of human behavior is analytically very different from the one Wolniewicz thinks of: however you behave toward other people, your behavior is 'just' (in the sense considered, and rejected, by Scheler), if only you behave toward all people in the same way; in Wolniewicz's sense, we can speak about 'just' behavior toward any single individual, if only this behavior is based upon considering the 'objective value' of actions of this very individual. To give a simple example: a father is 'just' in the sense analyzed by Scheler if he treats his children in the same way; he is 'just' in the Wolniewicz's sense if he rewards the 'good' behavior of his child and punishes the 'bad' one. (Note that the issue designated here as 'social justice' will be discussed below in the point "There are many Others").

Let's also remark that, according to Kymlicka, "some claim that the sense of justice is a necessary condition, or even component of love toward other people" [Kymlicka, 1998:188]. Any such a claim should be rejected, if 'love' means 'compassion' and 'justice' is defined in the Wolniewiczian way.

Supplement now these characteristics of the four 'pure' types of attitudes toward others with two theses. First, a metaphorical one. In Wolniewicz's words, "egoism is man's beast-trait, compassion - human, malice - devil, and justice - divine." [ibidem:118]
And second, on actual attitude (or character, according to Schopenhauer). It is a system of these four attitudes. Somewhat metaphorically it might be said (as Wolniewicz does) that an attitude A is represented by a pair of equations, \( A = E + M + C + J \). All these parameters (E, M, C, J) represent the 'relative weight' of each of these components of an actual attitude. Starting from this equation, we could say that all formally (arithmetically) possible combination represent a (logically) possible attitude. And any subset of the set of all those combinations represents an anthropological stance which says which of those attitudes are 'really' (and not only logically) possible. To give an example, Wolniewicz suggests that perfect egoism \( (E=1, M=0, C=0, J=0) \) is impossible. To follow Wolniewicz's example, it would be claimed that it is impossible (at least, for an intellectually 'normal' man) - without a dose of malice - to kill someone in order to take her but a trifle.

4.3.2.2.2 Now, I want to present in brief an anthropological conception termed by its author, Leszek Nowak, 'non-Christian model of man'.

This model is constructed as both a generalization and correction of what is designated by Nowak as 'Christian model of man'. The latter is to constitute the core of the rationalist paradigm. This model is characterized in the following way: 'the primary factor forming our attitude towards other people is their attitude towards us. The more benevolent others are, the more benevolent we are inclined to be. And, similarly, our abomination of others results from their abomination of us. Thus, man behaves towards people in the same way they behave towards him; he reciprocates both benevolence and hostility. That is why the Christian ethics orders us to break the vicious circle of hostility arising from hostility and to manifest charity towards our neighbors. For this and only this can eliminate the latter's abomination and incline him to respond with benevolence. It is what the idea of 'overcoming evil by means of good' consists in." [Nowak, 1993:197-198]

In Nowak's view, this mechanism does operate, thus 'Christian model' is by no means simply false. Even more, it depicts correctly many 'normal' inter-human relations. Yet, the area of its application is to be limited. On the one hand, if the degree of 'negative-ness' of the hostile acts of the partner passes over a point, the readiness to react with negative acts (as the 'model of rationality', in Nowak's interpretation, would demand) declines. The Orwellian figure of Winston Smith and his love toward Big Brother is to be exemplary for such a situation. On the other hand, if the degree of 'positive-ness' of the benevolent acts passes over a point, a symmetrical effect is to appear: this time it is the proneness to answer with positive acts which declines.

In order to specify those theses, Nowak formulates three rules of behavior of an agent Y toward his partner X. These rules are designated as principles of rationality, counter-rationality, and irrationality, respectively. These principles are:

R: (the principle of rationality) of possible actions, Y chooses one which is expected to lead in given conditions to a result which he prefers most;

C: (the principle of counter-rationality) of possible actions, Y chooses one which is expected by him to lead in given conditions to a result which his benefactor X prefers most;

I: (the principle of irrationality) of possible actions, Y chooses one which is expected by him to lead to a result that his benefactor X prefers least." [Nowak, 1993:201]

The area in which counter-rationality principle operates is characterized as the area of 'captivity', while one in which irrationality principle is valid - as the area of 'infuriation'.

It may be expected that many idealizing conditions should be assumed here. The following are explicitly formulated by Nowak: "(i) the considered orders of values are linear, (ii) X is able to bring about every state of affairs of Y's order of values, (iii) X knows Y's order of values, and vice versa." [Nowak, 1993:198]

4.3.2.3 I want to formulate a few critical comments on the theory of Schopenhauer-Wolniewicz and that of Nowak.

At the beginning, a comment which is addressed to both theories. They do not make a distinction which is, in my opinion, necessary; namely, they do not distinguish between description of various types behavior and mechanisms that supposedly generate them. This is particularly well noticeable when we juxtapose them. First of all, the Schopenhauerian 'malice' seems to be quite close to Nowakian 'infuriation'; the Schopenhauerian 'compassion' bears some, if not very great, resemblance to Nowakian 'rationality'; there seems to be a relation, though not quite clear, between Nowakian 'rationality' - on the one hand, and Schopenhauer-Wolniewicz's 'egoism' and 'justice' - on the other. Most probably, Nowakian 'rationality' might be viewed as a 'combination' of Schopenhauerian-Wolniewicz 'egoism' and 'justice'.

Thus, we could say that both the theories start from similar descriptions of the possible types of the Other-oriented actions (resp. of the possible Other-oriented attitudes). In both theories, however, the mechanisms which account for assuming by individuals these or those attitudes are radically different: these attitudes are either inherent to individual's 'character' (Schopenhauer-Wolniewicz) or are determined by the specific inter-individual situation (L. Nowak).

The similarity-and-dissimilarity of these two theories should support my thesis about the necessity of analytical separation between a classification of Other-oriented attitudes and theories accounting for the fact that people actualize those attitudes. The first issue is to be elaborated in the present chapter. The second one is a part of the much broader problem of possible determinants of human actions. This problem will be discussed in the last chapter of the present work. The concept of 'anthropological tetrahedron', developed there, may be applied to the descriptive model (classification) elaborated in the present chapter. Let's remark in advance that Schopenhauerian theory is an instance of 'Schopenhauerian anthropotagogy' (which itself is a result of a generalization of this theory); Nowak's theory is an instance of 'Althusserian anthropotagogy'.

Having formulated the general critical remark on both theories, and having drawn from it the most essential conclusion, I am going to make some more specific remarks on Nowak's 'non-Christian model of man'. In particular, I will be commenting on the following points. First, still on attitudes and attitudes-generating mechanisms. Second, on the strategic (resp. non-strategic) character of Others-oriented actions. Third, on the notion of rationality and on the mechanisms of decision-making. Fourth, on the problem of complex ('non-dyadic') inter-individual relations. And fifth, the temporal dimension of actions will be briefly considered.

The first point, then. It has been noted that Leszek Nowak "seems to disregard...that people happen to satisfy their partners' preferences not only under the influence of the extremely hostile attitude, but also because of sheer friendliness toward them." [Egiert, 1993:217] Agreeing with Egiert, one could ask how a thinker can neglect such a common phenomenon as friendliness. The possible answer could be this: Nowak conceptualized a phenomenon being often misinterpreted or underestimated. A phenomenon which happens to be conflated with 'normal' (rational, egoist...) behavior. Obedience toward someone who keeps in his hands means of coercion, or who controls the life-necessities, is - at least in some situation - perfectly rational attitude; no non-standard theory needs to be invoked here. On the other hand, Nowak seems to be right in pointing at attitudes and behavior which go well beyond obedience: loving one's oppressor is something very different from being obedient toward him. Focusing his attention on this,
very strange and intriguing phenomenon, Nowak passed by more usual phenomenon: some of us simply like (or love) some Others.

The second problem: the strategic (resp. non-strategic) character of Others-oriented actions. This problem is relevant, in particular, for the discussion of 'infuriation'. Let's consider a person who helps his neighbor, in this or that way - yet regularly. At the first sight, positive actions should be answered in a positive way, too (normalcy of the helped person being assumed). But more close inspection reveals some complications. Let's consider, for instance, an analysis of Nowak's theory in a psychoanalytic context. The concept of superego plays here the key role: 'introducing the superego into the consideration of positive actions has a significant effect for the shape of dependency...With the increasing discrepancy between the level of X's positive actions, and Y's positive responses, Y's superego starts demanding an equal goodness from Y's ego...This places the ego in conflict with its ideal causing internal tension which in turn results in aggression...the intensity of the...conflict is so high that the generated aggression suppresses all positive actions.' [Papzycki, 1993:209] In other words, an act - if seen is a narrow perspective - constitutes a positive action (of Y toward X, to use Papzycki's convention). Yet, the same act may be seen - in a broader perspective - as a part of more complex act which constitutes a negative action, causing - to follow Papzycki - painful 'internal tension' between ideal-of-the-self and the perceived possibilities of action (satisfying the rule of reciprocity).

It should be noted that Papzycki analyzes actions which are negative (pain-causing) but unintentionally rather than intentionally (the benefactor may be not aware of the spiritual pains he causes with his positive actions). But we might make along the same way still a step: A person who deserves the name of 'sophisticated malice-maker', a person who acts toward someone prima facie positively, but in order to humiliate or enslave him (impose upon him the sense of being 'obliged', 'owing gratitude' etc.) - such a person is logically possible - at least; and I tend to think that we actually meet such persons.

In such a case, what seems to be 'infuriation' ('black ingratitude'), if viewed in a perspective, turns out - when seen in a broader perspective - to be either 'natural reaction' (of an individual who cannot 'stand' any more his tensions) or deliberate action aimed at protection of one's autonomy.

In the third point, I'd like to formulate some remarks on the notion of rationality and the mechanisms of decision-making.

As we remember, Nowak adds to the principle of rationality two others: this of counter-rationality and that of irrationality. These three principles are surely different. But are they so different as the terms might suggest? I think they are not. No doubt, according to the first principle, acting individual is directed by his 'own' values, while in the case of the two others - by Other's values, in direct or indirect ('pervert') way, respectively. But, on the other side, all the three principles come under a single common scheme. In fact, all these principles say that an individual 'chooses of all possible actions one which is supposed to lead in given conditions to a result' defined in a way, i.e. as preferred most by the acting individual, as preferred most by another person, or preferred least by the other.

In my opinion, those formulations can be used (after some modifications perhaps) as characteristics of egoism, malice, compassion, or justice - in the sense of Wolniewicz. But are these formulations compatible with other parts of Nowak's own theory? This is not obvious. Take the following example. According to Nowak, people, when facing extreme malevolence, "lose their ability to feel hostility towards their enemies"; for their "being paralyzed by fear" [Nowak, 1993:199]. But if someone is 'paralyzed by fear', is he able to make any choice at all (no matter of what type values should orient his choice)? It can be doubted.

I would add, on my part, a possible account for Nowakian 'infuriation'. People faced with extreme benevolence seem to be filled with such feelings as nausea, boredom, irritation, and the like. It can be maintained that such feelings make impossible to act positively toward a person.

The problem of complex (non-dyadic) inter-individual relations is to be discussed in the fourth point.

I think that the story of John the Baptist, Herod and Salome may serve as a dramatic illustration of the problem: "On his birthday Herod gave a banquet for his high officials and military commanders and the leading men of Gilead. When the daughter of Herodias came in and danced, she pleased Herod and his dinner guests. The king said to the girl: 'Ask me for anything you want, and I'll give it to you.' And he promised her with an oath, Whatever you will ask me I will give you, up to half my kingdom. She went out and said to her mother, 'What shall I ask for?' The head of John the Baptist' she answered. At once the girl hurried in to the king with the request: I want you to give me right now the head of John the Baptist on a platter. The king was greatly distressed, but because of his oaths and his dinner guests he did not want to refuse her. So he immediately send an executioner with orders to bring John's head. The man went, beheaded John in the prison and brought back his head on a platter. He presented it to the girl, and she gave it to her mother." [Mk,6:21-28; 1989:1253-1254] This story is sufficiently suggestive to focus your attention on the central point of the problem which will be discussed at length in the section 4.3.4.

And the last, fifth, point. The temporal dimension of actions will be here in focus. I will draw upon a brief summary of a theory of Derek Parfit about relations between personal identity and modes of decision-making. J. Elster presents its main thesis thus: 'The person is 'nothing but' a more or less tightly connected sequence of mental and bodily states. The looser the connections, the more similar are our future states to the states of other persons, and the more difficult it is to defend temporal neutrality on the sole ground of rationality.' [Elster, 1986b:10-11]

This may be so. But we could take the same way, yet - in the opposite direction. It may be supposed that temporal dimension of decision-making is an important factor. So important that, say, our egoistically inclined person, his own happiness in the very distant future may be mattering less than the 'here-and-now' happiness of his neighbor.

4.3.2.4. In the previous points I have presented two anthropological theories of Others-oriented behavior. I have made some critical points. Now, I would like to discuss how we could draw from these two theories a conceptual scheme in which various anthropological could be formulated.

Before the abstract scheme will be formulate, I want to consider some examples of logically possible (imaginable) actions. All these actions are instances of a generic type of action, namely - murder.

[el] X tries to achieve some 'material', say financial, goals; Y disturbs him in a way, though - passively, even without knowing about it; in the result X is killing Y.

[el] X deliberately takes a gun from his home, though he has not even the smallest reason to be afraid of any assault; he is walking and at a moment is shooting at an unknown person passing the other side of the street; in result he kills this person.

[el] X's beloved mother has for years suffered unbearable pains caused by an incurable cancer. And for a long time, she has asked her son to take her life away from her. In the very end, he has yielded. (Let the moral acceptability of euthanasia remain untouched here.)
[e4] Y murdered Z in particularly atrocious way. X witnessed this murder. He knows that for some reasons, Y will not be judged, much less sentenced. Thus, having come up Y after protracted efforts, X is killing Y.

And another list of examples (repeat again: they are thought-experiments based on purely logical possibilities - I am not going to consider whether such facts could take, or actually have taken, place in the 'real life' or could/ have not); suicide being the generic type.

[e1'] X is the only son of an old and seriously ill woman. He is the only person on which she can reckon. Yet, being disappointed with having not obtained the prize he had expected to be awarded, X commits a suicide.

e2'] X, being healthy and wealthy, commits suicide in a hotel in order to cause some troubles for its management.

e3'] X, young and healthy, comes to a hospital and commits suicide - in a special, delicately planned way, in order make a transplantation of one's heart possible.

e4'] X commits a suicide in order to protest against the unjust, though not cruel, treating of an unknown person. (This example may be not a mere thought-experiment; A. Camus speaks of suicides of protest committed by Russian terrorists, staying in penal-labor colonies, when their comrades were flogging. He remarks also: "as outrageous one, we can regard an injustice done to people whom we regard as our foes". [Camus, 1991:20])

I want regard these examples as paradigmatic for various attitudes; [e1] and [e1'] - for egoism, [e2]/[e2'] - for malice, the next ones - for compassion, and the last ones - for justice. These examples and the respective attitudes are to be regarded, let me underline it, as purely' logical possibilities. If any such a situation or attitude can be registered in the empirical human world may be decided in various ways. Some anthropologist's will claim that only 'mixed' attitudes are possible (that no pure egoism or pure justice can be actualized in the behavior of any individual), some others - contrarily - that men are 'in their essence' simply egoists, or just persons, and only the complexities of the real life make it difficult to notice it.

Let's try now to define these four attitudes in a more abstract way. It is necessary, in my opinion, to define them as attitudes assumed by an individual toward another individual. The question of whether we can generalize these notions must remain open on the meta-anthropological level.

[E] X is an egoistic person with respect to Y iff Y's hierarchy of values is not represented axiologically in X's axiological structure.

[M] X is a malicious person with respect to Y iff Y's hierarchy of values is inversely represented axiologically in X's axiological structure and this representation dominates totally X's own hierarchy of values.

[C] X is a compassionate person with respect to Y iff Y's hierarchy of values is directly represented axiologically in X's axiological structure and dominates totally X's hierarchy of values.

[J] X is a just person with respect to Y iff Y's hierarchy of values is represented axiologically in X's axiological structure and neither this representation nor X's own hierarchy of values dominates the other.

The first three definitions seem to me sufficiently clear, as for the present stage of these considerations. The fourth one, the characteristic of the 'individual justice', needs some elaboration. The idea is drawn from Ajdukiewicz. His formulation of the principle of justice (but note! - of 'social justice') may be regarded as probably the most general, in relation to which all the other formulations may be viewed as its various concretizations.

Ajdukiewicz put his principle in the following way: "if a sentence that ascribes a right to a person, called by his name X.Y, is true, then a general rule must be true, a rule that ascribes this right to any person who has an attribute which is possessed by the person X.Y, but which neither consists in being just Mr. X.Y. nor is an attribute as to which it can be a priori, by the logical means only, proved that Mr. X.Y. this very attribute possesses." [Ajdukiewicz, 1985:372]

The definitional 'lack of dominance' of one's own hierarchy of values, and also of partner's hierarchy, might be characterized thus. X makes any decision concerning himself and his partner exactly in the same way he would make any such a decision with respect to an A-person and a B-person, these persons being defined only in general terms, without using the proper names.

Let me stress that justice has been defined here for the smallest 'society' - the group consisted of two persons: the agent and one other individual.

Having defined four 'pure' attitudes, consider if the list is complete. Of course, the question can be - at the best case - answered in a relative way: with respect to the way in which the definitions were formulated. And all these definitions are based on the idea that each man has his own hierarchy of values, but his axiological structure can comprise also representations of hierarchies of values of other people.

According to these assumptions, we can divide possible attitudes vis-a-vis a partner into two groups. The first group consists of one element only, namely of the egoistic attitude: there is no axiological representation of partner's hierarchy of values. The adjective 'axiological' should be underlined here. Partner's hierarchy of values may be represented cognitively (in an epistemic way): an individual may know what is his partner's axiology, he may even 'take into account' this axiology. Yet - in the same way as he takes into account knowledge about various parameters of the world, from the whether conditions to stock exchange indices. If there is no representation at all, no further questions can be asked. Therefore, no further subdivisions are possible.

On the other hand, the non-egoistic attitudes are defined by the existence of the representation of partner's axiology. These representations can be of various types. Let subdivide them further. Assume that agent's own hierarchy of values can be either 'dominated' by the representation of partner's hierarchy of values or can be not 'dominated'. If it not dominated and if there is no element of egoism, thus we obtain the attitude of justice.

In the case of the 'domination' of partner's axiology, two possibilities are at hand. On the one side, direct representation. In this case, we obtain 'pure' compassion. On the other side, inverted representation. In this case, malice is obtained. We could note that the final step of the way on which we arrived at this classification seems to be in accordance with a quite popular opinion worded by Buber: "he who hates is closer to the relation than he who experiences neither love nor hatred" [Buber, 1991:45]

It should be noted that these 'extreme' positions do not exhaust the list of possible attitudes. I would claim that the list contains all 'pure' attitudes. But 'mixed' attitudes are possible too. Though at the first sight the possibility of the 'mixed' attitudes seems to be quite natural, at the closer inspection the problems turns out to be quite complex.

In particular, there are some conceptual complications when a 'mix' of egoism and an other attitude is to be defined. Egoism has been defined through the lack of the axiological representation of partner's axiological structure. Any of the three other attitudes is just defined by a specific way in which this very structure is represented.

I would suggest that a part of the solution may be found when adopting the idea of partial representation. To be more specific, we could assume that only some values are represented; most naturally - the most 'elementary' values were represented. For instance,
one can be 'sensitive' to the value of someone's life as such but not to any particular quality of the life.

Constructing in this way definitions of the 'mixed' attitudes, we may revert to some interesting observations made by Scheler. "Most characteristic is the often emphasized fact that co-suffering and co-joy differ immensely as to their range...of dissemination. Co-suffering [compassion, Mitleid] is a genuine word which stems from the very nature of language, while co-joy [Mitfreude] is a weak creation analogous to it. In the most of languages, there exist many words to determine the kinds of co-suffering, while there are not so many for determining the kinds of co-joy. Anyway, it points out to the fact that co-suffering is much more disseminated than co-joy". [Scheler, 1980:215-216] We see here again the importance of the assumptions that axiological 'zero' exists.

An alternative (complementary) strategy consists in introducing the idea of 'weighing'. Let's present some intuitions referring to a concrete example. Take spending money. A perfect egoist should not be able to grant even the smallest fraction (say 1 cent) of his money for whatever 'not-his-own' goal. A perfect non-egoist should be able to grant (perhaps: almost; sheer survival might be compatible with perfect non-egoism) all his money (for what 'not-own' goal, it depends on whether he is a malicious, just or compassionate person). Almost perfect egoist were able to spend no more, say, than 0.1 per cent of his income (of the 'surplus', the costs of 'simple reproduction' having been deducted). Someone, 1 per cent; someone else - 50 per cent, etc. Of course, the absolute magnitude of the owned money should matter, too.

As these considerations demonstrate, I have not been able to offer quite satisfactory definitions of the 'mixed' attitudes. Nevertheless, I hope that some effective steps toward such definitions have been made.

These concepts, in spite of their moral connotations in the ordinary language, should be regarded as descriptive (description being opposed here not to theory but to evaluation). But they can be naturally used in moral discourse. And the moral use of those concept may, in turn, shed some light on their cognitive content.

Let's take into consideration the relation between egoism and altruism. Except for Aristipus, Stirner and few other moral thinkers, most of us tend to elevate altruism/compassion and to condemn (more or less severely) egoism. Such an evaluation is by no means self-evident; even if we leave aside 'extreme' positions and limit ourselves to the 'main-stream' of moral thought. Compassion, as defined - no doubt: very radically above, means that in any conflict situation the partner's good will have absolute dominance over the own good of the acting person. But should we really recommend a hard-working mother to take a second job in order to be able to buy her daughter a new fashionable dress? Personally, I say definitely - not.

And now, consider a bit less evident case related to the compassion-justice. The concept of (pure) justice is defined so that it implies the idea of punishment, retribution; even - in a sense - the idea of revenge. On the other hand, the concept of (pure) compassion implies the idea of universal forgiveness. Sure, forgiveness is one of the most beautiful moral ideals, and the moral revolution brought about by Christianity consists partly in giving philosophical and institutional support to it. But does the idea of forgiveness arise any difficulties? Surely not. Even if we assume that everybody has the right to forgive any evil he was done, we would have doubts whether we should forgive on behalf a person being in our custody.

Let me remind my remarks on ethics and anthropology. I argued that the language of anthropology should be a part of the language of ethics. And here an instance of this approach was given.

4.2.2.6. As I have already stressed several times, (meta-)anthropology is viewed here in a double perspective: on the one side, as a discipline in its own right; on the other side, as a basis for other humanistic disciplines, for philosophy of History and political philosophy - in particular.

The relations between anthropology and philosophy of History (etc.) are quite specific: various solutions to special anthropological issues determine, to a degree, solutions to historiosophical and political problems.

The problem of democracy is, both in its descriptive (historiosophical) and normative (ethical/political) dimensions, one of the most central questions of social philosophy. Thus, I want to indicate the relevance of the issues discussed in this sub-chapter (egoism, etc.) for the question of democracy.

A very clear presentation of these anthropological-political relations I have found in Wolniewicz's paper on Anthropological Fundamentals of Democratism. It will be, therefore, convenient to present a summary of this text.

According to Wolniewicz, we can speak of two main anthropological stances, and respectively - of two main types of democratism. In his own words, "the ways of democrats are parting accordingly to on what anthropology they build up their democratism - i.e. their idea of democracy. We distinguish two main types: those who fully trust in the natural propensities of the human nature, and those who do not share the completeness of this trust. Democratism of the first type we call conventionally - rousseauian (Rousseau, Social Contract, 1762), and of the second - rousseanian (Jefferson, Declaration of Independence, 1776 - following Locke's Treatise on Government, 1690." [Wolniewicz, 1993: 201]

Rousseauian democratism is to be based upon a thesis Wolniewicz calls Rousseau's axiom' and which says that "Man is naturally good." [ibidem] And Jeffersonian type of democratism is to be based upon an assumption which 'is simply a negation of the Rousseau's axiom and [which ] says: Man is not naturally good. For there is in him an elemental evil (Das Radikalblose - as Kant once said), being inseparable and irremovable part of his nature." [ibidem, 204]

In Wolniewicz's opinion, Rousseauian democratism is linked with the idea of egalitarianism and that of socialism. [ibidem, 201]. In other words, the rousseian idea of democracy is linked with the idea of equality, while the Jeffersonian - with that of liberty. [ibidem, 203]

Jeffersonian democracy is to be a non-natural state, and this non-naturalness is to be expressed best in the Ortega y Gasset's magnum opus. [ibidem]

We should also note that the 'non-Evangelic' model of man is deliberately constructed and used as an anthropological foundation for the non-Marxian historical materialism in general, and for the nM-MH theory of power/politics in particular. [Nowak, 1991b:25-80, 87-104]

4.3. At the present point, I am going to speak about love, friendship and related attitudes; thus, human beings are to be viewed now as 'having' value for the individual. To make this rather vague formulation more precise, let me remind the basic analytical considerations made at the beginning of this sub-chapter.

Human beings have some preferences (needs, values...). Confine for a while our attention to the preferences concerning food, shelter, health and the like things. An individual can assume various attitudes toward other individuals with respect to their needs. He may care for other individual's being hungry or he may not. He may worry about someone's illness or he may not. Etc. The Other is regarded (or - disregarded, in the case
of the desires of these three men. "Don Juan attains full satisfying of his desires only at the
European culture, are regarded as emblematic for the respective types. These are: Don
West. K. Starczewska distinguishes three types of 'human actions motivated by love'.
appears almost promptly. The word is systematically equivocal. But this equivocalness is
which the escape from oneself is hidden, permanent self-disgust" [Scheler, 1977; 105]
by Scheler is still more complex. In his view, love happens to be "but a pretty name, behind
the consciousness and subject-ness of the Other.
which subject-ness is an important, if not - the most important, attribute. And the non-
strumentality of the value, which the Other may be for an individual, has its roots in
consciousness and subject-ness of the Other.
According to the second intuition, sexual desire might serve as simple, possibly - the
simplest, still not necessarily paradigmatic, instance of the attitude in question. Of course,
if we assume that sexual desire can be (fully) satisfied neither with the help of an 'orgasm-
machine' (as presented in a Woody Allen's movie; the title of which I've forgotten) nor
with the help of a man-like doll.
While speaking of sexual desire, thus as an element of eroticism, the word 'love'
appears almost promptly. The word is systematically equivocal. But this equivocalness is
not incidental. Contrarily, it does reflect the interrelatedness and 'overlapping-ness' of real
phenomena.
In her study Wzory miłości w kulturze Zachodu [Patterns of love in the culture of the
West], K. Starczewska distinguishes three types of human actions motivated by love.
[Starczewska, 1975:17] Three characteristic figures, known from the history of the
European culture, are regarded as emblematic for the respective types. These are: Don
Juan, Tristan and Jesus from Nazareth. [ibidem:19] Starczewska is considering the content
of the desires of these three men. "Don Juan attains full satisfying of his desires only at the
moment in which he attains total and ultimate devoting of the desired woman and when
mat the same time he becomes the goal of her most profound desires." [ibidem:25]
Tristan's desire is that of "attaining 'absolute unity' with the beloved woman." [ibidem:26]
And Jesus wants "salvation for people whom he loves. He wants, therefore, disinterestedly
good for the object of his love". [ibidem]
At the present moment, I'd comment upon Starczewska's typology in the following
way. The 'Jesus-love' may be regarded as a case of the attitudes oriented at Other-qua-
subject. The 'Don-Juan-love' may be regarded as a case of the attitudes oriented Other-
qua-object. The 'Tristan-love' is a more difficult case. I do not want to decide whether it
should be regarded as a result of an 'interference' of the two other types, or it should be
regarded as a sub-type of a type of which 'Tristan-love' were another sub-type. Prima facie,
both interpretation seem to be reasonable.
Following Starczewska, I've tried to fix anad and define the most relevant, in the
present context, ambiguities of the word 'love'. But this does not exhaust the problem.
The connotation and even denotation of this word is very rich and difficult to be
specified. One could suggest that theoretical discourse should just dispense with this word.
Though I see some positive aspects of such a decision, I do not think that in general it
should be right. This word is so deeply and extensively rooted in our culture that its
omitting might simply result in neglecting an important problem-area and its complexities.
'Love' does not designate a clear-cut category of human phenomena, but - on the
other hand - it is not such a word as 'plant' which designates either American factory or
flower. It seems to be rather a Wittgensteinian family-concept. This family is a historical
product and it may reflect some important experiences that should not be neglected.
Let's note first that the word 'love' happens to be used in such contexts as 'love of
truth', 'love of music', 'love of one's country'... 'Love' is here a concept which distinguishes
not the type of attitude, interest, emotion but its 'intensity'.
The phenomenon of 'love of one's country' (let's assume that it is not an empty
phrase). Interesting and important. The very concept, and the associations it evokes,
suggests that there may be some interrelations between our 'non-personal' and 'personal'
values (a special 'mixture' of attitudes toward 'country' - its monuments, landscape, even
climate; and toward 'nation' - its history, its contemporary 'position' etc.)
'Love for animals. Quite possible, not for all animals. But dogs and cats, and horses?
We know that some people care more for their pets than for their fellowmen. Should we
say that they love their animals and they do not their fellowmen? Or, perhaps, they care for
their pets as others do for their cars, collections of paintings...?
And love for your mother and father, and for grandmother and grandfather,...; and
for your sisters and brothers,... and for your daughters and sons, and for grand daughters
and grandsons... Love for your wife/husband, fiancee or lover...
It should be reminded that these two types of attitudes (toward the Others) have been
distinguished analytically. As to their substantial interrelations, various stances are
possible. And, as usual, just this very distinction allows for formulating some
anthropological questions and answers. And among the answers, one can find the one
claiming for one-to-one interrelation between these two types.
It should also be stressed that this analytical distinction seems to grasp an important
aspect of inter-individual relations, but there may be some subtleties that would require
further analytical ramifications.
In particular, I'd like to note that some Other-oriented emotions are somewhat
paradoxical. To give an example. Some (most?) of us do not want to be loved in a purely
'altruistic' way. Quite contrarily, we tend to regard such a love as a form of piety or charity,
and we tend to sense these attitudes as somehow humiliating and abasing; we do want to be loved 'egoistically': we want to be desired, we want to be he without whom she 'cannot live', thus - in a sense - we want to be for the Other a 'necessity'; perhaps like air, water and bread...If so, a dose of 'egoism' (in the pre-theoretical sense of the world) may be necessary if someone's love is to satisfy some needs of its 'object' (and, thus, to be 'non-egoist').

Summing these remarks, we could formulate (in a rather tentative way) one of the fundamental anthropological questions:

[Q11] In which sense (in which way) can be a man a value (autonomous, non-instrumental) for another man?

4.3.3.1. At the first glance, the attitudes toward Others-qua-objects constitute a vast area. Therefore, a classification, if tentative, seems to be desirable.

Most generally, we could say that the presence-of-the-Other is either positive or negative value for an individual. Thus, in the first step, we might distinguish two attitudes:
- closeness-oriented.
- separation-oriented.

The basic intuition is very simple. If the presence-of-the-Other is - for the given individual - of positive value, then _ceateris paribus_ he or she will try to be close to the Other. If it is of negative value, then (instrumentality, social constraints, etc. being left aside) he or she will try to be separated from the Other.

In the second step, the closeness-oriented attitudes can be sub-divided into cooperation-oriented and conflict-oriented, and the separation-oriented attitudes can be sub-divided into active ones ('escape' from people) and passive (lack of any initiative oriented at making contacts with Others).

This classifications may be useful, but its theoretical importance is not clear to me. Thus, having noted the intuitions expressed in it and keeping these intuitions in my mind, I will be proceeding further on the way of a 'phenomenological' analysis of such phenomena as eroticism, love, friendship, or loneliness - in accordance with their prephilosophical conceptualization.

4.3.3.2. "In man, the range of emotional attitudes is immense. The zenith of the 'to'-attitude is the maximal union with the surrounding which is achievable...in the sexual act, and in a fictional way in the state of mystic or creative ecstasies; the uppermost point of the 'from'-attitude sits the act of murder." [Kępkiński, 1974:131] In this section, I am going to touch just upon this zenith manifestation of the 'to'-attitude. Thus, I am going to speak of sex, and - eroticism and erotic love, the most universal sphere of interpersonal relations.

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First of all, I do agree with the author of L'Etre et le Neant (from which occur all these citations come from) that "we must abandon straight off the idea that desire is the desire of pleasure or the desire for the cessation of pain." [ibidem] Well, this declaration calls for a comment. Nobody, and I believe also Sartre himself, would claim that it does not happen that sexual desire (in the vague sense of ordinary language) is of purely physical nature. It may happen so, and I suppose it does - possibly quite often. But in sexual desire being so conceived, there is nothing of particular philosophical interest (more humbly put, I don't see it there). Philosophically interesting is sexual desire understood in such a way in which is in accordance with Sartre's thesis. And this very thesis might be read in two ways: as an analytic postulate delineating a 'field' of phenomena, and as a thesis saying that these phenomena are not 'abstract possibilities' but that they come into actual existence of real people.

Secondly, we may repeat after Sartre that "every subjectivist and immanentist theory will fail to explain how we desire a particular woman and not simply our sexual satisfaction." [ibidem:384-385] If to use a philosophical language, we could add to the former the following general thesis: "It is best...to define desire by its transcendent object." [ibidem:385]

Into the context of this thesis, we may put the question of Sartre: "Shall we say that desire is the desire of a body?" [ibidem] In the same context may be located the answer: "In one sense this cannot be denied. But we must take care to understand it correctly. To be sure it is the body which disturbs us; am arm or half-exposed breast or perhaps a leg. But we must realize at the start that we desire the arm or the uncovered breast only on the ground of the presence of the whole body as organic totality." [ibidem]

But even this remark makes for a relatively small part of the whole story. Read his definition (or 'definition' - it doesn't matter here): 'My original attempt to get hold of the
Other's free subjectivity through his objectivity-for-me is sexual desire."

As you see, Sartre is going well beyond the point of in which the 'physical' totality of the sexual relation might be underscored. This harmonizes well with the emphasis he puts on that 'there is great abyss between sexual desire and other appetites'.

Of particular interest is the following, perhaps somewhat astonishing, thesis: "Consciousness chooses itself as desire. For this...there must be a motive; I do not desire just anything at any time." [ibidem:389] Two pages earlier, he declares: 'The being which desires is consciousness making itself body.' [ibidem:389] And a few lines below, he asks: "what is...the meaning of desire?'[ibidem]

Desire (we might add: as other attitudes toward the Others), according to Sartre, does not achieve its goal; it does fail. And this failure is by no means incidental: it 'stands at the origin of its own failure, inasmuch as it is a desire of taking and appropriating.' [Sartre,1989:398]

The considerations on sex play a very significant role in Sartre's theory. Sex does not constitute one of the many spheres of human life - among the others; quite contrarily: "the sexual attitude is a primary behavior towards the Other" [Sartre,1989: 406] And referring to Love and desire, Sartre says that 'all of men's complex patterns of conduct towards one another are only enrichments of these two original attitudes (and of the third - hate...)' [ibidem:407]

From Sartre move on to Levinas. In his Totalite et Infini, we find the following considerations devoted to the erotic life. "Impersonal character of delight does not allow to regard it as partner-relationship between lovers. Delight does not look for the Other but for her delight, it is delighting in delight...loving the love of the Other. For this reason, love is not a special kind of friendship. Love and friendship are not only differently experienced. Their correlate is different. Friendship desires another man. Love looks for something what has not the structure of individual being, but what is in the indefinite future, what is only to be borne. I love completely only if the Other loves me, not because I need his recognition, but since my delight is delighting in her delight and since in this identification without any precedence, in this transsubstitution the Self-Identical and the Other do not fuse but - beyond any possible project, beyond any possible power - they procreate a child." [Levinas,1998:321-322]

Drawing partly upon Sartre and Levinas, I'd like to make some systematic remarks on the subject in question. Physical pleasure (no doubt: in itself, quite important phenomenon) aside, we could identify three aspects of the 'non-instrumental relevance' of the 'sexual Other'.

First, we could say that the sphere of eroticism is one in which to the utmost possible degree coincide our wish that the Other be happy, and our wish that we be happy. To put it in a more abstract, and somewhat 'dry' (specially if applied to this domain of passion) language, it might be said that (assuming of course perfect erotic harmony) through one and the same action the acting person's preferences and those of his or her partner are being maximized. In a sense, the problem of choosing between one's own preferences and those of the Other simply disappears. Of course, perhaps always you can go more and more deep while looking for an accounting for a phenomenon. The problem of the relevance of sex is no exception to this rule. In my opinion, however, the state of 'axiological harmony' might be regarded as the final link in the chain of explanations. The next point is then not so much a next link as another yet complementary explanation.

Second, the erotic sphere is one in which particular 'wholeness', 'completeness' of interpersonal relations is possible. Specially, if we assume that in the erotic love (differently than in the case of narrowly conceived sexual relation), even the whole sexual intercourse, not to say - its element: coitus, is but a part of a bigger whole. (We might note that the Polish word 'współżycie' /literally: 'co-life' or 'co-living'/ which is normally used as a polite name for sexual intercourse aptly renders this intuition.) The importance of such 'completeness' may be also regarded as a final element in another chain of explanations.

And third. The erotic sphere seems to be the sphere in which the need for 'intimacy', 'closeness', overcoming the interpersonal 'distance' finds its natural satisfaction. Physical 'closeness' is by no means a sufficient condition for perfect 'intimacy'. Yet, it is, little if any doubt might be raised, a necessary condition. I would say that only through the medium of the acting in harmony: spoken language, and language of the body, the 'distance' between to individuals can be overcome. And this point leads us to a problem which will be debated in the next point.

Let's note still the problem put by Elster: "Certain forms of love illustrate the nonstandard case. As traditionally conceived, love can be strengthened only if required, because the goal of the lover is to be loved in return. In Racine's Andromaque Hermione asks the rhetorical question 'Je t'aimais inconstant, qu'aurais-je fait fidele?' Clearly, the implied answer is that her love would then have been even stronger. Modern writers often give the opposite answer. Julien Sorel's relation to Mathilde de la Mole in Le rouge et le noir or the narrator's relation to Albertine in A la recherche du temps perdu, is like a seesaw; when one is high, the other is low; love required is love extinguished."

Elster,1989: 68 Is the Hermiones' 'love' and 'love' of Sorel the same type of attitude (emotion...). This question seems to be important for our understanding of the role played by the Others in our lives.

I would like to end this section with three citations: from Marx, Sartre, and Marcuse. In one of his 1844 Manuscripts Marx speaks about man-woman relation: "This relation also demonstrates, to what degree the need for man has become a human need, thus to what degree other man has for him become needed as a man." [Marks&Engels,1962:576] And Sartre insisted that each us of might say, on the basis of his own experience, "what of love and desire can be contained in pity, admiration, disgust, envy, gratitude, etc." [ibidem,407] Speaking about anthropology of sex/eroticism, we should not forget that Herbert Marcuse might have been right while declaring in 1966: "the struggle for life, the struggle for the case of Eros, is today a political struggle." [Marcuse,1998:18]

4.3.3.3. As already suggested in the passage on 'intimacy', we should move now from the problem eroticism, to the those of loneliness, interpersonal 'communion', and the like. These two areas overlap, of course, considerably. Yet, neither any of them can be regarded as element of the other, nor they can be regarded as identical. Thus, separate section devoted to them.

According to an opinion, loneliness is - in a sense - impossible: 'Man is so much a social being that he can never be totally lonely. If he is alone, his dreams are getting filled with various actual and fictional figures, pleasing or not pleasing. Even in night-dreams, the experienced images are filled with men of various kind. The same concerns schizophrenia; in spite of his autism, the ill is never lonely.' [Kępiński,1975:130] This remark is much telling. Nevertheless, we are looking for an 'encounter' with real, live human being.

And the being-live is not enough. To quote Sartre once again: "if the beloved is transformed into an automaton, the lover finds himself alone. Thus the lover does not desire to posses the beloved as one possesses a thing; he demands a special type of appropriation. He wants to possess freedom as freedom." [Sartre,1989:367]

The phenomenon in question is difficult to be grasped. Thus, I will be taking points of observation. On this way, perhaps, I may come closer the very heart of this phenomenon.
Therefore, another quote - this time from the great Mexican writer Octavio Paz. In his "Dialectics of Loneliness," he speaks: "In a moment of their lives, all the men feel alone, still more: all men are lonely. To live - means to separate from that man we once were and to penetrate that one we will be, the future one being always strange. Loneliness is the ultimate background of the human condition. Man is the sole being that feels alone, and the sole one which is an objective of 'other's being quests. His nature - if we can speak of nature with respect to man, that being which discovered itself just at the moment when is said 'nay' to the - Nature - consists in attempting at self-realization in the other. Man is the yearning and searching for communion /.../ feeling alone has a double meaning: on one hand, it consists in the having self-awareness; on the second, - in the desire to go out of oneself." [Paz, 207-8]

From this description on, we could go even further. We could, for instance, approach the philosophy of Nietzsche. Or, at least, some elements of it. - According to an interpretation, in Nietzsche's philosophy "Dionisius symbolized man's unity with life where his own individuality is absorbed in the larger reality of the life force, whereas Apollo was the symbol of the 'principle of individuation', that power that controls and restraints the dynamic process of life in order to create a formed work of art or a controlled personal character." [Stumpf,1993:423] The Nietzschean perspective suggests that the "to"-orientation may be a part of a broader phenomenon, which might be characterized as "Dionysian tendency" - tendency toward 'going outside', toward plunging into the 'life', 'world' etc. This perspective, with all its significance, directs our attention towards regions rather different from those being of interest for action-oriented anthropology. Thus, let's come back into more 'prosaic' landscape.

Some more sociological in style considerations are there. For instance - Marx's. In one of his Manuscripts, he describes (perhaps somewhat ideistically, but it is not statistics which matters here) a process of community-making: "When the communist artisans unite, learning, propaganda etc. are - first of all - their aim. But, at the same time, it results in a new need, the need of community, and what is to be a means becomes an end. /.../ Smoking, drinking, eating, etc. are no more the means of uniting, the means producing social ties. Community, union, and talking - the aim of which is community again - it is sufficient for them." [Marks&Engels,1962:598]

This Marxian description harmonizes with the remark of Simmel, who stresses that "the making of society is in itself a value" [Simmel,1975:55]. Still more specific convergence is to be noted: "in the social life, speaking becomes a goal in itself, not in the sense of cultural/social anthropology) studies. He is speaking about small communities living on a very low level of technology and economy. He observes that "their magnitudes varies from forty to two hundred and fifty members. When the magnitude of a population goes beyond the minimum, the community...vanishes; when it goes over the maximum, it splits. /.../ One has to admit that more profound reasons, of social and moral character, stabilize the number of individuals who are to live together within the range of population optimum." [Levi-Strauss,1993:461] And a practical, political conclusion is drawn: "In opposition to Rousseau, who wanted to destroy in the State any partial community, the reconstruction of such communities is the last means for bringing some health and force back to the ill liberties." [ibidem:462]

To demonstrate the complexities of the issue, let's note that Rousseau is viewed - quite rightly I believe - as a forefather of socialism, or at least - of some its currents, the mainstream including. And about socialism, it was said that its psychological force "goes...on the one side from the conceptual rationalism, on the other side - from the dark, possibly atavistic, instincts of community". [Simmel,1975:101].

This latter line of argumentation is continued by Hayek. He emphasizes that "freedom is an artifact of civilization which liberated him [scil. the man] from the ties of small group; even the chief had once to be submissive to its changing moods. Freedom has become possible due to the gradual evolution of the civilized discipline, which is at the same time the discipline of freedom. Being based upon impersonal and abstract rules, it protects man against arbitrary violence on the part of others and provides each individual with the possibility of making for himself a protected sphere in which no one is allowed to intervene and within which man can apply his knowledge for his own goals." [Hayek,nd.:87]

We passed from the problems of sex and eroticism to those of loneliness and community. And now, we are to move further: from intimate interpersonal contacts to its more general form, of which a sight of a unknown passer-by might be an instance.

We could (and, in fact, should) go even still further - to the relations with the unknown Others which do not involve any direct physical contact. In our-days civilization, such relations seem to be of particular importance (due to the mass media), though, in earlier days, they did exist too.

In those relations manifest themselves such phenomena as desire for being famous, popular, or - simply 'known', even if for criminal acts. In other words, people often want to be 'relevant'. If they cannot, for whatever reason, be relevant in a 'positive' way, they may accept the 'negative' way: it were better to be loved, but if being-loved is impossible, then it is better to be hated (feared of, etc.) than to 'not-exist' socially. Such a phenomenon, if it actually exists, may be of some sociological importance; it may contribute (to a degree of course, probably not to a great one, yet not negligible).

To make a step further, let's think again about various 'stars' of mass-media (assume that money is not the single force which operates in this domain). It is often said that they play a role on a stage. Thus, we couldavail here of the metaphor of theater. As R. Dahrendorf once wrote, the Shakespeare's metaphor (the world is a theater, and people are actors) "has today become the central principle of the science of society". Central or not, surely important. And - useful: it directs our attention towards three different though related phenomena.
First, we can locate the theater metaphor in the context of the concept of strategic action, in particular - oriented at some 'material' (e.g. financial) goals. One can try to 'trap' his partner, pretending friendship, cheating him, seducing etc. These phenomena should be studied also in the context of the cognition-of-the-Other. - However important, they are not at the focus here.

Second. The concept of theater is related to those of tradition, social roles, ritual etc. These issues will be discussed below at two places - in a 'pragmatical' sub-chapter devoted to the problem of personal identity (6.3.), and also in the last chapter - in the context of so-called 'Althusserian' anthropologies.

It is the third area which matters here. I think here of a phenomenon which might be called 'social theater' being played 'for its own sake'. In other words, we leave aside, say, the situation in which someone plays the role of a 'good friend', since he tries to get some information of importance for his business. And we leave there also the situation in which a professor plays the role of 'stern teacher' simply because he believes that 'one should behave so'.

What, then, is here the point? I'd say that the desire for being 'in the center of the social stage', for being applauded and admired, for being 'known' and even 'famous' - this desire defines the area in question. Perhaps in this area, or close to it, we could locate also problems studied by Veblen (so-called 'conspicuous consumption') or - by Packard (status-seeking).

We may have arrived here at a paradox. We started from the value of intimacy (closeness, relatedness...), and - step by step - we reached the value of theatrical self-presentation; the latter being an epitome of 'artificiality'. And 'artificiality' seems to be at the very opposite side of the spectrum of inter-human relations.

This paradox may be apparent. It indicates the ambiguity of the concept of the Other, and this ambiguity is derivative of the ambiguity of the concept of man. This ambiguity is not only the matter of analytical precision. It is not to be overcome by simple specifications. This ambiguity reflects a fundamental fact: people 'see' (constitute, to use the phenomenological language) their fellowmen differently.

On the one side, the Other may be almost identical with a live body which is, say, pretty, emitting nice sounds, gentle and warm when touched... On the other side, the Other is a 'moral person', of whose judgments - approvals and disapprovals, are us of great positive or negative value. - For instance, the famous economist and philosopher, Friedrich A. von Hayek, stresses that 'ethics is not a matter of choice. And it is not excluded that the fear of our neighbors' frowning and of other manifestations of their disapproval is our only inherited trait.' [Hayek, nd.:80] (Incidentally, it may be noted that the knowledge-values problem, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter manifests itself in a special form.)

We don't have to go so far. Perhaps the Other as the 'attitudes-assuming' being is he who plays the fundamental role for (most) people. If it were so, we should expect that, though 'being-loved' is usually much more preferred than 'being-hated', people prefer 'being-hated' than being treated with perfect indifference.

If this were true, we could say that human beings want to be subjects and that they draw their sense of subject-ness from the attitudes of the Others.

I would say that we have arrived to a conception which is just opposite to the Sartre's theory of the Other (or - its interpretation, perhaps somewhat simplified). It should be then useful to present the latter in a brief form.

That we are speaking about Sartre's theory of the Other just now is not incidental. I should remember you that Sartre commences his analysis of the Other not from any complex interpersonal relation but - from the simplest one: from a relation which is being snuck up during even the most transient contact. It is not incidental that a whole (and quite long) sub-chapter is about The Look. It is impossible to mention all the important elements of the theory in question; only a few points will be invoked.

Let's start from Sartre's characteristic of the relation he calls "being-seen-by-another", it "represents an irreducible fact which cannot be deduced either from the essence of Other-as-object, or from my being-as-subject. On the contrary, if the concept of the other-as-object is to have any meaning, this can be only as the result of the conversion and the degradation of that original relation. In a word, my apprehension of the Other in the world as probably being a man refers to my permanent possibility of being-seen-by-him; that is, to the permanent possibility that a subject who sees me may be substituted for the object seen by me. 'Being-seen-by-the-Other' is the truth of 'seeing-the-Other.'" [Sartre, 1989: 257]

The importance of this relation reveals itself in the phenomenon of shame. And as Sartre underscores, "shame is shame of oneself before the Other; these two structures are inseparable" [ibidem:222] But, on the other hand, "I can be ashamed only as my freedom escapes me in order to become a given object." [ibidem:261] This accords with the Sartre's declaration: "I grasp the Other's look at the very center of my act as the solidification and alienation of my own possibilities." [ibidem:263] And, in a similar vein: "The Other's look touches me across the world and is not only a transformation of myself but a total metamorphosis of the world. I ma looked-at in a world which is looked-at. In particular the Other's look, which is a look-looking and not a look-looked-at, denies my distances from objects and unfolds its own distances." [ibidem:269]

While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other tries to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me. We are by no means dealing with unilateral relations with an object-in-itself, but with reciprocal and moving relations. [...] Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others." [ibidem:364]

At this moment, we should be able to juxtapose two views concerning the role of the Other: the one which concluded the considerations on the metaphor of theater and that of Sartre. In a simplified form, the respective views might be put thus:


From these two theses we can obtain an important anthropological question:

Q12 What is the relation between agent's subject-ness and the Other's existence?

And starting anew from this question, we might explore the area of possible answers. Besides these two considered, there may be some others. In particular, more systematic attention should be given to a thesis which would claim for a 'paradoxical' character of the 1-Other relations. Such a thesis should assume that both Sartrian and anti-Sartrian theses are, in sense, true. (It may be that what I've called here 'Sartrian-thesis' is in fact a schematic summary of his views; more elaborated one should be more 'dialectical' also; Sartre, after all, followed Hegel's 'Master-Slave' dialectic. But I am not engaged in historical analyses but in model-building of a sort.) Their apparently contradictory character may reflect the real 'contradictoriness' of these relations.

### 4.3.4. On multitude of the Others

In one of the previous point, I have defined egoism and alternative attitudes assumed by individuals towards the other people. These definitions are of 'parameter' character; they
define someone's attitude in relation to a given partner. Such a definition seems to be somewhat counter-intuitive: Intuitively, we tend to think of our fellow-men as being merely 'egoists' or 'altrists', without any parameters being introduced. In particular, when we discussed either Nowak's or Schopenhauer-Wolniewicz's model, we tacitly assumed a hidden assumption: the set of people is, from the point of view of the given individual, homogenous - all people are, for him, 'identical'.

This discrepancy between intuition and the formal definition need not to be seen as very serious: We could generalize these definitions by adopting the following scheme:

\[ [*] \text{ 'X is a/n (...) person.' iff 'For any Y, X is a/n (...) person with respect to Y.' (The words 'egoist', 'malicious' etc. are to be put, respectively, into the blank places.)} \]

At the first sight, this scheme seems to reconcile intuition and formal definitions. This need not to be so. The simple logical operation of binding the parameter with the general quantifier is not so obvious as it might appear at the first glimpse. It is not obvious even from the formal point of view: it is not evident that this definition is not internally inconsistent. Still less obvious is it from more substantial, specifically anthropological point of view: the various stances concerning the admissibility of such definitions represent various anthropological conditions.

To be more precise, the \[*\] scheme can be easily adopted in the case of egoism. In fact, the assumption that nobody's axiological structure is represented in the X does not result in any analytical troubles.

Some serious difficulties arise when the representability - specially one defining compassion or malice is assumed. In a less formal language we could formulate this difficulty thus. It is obvious that a perfect saint (resp. wicked person) prefers the good (resp. the evil) of his fellowman to his own. But what about the situation when there are not two but three parties involved? Specially, if the situation is so that our saint (or 'anti-saint') cannot maximize at once the good (evil) for both partners?

The first intuition suggests that when there are two (or more) partners, pure compassion and pure malice should be impossible. A dose of justice should be necessary. That sounds good, the point is that justice is also not so unproblematic as it might appear.

4.3.4.1. In analyzing these difficulties, we could avail of the studies of 1972 Nobel Prize winner (in economics) Kenneth J. Arrow, and of his followers. I mean the vast area of investigations opened in 1951 with Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values. This area lies in the border-territory of economics and political science and political philosophy. The various methods by which social choices can be made are being studied in this area. At the first sight, the relation between studies on democracy, market, dictatorship and convention on the one side and the individual's behavior on the other, they may be viewed as linked, yet in rather complex and indirect way. And this is true, in a sense. Yet, there is - in my opinion - a more close relation. Let's see why it should be so.

In Arrow's words, "the methods of voting and the market are methods of amalgamating the tastes of many individuals in the making of social choices". [Arrow,1964:2] Put aside the beginning and the end of this proposition, take only the middle part of it - the conception of the "methods of amalgamating the tastes of many individuals". Not only societies, and other social groupings, need such methods. Individuals do too: Let's figure a father who has five sons born on the same day. Let's assume that these boys are sufficiently young so that their father has decisive say in making choices concerning them; let's assume - in a complementary way - that they are sufficiently old so that they have their own crystallized preferences, and that these preferences differ. My claim is that this father (and, in general, any individual in a similar position) faces the same problem which a group of equal adults would face. More generally, the problem arises in the case of the making-decision which will result in an act bringing about some consequences relevant for a number of peoples (the syntactical concept of the 'cluster' of co-act actions has its natural application here).

We could say this also thus: individual-decision concerning a group of people is - in some respects - equivalent with group-decision concerning this very group.

To be more specific, let me quote the 'General Possibility Theorem'. It says that: 'If there are at least three alternatives which the members of the society are free to order in any way, then every social welfare function satisfying [some] conditions...and yielding a social ordering satisfying [some] axioms... must be either imposed or dictatorial." [ibidem]

In other words put, this theorem states that the conditions claiming for non-imposed and non-dictatorial character of social welfare function are not consistent with three other conditions put on such a function. These conditions are rather natural, though their precise mathematical formulation is somewhat complex (thus I shall quote only the intuitive formulations).

The first condition is expressed non-formally thus: "every logically possible set of individual orderings of a certain set S of three alternatives can be obtained from some admissible set of individual orderings of all alternatives." [ibidem:25]

The second condition postulates that social ordering should respond "positively to alternations in individual values or at least not negatively. Hence, if one alternative social state rises or remains still in the ordering of every individual without any other change in those orderings, we expect that it rises, or at least does not fall, in the social ordering." [ibidem:25]

The third condition, is characterized by Arrow as "the independence of irrelevant alternatives", and formulated intuitively thus: "the choice made by society from a given environment depend only on the ordering of individuals among the alternatives in that environment. Alternatively stated, if we consider two sets of individual orderings such that, for each individual, his ordering of those particular alternatives in a given environment are the same each time, then we require that the choice made by society from the environment be the same when individual values are given by the first set of orderings as they are when given by the second." [ibidem:26-27]

Other complexities are to be also considered. Let's avail of the famous example discussed by Sartre in his Existentialisme est une humanisme. Sartre tells us a story of a young man who, during the Nazi occupation, demanded from the philosopher a moral advice. The young man's father "was on bad terms with his mother, and, moreover, was inclined to be a collaborationist; his older brother had been killed in the German offensive of 1940, and the young man...wanted to avenge him. .../ The boy was faced with the choice of leaving for England and joining the Free French Forces...or remaining with his mother" [Sartre,1962:595] In Sartre's view, this young man "was faced with two very different kinds of action; one, concrete, immediate, but concerning only one individual; the other concerned with an incomparably vaster group, a national collectivity, but for that very reason was dubious, and might be interrupted en route." [ibidem:596] In a language of
ethics, it was a choice between "an ethics of sympathy, of personal devotion" and "a broader ethics, but one whose efficacy was more dubious" [ibidem].

4.3.4.2. Both the formal general analysis of Arrow and Sartre's "case-study" seem to lead to one conclusion. Except for a perfect egoist, and except for a person involved in an isolated dyadic relation, it is impossible to assume the same attitude toward all fellowmen. And since most relations are not isolated, then it seems to be necessary that everybody (except for a perfect egoist) should differentiate in a way all his fellowmen.

The just stated 'impossibility-thesis' is of negative character. It allows for a variety of 'combinations' of attitudes. Therefore we could formulate the following question:

**[Q13]** What are possible and actual 'combinations' of attitudes towards Others?

Developing the second ('necessity') thesis, I will be trying to depict the structure of what might be called 'individual's social world'. To avoid possible misunderstandings, the following reservation is to be made. It is rather non-controversial that any man defines (more or less consciously) a classification of his fellowmen.

It is a matter of debate (between, say, Mead's interactionism and Parsons' functionalism), which social relations are more important: 'conscious' or 'unconscious'. Fortunately, we do not have to be involved in those debates: our sole aim at this moment is to describe some possible subjective categorizations of which plays a role in direct determination of the Other-oriented actions.

One of (if not - just the) most fundamental classification/s of the individuals can be, in my opinion, defined thus. Any individual categorizes other people either in a 'general' way or in a 'particular' one. This distinction is based on a classification of attributes of any individual. I assume that attributes of any individual (probably of any object; if we'd like to develop this remark, we should involve into the debate over 'external' and 'internal' properties; this is impossible here) can be divided into two classes of: the class of the inherent attributes and that of the relational ones. (It might be added that the precision and 'sharpness' the dichotomy of the ways of categorization depends on the related traits of the dichotomy of the 'inherent' and 'relational' attributes.)

The class of inherent attributes includes these attributes that are conceptually independent from any social relations. The word 'conceptually' is important here. For instance, the height of any individual is an attribute which is inherent: it can be measured physically; but the quality of nourishment and health care (and these depend on socio-economic conditions of life) may co-determine the height of a man, thus it may depend on social relations substantially (materially).

The relational attributes comprises these attributes that are defined in the terms of social relations. To be someone's parent, sister or child - these are examples of the relational attributes.

It might be noted that individuals which are categorized 'generally' can be identified with their proper names (assume that each individual has his own proper name; this might be assured by availing of sufficiently long proper name, one including - for instance - first names of parents, grand-parents etc.). Individuals categorized 'particularly' are determined by general terms (such as 'honest', 'intelligent' etc.).

These considerations are rather formal and dry. Let's formulate now the main intuition which motivates introduction of this dichotomy. Start with the example of maternal love. About this type of love the following thesis might be formulated: Any mother (some would add: normal, in order to exclude some cases regarded as 'pathological', and statistically unimportant) loves her child unconditionally. In Fromm's words, it should be so that 'motherly love is like an act of grace; if it is there, it is a blessing - if it is not there it cannot be created. [...] The relationship to father, on the other hand, can be controlled. He wants the son to grow up, to take responsibility, to think, to build; or/and to be obedient, to serve father, to be like him. Whether father's expectations are more or on development or more on obedience; the son has the chance to acquire father's love, to produce father's affection by doing the desired things.' [Fromm, 1969:49-50]

Interestingly, similar observations had been made by Scheler: "To the 'maternal love' corresponds no 'paternal love'. For man's love to his own child is much more determined by his love to the mother who bore the child, than mother's love to her child is determined by the love to his father; it is much more strongly determined by the particular figure and character of the child." [Scheler, 1980: 265-266] (Personally, in particular - as a father, I wouldn't agree with Scheler; but the validity of this thesis doesn't matter here. Scheler's thesis is an answer to a 'hidden' question which is, in my opinion, of great significance).

Reading this thesis radically, we'd say that ('normal') mother, but not - father, will love her child even if - to give a very extreme example - he becomes one day a Nero, a Hitler or a Pol Pot. Fromm may be right, may be not. It is not my task to try to solve this problem. But his formulation allows to convey the intuition in question.

We could add still the following formulation. An individual can see some other people in the perspective of their virtues and vices (as being defined by this individual). And he can see some other people irrespective of their virtues and vices.

And yet another approach might be outlined. We could consider a rule that might be called 'rule of individual's identification'. A man is identical (from the point of view of another man) acting toward him) with the set of his/her actions. In some models of human actions this rule holds, and in some others it does not.

The description of the following possible situation might illustrate intuitions I am trying to transmit here. Someone learns that man whom he has believed to be his father actually is not. The set of actions performed by the adoptive-father remains unchanged. But the attitude of the adoptive-son may radically change. We could speak here about (reversed) Oedipus phenomenon - (its actuality seems, in my eyes, to be more plausible than that of Freudian Oedipus complex.)

Take now another aspect of the attitudes toward the Others. I mean the way in which the Other 'is given' to the individual. Starting from the simplest - and, otherwise, profoundly philosophically involved - classification, we could say that the Other can be 'given' either 'directly' or 'indirectly'.

We could further assume that the Other is given 'directly' in the face-to-face relations. Interestingly, the concept of 'face-to-face relation' links (empirical) sociology and philosophy. Even if this link is somewhat superficial, it is - nevertheless - telling. And it may be but need not to be so.

In particular, in a Z. Bauman's these two perspectives converge in an interesting way. In his fundamental book on *Modernity and the Holocaust*, he is analyzing the role of "making the victims invisible" [Bauman, 1991:50] He stresses that the invisibility of the 'taught' people played an important role in the famous Milgram's experiment. He demonstrates how the tendency toward eliminating the victims from the sight of the oppressors played a significant role "in the permanent process of improving the technology of Holocaust." [ibidem] These are not incidental remarks but some conclusions from a theoretical vision which is summarized in the following passage:

"Responsibility, this corner stone of moral behavior, is the result of the proximity of the Other. Proximity means responsibility, and responsibility is proximity. To debate what
is the first were unproductive. The destruction of responsibility, and thus the neutralization of the moral drive which results from it, must necessarily lead to (is in fact a synonym of) replacing proximity with physical or spiritual separation. The alternative of proximity is social distance. Moral attribute of proximity is responsibility; moral attribute of social distance is lack of moral reaction or xenophobia. If proximity erodes, responsibility is suppressed; on its place may appear aversion, since a close subject has been replaced with the Other. The process of transformation consists in separation. It was just separation which made possible that thousands of people killed and millions were looking at without any protest. It is the technology and administration of the modern rational society which made this separation possible. [ibidem:254]

(We should note that Bauman takes a position as to an important anthropological issue, but also indicates its wide historiosophical context.)

Let's stay still with the problem of 'invisibility' of the Other. A quote from The Culture of Narcissism, should cast some light on another aspect of this problem. While considering our predicament, Lash formulates the following observation: "To live for a moment is the prevailing passion - to live for yourself, not for your predecessors or posterity. We are fast losing the sense of historical continuity, the sense of belonging to a succession of generations originating in the past and stretching into the future. It is the waning of the sense of historical time - in particular, the erosion of any strong concern for posterity - that distinguishes the spiritual crisis of the seventies from earlier outbreaks of millennial religion, to which it bears." [Lasch,1979:30]. The quote both indicates an important anthropological issue and points at its social and historical relevance.

To make the issue more acute, let's divide all people into three groups: predecessors (here: those who have already died), successors (here: those who are not yet born), and the contemporaries. There is little doubt that we assume some attitudes not only toward our contemporaries but also toward our predecessors and successors. For instance, one can feel (and, in result, actually to be) bound with a promise given to a dead person. Sometimes, fulfilling such a promise needs a lot of effort; nevertheless, some people do their best in order to bring into reality what was promised. And taking other temporal direction, people often try to secure the future of their not-yet-born children or grandchildren.

In a sense, the second case is still more interesting than the former. If we speak about attitudes toward people who died we speak any way about attitudes toward 'concrete' individuals. But if the attitudes are oriented towards those who will be born in the future, then we can think only of 'abstract' individuals. Abstract in this particular sense that being even not of any determined sex. The only determined attribute is the relative one: being the child of X.

Let me complement these considerations with some additional brief remarks. First, we could note that all the 'pure' attitudes, distinguished after Schopenhauer and Wolniewicz, are most clearly defined when the attitudes towards the unknown people are considered. Pure' compassion and 'pure' malice (and 'pure' justice, too) are best comprehensible if the partner is not known to the agent.

Second, following Margolis, we could speak of the puzzle of "voluntary contributions to the supply of a public good". [Margolis,1982:tx]

We could consider (as also Margolis does) the example of voting in a parliamentary election, when there is no control, direct or indirect, of the participation. Even if the results may be of real practical importance for the voter (what is not obvious), the probability that his single vote will be decisive is extremely small. Thus, following the principle of rationality, many individuals (not all: weather may be good and line to the ballot-box is short, then also the 'costs of voting' are very small and it 'pays' to go to vote) should not vote. Yet, some of them do.

And still more. Much more. There are those who engaged themselves in patriotic or revolutionary activity, in activity that could have been terminated with death, tortures, prison. And I mean those who enjoyed material well-being and also a large scope of individual freedom. (It has been noted that utilitarianism, if interpreted not as political philosophy but as a rule of individual conduct, calls for a rather heroic - and surely: non-egoistic - attitude.)

Third. However respect-deserving heroic attitudes may be, also this coin has its other side. There is an ironic statement formulated in relation to some 'social activists'. It says that they 'so much love mankind (or a nation, or a class...) that they forget to love any single person'.

Is it possible that someone really cares for foreign people and does not pay any attention to the needs of his nearest persons (parents, children...). It may be that such a phenomenon is a special case of self-delusion. But such an interpretation may also be applied to attitudes of some women toward their children. I mean those women that seem to love (= to be fond of) their own self-images as 'devoted, all-sacrificing mothers' more than their children.

We could risk here the following, rather general, thesis: The 'social world' of any individual is not homogeneous.

This statement seems to be little controversial. It calls not so much for alternatives (it has but one alternative: perfect-homogeneity thesis) as for alternative concretizations and alternative complementation. In particular, we should ask for alternative theories accounting for the heterogeneity of the individual 'social worlds'.

Trying to answer to this demand, let's refer first to Ortega y Gasset. According to this thinker, love is ex definitione a creator of hierarchy dividing people into the close and the further". [Ortega y Gasset,1980:142].

This is a rather weak form of a dichotomy which plays, in view of some thinkers, an important role in the interpersonal relations. Quoting some Plessner's words, we may introduce a much stronger form of this dichotomy: "Man as force...remains of necessity in the situation of fighting for it, i.e. in opposition between closeness and strangeness, between the friend and the foe." And in a still stronger formulation, the relation "friend-foe is conceived...in its belonging to the essential constitution of man." [Plessner,1994:68].

Why this relation should be so essential? In Plessner's, summarized, opinion - due to the fundamental importance of the phenomenon of strangeness. And putting it in a more elaborate way, and in his own words: "The common view interprets this phenomenon as a protective means, reducing it to the fear of loses or to an enterprise oriented at enlarging the sphere of one's own power. /.../ The cause of the permanent formation of the horizon of closeness is the fear or sense of oppression, which do belong to the essential attributes of man, and which result in the enemy reaction in the form of counter-attack. But this fear is rooted in the weird character of strangeness, and not in its possibly affecting one's sphere of closeness; the strange is not simply the different."[Plessner,1994:69]

Thus, in Plessner view (similar, to a degree, to that of Gombrowicz - presented in his 'thought experiment'), the phenomenon of 'strangeness' calls for more systematic description. His own one runs thus: "the strange is the one's own, close and familiar - but in something different and as something different and therefore - let's recall one of the Freud's discoveries - it is the weird. If it might be formulated thus: man sees 'himself' not only in his 'here', but also in the 'there' of this what is different. The sphere of closeness is not, of its very nature, limited and does not spread (as if ahistorically) up to a limit, but it is
open and thus it reveals to the man the weird character of the strangeness in the inconceivable intersection of the own and the strange. From this weirdness and strangeness, man is not liberated even by the conception of manhood." [Plessner, 1994:70]

A thesis, being very similar to that of Plessner, is formulated in a work of the father of sociobiology. (This, for instance, convergence is, in my view, one of the arguments that should support the 'Lovejoyian' view of theories I am trying to develop in the present work.) In the essay On Human Nature, E. Wilson says: "In all the life-periods, there occurs a tendency towards dichotomizing, towards including the other people into two categories with artificially sharpened boundaries. We seem to feel well only when we are able to mark the whole part of the human kind beyond us as members and non-members, relatives and strangers, friends and foes." [Wilson, 1987:104]

It seems to me that we can, prima facie at least, distinguish two different positions as to the structure of the 'individual's social world'. One position, which can be related to the ideas of Plessner and Wilson, claims for the fundamental role of the differentiation of the social world. In particular, for the simplest differentiation - dichotomy. Another position might be related to the Sartre's anthropology. Sartrian variant of the master-slave dialectics seems to regard the differentiation among the Others as secondary factor, at best, in comparison to the structure of individual-Other relation.

Let us try now to locate this issue in a broader context. First anthropological, then-sociological. As regards anthropology, we can pass - almost instantly - problem of the 'individual social world' tot that of 'love' (in the common-language sense, in which the notion of compassion and that of desire is conflated, perhaps not incidentally).

We might start from the following, quite natural - I'd even say: self-imposing question: Can one love some persons profoundly and, at the same time, hate others - with equal power? (I leave deliberately this question in this crude form. Further analysis should allow us to make it more precise.) As an answer to this question, we can read the following considerations of Fromm:

"Exclusive love is a contradiction in itself. To be sure, it is not accidental that a certain person becomes the 'object' of manifest love. The factors conditioning such a specific choice are too numerous and too complex to be discussed here. The important point, however, is that love for a particular 'object' is only the actualization and concentration of lingering love with regard to one person; it is not, as the idea of romantic love would have it, that there is only the one person in the world whom one can love, it is that the great chance of one's life to find the person, and that love for him results in a withdrawal from all others. The kind of love which can be experienced with regard to one person demonstrates by the very fact that it is not love but a sado-masochistic attachment. The basic affiliation contained in love is directed toward the beloved person as an incarnation of essentially human qualities. Love for one person implies love for man as such. Love for man as such is not, as it is frequently supposed to be, an abstraction coming 'after' the love for a specific person, or an enlargement of the experience with a specific 'object'; it is its premise, although, genetically, it is acquired in the contact with concrete individuals." [Fromm, 1969:135-136]

In the context of his analysis of the modern inter-human relations, Fromm formulates the following thesis on love: "The superficial character of human relationships leads many to hope that they can find depth and intensity of feeling in individual love. But love for one person and love for one's neighbor are indivisible; in any given culture, love relationships are only a more intense expression of the relatedness to man prevalent in that culture. Hence it is an illusion to expect that the loneliness of man rooted in the marketing orientation can be cured by individual love." [Fromm, 1967:82]

Fromm's thesis is by no means a trivial comment; quite contrarily, it is a strong thesis which can be false. Thus, I want now to list a number of observations and ideas upon which some 'concrete' negations of Fromm's thesis can be formulated.

Commence with the phenomenon of, let's say it so, egotistic love. In grasping it, avail of a literary description. In Musil's Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, the emotions - aroused by a woman, who was his friend (still from her childhood) but not a mistress - of Ulrich, the title hero of the novel, are described thus: "In fact, she seemed to him not nice only once, when she and Walter had got married. Then, she manifested that unpleasant egotism-in-the-two which often makes the wives - young, ambitious, being-in-love with their husbands - so unbearable for other men." [Musil, 1971(i):65]

From the literary description, we can move to real-life phenomena. I mean here, in particular, some facts concerning prominent Nazi criminals. To take some concrete examples, we could speak of Eichmann (as presented by H. Arendt in her Eichmann in Jerusalem), or of Stroop (depicted in Moczrski's Rozmowy z katem [Talks with the executioner]). These individual portraits could be supplemented with some historical-psychological studies of Gestapo- or SS-men. Both the studies of individuals and the analyses of groups seem to convey a simple though strange and astounding message: there can and do exist people who love their parents and spouses, children and relatives, and who are able to participate in genocide.

From these, rather extreme examples, let's return to the less dramatic area of everyday life. According to K. Horney, "it is not important if people in general like us, it is important whether some of them like us - those whom we like, those with which we have to live or work...Neurotics feel and behave as if their whole existence, happiness and safety depended on their being generally liked, or not." [Horney, 1982:89] In short, to be looking for being loved by all men means to manifest some elements of neurosis. And complementarily, a 'normal' (sane) man should be satisfied with loving a few persons and being loved by them.

We could ask a similar question. Is it possible that someone assumes the attitude of malice toward all people without exception? Such a hypothesis is logically possible; substantially, it is not implausible. But, of course, other options may be taken. Perhaps the stories about this or that big criminal who loved his mother or a child are not only a part of humanist ideology; perhaps they convey a grain of truth about the human soul? If so, a thesis claiming that every man tends to love at least one other human being would be a true anthropological proposition.

And now, a few words on some sociological implications of the anthropological problems we've just debated.

First, I want to refer to a book of a known American political scientist. In his The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, hot debated some years ago, S. Huntington maintains formulates the following thesis: 'The included into civilization 'we', and the staying out of it 'they' - it is the permanent motive of the history of human kind. The differences in the behavior within the civilization and in the external contacts results from the following causes:

1. the sense of superiority (and sometimes, of inferiority) towards the people whom one perceives as being very different;
2. the distrust and fear of such people;
3. the difficulties in communication, resulting from language differences and different norms of behavior;
4. the lack of familiarity with assumptions, motivations, social relation and social practice of other peoples." [Huntington, 1997:181]
Secondly, a quote from the Wilson’s essay should illustrate the sociological relevance of the problem. “=The blood of the martyrs is the semen of the Church.= In the horrifying sentence, Tertullian... uncovered the basic blemish of the human altruism, asserting that the goal of a sacrifice is the extolling of one human group over another.” [Wilson, 1987:189]

Third, returning to the author cited above, we may quote the following thesis: “Each way of associating and establishing communities with the purpose of settling, running economy, love, cultivating a religion, bringing up the offspring, is determined by this relation: foe - friend.” [Plessner, 1994: 69]

Summing the considerations made in this point, we could say that we have studied several possible answers to an anthropological question that seems to belong to the most important ones and might be formulated thus:

\[Q14\] What is (are) the structure(s) of the individual ‘social worlds’?

4.4. On the structure of individual’s axiological system

Among all the semantical problems of anthropology, that of the very ‘systemness’ of the axiological system of a man is one of particular importance. This problem could be also defined as that of ‘interactions’ between values. Some intuitions concerning this area are rather simple, still the task of turning the intuitively sensed problem into clearly formulated question(s) may be not so. Simple or not, it is the task I am going to undertake here.

The following example, taken from an essay of Ortega y Gasset, may orient our intuition. The Spanish philosopher quotes memoirs of his friend which are ‘to shed some light on the geometry of feelings’. These memoirs run thus: “Today, Soledad has left Madrid for a few days. Suddenly Madrid appeared to me as an empty and lifeless city. [...] The geometrical and topographical attributes of Madrid, being the same as always, have lost their importance. For me, the city had once center and peripheries. The house of Soledad was its center and all these places in which Soledad was never seen were its peripheries. In the same way, the people around me were classified according to very subtle criteria of their relation Soledad.” [Ortega y Gasset, 1980:203] In short: Due to the apparently simple fact, a beloved woman having left a city, various axiological qualities of the place seem to have changed.

Or, to give another example, for many persons it holds true that - other factors equal - to obtain more money for a work is better than to obtain less money for this same work. The importance of obtaining ‘good’ pay may or may not vary in relation to other facts of life. It might be that the separation with the beloved person makes someone more sensitive to any other misfortune. But it might be that it makes someone else indifferent to this and others (either positive or negative) occurrences.

These two examples should make it more clear what we are talking about while speaking about ‘systemness’ of a man’s axiological structure. More systematic analysis of this problem will be effectuated in the following steps.

First, a few words will be said on a simple case of the problem of generating values in complex situations.

Second, the problem of hierarchy of values is to be discussed.

In the third step, I will concentrate my attention upon some ‘global’ values, such as happiness, meaningful life, and (positive) self-portrait.

Fourth, I will discuss some ‘societal’ values, such as freedom, and its relation to other values.

Fitfully, availing the metaphor of text, I will discuss the relation between substantial and formal values.

Sixth, following some ideas of S. Kierkegaard and E. Spranger, I will analyze the question of the ‘consistency’ of possible axiological spaces.

And seventh, the broader relevance of these issues will be pointed out.

Putting these issues into an interrogative form, we can note down the following question:

\[Q15\] What is (are) the structure(s) of individual’s axiological system? Or, in other words: How do various preferences of the given individual ‘interact’?

4.4.1. ‘Atomistic’ or ‘non-atomistic’ structure of axiological systems

I would like to start the considerations on the system of values from possibly the simplest issue which can be defined as ‘atomistic’ vs. ‘non-atomistic’ structure of such a system.

The following example should make clear what is here the point. Assume that John prefers all the Mozart’s symphonies to all the Bruckner’s ones. It means that he would prefer a concert in which a Mozart’s symphony were to be performed to a concert in which a Bruckner’s symphony were in the program. Does it mean that he should prefer a concert composed exclusively from Mozart’s works to one containing both Mozart’s and Bruckner’s pieces? I am not so sure. And I suppose that many people would choose Mozart-and-Bruckner concert to one in which the same Mozart’s symphony should be played twice.

On the other hand, the second possibility is not purely abstract. If we have thought about ‘concert’ listened not in a philharmonic hall but at home (from CD’s, radio etc.), we will have to admit that this option is quite real: actually chosen by some people.

However, I would add: some - but few. Still, if we modified the considered example and in the place of Bruckner we put some heavy-metal (or disco-polo, or whatever what standard Mozart’s listener does not like to listen to) piece, we would say - instead ‘few’ virtually all!

Let’s formulate now the problem in general terms. Assuming a relation of preference being fixed and a sequence of identical situations (for instance, the set of CD’s may be the same at any moment of an evening; thus, after a CD has been listened to, a numerically new but substantially identical situation comes into being), we should assume that if a sequence of decisions is being made, then always the same decision is actually made. At least such a conclusion should be, I suppose, derived from the Patryas model.

And this is a possibility that should not be rejected. Quite contrarily, it should be clearly formulated. But of course it is only the simplest possibility. More sophisticated theories are possible, and probably not only possible, but also needed if human behavior is to be correctly described and explained.

Two factors seem to play a role here. First, the length of the sequence. It may be that the decision-maker will return to the most preferred option already in the third step (i.e. after one ‘break’) But it may be that he returns only in the third, fourth...step. Or, never...

And second, the ‘power’ of the values in question. It might be claimed, for instance, that the mechanism described above works if all the possible options are positive but do not work if the second best solution is negative (as it may happen). This would be the weakest thesis. And a stronger one would claim that the mechanism in question works only if the value of all the alternative options is above a ‘threshold’.
Two intuitions could be additionally noted. First, it seems that in some real situations we face the following paradox. On the one hand, an action is possible if being motivated by a sufficiently 'great' goal; be it earning an enormous sum of money, be - obtaining a political position, or visiting a particular place... On the other hand, the goal having been achieved, it gives no satisfaction and loses its motivational power. In other words, it is the very process of acting which is of value in such situations, and not the goal itself.

Second, it may be that no specific 'substantial' value plays the decisive role for an agent but some 'formal' ('aesthetic') values: life is to be 'interesting', 'full of new experiences', 'varied', etc. (This question is to be discussed in more detail below.)

The problem considered here is of importance in some interpersonal relations. Some of us would surely be able to indicate individuals who do love (this word matters here; it should be read with its erotic connotations) their wives or husbands, but who are not able to remain 'faithful' to them, who regularly involve themselves in various 'love affairs', but always come back to their partners.

4.4.2. Aggregation of values: the 'local' case

Situations, even very simple ones, are generally 'multidimensional': there are many aspects of the situation (of any outcome of any act possible in the given situation) which are axiologically relevant. In the terminology adopted in this work, we could say it thus. Performing an act, we usually effectuate a number of various actions. Usually, we are not aware of all those actions. But normally we are aware of a few of them. Therefore, we have to solve a problem of aggregation of values.

In still somewhat different language, we could say that values are usually 'vectors'. The problem is how people compare such vectors, assuming that a preference relation is separately given for each component of them.

To 'have seen' the problem more vividly, consider the value of a concrete situation. Say, mountains wandering. The value of it is a 'sum' of some more elementary values. The aesthetic values of the panoramas (itself not a single value), the sport values of technical difficulties on the trial, the social values of good company....

Or, take into consideration the value of Christmas party. It consists, on the one hand, of the special 'atmosphere' of this evening, the joy of being-together etc. On the other hand, - of the taste and smell of twelve (if Polish tradition is being preserved) dishes... And the gifts we find under the Christmas-tree... The value of the party is of 'vector' character. Could we say that it is a 'sum' of the values of its components?

Or, the following example. Some people are in position to decide whether to live in the country, in a provincial town, or in a big city. Such a decision may be made in view of well defined medical considerations: the proximity of a clinic may decide, or - determining the opposite choice - the healthy 'country air'. Decision of this sort brings neither a new problem nor even a particularly interesting example. But it may also happen that such a decision is being made in view of some more complex values. For instance, someone can prefer 'rural existence' to 'big-city life', and someone else can like best live in small towns (a Cambridge or a Kazimierz nad Wisłą). In such a case, we should probably say that it is 'style of life' or 'way of life' that matters here.

'Style of life' seems to be quite 'global' value. Yet it should not (should not: if this category is not to be a synonym for any other) confounded with that of 'sense of life' or 'set of roles' etc. To follow the above example, we could think of a writer or a mathematician whose professional activity determines his sense of life and who can work both in a New York and a Duszniki. Still, given these assumptions, the choice of the style of life seems to be quite real.

The problem in question is also relevant for interpersonal relations: individuals are complex wholes. Of course, not always the complexity matters. But sometimes, it does. Take the following example. Settling on 'marriage of convenience' (thus marriage in which - in opposition to 'marriage of passionate love' - a sort of 'life-accountancy' is possible), we may take into account the intelligence, appearance, financial situation, eloquence or any other trait of the candidates for the future spouse.

4.4.3. 'Aggregation' of values: the 'global' case

As far as now, I have spoken of values that can be named 'local' since they are relevant in perhaps complex ('multi-dimensional') still particular life-situations. In this section, I would like to shift my attention to the 'global' values, those that concern human life as whole rather than its specific parts.

I am going to start from such familiar and intuitive concepts as happiness, sense of life, and self-portrait. It is quite possible that these notions, as any, taken from ordinary language, cannot be regarded as ready-made categories to be only somewhat theoretically 'polished'. But, at least, they indicate a field to be theoretically explored.

A field which is particularly important in the context of a Sokratesian vision of philosophy oriented at practical life-wisdom. But the issues located in this field are of broader theoretical importance. To sketch it, let me make a reference to a book on the contemporary political philosophy.

In the chapter on utilitarianism, we come across considerations about various standpoints as to the definition of individual welfare (utility). According to the author, we can propose four ways of understanding the concept. In the first one, it may be defined as 'hedonist utility' (sum of pleasures); in the second - as 'non-hedonist psychical utility' (positive psychical sensations are varied and cannot be reduced to pleasure), in the third - as 'satisfying desires' (irrespective of sensations accompanying it), and in the fourth - as 'rational desires' (those based on complete information and right appreciation). In his view, all those stances are compatible with moral and political philosophy of utilitarianism (being alternative concretizations of it). [Kymlicka,1998:22-29]

Quite similar idea can be found in the non-utilitarian philosophy of John Rawls. He invokes a theory of good (ascribed to Aristotle, Kant and Sidgwick) which is to characterize so-called primary goods. They are various: from well-being to self-respect. The basic idea of Rawls' theory is that "the good of the given person is determined by the most rational, long-term plan of his life. Man is happy when he has succeeded, more or less, to realize this plan." [Rawls,1994:133-134]

I think that Kymlicka and Rawls define in a concise way the problem to be discussed below. In this section, I am going to discuss this problem more comprehensively. It may be useful, however, before embarking on more detailed analysis, to restate the problem. I'd say that it may be defined as 'aggregation-problem', or - 'problem of substitution'. These two terms, aggregation and substitution, may be seen as delivering complementary descriptions of the phenomenon (phenomena) in question.

The problem of aggregation can be formulated, perhaps tentatively, as follows. Can 'local values' (values striven-for or actualized in particular situations) be aggregated into 'global values' (being characteristic of more complex situations, the most complex being perhaps - cf. above 'syntactical' considerations - the whole life)? And if they can, in which way or ways, do they happen to be aggregated?
And the problem of substitution can be stated thus. Which values, if any, can be substituted for with other ones? Can, for instance, such a value as 'being loved' be substituted for with the value of 'being famous'? Or with any other value? It should be easily noticeable that the problem of substitution is a part (or other side) of that of aggregation: if any single value could be substituted for with any other value (to be more precise: a degree of value of a type - with a proper degree of value of an other type), then the aggregation problem should have a relatively simple solution. If not, if there existed some not substitutable values, then the problem of aggregation would turn out to be much complex.

Concluding these introductory remarks, let me add that not only in political philosophy but also in economics these questions are of importance. For instance, we can read in history of economic thought that "creators of the theory of marginal utility regarded the existence of a measure of utility as a fact raising no doubts. Menger and Walras never put seriously the problem of measurability of utility. Jevons was the first who objected that utility should be measurable." [Blaug, 1994:338]

Below, I will be considering several concepts that may be regarded as solutions to the problem of global aggregation. These are the following: 'life-as-such', happiness, sense-of-life, self-image (self-portrait). At the very end, their interrelations will be analyzed.

4.4.3.1. I would like to start with a very popular, pre-philosophical idea which nevertheless plays a role in a famous philosophical book. I think of Sein und Zeit and the thesis which says that "It is being (Sein) about which cares the being (Seiende) [i.e. man - W.Cz.]." [Heidegger, 1994:58]

I do agree with Hegel and Camus who regard suicide as a serious philosophical problem. Yet, from more empirical, statistical point of view, it seems trivially true that people (most of them) do care for their lives. One could add - for life-as-such. It does not mean that people do not care much for the quality of their lives. They do. But they are also able to do very difficult things, they are able to stand more than they imagined before, to break many norms, rules and values.

Other way round put, people try to avoid death. They try to delay it as much as possible. Even seriously ill, and old, people - many, perhaps even: most of them - hope to live.

But on the other hand, it is really so that the sheer number of years, months, days...we have already lived through and hope still to live is an important factor actually determining our behavior? If we refer to simple facts, to the conduct of those who quite consciously make - with nicotine, alcohol, cholesterol and whatever else - their lives shorter, we should be hesitating while giving the positive answer.

Another aspect of this problem is presented in Poeppel's words. Following T. Mann's considerations on time (from Zaubberberg), he asks this question: "how long, in fact, do we live? Is the duration of our life to be measured with the calendar years - as it is usually done - or the duration of our life should be measured with what we have experienced (erlebt)? The subjective duration of our previous life...depends on what has come into our consciousness, and then has found its place in our memory." [Poeppel, 1989:56]

We can look at this issue from still another standpoint. Max Scheler quotes (approvingly) the following thesis of W. Sombart: "Each cathedral...each cloister, each medieval city-hall bears witness to the bridge thrown over lives of single men: their construction is being continued through generations who believed in eternal life. Since the individual broke out of the community more durable than he himself, it is the length of his life which is the measure of bliss." [Scheler, 1977:60-61]

In this context, it seems to be rather intriguing that according to the 'economic approach' to the human behavior (developed by G. Becker and others) "there exists an optimal expected duration of life determined by the moment in which the utility of the additional year of life is evaluated as lower than the utility which should renounced while time and other resources being sacrificed in order to assure the additional year." [Becker, 1990:30]

Complete these considerations with the following remark. At a time, it seems to be noteworthy, the question of the value of 'life-as-such', at the first cast of eye - rather academic, played a role in debates on real political issues. A debate on Western Values and Total War, which took in 1961 - on the occasion of Commentary magazine fifteenth anniversary, may serve as a good specimen of this genre. In this debate took part four (five, N. Podhoretz, who was the moderator, including) prominent intellectuals: S. Hook, H. Stuart Hughes, H.J. Morgenthau and P.S. Snow. The threat of thermonuclear war, at that time not illusory, was the starting point of the debate. S. Hook concluded his introductory statement with the following words: "As I read the history of Western culture it seems to me survival at all costs is not among the values of the West. It was Aristotle who said that it is not life as such, or under any conditions, that is of value, but the good life. The free man is one who in certain situations refuses to accept life if it means spiritual degradation. The man who declares survival at all costs is morally dead, because he's prepared to sacrifice all other values which give life it meaning." [Hook et al., 1962:1202]

In more acute form, Podhoretz puts the problem in the question addressed to Morgenthau: "would you rather be red or dead, or neither?" [Ibidem:1203]

Very interestingly, quite similar motives can be heard in the remarks of H. Arendt on Marx's 'place in the history of freedom'. In her view, since Marx, "in opposition to his modern-age predecessors - and in accordance with his ancient teachers - identified necessity with the self-imposing drives of the life-process, he ultimately grounded the most politically fatal doctrine of our time, claiming that life is the utmost good and that life of society is the most important area of human activities. In this way, the role of revolution has consisted not in the liberating people from the suppression of other people but in the liberating the life-process of societies from the constraints of want in such a way that this process should become the source of abundance. Not freedom, but affluence has become now the goal of revolution." [Arendt, 1991b:62-63]

4.4.3.2. Now, happiness. I will commence with the definition of this notion given by W. Tatarkiewicz in his famous treatise. The title category is defined there as "complete and permanent satisfaction with the whole of life". [Tatarkiewicz, 1962:31]

I'd like to comment on this notion thus. First, to make a remark on the relation between the notion of 'rational action' and that of 'happiness'. Let's compare two agents sharing a common axiological perspective. Still, one of them acts strictly according to the principle of rationality (chooses the 'best' acts), the other makes decisions at random. Let's assume additionally that both of them are successful in achieving their (rational in the first case and 'a-rational' in the second) goals. Let's assume then that the only difference between them can be reduced to the differences of the situations they are acting in. Let's assume that the latter is lucky (his situations are most favorable), and the second - unlucky (his situations are extremely unfavorable). Thus, it can happen that the best possible result achievable (and, according to our assumption, achieved) by the rational individual is worse than the worst result achievable by the a-rational individual. If so, the rational agent can be 'unhappy', and the a-rational one, contrarily, quite 'happy'. (It might be noted that this comment has something to do with the problem mentioned in the point 4.2.2. namely that...
of 'axiological zero'. Or, more broadly, it has something to do with the /logical/ weakness
of the relation of preference. It shows that the possibility of quantification - or quasi-
quantification - is not only a matter of precision or empirical verifiability but also of
theoretical importance.)

What is conceptually separated in English, it is confounded in Polish ('szczęście
means both happiness' and 'luck-ness'). These remarks demonstrate that this confusion is
not incidental.

Second. If one is to be satisfied with the whole life, one is to be satisfied (to a
degree) with various parts of one's life. Thus, viewing formally, happiness should be
associated with a function that adds some characteristics of 'local' situations (let's assume
that such quantifiable characteristics are possible). It is rather obvious that different
functions can be considered. To determine in a way the whole class of these functions
would be a general goal of meta-anthropology. Different anthropological standpoints
could be characterized by different subsets of this set.

For now, let's single out some most obvious elements of this set. Incidentally, such
functions deserve perhaps the name of 'life-strategies'. So, what kind of 'life-strategies'
(orientations towards happiness) might be discussed? In my view, at least the following
should be mentioned:

[1] 'integral' (in the mathematical sense of integration) strategy: all positive and negative
elements matter and sum up to produce the general result;
[2] 'maximization' - strategy: the best ('local') situation matters (the known dicton
expresses this strategy: 'to have seen Naples and to die');
[3] 'maximinization' strategy: the worst situations matter: the happier is life the better are
the worst situations in the whole life (in other words: it is a version of risk-avoiding
orientation).

It has been noted that "To ask for the ability to love without being vulnerable to grief
is to ask for the moon, as is the desire to enjoy the euphoria of hope without being
disappointed if the hoped-for events fail to occur." [Elster,1989:67] Following this
observation, we could note that it demonstrates that in some cases 'integral' strategy does
not offer any solution. If we have two possible 'life-scenarios', of identical 'net' happiness
(of identical final trade-off between positive and negative elements), one based on small
'gains' and small 'losses', the other on bigger both 'gains' and 'losses', the 'integral' strategy
says nothing what people do.

A question can be put: Can the individual learn how to be happy? What should it
mean? I think that the following suggestion could be made. Let's assume that a utility
function may be defined for all types of values. The values of such a function a real
numbers, and the function is a continuos one.

It may be defined for all types of values. The values of such a function a real
numbers, and the function is a continuos one.

To learn how to be happy (or rather: more happy), it means to make one's utility
function growing more fast for positive value and more slowly for negative values. This
formulation follows the language adopted in some psychological investigations.

It should be noted that such self-transformation seems to be compatible with all the
three 'life-strategies' listed just above.

According to an economist, "Although Americans in 1970 had real incomes per
capita 1.7 times greater than in 1947, they nevertheless declared no increase in their felt
happiness." [Hirsch,1977:112] We could of course raise all the methodological issues
concerning operationalization, surveys, vague concepts, etc. But without forgetting them,
let's assume that a social fact was registered. If so, we should ask what anthropological
accounts could be given. Two answers (at least) can be noted. The first, seemingly the
simplest one, says that real income does not determine the level of happiness. But the
simplicity of this answer is somewhat misleading: in all modern conditions, and in those of
USA in particular, the amount of disposable cash determines (to this or that degree) the
level of satisfying one's various needs.

The second answer would start from a different idea and lead in another direction. It
bases on the concept of expectations and the assumption that the rate of real-income growth was sufficient to assure that level of
expectations-satisfaction did not diminish but not sufficient to make it to increase.

Perhaps other answers are also possible, but I do not see them.

Ending these remarks on happiness, I want to say a few words about the broader relevance
of the problem. In particular, I'd like to register a (hypo)thesis formulated by many
authors, and most radically by Scheler [cf. Tatar,1962:553-554] I would put it thus:

[H] The more happy an individual is, the more - all other factors being equal - positive
attitudes of others he assumes.

This formulation is not very precise. Nevertheless, one may note, even in the sketchy
form, the importance of the thesis. On the other hand, one may note that this thesis makes
the models of interpersonal interactions more complicated, in comparison with those ones
which do not take into account the concept of happiness.

There is another way which links the concept of happiness with the models of
interaction. This way goes through the concept of perception and interpretation of the
Other's behavior. There is little doubt that, with the possible exception of most extreme acts of the Other (like murdering, torturing etc.), our reaction to the
Other's behavior depends on the perception and interpretation of this behavior (perhaps
language communication delivers the most evident examples: the perceiving one's
behavior as 'offending' is in most cases - very 'interpretive'). One can suppose that the
level of happiness influences this aspect of the interpretive attitude which could
characterized as 'touchiness' and 'offense-susceptibility' on the one side and 'indulgence' or
'tenacity' on the other. Let me note that it is by no means obvious in which way (if any)
happiness co-determines this aspect of cognition.

4.4.3.3. At the point 3.3.3. I mentioned the problem of the 'sense of life'. Now, I am
coming back to it. To account for this return, let me underscore the difference between
syntactical question of the meaningfulness of analyzing one's whole life as an intentional
whole (as action of a higher order) and the semantical problem of the (theoretical)
meaningfulness of the notion of 'sense of life', or related.

One might suppose that the semantical notion of 'sense of life' presupposes the
syntactical one of life as 'complex action'. In my opinion, it is not so.

On the other side, we could assume that life may be regarded as an action, without
implying that it is furnished with a sense. I see it as follows. Let's assume that for an
individual the possible states of the world split into two classes: states in which he is
hungry - and those in which he is satiated. We can imagine an individual who cares for
being-satiated at any particular day. On the other hand, we can define an individual who
cares for being-satiated in all his life and undertakes different actions (possibly very
complex ones) oriented at assuring realization of this goal.

Still, if we don't want to over-stretch (as in the case of 'egoism') the denotations
of terms, we cannot say that our far-planning guy cares for meaningfulness of his life.
Let's then assume that this very notion is - from the 'syntactical' point of view - acceptable. So, we can ask some further, this time - semantical questions.

Having defined 'sense-of-life' in a negative way (limiting the intended denotation of the term), we should try to find further ways of its specification.

At the first glance, two interpretations of the 'sense of life' seem to be possible (distinguishable).

[1] In one interpretation, the need for 'sense of life' could be identified with the need for a 'framework', for a 'Leitmotiv', for 'permanence'. I would say that 'sense of life' in this interpretation is an 'aesthetic' quality of life. If we avail of the metaphor of 'life-as-text', we could say that life has its sense if viewed as a text is 'coherent', 'compact', if it not dissipates into 'episodes'.

[2] In the second interpretation, the 'sense of life' is based upon 'objectification' of one's life and its embedding into a broader context. In this interpretation, 'life has a sense' if it is viewed as a part of a broader whole. This broad whole may vary from a single individual through relatively small groups of individuals to such collectivities as Nation, Class or Mankind or such entities as Science or Art. In this meaning, one's wife, children, family (more precisely - their well-being, happiness, etc.) or - nation, science, art, ideology (their development, progress...) can be one's 'sense of life'.

Some examples could be instructive. Let's figure an individual who has all his life traveled, and, say, has visited almost all the capitals, and for the coming years is planning visits to all the remaining ones. Let's assume that he is not a journalist and does not write any books about his travels, nor makes any films etc. He does not even try to be recorded in the Guineas' book. It may be said that 'visiting all the capitals of the world' is the sense of his life; the concept being interpreted here as in [1].

Let's take now a woman who subordinates all her life to her beloved man. Her life can (though need not) lack of almost any sense in the first interpretation: it depends on the character of the life of the person she loves. Nevertheless, if she knows that she helps her man, that he needs her etc. - her life may be full of sense in the second interpretation of the term.

The basic differences between these two interpretations could be summarized thus. Firstly, the first interpretation of 'sense of life' does not allow for evaluations 'from without': the 'sense of life' has to be experienced by the subject of the life. The second interpretation of the sense of life allows for external look: others can ascribe sense to someone's life, or - contrarily - can someone's life deprive of its sense. Or even History can 'take away' someone's sense of life, as it might have been the case in the 1990' with some (old, 'genuine')... communists.

These two types of the sense-of-life might be related with Kierkegaard's three stages of life: aesthetic, ethical and religious. The first type would correspond to the aesthetic stage, while the second to the ethical or religious.

Having sketched the possible ways of making the term more precise, we can pass to more substantial issues. Let's start with the following opinion pronounced once by Kotarbiński: "Hours come when you are hungry, others - when sleep is becoming necessary; at another time, the full instant effort is required by the present professional task, and at still another - the need for relieving physical pain dominates absolutely. Thus, instead of the phantom of the sole life-goal, the plurality of variously assumed goals, not life-goals...but actions-goals stand before our eyes." [Kotarbiński, 1986:129]

Kotarbiński's stance might be interpreted thus: The concept of sense-of-life is empty empirically. I want to stress the word 'empirically'. It makes an obvious difference, whether we say that a situation is logically impossible or we say that it does not occur.

We can read Kotarbiński's thesis in another way, assigning to it a weaker interpretation. There are two basic ways of such a reading. Assuming one of them, we read this thesis as a statistical generalization: most people do not care for any sense-of-life. Only a tiny minority does. This interpretation can be further concretized in two ways. First, 'sense-of-life' can be regarded as a sort of 'spiritual-luxury', being not attainable for most people for the same, roughly speaking, reason for which other luxuries are not (and virtually nobody cares for fundamentally unattainable goods). And second, 'sense-of-life' can be regarded as a sort of vagary or eccentricity, something like climbing Mount Everest or proving Fermat's theorem.

And taking the other line, we could say that 'sense-of-life' is of some relevance for all people, but there are many aspects of life which determine our life evaluation, and the sense-fullness of life is only one of them, and perhaps of secondary importance.

4.4.3.3. Now, self-portrait (self-image) is to be the subject of the analysis. We have thus arrived at a problem-area which encompasses issues which were to be remained untouched in this work. In particular, the problem of individual's knowledge was to be deliberately omitted. But it is impossible to speak about self-portrait without having mentioned self-knowledge. Thus, in spite of the general itinerary, a short excursion into this domain is necessary.

And even more: a few, if short, steps into the domain of general metaphysics are to be made. Among profound metaphysical issues being of relevance for anthropology is one which goes back to the Heraclitus-Parmenides controversy. It is the problem of the identity of existing-in-time objects; in particular - of the identity of persons. Such a profound problem cannot be discussed here, if cursorily only. But we can, and should, discuss a fragment of this issue. We do not have to fathom all its metaphysical depths in order to consider its implications for anthropology. We can leave aside the problem of actual identity of human beings. We can just register the fact, confirmed by both the internal - phenomenological - experience and by others' declarations and self-descriptions, and analyze it theoretically.

In other words, I am going to accept two assumptions. First, we can speak of such objects as individuals preserving their identity throughout an interval of time; for instance, we assume that between 1798 and 1855 there existed an object known as 'Adam Mickiewicz'. Second, such objects have knowledge about themselves, in short - self-knowledge; for instance, the knowledge of Adam Mickiewicz about Adam Mickiewicz is an instance of self-knowledge. This conceptual decision does not exclude the possibility that self-knowledge should not exist, if defined in other way (putting it in a brief form, I'd say that it may be - and I tend to think that it is actually so - that 'transcendental ego' is not equipped with self-knowledge, but concrete human being, a Smith or a Kowalski, possesses self-knowledge). Having made these assumptions, we can ask more special questions about self-knowledge. But just these special questions are most interesting for anthropology, as being conceived here. The first question concerns the 'nature' of self-knowledge, or just -

[Q16] What is self-knowledge, and what role does it play?

Various answers are possible. Let's sketch a classification of them (this classification, made for a rather special anthropological issue, avails of the scheme which in its all generality will be presented in the chapter 7):

[1] self-knowledge is a constant ('given') parameter characterizing each man;

[2] self-knowledge is a process ongoing 'in' man;
self-knowledge is a product of interactions with the (social) environment.

This is but a 'first approximation'. In a systematic constructing of a classification of theories of self-knowledge (what is not undertaken here), the following facts should be, among others, taken into account. Firstly, as regards the first possible stance: it is characterized in a 'formal' way rather than a 'substantial'. And this distinction is important: one can formulate theories (of this type) being very different 'substantially', yet 'formally' identical. As the most extreme examples we could find those: on the one side, a strong version of Cartesianism: man is perfectly self-transparent, thus his self-knowledge is also perfectly adequate; on the other side, we might try to define (I say 'define', since possibly no actual theory is so extreme) a strong version of 'suspicion hermeneutics': man has no adequate knowledge of himself, he lives totally 'in the chains of illusions'.

Secondly, the self-knowledge (as knowledge in general) need not be regarded as a homogenous whole. Quite the opposite, it seems a priori more plausible that man's cognitive access to himself is varied, and to point is to characterize the 'logic' of these variations. In these context, some theses of Ricoeur deserve some attention. In his opinion, "the famous Cartesian cogito which grasps itself only in the moment of doubt is a truth being as sterile as unquestionable". [Ricoeur, 1985: 196] This opinion should be complemented with this thesis: "Before Freud two issues were conflated: apodictic-ness and adequacy. I am there, but what I am - I, who is there? I cannot know it. .../... What I am is as problematic as apodictic is the fact that I am there." [Ricoeur, 1985: 250]

Third. Still Ricoeur. In Ricoeur's essay Le conscient et l'inconscient one chapter is characteristically titled 'Consciousness as a task'. [Ricoeur, 1985: 213] His remarks there are too elusive that one should decide whether his theory approximate rather [3] or [4]. Anyway, he seems to express an idea saying that adequate self-knowledge may be extending.

Fourth. We could relate to the [3] some ideas of Mannheim. He stresses the relevance of autobiographies as a research material. In particular, in his opinion, studying autobiographies we can answer the following question "in which way and in what aim did people observe themselves?" [Mannheim, 1974: 208] He speaks also of "various introspective attitudes and their social functions." According to him, in the history have existed at least two types of self-observation. "The older one resulted from egotism of a kind. Saints observed themselves in order to attaining salvation...On the other hand, a modern researcher (for example Rousseau) is interested in himself inasmuch as he can use the knowledge of his own psychic frailty as a universal medicine for the whole society." [ibidem:208-209] While speaking, with Mannheim, about autobiographies, we should mention at least the sociological tradition originated by The Polish Peasant of Thomas and Znaniecki.

Let's make a survey of problems related to the idea of self-portrait. First, the very existence of self-portrait should be discussed. In particular, we should decide whether it is/should be a matter of an analytical decision, or it is a substantial issue which can be solved in various ways. I think that it would be possible to formulate such a broad definition of self-portrait that it would be analytically true that each man has his own self-portrait. Still, in my opinion, we should look for a more rigorous definition which would allow to debate if all people actually have self-portraits, what determines that some do not have, etc. Such an approach seems to be more productive. I am not able to offer any precise definition of self-portrait. I want only suggest that it should be located in the framework of a theory of self-knowledge. Self-portrait would be either a special part of self-knowledge or (I tend to regard it as a better variant) or a type of self-knowledge; let's say, a type of 'sufficiently well' organized (structured, ordered...) self-knowledge.

Another (rather complementary than opposite) line along which differentia specifica of self-portrait might be looked for can be drawn thus. We could stay from the fact that (as stipulated in Patryas' model), any individual has some knowledge about himself, that is knowledge about acts he can perform. This part of self-knowledge does not belong to self-portrait. Similarly, the knowledge of one's first-order values (it doesn't matter here if adequate or not) does not belong to self-portrait. But perhaps the knowledge of one's higher-order values should be regarded as a part (perhaps even constitutive one) of self-portrait.

Second, however self-portrait would be defined, it should not be done so that all relations between self-portrait and self-knowledge are analytical consequences of the definition. We should be able ask for instance the following question: Does self-portrait function as a 'filtering' mechanism which lets some pieces of information 'in' (those being compatible with self-portrait) and keeps the incompatible 'out'? Or, self-portrait is rather generated by self-knowledge (by a quasi-inductive way of generalizing 'special' data about the individual)?

Third, what is the relation between self-portrait and the knowledge about one's portraits in the others' minds.

Fourth, how much is the self-portrait important? What are the relations between self-portrait and happiness, and between self-portrait and sense-of-life?

Fifth. The issue of self-portrait is closely related to that of individualism. This is a very broad problem, as the survey in Lukes' book demonstrates.

Sixth, still another aspect of the self-portrait problem is of political and ideological importance: it plays - at times - a role in the definition of left-right opposition. As we know, the core of right ideology can be characterized as anti-egalitarianism. And anti-egalitarianism happens to be grounded on some anthropological premises. In particular, it is being claimed that "nobody wants to be equal to others" (R. Gervaso, cited after Bobbio, 1995: 101) Undoubtedly, there is a point here. But what is this point is not so obvious. I think that two aspects should be specified. On the one hand, the quoted sentence may express the need for 'being someone different'. Consider an example: John collects photos of birds, is an expert in cooking fish soups, swims in pools... Peter does not collect anything but cultivates roses in his garden, is an expert in mending old radio sets, makes long walks... - Adding perhaps some further characteristics, we could obtain images satisfying the criterion of individual originality (specificity). Still, neither of these characteristics can be qualified as 'better'. (In negative way, this value can be characterized by reference to the Huxley's world, in which indistinguishable individuals were produced.) Therefore, such an orientation is, at least prima facie, compatible with egalitarianism. (though, as Marx observed in his remarks on 'primitive communism' [Marx & Engels, 1962: 575-576], in some forms it may happen so).

On the other hand, the phrase "nobody wants..." may also express the need for 'being someone better'. This need can be satisfied in a social order allowing for some hierarchies (but even in this case further specifications are needed: the mere existence of a hierarchy generated by sport results does not imply any other social consequences; of course, usually it does but only in a social context, already hierarchical).

Sixth, the problem of self-portrait is also of historiosophical and historical (in the sense of Braudel or Topolski's profession) importance. For instance, a contemporary British historian, Peter Burke, continues the debate started more than century ago by Jacob Burckhardt; the role of Renaissance in the birth - or dissemination - of individualism is at stake. [Burke, 1991: 162-164] And individualism, as noted above, is an attitude that
presupposes existence of self-portrait. This historical issue is related to the political/ideological one mentioned in the former point.

Seventh, the problem of 'commensurability' (resp. 'incommensurability') of individual axiologies arises here. As it can be easily noted, to be 'better' than someone else means - in a sense - to be 'as others', since just sharing the same basic values allows for comparison. Take as an example the symbolic (surely not the most important, yet just this aspect is in focus here) value of money; it depends on the number of people who regard money just in this way. The same can be said of the symbolic value of power, scientific degrees or aristocratic titles, etc.

On the other side, to be really 'different than others' excludes, at the first sight, any hierarchization, since no 'yardstick' for comparisons exists. But the 'incommensurability' of, say, life-styles is not absolute. Life-styles can be more or less similar. If so, we can imagine that the value being one's target is not 'individuality' as such but being 'most original'. (Incidentally, I would risk the thesis that an orientation of this kind can be found today, specially in some artist milieus; 'originality at any cost'.)

Eighth. As Cassirer remarks, "Social consciousness of man depends on a double act, i.e. identification and differentiation." [Cassirer, 1971:352] Partly, as suggested above, it is a matter of logic: any difference, hence any comparison, assumes a common basis for comparison, thus identification. But this logic determines only some limits within which a play of tendencies takes place.

Ninth. In philosophical literature, some important remarks on the issues debated here can be found in Contribution to The Topography Of Spanish Conceit of Ortega y Gasset. The Spanish thinker offers there an interesting classification of self-evaluations. He starts from the general concept of 'self-evaluation' that is further divided into 'reflected' and 'spontaneous'. And in their turn, both 'reflected' and 'spontaneous' evaluations comprise 'normal' and 'abnormal' forms. The abnormal form of the 'reflected' type is identified with vanity, and the abnormal form of the 'spontaneous' type is identified with conceit. The latter is still further classified into conceit 'based upon upper values' and that 'based upon lower values.' The second type of conceit is characterized as 'Spanish'. [Ortega y Gasset, 1980:144] Interestingly, it is the land of Basques in which, according to Ortega, 'conceit assumes extreme forms'. And its comprehension may open the way to the deepest layers of the Spanish history. [Ibidem:133-134]

It may be interesting to indicate some links between the anthropological problems discussed in the present passage and some sociological issues. In particular, I think of the model (ontology, if you prefer) of the social reality which dominates in social theory, in spite of its many a theoretical differentiation. I think of tripartite model which distinguishes three domains of social reality: economy, politics, culture (or 'society' in a narrow sense). This ontology may be found in Marx's historical materialism (in Nowak's non-Marxian historical materialism too), in Weber's historical sociology, or in the theories of social stratification. This ontology raises many doubts, and - in an opinion which I share - should be overcome. Nevertheless, it's persistence suggests that it may reflect some actual aspects of social reality. This problem deserves an analysis that goes well beyond the scope of the present text. Here, I want to concentrate on this aspect of the problem which is most close to anthropology. In this context, the theory of social stratification seems too be most appropriate as the point of reference.

According Kozyr-Kowalski's brief summary, the main idea of this theory is the idea of the 'multi-dimensionality' of social differentiation and inequality. And the 'multi-dimensionality' is to consist in that they "have at least three independent and mutually irreducible sources: economic - social - political. As economic source is regarded...income or wealth. As the source of inequality manifested in social distances and social exclusivity is regarded prestige or respect. Power...is regarded as the third important determinant of social inequality." [Kozyr-Kowalski, 1979:11-12]

We can see that such values as power (resp. freedom) or prestige (resp. lack of 'moral humiliation') may be important not only anthropologically but also sociologically.

Having made this remark, I take the opportunity to say a few more words about relations between anthropology and social theory. In my opinion, there is little doubt that the structure and content of individual axiological systems do matter sociologically. And one does not have to accept any sociological/historiosopical 'idealism'. Also in 'materialist' theories this thesis is acceptable. It is not the relevance of values as such, but the problem of the ways in which individuals create, choose, inherit, assume...their values which is controversial (this observation may serve as an instantiation of the general orientation defended in this work: any genuine controversy presupposes an area of consensus; an 'absolute' disagreement, if imaginable at all, excludes any controversy).

In other words, values constitute a 'mediating element' between individual and society, between individual actions and history. And not this fact, but the mechanisms of its functioning and the nature of the factors determining it - define the proper area of debate and controversies.

4.4.3.4. Now, we should discuss the interrelations between the concepts of happiness, sense-of-life and self-portrait.

We should consider first, if the concepts are really different. It might be so that they were (almost) synonymous. If it were the case, philosophical analysis should demonstrate it and suggest choosing one of the term as basic and declaring the other two as equivalents of the basic. But, as I am going to demonstrate, these three concepts, however vague and imprecise, are associated with ideas which are related to various groups of intuitions.

Let's consider, one after another, the three pairs of the concepts in question. First, happiness and sense-of-life. There are at least two arguments against identification of these two concepts. On the one side, it cannot be analytically excluded that someone who lives 'day-after-day', satisfying all his basic needs but without even considering the problem of the sense of his life, is a happy man. On the second side, it might be supposed that the considerations about one's sense of life can make the considering person unhappy; particularly if he has discovered that his life has been meaningless.

Second, happiness and self-portrait. As in the previous case, someone who is completely 'externally' (in particular: toward the Others) oriented can be happy, without possessing no particular self-portrait at all. And one can have a positive self-portrait without being happy. For instance, for feeling not able to console himself after the death of a beloved person.

And third, self-portrait and sense-of-life. Someone may feel that he has succeeded in his life, that he has attained the goals he put, and he may also think - self-critically - that he has been simply a lucky man, whose successes are due to opportunities, and who would have not succeeded, had the external conditions been less favorable. And taking the opposite direction: one may posses a positive self-portrait, say, the faith in one's creative capabilities. And he may feel that due to his being in some particular conditions (stay in prison, say), he has not realized any of his life-goals. It is also interesting that, as many have noted, happiness is not a good goal in life in this sense that it is mainly, if not exclusively, being achieved as a 'by-product' of life oriented at other goals than happiness itself.

If this thesis, by no means analytical but profoundly substantial, is accepted, then it can be concluded that there are some (important) values that cannot be goals of actions.
So much about differences between these concepts. But of course they are closely related. Therefore, a few remarks on what they have in common.

First about sense of life or self-portrait, and - in particular - about the role of language. Though not only in this area language is of importance, this area demonstrates it vividly. There is no doubt that language plays an important instrumental (technological, or 'material') role. It may be that this role is genetically primary. But here we are speaking of language which creates a reality. Reality which is anthropologically important.

In Cassirer's words, "Without symbolism, human life were similar to the life of prisoners in the cave of the famous Plato's parable. Human life were closed within the confines of his biological needs and practical interests; he would not have access to the 'ideal world' which is from various sides being disclosed to man by religion, art, philosophy, and science." [Cassirer,1971:91] Of course, these 'ideal worlds' have mattered in the human history. But there is a sphere, which has played perhaps decisive role in the human history, that is 'less ideal' than that of art or philosophy but one which cannot be reduced to biological dimension. The sphere of greed, lust for power, conceit... In this sphere language is absolutely essential: Neither nationalism, nor class consciousness; neither asceticism nor conspicuous consumption; neither vindictiveness, nor charity... - none of those attitudes seems to be possible without mediation of the language.

4.4.4. The value of freedom, and related issues

Now, I would like to speak of some values that briefly can be characterized as 'societal'. I use the term 'societal' as a convenient alternative to the word 'social': it may be claimed that all values (the 'societal' including) are social in their nature, and I am thinking of a rather special type of values. Roughly saying, I mean the values an individual ascribes to his 'own' social relations. A few of them - have already been discussed (love, intimacy...), many more - even not mentioned. My goal here is not to complete this discussion. Quite contrarily, I am going to focus on a special sub-type of societal values. These very special values can be intuitively characterized as being at once 'societal' and meta-values for other values, either societal or non-societal. Freedom, as a value, is the most important instance of this sub-type. It is societal: it refers to some relations between one's actions and the other people. And it is a meta-value: the value of freedom depends logically on the existence of other (of 'lower degree') values. It does not mean that this meta-value is less important than other, in particular non-societal 'material' values. It may be that freedom is one's ultimate value, yet it can be the sole value: the individual has to ascribe value to material well-being or scientific truth, to sex or religious contemplation if freedom to be any value, the more - the ultimate one (an analogy with Elster's thesis on the logical primacy of egoism could be noted here.)

Freedom is undoubtedly the most important example of the considered type of values. But there are others. And, for some reasons, just from them I will commence my considerations. And with the value of freedom I will end them.

4.4.4.1. In his Social Limits to Growth, an English economist, Fred Hirsch, writes: "as the level of the average consumption rises, an increasing portion of the consumption takes on a social as well as an individual aspect. That is to say, the satisfaction that individual derive from goods and services depends in increasing measure not only on their own consumption but on consumption by the others as well." [Hirsch,1977:2] This quotation is - in my view - important for several reasons. First, it demonstrates clearly that the problem is not a mere philosophical curiosity but is one of socio-political relevance. (In the introduction to his book, he defines three issues - "(1) the paradox of affluence, (2) the distribution compulsion, and (3) the reluctant collectivism" - and defines the thesis that these three issues are interrelated, and stem from a common source' as his "major thesis". [ibidem:1] Second, it demonstrates the usefulness of the analytical distinctions made in the chapter two: a given act (say, visiting a fashionable spa) may be viewed as 'supportive' for at least two intentional actions: recreational and social. Third, it indicates the basic link between self-image and (other) values. This link is established by a mechanism of interpersonal comparison: the agent compares himself with other people and defines himself as "better" or "worse" than the others.

Continuing the last point, we should note that a particular question arises which could be termed 'Guinness-book problem'. But first, again a quote from Hirsch: "Wicksteed [sic] in his The Common Sense of Political Economy - W.Cz.] insisted that whereas Napoleon might wish to encourage the belief that every soldier carried in his knapsack a marshall's baton, it was obviously impossible that every - as distinct from any - soldier could rise to the position of marshall." [Hirsch,1977:23] The point is that some people are oriented at such values as 'being unique' or 'being the best'. It is not obvious that these two values are identical. It might be said that in some cases they overlap and in some others they do not. On the one hand, it might be that 'being unique' is an autonomous value. On the other one, it might be that this very value interferes with some others. Let's consider an example taken from the domain of fashion. The pure 'being-unique' orientation would perhaps manifest itself in the most ridiculous dress. But the 'being-the-best' orientation would surely manifest itself in the combination of uniqueness with social standards.

Again, we should underscore the socio-political relevance of the problem. The first orientation but to a limited degree generates social tensions and conflicts: virtually everybody can find a field in which he could confirm his uniqueness (Guinness' record-book is the best example of this mechanism). The second orientation is potentially much more socially dangerous: the Wicksteed's example demonstrates it well.

As a related phenomenon we can regard one known as 'sour-grapes'. Here, with a specific (substantial) or - first-order) value interferes that ascribed to the avoiding risk and disappointment. If this value is sufficiently 'high', it can influence some other values.

4.4.4.2. Now, I am going to speak about freedom. Of course, not about freedom as such; this would be a great task for itself. Freedom as a value, or the value of freedom is to be the subject of my remarks. Nevertheless, some general remarks are necessary.

In particular, it should be noted that the word 'freedom' has different, if related, meanings. Or, to be more specific, we could speak about two most important aspects (sides, or - even - types or forms) of freedom. On the one hand, we could distinguish 'external' freedom; this concepts partly overlaps with that of liberties. 'Freedom' means here autonomy, independence, material possibility of action. On the other hand, we could speak of 'internal' freedom. Here, 'freedom' means the ability to 'distance oneself' from one's knowledge and values, from one's past experiences and its refined products.

Before going into details, note the rather obvious fact: the value of the 'external' freedom and the value of the 'internal' one need not be identical. An individual may appreciate his being able to move here and there without facing any physical or legal barriers. At the same time, he can accept his being inveigled drunkard and gambler. On the other side, another individual may experience his inability to resist his 'bad' habits as more humiliating than being under police supervision.

Let's read now a passage from a book on political philosophy. Its author is considering the importance of various limitations to individual's freedom (liberties). In his
restrictions on individual and political liberties are more important than those on traffic. They are more important not because they divest us of more liberties (in a neutral way defined), but because they divest us of more important liberties. Those liberties are so much important since they secure us more control over key projects of our life, thus support our self-determination more than freedom in traffic - no matter, how much of neutral freedom do they contain. [Kymlicka, 1998:162] One should agree that this opinion expresses a normative conviction held rather widely in the European culture. But read in the anthropological context, it is much more controversial.

Surely, it is a simple and - in a sense - natural stance: the relative importance of freedom in a sphere of life is 'directly proportional' to the relative importance of this very sphere. (It should be noted that Kymlicka's formulation is in fact stronger. Interpreted as descriptive / here: non-normative/ thesis, it assumes additionally that individual axiological hierarchies are 'sufficiently similar'; this assumption is anything but obvious.) But the probably most opposite stance, namely one claiming for equal value of all instances of freedom (in other words for the independence of the value of freedom from the axiological hierarchization of the basic 'dimensions' of life), though surely not so 'natural' as the former, should not be a priori rejected.

And these two stances do not exhaust all the possibilities. We should, for instance, consider a thesis which would claim that the value of freedom depends on the 'visibility' of it's restricting: the more restriction of freedom is visible in a sphere the more important freedom in this sphere. (I would hypothesize that just this model approximates attitudes of some, mainly adolescent, people.)

In the context of these considerations, the following speculations (if only speculations, it is another problem) seem natural. Freedom (more precisely: a degree of freedom) of acting is not just given. It may be an objective of conscious, deliberate actions. And if so, we could apply to those actions the standard cost-benefit analysis. This could be a task for itself. Therefore, a selection is necessary. I tend to think (but it is an intuition I am not able to account for) that the most interesting question in this area is one to be formulated soon. But to formulating it, we have to make some conceptual distinction. We should note first that in the case of freedom, as in the case of any 'generic' value, at least two strategies are possible.

On the one hand, an individual may maximize his 'total' freedom, that is freedom in all spheres of his life. But efforts needed in order to enlarge freedom in one sphere cannot be applied in any other sphere. And the amount of efforts is limited. Therefore, it is not (usually) possible to maximize freedom in all spheres at once. Thus, the maximization of freedom in one sphere excludes (may exclude) maximization in the others. The maximization of freedom in one fixed sphere can be, then, regarded as an alternative strategy. This strategies has two basic variants. One of them consists in enlarging freedom in an already existing sphere of life. The second - in creating a new and autonomous sphere of life. And just the second variant of the second strategy is particularly interesting. Adopting this strategy might be characterized thus: the individual accepts (assumes, or even creates) some values since their realization is possible in a free way, or - differently put - these values constitute a sphere of freedom.

Let's accept hypothetically an anthropological thesis that might be assigned to Sartre: assume that man is, or - can be, at any moment absolutely free (whatever it could mean). Would anybody want to be absolutely free? - This question should be regarded as a thought experiment. (In a similar way, we could ask whether anybody would actually like to be truly immortal; not to live about one thousand years instead of about one hundred, but to live eternally, so that one million years were but a twinkle.) The positive answer is possible. But the negative one is more plausible. Still, the negative answer comprises a large collection of various positive stances. And exploration of those possibilities is a task for a (meta-)theory of freedom.

Let me recall a suggestion I've already made. While speaking about complex actions, I stressed that the distinguishing more or less complex actions can be used in resolving 'paradox of freedom'. Now, I have to return to this problem.

From considerations on 'escape from freedom' should be instrumental in characterizing (in possibly non-ideological way) the positive value of freedom.

'The first mechanism of escape from freedom I am going to deal with is the tendency to give up the independence of one's individual self and to fuse one's self with somebody or something outside of oneself in order to acquire the strength which the individual self is lacking. Or, to put it in different words, to seek for new, 'secondary bonds' as a substitute for the primary bonds which have been lost.' [Fromm, 1969:163]

The annihilation of the individual self and the attempt to overcome thereby the unbearable feeling of powerlessness are only one side of the masochistic strivings. The other side is the attempt to become a part of a bigger and more powerful whole outside of oneself, to submerge and participate in it. This power can be a person, an institution, God, the nation, conscience, or a psychic compulsion. [Fromm, 1969:177]

"...another mechanism of escape which is of the greatest social significance. This particular mechanism is the solution that the majority of normal individuals find in modern society. To put it briefly, the individual ceases to be himself; he adopts entirely the kind of personality offered to him by cultural patterns; and he therefore becomes exactly as all others are and as they expect him to be. The discrepancy between 'I' and the world disappears and with it the conscious fear of aloneness and powerlessness. This mechanism can be compared with the protective coloring some animals assume. They look so similar to their surrounding that they are hardly distinguishable from them, the person who gives up his individual self and becomes an automaton, identical with millions of other automatons around him, need not feel alone and anxious any more. But the price he pays, however, is high: it is the loss of his self." [Fromm, 1969:208-209]

In the chapter on Freiheit of his Philosophie II, Jaspers considers the reasons for 'escape from freedom' (in 1932; in Fromm's book under this title there is no reference to Jaspers). In his view, the man who would like to taste of the original freedom, "he wouldn't like to see in himself anything what is only given, he'd like to regard himself as his own choice for which he bears responsibility. |...| Committing oneself, I give up the possibilities in order to become actual. From the emptiness of the rich world which might have been, I am coming into the completeness of the world, being poor in the comparison with the former, the actualization of which depends on my being myself. But at the same time, I demur from this committing, I don't want to become actual." [Jaspers, 1990:173]

In other words: To accept a possibility means to reject some other possibilities: to marry Ann means, given some legal/social rules, not to marry Barbara, nor Caroline, nor Dorothea... But not to marry anybody means either to stay alone or to be in an informal relation. In short: to make a 'positive' decision means usually to make at once a few (perhaps quite a few) 'negative' decisions.

From Jaspers, we could go still a slightly different direction. I would risk a thesis which at the first look only appears paradoxical. It says that 'escape from freedom' may be (in some cases, almost surely not in all of them) a manifestation of taking-freedom-seriously. And 'celebrating' totally free decision-making may be but a way of masking the actual decision-avoiding. To be more specific, I'd say so: Man can be aware of some psychological mechanisms which operate in his mind also. In particular, he may know, for
interpretation suggests many interesting and important analyses. To be carried out in a

depth to develop one's most precious (original, specific...) skills, abilities, etc. [ibidem:47]

This idea in question. First, this slogan is to be interpreted as a postulate that one should

be 'a member of the majority-group.

The membership, not concealing one's identity (ethnic, religious, political...) not pretending

be to note that these two values may interfere: If applied to the member of a minority-

('being a member of a community', 'rootedness', etc.) happens to be a value, no less, if not -

it may suggest that the value of authenticity is, so to say, 'derivative' and not 'primordial',

This aspect is not significant here. But this remark seems to have also a cognitive aspect:

obvious intention, this remark has an evaluative meaning; rather negative than positive.

Beautiful, right and rational counsels... But 'be yourself' may also mean: follow your predilections, drives, habits, or: stick to your own principles, or: follow

in behavior or as a recommendation of being honest and not pretending to possess other

values which are very close to freedom. Take Jaspers again. He declares, somewhat
vaguely in my opinion, that "decision and one's being oneself are identical.' [Jaspers, 1990:170]

And in fact the idea of 'authenticity' seems to be somehow related to that of freedom. Therefore, some remarks on this concept should be allowed here.

Though the idea of authenticity occupies a particularly important place in the 'existentia'l tradition, in other philosophers some useful comments may be found, too. For instance, in Kotarbiński's Medytacje o życiu godziwym [Meditations on Decent Life], we find an essay devoted the 'Slogan: Be yourself' [Kotarbiński,1986:45]

In the first step, we should - according to Kotarbiński - distinguish two different meanings of this slogan. It serves 'at times at least, as an incentive to avoid artificially in behavior or as a recommendation of being honest and not pretending to possess other character than one does. Beautiful, right and rational counsels... But 'be yourself', may also mean: follow your predilections, drives, habits, or: stick to your own principles, or: follow your conscience. '[Kotarbiński,1986:45]

Subsequently, Kotarbiński suggests to consider 'evolutionist version' of this slogan. In this interpretation it is to call us: 'become what you are'. So interpreted, this slogan turns out to be a special and brief version of the ideology of 'self actualization/realization' ('anthropological' Marxism, humanist psychology...)

In Kotarbiński's view, so interpreted, this slogan raises doubts. First, it 'directs our attention not to the object but to the subject of endeavor' [ibidem:46]. In Kotarbiński's obvious intention, this remark has an evaluative meaning; rather negative than positive. This aspect is not significant here. But this remark seems to have also a cognitive aspect: it may suggest that the value of authenticity is, so to say, 'derivative' and not 'primordial', that the value of "being authentic" depends on the values which are actualized or expressed in 'authentic' actions. - This may be but not - has to be so.

Note the second objection; the slogan recommending being-oneself is "foreign to the spirit of community" [ibidem]. The ethical aspect aside, we could say that 'community' (being a member of a community', 'rootedness', etc.) happens to be a value, no less; if not more, important than 'authenticity'. That seems to be rather obvious. More interesting may be to note that these two values may interfere: if applied to the member of a minority-group, the slogan 'be-yourself' can be interpreted as recommending open manifestation of the membership, not concealing one's identity (ethnic, religious, political...), not pretending being a member of the majority-group.

In spite of his critical remarks, Kotarbiński offers two positive interpretations of the idea in question. First, this slogan is to be interpreted as a postulate that one should develop one's most precious (original, specific... skills, abilities, etc. [ibidem:47]. This interpretation suggests many interesting and important analyses. To be carried out in a

systematic way, they should be put into a framework of anthropology which focuses on

man as a/n (psycho-physical) object possessing various - material and mental - attributes.

But such a perspective determines this part of anthropological interests which has been
designated as 'substantial' (in opposition to - 'functional') anthropology. And this very part

was declared as located out of the domain of the present work. Therefore, we have to note this 'link' and pass on to the second interpretation.

According to this interpretation, the slogan is to be "a defensive one: not allow that

automatism of social relations or any other blindly suppressing forces should destroy

the individual qualities one has. It may summarized into the postulate of individual dignity"

[ibidem:48]

The last sentence shifts our attention to another, if related, point. The value of

authenticity (and of freedom) is to be related to the value of individual dignity. And this

may be in its turn viewed as 'a special case' of a more general value.

We say sometimes that we are treated 'as air', 'as a thin', 'worse than a dog'. And we

want to be treated in a 'human way' we also demand 'human conditions' in this or that

sphere. These popular phrases express a feeling (intuitive conviction...) that human beings

are 'particular' beings, somehow distinguished from all other objects existing in the

Universe (in 'our part of it'.

Dignity may be a part of being treated as 'human being'. Thus, the value of dignity

(freedom etc.) may turn out a part of the value of 'being-a-subject'. And if it should be

so, the problem of dignity and that of eroticism (cf.4.3.3.2.)

In a book devoted to philosophy of encounter (in a chapter on F. Kafka), we find still

another important intuition. The 'fight for freedom of self-deciding is the fight for sense.'

[Bukowski,1987: 101] That sounds, at the first while, quite interestingly. But we could ask

whether this approach does not come close to the idea of freedom as 'necessity made

conscious'. I am not sure whether such an interpretation is in accordance with Bukowski's

intention. On the other hand, starting from this doubt, we could ask the question about the

relation between the value of sense and the value of freedom. The possibility of

stoic/hegelian concept of freedom may suggest that the sense as a value is more important

than freedom. Or, to put it other way round, that absurdity (= lack of sense) may be more
difficult to be stood up than lack of freedom.

At the very end of this section, change the mood and language. Let's say some words

on freedom as seen in a rather particular psychological perspective. The change of

perspective should allow us to grasp another aspects of the problem.

In his Temperament-Personality-Activity, Jan Strelau presents some results of

investigations on the role of activity as a regulator of the stimulation-demand. In

particular, investigations on the style-of-action manipulating are presented. In all the
discussed experiments constructional tasks were used. And in regulating the relations

between the auxiliary and the main acts, two types of instruction were used. On the hand,

'heuristic, which informed only about the final goal of the task and allowed the

investigated person to organize the actions in the way being most proper for him'; on the

other, 'algorithmic, which consisted not only of description of the goal of the performed

task, but also of descriptions of the successive operations given in such an order in which

they should be performed' [Strelau,1985:338]. It turned out that preferences concerning

the type of instruction (heuristic or algorithmic) vary accordingly to some temperamental

traits (so-called low or high 'reactivity').
4.4.5. The formal values of life

Individual life can be interpreted - in a metaphorical way - as a text. And just of this metaphor I am going to avail now. More specifically, I am going to make use of the traditional, known from the theory of literature and aesthetics, distinction : content (substance) versus form. This distinction can be applied to a classification of values the individual tries to actualize in his life.

Commence with intuitions. Let’s make two lists: of the ‘substantial’ values and of the ‘formal’ ones. These lists do not claim for any completeness or systematic character; my only aim is to give some examples. The first list contains such values (the degree of their universality doesn’t matter here; these are values for some individuals) as: possessing big money (resp. having not ‘enough’ money), experiencing ‘deep’ sexual pleasure (resp. sexual dissatisfaction), being famous (resp. staying ‘in the shadow’), well-founded hope for salvation (resp. fear of eternal condemnation).

And on the second list locate such values as: interesting life (resp. boring one), life full of adventures (resp., lack of unexpected situations), dynamism (resp. tranquility). Etc.

What is the nature of ‘formal’ values? They can be regarded as meta-values, values which determine the way in which we consciously choose values (of lower order). But, it should be stressed, the ‘formal’ values constitute a special type of meta-values. Some moral values (for instance, some variants of Kantian imperative) are meta-values, yet they are ‘substantial’, and not ‘formal’ (in the sense adopted here).

It should also be noted that whether a meta-value if ‘formal’ or ‘substantial’ need not be always clear. If someone’s life is full of drastic changes, it may be so for various reasons. The possibility that the individual axiology is simply changing is important, but is not to be discussed at the present moment. I want to assume here the possibility that the drastic changes in the ‘way of life’ are results of a deliberate decision motivated by a fixed set of values.

On the one hand, someone could wish to have as many variegated ‘experiences’ as possible (thus he could be a steel-worker for a time, a monk for another period, a thief, etc.). It might be said that a single ‘formal’ meta-value determines so strange choices of first-order values. On the other hand, someone wants to write a big ‘panoramic’ novel about his times, and he believes that first-hand experiences are necessary for this work. Here, the ‘formal’ value of ‘extreme variation’ of experiences is not the ultimate value as in the first example, but is instrumentally subordinated to a single substantial value: ‘writing a good novel’.

The distinction seems to be important for several reasons. In particular, it helps to understand the process of reproduction of individual’s axiological system: some ‘formal’ values contribute, all other factors equal, to the preservation of the ‘first-order’ values; some others (say, fondness of novelty) contribute to the changes of the individual’s axiological space.

We could note an analogy between two relations: one which holds between ‘non-societal’ and ‘societal’ values, and those between ‘substantial’ and ‘formal’ ones. This analogy consists in that both ‘societal’ values and ‘formal’ values are meta-values.

4.4.6. On ‘(in)consistence’ and ‘(dis)continuity’ of axiological systems

At the very end of this sub-chapter, I’m going to discuss the problem which may be the most difficult from among all the tackled in it. This problem may be tentatively defined as that of ‘(in)consistence’ and ‘(dis)continuity’ of axiological system.

In approaching the issue, I will draw upon some ideas of Kierkegaard, Spranger, and Scheler, to name the most important sources of inspiration at this point.

Commence, then, from some ideas of Kierkegaard. In fact, from ideas being of key importance in the philosophy of Dannish thinker. They are summarized and clearly expressed in the title of his main work: Either/Or. Qualitative dialectics, the name given to the part of his philosophy which is of importance here - it conveys briefly the central idea of this work.

This idea might be summarized thus. (This summary is based on the presentations given by Toeplitz [1980:47-89] and Copleston [1995b:336-352].) We can distinguish three types of life - aesthetic, ethical and religious. These types of life constitute three, so to say, separated domains. Separated - since, according to Kierkegaard, there exist no intermediate, transitional types. Putting it in another way, these three types are not Weberian ideal-types which represent ‘pure’ and ‘extreme’ which do not exist in the real world. Quite contrarily, the actual, real-life character of these types is fundamental for Kierkegaard’s theory. Neglecting this fact, one cannot understand correctly the concept of ‘leap’ which plays so important role in Kierkegaard’s philosophy.

This conception of three types is supplemented (in original Kierkegaardian formulation, simply ‘interwoven’) with another idea. According to it, there is a ‘natural’ sequence of these types: from the aesthetic through ethical to religious. We could say that Kierkegaard constructed a model of human life, or - so to say - of ‘individual’s history’, which is both ‘revolutionary’ and ‘telological’, if to adopt historiosophical terminology. The types turn out to be ‘stages’ of individual’s development.

I’d like to emphasize that from the logical point of view, the second idea (that of ‘stages’) presupposes the first one (that of separated ‘types’), but is not its logical consequence. It is logically admissible that man should make ‘leaps’ in any direction: also from religious to aesthetic type, or directly from aesthetic to religious etc. Human life might consist of any number of such ‘leaps’.

The idea of ‘directionality’ of life is to be discussed in the last chapter. And now, we should confine our attention to the ‘static’ (or ‘structural’) part of this theory. And while speaking about this part, we should distinguish two its elements. First, the general idea of the separated (or ‘closed’), qualitatively different, types of life. And second, the special idea of just three types. In my opinion, the general idea, first of all, matters here, though the Kierkegaardian list is not to be neglected, too.

Kierkegaardian stance might be confronted with that of Spranger. In his Lebensformen, he is developing a theory of culture and man (he characterizes his intention as “die Begrundung einer geistwissenschaftlichen Psychologie der Individualitat, einer Ethologie oder Charakterologie” [Spranger,1929:119]) He distinguished six ‘types of personality’ (of ‘characters’ or ‘orientations’). Unlike Kierkegaard, he stresses that “die Grundtypen...nicht etwa Photographieren des wirklichen Lebens sind, sondern auf einer... idealisierenden Methode beruhen.” [Ibidem]

Of special interest and importance is the way in which Spranger is constructing his typology. It is not a simple list of types. This typology is obtained by a successive application of some general criteria. In the first step, we can distinguish two general types: ‘people-oriented’ and ‘world-oriented’.
4.5. On the cognition of the Other

I have devoted most place in the present chapter to the problems of values. The problems of knowledge were touched upon only in its very beginning. Now, while closing it, I am going to return to the cognitive issues; more precisely - to those indicated in the heading of this section.

To speak, in the context of anthropology, of cognition of the Other is much more natural than to speak of cognition, say, of the physical properties of iron, though - for instance - physical knowledge must be a part of accounting for, say, the activity of a smith.

Still, there is an aspect of this cognition which makes it specific. The point is that in the case of atoms or galaxies, DNA or ecosystems, natural numbers or modal logics, even a novel or Kondratjeff's cycles - all these objects are, so to say, indifferent in relation to human cognition. It is not the case with the cognition of the Other. The object of cognition is also a subject who can be aware of his being this object. In result, he can assume various attitudes toward the Other who tries to get knowledge of him. The possibly oldest and most familiar phenomenon is that of lie; they are also many other phenomena of this sort. Therefore, the decision to devote some place to this particular part of the metaphysics of cognition seems to be quite well grounded.

The problem of the cognition of the Other is one of the most fundamental of any comprehensive epistemology (or, as I'd personally prefer to speak, of metaphysics of cognition). Any epistemology of this type should take seriously even the strongest skeptical objections against the possibility of knowing the Other. On the other hand, we should remember for instance Sartre's stance, one being opposed by him to that of Descartes and Kant, according to which, "through the I think we reach our own self in the presence of others, and the others are just as real to us as our own self. Thus, the man who becomes aware through the cogito also perceives all others, and he perceives them as the condition of his own existence. He realizes that he can not be anything (in the sense that we say that someone is witty or nasty or jealous) unless others recognize it as such. In order to get any truth about myself, I must have contact with another person. The other is indispensable to my own existence, as well as to my knowledge about myself. This being so, in discovering my inner being, I discover the other person at the same time, like a freedom placed in front of me which thinks and wills only for or against me." [Sartre,1962:601-602] The variety of positions ranging from this of Sartre to that of Husserl's who laboriously grappled with the question of inter-subjectivity would deserve attention.

In anthropology, as in any other field, of particular importance for the advancement of its exploration, is the specification, separation and classification of questions. As to the sub-field of the cognition of fremde Ich, the "unsatisfactorily clear differentiation of the problems" was stressed in particular by Scheler [1980:323]. In his opinion "we should differentiate six problems having been too much confounded." [ibidem] His list of these problems runs thus: "1. What essential relation does hold between I and the community in general...?" [ibidem] "2. What is the legitimization a definite individual has to assume, in the form of reality-proposition, the existence of a definite community in general...?" [ibidem] "3. The question of the origins of the awareness of community and the awareness concerning other people." [ibidem] "4. Very different from the hitherto listed is the problem of the empirical psychology...of the individual and the empirical developmental psychology of man as species-being, which arises in the relation to the origin and development of the concrete men's knowledge about concrete psychical surroundings and environments (Mit- und Umwelten)." [ibidem] "5. The complete theory of cognition of the community and the foreign I (the real I, soul) should comprise the metaphysics of this cognition and a view on the conditions of interactions...between souls." [ibidem] "6. The problem of individual and community and the I and 'Others' as psychic subjects is, after all, an axiological problem - in the most fundamental sense, both ethical and juridical." [ibidem] So viewed, the whole domain is very broad. In the context of the 'functional' anthropology, however, only the less fundamental still important (and from the point of view of anthropology - even more important) issues are to be raised. An analogy may help to convey these intuitions. On the level of general epistemology we can discuss if we are able to get any actual knowledge of the material world. I believe that such issues are legitimate part of the whole set of philosophical problems. However, if we are to develop a philosophy of physics, at least a dose of 'epistemic optimism' has to be assumed, and attention paid to such issues as precision of measurement, consequences of insolvability of some differential equations, etc.

Therefore, I assume - in accordance with every-day intuitions - that we know, to a degree, other people. I also assume that we know some people rather poorly, and some
of the irritating... Undoubtedly, the composition of these elements differ from person interesting. The second possibility matters.

and I do hate him' - does such a declaration say something about she who utters it or does

importance for any theory of the Other-cognition.

'man' is a complex totality of various traits - of 'virtues' and 'vices', of the ridicule and of the irritating... Undoubtedly, the composition of these elements differ from person to person; still virtually nobody is made 'iron' only, nor 'of marble', nor of any other single

'quasi-empirical': based on novels-reading or movies-seeing).

in its turn can be rather 'empirical' or, contrarily, more 'theoretical' - based on reading

of anthropology, the issue seems to be important. 

ATTITUDES TOWARD THEM?

seeing systematically, we should take into considerations the complex set of relations between self-knowledge, knowledge of 'concrete' Others, and 'personal' anthropology (that in its turn can be rather 'empirical' or, contrarily, more 'theoretical' - based on reading philosophers and psychologists; various in-between kinds are also possible - for instance 'quasi-empirical': based on novels-reading or movies-seeing).

of classical epistemological issues, the one discussed since Plato ad Aristotle, namely that of universality of knowledge and the singularity of being, is of particular importance for any theory of the Other-cognition.

Consider now a related issue. Let' start with considering some factors determining adequacy of Other's cognition.

Second, the problem of knowing Other's values. To know what is someone's set of preferences may be of some importance for the actions oriented at the Other. Thus, the problem is of importance for the issues of altruism, malice etc.

Third, the awareness of being-the-object-of-cognition may have some consequences in the determination of one's actions. Actions can be oriented, mainly or to a degree, a creating one's image.

Fourth, the self-cognition can both affect and be affected by the Others-cognition. The nature of these interrelations constitutes another area in the field being described here.

Fifth, at the very end of this sub-chapter, I will indicate a problem concerning relations between cognition of the Other and 'general' cognition. The just listed issues might be, I suppose, summarized in this question:

Q17. How do different ways (levels, etc.) of the cognition of the Others affect agent's attitudes toward them?

4.5.1. Accordingly to the schedule, I will start with considering some factors determining adequacy of Other's cognition. They may be of course numerous, but I don't claim for completeness; I focus my attention on the following factors: 'theory-ladenness' of cognition, the role of 'distance', the temporal dimension of cognition.

The first factor, then. This problem has already been discussed in another context; therefore, here I will but summarize those considerations. This problem is a very special case of the much more general epistemological issue known as 'theory-fact' or 'theory-observation' problem. Interestingly enough, it was discussed mainly in the context of physics, and in the domain of humanities - in the context of history. But also in the domain of anthropology, the issue seems to be important.

Seeing systematically, we should take into considerations the complex set of relations between self-knowledge, knowledge of 'concrete' Others, and 'personal' anthropology (that in its turn can be rather 'empirical' or, contrarily, more 'theoretical' - based on reading philosophers and psychologists; various in-between kinds are also possible - for instance 'quasi-empirical': based on novels-reading or movies-seeing).

If a person's attitude toward a person, toward an X, is determined by the 'individual nature' of X. The variable X stands here for this or that proper name. The point is that this assumption is by no means obvious. It does not mean that it must be false; it might be true. Thus, there is here an open problem that allows for various solutions. Let's analyze it in more detail.

It could be said that the agent considered in the standard models illustrates some existentialist, or rather personalist orientation. He regards any individual just as individual: specific, unexchangeable for any other, irreplaceable, being not an specimen of any collective category.

But it is quite possible that someone's attitude toward other people is much more realistic (here: opposed to 'nominalistic'): X is not regarded as Marry Smith, Jan Kowalski or Istvan Kovacs. S/he is regarded just as a woman, communist, or Hungarian. Or perhaps as a young woman, a politician, or a big-city dweller. Etc.

To use psychological terminology, we have arrived at the theory of stereotypes. It is not my goal to refer this theory in any detail. Rather, I want to emphasize its broader philosophical importance. I want to note also that theory of stereotypes reveals a similarity - Though rather distant - to Freud's theory of transference.

A good illustration to this problem can be found in Sartre's Existentialism in English version of Existentialisme est un humanisme: "given that man is free and that there is no human nature for me to depend on, I can not count men whom I do not know by relying on human goodness or man's concern for the good of society. I don't know what will become of the Russian revolution; I may make an example of it to the extent that at the present time it is apparent that the proletariat plays a part in Russia that it plays in no other nation. But I can't swear that this will inevitably lead to a triumph of the proletariat. I've got to limit myself to what I see." [Sartre,1962:598] Live the political naivete of Sartre aside; let's focus on the philosophical content of this passage. It demonstrates that Sartre's theory of the Other-cognition might be called (somewhat metaphorically) 'Humean'.

According to historians, the awareness of the moral relevance of the motives and intentions is a historical product of philosophy, religion, and law. We should ask the question of how such 'abstract' awareness really affects the way in which we perceive our fellow-men. Do we construct our images of the Others on the basis of their particular actions, or taking a view on their life-histories, or also - considering their verbal self-interpretations?

Everyday-life (spontaneous, common...) philosophy which usually expresses either optimistic or pessimistic image of man (which is to be - from his nature - either 'good' or 'bad', either 'active' or 'lazy', either 'thinking' or 'thoughtless') probably does not create...
them, but expressing what has already existed, may contribute to the social reproduction of those images.

In this context, we could undertake also the problem of self-fulfilling predictions. It may happen, for instance, that someone was influenced by literature of a sort (think, say, about Celine). This literature forms his ‘pessimistic’ vision of man. And this vision is functioning as kind of ‘filter’ which rejects the positive information about people while preserves the negative one. And this negative information co-determines negative attitude toward people. And this attitude arises negative reaction. - The circle of reinforcement is turning on. - This is a relatively simple mechanism. More complex may operate, either. For instance - ‘idealism’ (to be found, say, in the literature ‘for young girls’) may generate ‘over-optimistic’ perception of the men. Nevertheless, after a time, a number of negative experiences may bring about a dramatic (‘catastrophic’ - in the sense of R. Thom) breakdown of this idealist vision, abruptly giving way to a ‘black’ one.

We could sum up these brief considerations in the following way. The ‘theory-ness’ of cognition (experience, perception...) is hardly disputable fact. But, to put it in the very general way, the ‘power’ and the mechanism s of the theory-experience interactions need not be identical in all ‘region’ of reality, thus is all domains of its cognition. Thus, the special anthropological variant of the problem is not a simple concretization of its general form, but a problem in its own right.

As an illustration, take the view presented by the known psychoanalyst: ‘Erotic love enchants man of [a] type, for it means for him the utmost fulfillment. /.../ Nothing surprising then that a man feeling in such a way happens to divide people into those who are granted with love and those who are not. Not money and not social position, but whether someone has a spouse or love-partner or has not - it divides people” [Horney, 1978:344]

The second factor: the role of ‘distance’. In other words, the problem of the ‘agent-Other’ relations as a factor determining the adequacy of the cognition of the Other is to be discussed. To formulate it more precisely we have to refer to the idea of ‘distance’ between two individuals. The concept of ‘distance’ lacks one important formal trait (which characterizes the standard geometrical notion of ‘distance’), namely symmetry: X may be in love with Y, thus Y being ‘close’ to X, but at the same time Y may be indifferent toward Y.

The idea of ‘distance’ needs further specification; the distance is to be ‘measured’ along various coordinates, or - in relation to various dimensions. Accordingly to the analyses conducted in the point 4.3.4., we can speak of two dimensions, at least. The first one is ‘Schuetzian’, the second ‘Meadian’.

Let’s make two notes. One after Horney who states that “the need for total submission generates the necessity to idealize the partner” [Horney, 1978:364] And one after Scheler. According to his analysis, “there may be emotional acts which are conditioned by the pronouncement of a judgment (or better - evaluation). It seems to me that ‘respect’ is such an act. It presupposes this primary distance toward an object, and this distance - before the emotional act takes place - only makes possible the estimation of the value; in it - in the scope of intention - the value of the object must be actually given. Love and hate lack just in this distance.” [Scheler, 1980:231]

The problem that arises here can be summarized into the question of Plessner: “Does love dazzle or, contrarily - opens the eyes?” [Plessner, 1988:32]

Two, or three, groups of answers can be considered. On the one hand, a group of ‘linear’ (in fact: monotonic) relations. This group may be further subdivided into one comprising ‘positive’ relations (the closer is someone, the better he can be cognized; ‘open eyes’), and one - including ‘negative’ ones (‘dazzled eyes’). And the second (or third) group consists of ‘nonlinear’ dependencies: an ‘optimal’ (for the cognition) distance is assumed.

Another problem can be defined on the basis of a psychological experiment described by David L. Rosenhan in his essay On Normal People in an Abnormal Environment. This experiment demonstrated the relative (at least in special social context, in the quoted case - of the mental hospitals) easiness of labeling people. The normal people were regarded as ‘abnormal’, though after having been received as psychiatric patients, they did not simulate any mental disorder. Rosenhan speaks of ‘depersonalization’ and demonstrates that ‘depersonalized’ attitudes reproduces itself smoothly: individual defined, so to say, in a contextual way, loses - in the eyes of the defining individual - his personal character, and in turn he arises no cognitive interest in the defining individual. [Rosenhan, 1978:71-75]

This experiment offers the most vivid example of the phenomenon which - in less evident forms - is much more widespread. In the philosophical text, we should not neglect one of the most elaborate analyses of the phenomenon in question. I mean here of the Sartre’s study of Jean Genet’s biography. I will refer to the brief presentation of Saint-Genet, comedien et martyr to be found in the excellent of Sartre’s philosophy by W. Gromczyński. Genet, as a ten-years old child was noticed while taking money from a drawer. He was defined as a ‘theft’. For two or three years, he was not steal. But “for those who are observing him, it does not matter. They are... convinced that Genet’s evil dispositions will manifest itself in favorable conditions. Genet knows that even he commits no crime, people will be alertive and susceptible toward him. He has himself believed that he is evil to the core.” [Gromczyński, 1969:293]

The third factor: time. Let’s consider now the issue of the determinants and mechanisms of the cognition of the Others. I would confine my attention to two points.

First, the ‘quantitative’, temporal, dimension of inter-individual relations. According to a popular proverb, you should to have eaten a peck of salt with somebody, if you are to know him well. In other words, the epistemic quality of an individual’s knowledge about the Other should be a function of the time this individual has spent with this Other.

This intuition seems to be plausible, and up to a degree - almost evidently valid. In fact, it hardly can be objected that our knowledge about the Other is - if we have know him for years - more profound than in the case of the Other whom we have known for a few minutes, since, say, the moment he sat next to us on the park-bench. On the other hand, there is little doubt that time of life is not ‘uniform’, ‘homogenous’... But if some temporal intervals of someone’s life are more ‘dense’, ‘relevant’ etc., then also the ‘cognitive relevance’ of some physically equal intervals may differ. One can hardly doubt that he who has seen a person saving life of a drowning man, or - contrarily - beating cruelly a child, has to a degree a better knowledge of this person than someone who has known this very person for years, but only from incidental, unimportant contacts.

All these reservations concerning non-uniformity of life-time having been made, the problem of the relevance of time (in a sense: a very special case of the problem of induction) remains open: the relevance of time depends on the constancy of the individual nature of the given man: if the individual nature remains unchanged then the temporal dimensions matters, ceteris paribus; but if a ‘revolution’ or ‘catastrophe’ has taken place in the individual’s life, then the temporal dimension becomes irrelevant. This reservation is not, however, so strong as it might appear. In nobody’s life such homological revolutions occur every day, or every month; possibly not even every year. If it were so, then the temporal dimension would preserve its importance, if limited to the recent, ‘post-revolutionary’ period of life.

4.5.2. According to our plan, the question of knowing Other’s values is now to be in focus. As it has already been shown, the phrase ‘taking into account the other’s values’ can be
referred to as different attitudes as those of malice and love. Nevertheless, it calls for the further analytical inspection. To my eyes, at least the following issues deserve some attention:

First, the question of knowing the other’s values. (Of course, this question arises only if we assume that the axiological structures /perhaps one should add: of the contemporaries, or - of the mates, or still other reservation of this sort/ are /considerably divergent.) This question might be further split:

(1) The question of stability of axiological structures matters (if these structures change at relatively high pace, even a loving person may have difficulties with keeping pace with these changes).

(2) The problem of self-transparency of the individual as the axiological subject. (A Freudian theme of the hidden motives is but a part of the issue. It might be said that Freudian theory shares an important feature with the Cartesian tradition: individual is furnished with a well defined axiological structure, either fully visible ‘in the light of consciousness’ or hidden ‘in the darkness of the unconsciousness’. But, as noted in the point 4.2.3, it’s possible that individuals at least sometime do not have any well-established axiological structure.)

(3) The question of the ‘verbal expressibility’ of the axiological structures. (One could note that this is a problem that has been artistically explored by I. Bergman, for instance.) More generally, the possibility of inter-individual communication is to be discussed in this context.

(4) If we distinguish one’s ‘private’ and ‘public’ values (the former being the actual ones, the latter - the only verbally declared), we’ll be able to expect that some actions are subjectively love-guided and objectively - pain-causing, or subjectively malicious and objectively joy-bringing.

If we assume the positive answer to the question about actual role of the awareness of the intention-action distinction, we will be able to say that the knowledge about the Other’s values decides (more or less definitely) how the Other’s actions are interpreted - as, say, malice, ‘mistake’ or compassion.

4.5.3. The cognition of the Other and his presentation-of-the-self - so might be characterized the subject of this point. Start our considerations with citing some Ingarden’s remarks. "If we did not know - on the basis of our own experience - that we could learn about other people’s psychical states through direct and evident perception, then we would not be afraid of the other people being able in favorite circumstances to learn what is going on inside us, we would not hide ourselves, we would not put on us various masks, we would not lie them with our very behavior only for that nobody intrude into the sphere of our intimacy." [Ingarden, 1970:426]

Similar issues seem to be discussed in Lacan’s Les quatre concepts fondateurs de la psychoanalyse; I say ‘seem’ since may opinion is based not on the reading of this work but on its short summary presented by P. Dybel. The problem being relevant here is presented thus: "the tendency to submitting to illusory substitutes of regard...can be observed on the level of inter-human relations also. It is here the consequence of the existence of the fundamental asymmetry between the way in which the subject sees himself, and the way in which he is seen by the other. It opens for the subject the possibility of presenting to the other the ‘appearance’ of himself; showing himself being such as he wants to be seen by the other, and not as he actually is. On the other hand, the subject is given for a prey to illusory images of the other." [Dybel, 1997:220]
4.5.4. In the present section, we are going to make an overview of the possible relations between self-cognition and the cognition of the Others.

Let start from a quote which not only introduces us into the very gist of the problem but also points out to its wider relevance. In a book On Revolution, we read: "Robespierre's morbid distrust of people (the closest friends including) arose, in the last instance, from the - rather normal - self-suspicion". [Arendt, 1991b:97] Arendt suggests, and doing so she seems to follow the Cartesian way of thinking. Not to say that we do not have to speak about Cartesianism. Also the popular dictum says: 'The well-fed will never understand the hungry.' This intuition lies at the bottom of those theories of Other-cognition which could be characterized as 'theories of introjection'.

But, on the other hand, we might claim that in fact we first have some images of our fellowmen: we evaluate them as 'good' or 'evil', 'nice' or 'rough'...and only on this ground, on the way of comparison, we should evaluate ourselves (and self-evaluation contains 'at once' its cognitive aspect).

We could also claim that self-knowledge and knowledge-of-Others are mutually independent. - In sum, we have three very simple theories concerning this problem. More complex (and probably more true) are to be articulated.

An important part of any image (both self-image and Other-image) is an evaluation. And the simplest consequence of this fact is the comparison between theses images, or - between the evaluations they contain. It may happen that these evaluations are in equilibrium. Then, nothing particular happens (or, at least, it seems so - more subtle analysis might demonstrate here some effects?)

But it happens that the comparison is negative for the comparing person. And such a situation is more or less painful for the given individual. Therefore, he tries - all other factors equal - to diminish the painfulness. Two (pure) strategies are a priori applicable. He can elevate one's own value. And second, one can diminish the value of the Others. ('mix' strategies seem possible too.)

Two groups of standard questions can be formulated. First, on the mechanisms determining the choice of the first or the second (or the 'mix') strategy. And second, it can be guessed that the type of strategies people choose has some further - psychological and sociological - consequences.

It is still to be noted that the issue of inferiority complex, occupying central position in the psychology of Adler, the inferiority complex, is to be partly located in the are we are looking here.

The problem of the cognition of the Other is discussed here not sub specie philosophia perennis, but as a part of (meta-)anthropology of acting man. Therefore, the relation between self-cognition and Other-cognition is viewed here mainly as a part of a broader relation which is composed of the two elements but also of the Other-oriented attitudes.

In this context, the problem of how self-cognition influences the way in which someone behaves himself toward the Others is to be undertaken now.

We start from an opinion formulated by a Polish psychologist, Koziielecki: "excessive self-concentration may disturb and unsettle contacts with other people. In L. Berkowitz's opinion..., it diminishes ability to empathy and motivation to undertaking altruistic actions." [Koziielecki, 1986:335]

In other words, cognitive self-concentration may contribute to the fostering general (in particular - moral) egocentrism. But, on the other hand, it may be that if the interest in self-cognition goes beyond a level, it may result in 'reified' attitude toward reality, including people, in most extreme case - including oneself. Thus, a hypothesis (in fact, a sketch of a family of hypotheses) may be formulated claiming for the existence of an optimal (relative, say, to compassionate attitude toward the Others) level of the cognitive self-interest.

4.5.5. At the very end of this sub-chapter, I want but to indicate a problem concerning relations between cognition of the Other and 'general' cognition.

I'll avail of Hannah Arendt's reflections on Eichmann's personality. Among other vices (or defects of character), she finds in him - boastfulness. With this vice, in her view - a common one, she juxtaposes another, of which she says: "his absolute inability to look at anything from the point of view of another man - this was the more specific and the more important as to its consequences defect of Eichmann's character." [Arendt, 1985:61-62]

The following observation should also be quoted. "The longer one was listening to him, the more clearly one could see that there was a close link between his inability to speak and his inability to think, namely to think from the position of another man." [Arendt, 1985:64]

The important problem which arises here concerns the nature of the defect in question. Briefly put, is it rather of 'intellectual' character, or of 'moral' one? In other words, is it an aspect of the peculiarities of individual's information processing, or a side of his emotional orientation and attitudes toward people?

The context in which these considerations are made, confirms the relevance of the problem for the theories beyond the scope of anthropology.
5. Decision-making (or: action-undertaking)

In the previous two chapters, I have discussed 'syntax' (the formal structure of action) and axiology. Now, following the logic of the basic model (so-called humanist interpretation, or rational-choice model), I want to discuss how the maximization principle could be modified. In other words, we may task in this chapter is to describe a space of the models of decision-making or, alternatively put, of action-undertaking (the distinction; action-undertaking - action-realization will display its relevance in the next chapter devoted to 'pragmatics' of actions).

5.1. Strategies of decision-making

I will commence with the concept of the strategy of decision-making. The consequent of the principle of rationality describes one of such strategies. I want to assume that a set of possible strategies of decision-making is given. For this set, I would like to suggest the following classification.

First, we could divide all decision-making strategies into two groups. The first group is composed of endogenous ('autonomous', 'internal') strategies, while the second - of exogenous ('heteronomous', 'external', ...) ones. The idea of this division could be formulated thus. An agent can work out his decision himself or he can, so to say, 'order' the making the decision he needs. Any decision-situation is somewhat similar to, say, designing one's apartment (being a special case of the generic type of situation). One can design it himself, but one can hire a designer. We will soon see some limitations to this analogy.

Second, these two groups should be further subdivided. The set of endogenous strategies could be divided thus. In the first step, we could distinguish 'searching-strategies' and 'non-searching-strategies'. Any searching strategy consists in considering a set of possible courses of action, and choosing one of them. In the case of non-searching strategies, the agent just assumes a way of acting without considering alternatives.

Each of these sets can be further subdivided. The set of 'searching-strategies' is composed of two types strategies, namely of the 'optimizing' and the 'satisfying' ones. Actually, the set of optimizing strategies consists of one element as defined by Kmita-Patryas' model. The set of satisfying strategies consists of indefinite number of Simon-type strategies as defined in the model of bounded rationality.

As regards the subset of 'non-searching strategies', I am less sure as to their further classification. At this moment I can only say that a few types of non-searching strategies might be, I suppose, distinguished. The first type comprises 'conservative' strategy: if you can, follow the decision you already made in the past. But we can also think of 'innovative' strategy: do not follow the decision you made in the past; make an other - perhaps even: opposite - choice.

And 'imitational' strategy recommends: do as others do; follow the pattern of behavior adopted by some other people.

It should be noted that these strategies are not always applicable. 'Conservative' (but also 'innovative!') one is obviously applicable only when the 'new' situation is similar to an 'old' one. And the 'imitational' one can be adopted only if some other people are there is a similar situation.

The set of 'exogenous' strategies comprises two groups. The first of them comprises 'persons-based strategies', the second - 'non-personal' strategies.

As regards the first group, the strategies it is composed of can be characterized thus. We can ask an other person to make the decision on our behalf. It should be stressed that this way of conduct should be analytically distinguished from obeying someone's orders: in the case in question, an agent is seeking for someone who would like to decide on his behalf - insists on someone's, even of an unfamiliar person, involvement in his affairs.

As regards the second group, the strategies consist in leaving the decision to the Fate: a die, leaves of a flower, lots... - we know quite a few methods, occasionally adopted by many of us.

This classification of strategies does not seem to be very satisfactory. Unfortunately, I have not found any better. Thus, since the problem is important, to present such a classification is better than to present none. And having a classification of various - logically possible - strategies, we can maintain that humanist interpretation (rational-choice theory) is not tautological.

5.2. Aspects of situation

Now I will discuss the notion of 'situation' which should probably remain a primitive concept of a (meta-)anthropology. It does not entail that it does not deserve more close inspection. Quite contrarily. More systematic analysis should demonstrate that this category is a complex one, and these complexities are relevant in the description and explanation of actions.

I believe that at least the following facets of any situation should be taken into consideration. In other words, the following characteristics should be regarded as potentially relevant for the action being undertaken in the given situation:

5.2.1. Time. Considering actions which are composed of outcomes located at time-moments 'beyond' one's life (after one's death) might appear at first glance of pure speculative character. It is not so. Some people believe in the immortality (of soul, of person...). Thus, any systematic anthropology should take into account that some people are motivated by the desire for salvation, or by the fear of eternal damnation. If we think of anthropology being a basis for philosophy of History (as the present author does), then these problems should not be neglected: there is little doubt that motivation of this kind has played a role in History. (If, however the question should be picked up in a more systematic way, the metaphysical 'surrounding' of anthropology should be much more explored than it is possible in the present text.)

I think that at least on the most general level of anthropological considerations we should allow for the possibility of the situation in which the involved person desires 'heroic death' (according to Weber, "in the Brahmin ethic the king was explicitly enjoined to seek death in battle one he had beheld his grandson." [Weber,1968:532]) (At this moment, we might note an additional argument in favor of meta-philosophical strategy. From any materialist position, the Christian faith in the immortality of soul may be so much 'fantastic' as the Indian faith in reincarnation. However, it would be empirically - in the sense of empirical sociology and historiography - false to maintain that no meaning, except for the emotive one, can be assigned to the respective sets of opinions.)
Elster notes that, according to his knowledge, "Marx never...discussed...fatalities that may befall men, such as disease or accident, nor does he refers to the implications of man's mortality. Yet the limited and unknown span of human life has profound consequences for human nature...An implicit reference to man's mortality, however, underlies the view that even in communism the economization of time will remain of paramount importance." [Elster, 1985:61] This note is to illustrate that the issue of situation-time is not only of anthropological interest but may also have more far-reaching consequences.

But even if we limit ourselves to the mundane motivation, the after-death time horizon deserves attention. There are various activities which are motivated by such considerations. Possibly most common practice of this kind is making up a testament. You should not to speak at once about some present-day interests of the testator: some keep their last will in secret, while the will itself happens to be in detail considered.

Let me also remind an idea I was speaking about in the Preface. I mean Hans Jonas's ethics of responsibility. The main idea of this ethics (and of many others articulating ecological concerns) is that of being responsible for the life-conditions for the generations to come. I believe that it is an important though possibly 'utopian' idea. But how much utopian? It depends on the time-horizon of individual decisions. Not only actual but also possible. We could ask if it possible that most of human beings should take into considerations the fate of those who will live in one hundred or two hundred years. I do not know whether the answer is positive. Yet, I think that the negative one is by no means self-evident.

In this context we should mention the concept of hope and its cognate terms such as fear, optimism, pessimism ant the like. Interestingly enough, these issues have recently been undertaken in the spirit of analytical philosophy (For instance, J.P. Day's essay on Hope.)

Now, I should invoke the issue (to be discussed more systematically in the next chapter) of the (sense of) personal identity. The sense can be more or less 'strong' (resp. 'weak'). It can be suggested that also this factor influences the way in which people make their decisions. In particular, it may be supposed that the 'degree of deliberateness' depends - for a given person - on the 'power' of his sense of personal identity: if the power is relatively great, 'the degree of deliberateness' changes little; if the power is relatively small, this degree changes in a considerable way. In other words: in the first case, the decisions considering actions with temporally distant outcomes are made in the same way as those considering actions with outcomes being close in time; in the second case, 'the degree of deliberateness' decreases relatively to the increasing temporal distance between the possible act and its supposed outcome.

It may be also suggested that people differ as to their sense of personal identity, and therefore - given the dependence characterized above - people differ as to the way in which they make decisions about distant future.

Such issues are considered in Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons. Having not had this book in my hands, I will quote a brief summary made by Elster: "The person is 'nothing but' a more or less tightly connected sequence of mental and bodily states. The looser the connections, the more similar are our future states of other persons, and the more difficult it is to defend temporal neutrality on the sole ground of rationality. /\ Many economists arrive at a similar conclusion through different arguments. On the descriptive view of rationality as consistancy, there is nothing irrational about discounting per se, as long as it does not give rise to choice reversals. Some would argue that even the normative concept of rationality is consistent with time discounting. To argue otherwise, they say, is to use rationality as a guide to the choice of ends, instead of its proper but subordinate place as a guide to the choice of means. Preferring the present over the future is like preferring apples over oranges, and de gustibus non est disputandum." [Elster, 1986b:10-11]

5.2.2. The complexity of the situation. Situation can be characterized by a set of actions which can be undertaken. Such sets can be composed of different numbers of actions. If the number is small, we can assume that ceteris paribus the principle of rationality just holds. If the number becomes greater, the principle becomes less and less plausible, and Simon's theory of so-called bounded rationality (cf. a brief presentation of this theory in [Crozier & Friedberg, 1982:294-301]) becomes more adequate: decision-making is getting oriented at finding 'satisfying' rather than 'optimal' solutions.

It may be noted that while we can speak of one theory of 'absolute rationality', we should speak of a class of theories of 'bounded rationality': various theories of the second type differ, at least, as to 'level of complexity' which separates situations in which the principle of optimality is supposed to operate from those in which the satisfying-principle plays determining role.

5.2.3. The degree of 'particularity' of the specific actions and their possible outcomes. It may happen that all the outcomes 'almost' the same (the satisfactions from drinking 'Coca-Cola' or 'Pepsi-cola' be an example) or - contrarily - they are very different; many 'in-between' situations are also possible. It might be, for instance, supposed that in (as to their 'internal differentiation') situations various models hold: roughly, if possible actions/outcomes are very different, the principle of rationality holds. If the actions/outcomes are very similar, decisions are rather 'accidental'. In the case of 'in-between' situations Simonian mechanism seems to operate.

5.2.4. The 'absolute' (as opposed to 'relative' - discussed in 5.2.3) values of the possible outcomes: it might be that the worst possible outcome can be nevertheless of positive value, and - other way round - the best possible outcome can be of negative value. It could be suggested that in the second case people are more 'prudent' than in the first one, thus also their behavior approximates the model of rational action in the first case better than in the second. Yet, it is but a hypothesis. In general, a question can be formulated: does individual choose between various positive values (between greater and lesser good) in the same way as between various negative values (greater evil and lesser)? Or grasping the problem still in somewhat different way: does the difference between maximal and minimal values (between the best and the worst outcomes) of possible actions matter, or it does not?

A related issue might be put so: do people choose in the same way between on one hand - 'very small' and 'small' (though positive) value, and - on the other - between 'big' and 'very big'. In other words, we should consider if the 'poor' and the 'rich' adopt similar or different strategies. This question is of direct sociological or even historiosophical importance: it was addressed in a way by Weber, and his answer to it is a part of his theory of rationalization; similarly - and this similarity is by no means accidental - a solution of this problem plays its part in Galbraith's theory of poverty.

This issue seems to be related with the problem of emotions-cognition-action. In the perspective generated by this problem, we could classify situations differently. We could speak of strong emotions as aroused by 'very big' ('hot') - either positive or
negative values, and of weak aroused by 'small' ('cool') - again: either positive or negative values. It could be suggested that we act differently if the situation is strongly 'emotions-laden' (either positively or negatively) and differently if its 'emotional temperature' is more moderate. 'Differently' might mean here: more (in 'cool' situations) or less (in 'hot' ones) deliberately. In particular, some situations may be perceived as very dangerous. Such situations often engender fear. And, obviously, fear quite often modifies the way in which we behave, and in particular - the way in which we make our decisions.

5.2.5. As other side of the same question may be regarded the problem of risk - here the point is not which strategy he chooses but how the determinacy (resp. indeterminacy) of outcomes affects the very process of decision-making: it might be that the very 'risk-ness' of the given situation modifies the way in which the decision is being made.

5.2.6. In 5.2.3. and 5.2.4. a tacit assumption is important: all the possible actions and their outcomes are, so to say, of the same sort. This assumption should be discussed and its role should be specified. It is to be done in two steps. In the first step, we should compare two situation, each being 'homogenous'. The latter notion seems to be intuitively simple, but its definition would be rather difficult; thus some examples only: someone is to decide whether to spend his winter holiday in Karpacz or Szklarska Poręba or... - it surely is a homogenous situation; similarly if someone else wants to spend his evening in theater and is to decide if to see 'Hamlet' or 'Faust' or... It might be that someone is very keen of skiing but visits theater rather seldom, just to 'be a cultural man'; and it might be that someone else is a connoisseur of theater and in winter needs just some rest and 'fresh air'. One could guess that these two persons being in 'the same' situation may make their respective decisions differently. In other words, we could maintain that the way the decision is being made depends on the importance of the given value in the overall axiological system of the individual.

5.2.7. In the next step we should take into consideration 'heterogeneous' situations. A specific part of those situations comprises 'tragic' situations such as in the previously cited Sartre's example: to stay with one's dying mother or to join resistance-movement (assume that we consider a man who strongly loves his mother and who at the same time has a strong sense of patriotic duty). I am afraid that rational-choice theory has very little, if anything, to say about such situations. Yet, it does not mean that someone who is in such a situation should not be rational. If anything is 'irrational', it is not the man who has to make such a decision, but 'irrational' is the situation which faces the man with such dilemmas.

5.2.8. Dramatic situations, such as those having been experienced by the prisoners of concentration camps, face us with other question, one being related in a sense with Maslow's problem: Is freedom of choice a kind of 'luxury' being striven for when more basic needs have been satisfied, or - as Victor Frankel maintains (having himself experienced this situation) - is a 'basic good'? In other words, should problems to be decided be relatively unimportant if the decision are to be 'rational', or even in extremely difficult situations man can behave rationally? In still other formulation, do man's basic needs (of water and bread, of lack of pain) have to be satisfied, if man is to consider various options, or even if they are not satisfied, he can - if only being conscious - to make his decisions, for instance - to follow some moral rules he accepts.

5.2.9. Special attention should be directed towards Jaspers' 'limiting situations'. In the words of B. Rudziński (the author of the fundamental monographic book on Jaspers' philosophy), 'of limiting character are not, according to Jaspers, those situations that manifest themselves to uninterested observer, but those we come across while striving in the life-practice at actualizing the postulate included in the structure of the classical metaphysics: to find the relation with the Absolute and experience what is comprised in the sense-framing. Only while striving for absolute value, I experience suffering, death, guilt, struggle as the proofs of its absence. Only in this striving for the permanent, for the giving-absolute-relevance, individual experiences the absence of the Absolute. The absence of the Absolute - it is the definition of the limiting situations." [Rudziński, 1980:62] What can be said about decisions being undertaken in such situations. Are they usually more rational than those being made in more standard situations, or - contrarily - less?

5.2.10. The category of situation, as understood for instance in Patryas' model, seems to denote something which is 'just given' to the individual being its subject. In the points 5.2.1. - 5.2.7. I have de facto accepted this interpretation. Still, this tacit assumption is far from being obvious. We need here some more sophisticated categories. Perhaps we should make a distinction between 'actual situation', being given to its subject 'at the first sight', and 'could-be situation', to be possibly discovered by the agent. Or perhaps we could say about 'pre-reflexive situation' and 'post-reflexive' one. No matter which words we might prefer; anyway, we should - I believe - make a distinction of this kind.

And analyzing situations in the framework of this distinction, we could say that a special faculty of human consciousness, namely 'imagination' determines our ability to recognize the possible states of the world and not only the actual ones. It is interesting that this epistemological qualification accounts - according to Sartre - for man's specific ontological position, namely for his freedom [Sartre, 1970:335-338] Commencing with these Sartrian ideas, we can proceed further and discuss other problems.

These ambiguities of the notion of 'situation' have something to do with an other opposition that should not be neglected. Let's look first at two exemplary situations.

First situation. Mr. Smith has received some unexpected money. He deliberates (possibly with his wife and/or children, etc.) how to spend this money. It is conceivable that his actual behavior will approximate one that may be expected on the ground of the humanist interpretation. And second one. Mr. Jones wants to buy a new and expensive car. Estimating his income, we might be able to say that he hardly can afford such a purchase. Nevertheless, he is very resolved to buy it. He may undertake a number of actions in order to achieve this goal. The set of the possible actions seems to be much less 'articulated' than in former case.

It may be maintained that in both situations their respective subjects act 'rationally' in the rather intuitive sense of the word. Still, if we try to apply the humanist interpretation (as an explication of the notion of 'rationality') we will notice a difference. We could say that in the first case the means are given and the goal is looked for, and in the second - the goal is given and the means are looked for.

Those who act in accordance with the second pattern follow (even if in a small scale) the call of a great Polish romantic poet, Adam Mickiewicz: "Mierz sily na
zamiatę, Nie zamia podlgu sił (Measure your power by the yard-stick of your intentions, and not your intention by that of your power); for that: "Tam sięgaj, gdzie wzrok nie sięga" (Reach beyond the reach of your sight). Let's ask once again: do they act rationally?

I think that the first situation-action might be designated as 'passive' (responsive, reactive, conservative... one), while the second - as 'active' (intentional, creative, transforming...). It may be that the ways of decision-making are different in 'passive' and 'active' situations, respectively.

5.2.12. There is still another direction in which the analysis of situation as 'the given' could proceed; namely, the subject-aspects of situation should be discussed. In particular, we should analyze the question of individual's capabilities. In Patryas' model, agent's capabilities are regarded as given. The only complexity taken in this model into account is the problem of adequacy of agent's knowledge about his capabilities.

One of the idealizational assumptions says that the agent knows that he is able to perform any action of the given set and only such an action. The only important modification introduced by Patryas consists in dividing people into 'risk-prone' and 'not-risk-prone'. Those being members of the fist group undertake actions oriented at the most preferred state, irrespective of self-knowledge, while the others choose among actions they are sure they are able to perform.

I would say that even on this level, many specific questions arise. In particular, our self-knowledge need not be characterized subjectively in the Boolean way. It may be that we suppose that we are able to perform an action, and that the 'power' of those supposition differs from total certainty to total uncertainty.

It may be that the self-knowledge is a value. Therefore, an agent can choose just the action of which he does not know if he is able to perform it or not; he can do it in order to improving his self-knowledge.

5.2.12. And if we were to stay inside the domain of theory of action, narrowly defined, we could limit ourselves to the modifications of assumptions concerning agent's knowledge about his capabilities. But if we are working in the domain of (meta-)anthropology such a limitation would be a serious negligence. We have to discuss the problem of capabilities as such.

The first, and simplest, remark is that. Many abilities (if not almost all of them) can be acquired only in practical way. You can learn to swim by swimming, to dance by dancing, to solve algebraic equations by solving them. Etc. This does not seem to be a serious challenge to the humanist interpretation; nevertheless, some specifications would be wanted, specially when more formal approach is taken.

Second, many abilities can be acquired in an 'artificial' way. The learning of foreign languages could be a good example. This very example demonstrates that such a way need not be the best one. Quite contrarily, it may be claimed that there is a more natural way (one in which acquiring language skills is a by-product of 'real' - and not artificially arranged - communication). - This time decision is to be made as to the strategy of developing one's skills.

Third, the ability to acquire some skills may be also a goal of conscious actions. - Today, it is quite fashionable to maintain that the task of schools and academies is not to teach biology or history, but - to teach how to learn. In other words, the student is not to learn a specific subject but to learn how to learn. We could easily iterate this formula, and could maintain that the task is to learn how to learn....how to learn. - That there is some sense in this fashion, I wouldn't object. But how much? We should know more about human capabilities, if the answer were to be more than a mere declaration.

There are some further analytical subtleties concerning skills, that would deserve scrutiny. Consider an extreme case. To be able to kill a man (or, even, to avail of much more common issue, - to kill a fish to be eaten during Christmas party) - does this characteristic comprise but some physical skills or also some moral (emotional) ones? Is everybody who consciously and without any moral hesitations accepts capital punishment able to execute it, even if the action is mechanized and its performance is reduced - behaviorally - to, say, pressing a button? I have no clear intuition as to the way in which these questions should be answered. Anyway, it seems to me that beyond this analytical problem a more profound issues lurk.

There are still further some substantial questions concerning skills. Of all of them, I'd like to mention only the problem of the repetition of an action of a sort and the relevant skills.

One stance is expressed in the popular dictum: Practice makes master. It might be somewhat specified thus: the more often one performs actions of the given type, the more masterly he does it.

That stance might be opposed with a thesis which would express the intuitions contained in reflections on alienation, boredom, and the like. According to this stance, beyond a threshold, the over-repetition of actions may result in decreasing level of the relevant skills.

As it is easily noticeable, we have arrived at anthropological issues that lie at the bottom of the debate over positive/negative aspects of the division of labor. And since the latter concept can be (as I had the opportunity to argue elsewhere) made a key concept of a theory of History, this issue may also turn out to be not only of anthropological importance, but also of broader significance.

5.3. Types of situations and types of decision-making strategies

Now, I would like to combine some remarks made in the two previous points. In other words, I'm going to sketch some ways along which the answers to the following question might be looked for:

Q18 How do various aspects of situations determine the decision-making strategies?

To avoid very formal presentation of the basic idea, let us begin with an intuition. In order to present it, discuss an example.

Say that a John is to decide where to spend his summer holidays. Let's assume that he prefers swimming and sun-bathing on sandy beaches over any other form of resting. Therefore he decides to go to a sea-side resort. However, he likes both, say, Międzyzdroje and Sopot (or, if you prefer, Saint Tropez and Biarritz). Thus, he asks a friend (who, incidentally, is not to spend his holiday in any of those resorts) for a suggestion and, following it, decides to go to Międzyzdroje (or Biarritz...). Since he has always rented apartments, he does not consider, even for a while, whether to stay in a hotel or on a camping: he just continues his own holiday-tradition. Still, he has to choose a particular apartment. The information allows for no particular decision.
Therefore, he puts at random his finger on a list of 'for-rent' apartments and thus makes his final decision.

This short story is to convey two ideas. First, the set of actions being possible in a situation may be viewed as equipped with a classification. And if a classification is given, then a decision which not wrongly can be - in a context - seen as a simple one, in another context - that of this classification - can be seen, contrarily, as a complex one: choosing a group of actions, choosing a sub-group, choosing a sub-sub-group, etc. Second, it is not logically necessary (as the story demonstrates it) that all the partial decisions be based on the same strategy; contrarily, it is possible that making the final decision can be - in a situation - based at various 'moments' upon various strategies.

The just debated issue is closely related to the iteration-problem and the problem of second-order preferences; the notion of meta-values appears here again.

The point is that an agent can (though need not to) be aware of the strategy(ies) he adopts while making his decisions. And being aware of it/them he can (though - again - need not to) assume an attitude toward his 'style of decision-making'.

Before further considerations, let me say that the considered issue is not purely speculative one. Well, it is obvious that evaluating one's 'style of decision-making' - again - need not to) assume an attitude toward his 'style of decision-making'.

Various rationalistic theories of man (of action) are called rational-choice theories. - With noting this fact and commenting upon it, we could open the next chapter on (meta-)philosophy of the acting man.

The emphasis is to be on the word 'choice' (resp.decision). The point is that in some situations the action is almost fully completed with the very act of decision-making: the practical accomplishing of the decision is - though in a way crucial yet theoretically - trivial fact: While shopping or ordering a meal at a restaurant, the key point is to decide what to buy or to order. And asking the shop-assistant (waiter) for the chosen item and paying for it is from the social ('external') point of view (most, specially as regards paying) important still from the individual ('internal') point but a minor aspect of the given action. Similarly, the act of voting (by pressing the button or by show of hands) as being performed by, say, a member of parliament is (most often) but a mere consequence of the political decision to say 'yes' or 'no'.

On the other side, to consider the most extreme opposite case, it may be guessed that between the (conscious, let's say more - deliberate and elaborate) decision about murdering someone and accomplishing it must be - at least in some cases - if not an abyss then at least a deep cleavage, described for instance in Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment.

The opposition between the most trivial everyday activity of a consumer and the tragic activity of a murderer introduces the central question of this passage.

(We might add a remark, to be possibly discussed in the context of a sociology of knowledge, that the image of man presented in the rational-choice theories, it's focus of interest, seems to reflect - mainly, though not exclusively - experiences of consumers on the one hand, and of various bureaucrats on the other.)

But before going into more systematic analysis of this question, let's discuss briefly another case. A surgeon is to operate on his own child. What can be said about the quality of the operation? On the one hand, following the Patryas' model and assuming, rather in accordance with common knowledge, that most people care for their children more than for other persons, we should expect that the operation would be performed in the best possible way. However, following again common knowledge, we should not be so sure about it. There is a reason to suppose that what is believed to be positive factor may turn out a negative one: such a situation may be a source of strong motivation or of 'emotional stress' which - in the extreme case - might make the operation impossible.

The following literary example may be also illustrative for our problem. The title-hero of the Pirandello's novel The Late Mattia Pascal makes at a moment such a confession: "I had decided that I would not be cruel to Miss Caporale. I had decided so but - alas! - I was cruel, though I did not want it: I was even the more cruel the less I wanted it." [Pirandello,1983:172] In a perspective (say that of Schopenhauer-Wolniewicz, mentioned a few lines below) such a confession is (almost) meaningless. Quite a few, I believe, would say that this confession is meaningful, that it reveals an anthropological phenomenon being more complicated than simple self-delusion, and - thus - calling for a serious analysis.

I may also recall you that the concept of 'pragmatics' is related to the Chomskian notion of 'performance' which is contrasted with the notion of 'competence'. Taking the risk of oversimplification, I might say that this opposition validates meaningfulness of declarations, which can be instantiated with such a
pronouncement: "I have not said what I did want to say." It should be stressed that the Chomskian approach to such statements differs essentially from a Freudian (or other based on the 'hermeneutics of suspicion') one. In the second perspective someone has said what he 'actually wanted' to say, and not what he 'thinks/thought he wanted' to. Freudian strategy refers to the idea of self-knowledge which should never be full transparent. Chomskian strategy, on the other hand, refers to the idea of 'disturbing factors' which mediate the relation between decision (to say something) and its actualization (in concrete utterance).

In other words, we are going to discuss the factors which may determine the accomplished act(ion) as opposed to, or just differentiated from, the just undertaken - or still better; planned ones. Or, somewhat differently put, the differences between decision and its effectuation are to be in the focus.

To avoid possible misunderstanding, let's underscore that the relation between planned and executed act, and not between planned and executed action, is at the focus here: action is, so, to say, a 'common product' of the acting individual and the world; therefore, the result of an act (and (usually) does) differ, more or less, from the expected result. For instance, in the case of someone who told a woman 'I love you' received a slap in his face instead of an expected sign of positive feelings, we can suppose that his knowledge about this woman was incorrect. And we face very different situation if someone who did want to say 'I love you' actually said 'I leave you'. The second discrepancy calls, in my opinion, for very different explanation. And pragmatics is conceived here as a discipline which offers explanations of this type.

But before going to the proper pragmatic questions, we have to discuss first the question of the very validity of the central problem of pragmatics. We could formulate this question thus.

6.1. Does 'pragmatics' of (action)s exist at all?

Obviously, this question is constitutive for pragmatics. Still, it is not a formal question. Beyond it lurks a real and difficult problem concerning the nature of action, and thus of man. Roughly speaking, we should decide if it makes any sense to distinguish between what a man is doing and the decisions he has made, or it is so that his acts, and only acts, tell us what his real decisions have been.

6.1.1. It would be convenient to open this part of our considerations with a reference to the already quoted Schopenhauer's model of man, as reconstructed by Wolniewicz (previously another part of this model was discussed). The notion of character plays in it the most important part. The basic Schopenhauerian thesis on character says that it 'manifests itself only in what someone is doing; not in what he is saying or preaching, even not in what he is thinking himself. He has thought of this and has thought of that, but eventually has done one thing, and only it does matter anthropologically.' Wolniewicz, 1993:104)

In more elaborated way, this notion is characterized by five postulates. One of them says that "Man's character is empirical." [ibidem:106] It means that character can be "known only indirectly and ex post, also one's own character." [ibidem] In Schopenhauer's own words: "An den Taten allein lernt ein jeder sich selbst kennen" [ibidem] The most important conclusion may be this: "If we face a difficult choice, our decision - like that of any other man - remains for us a riddle, as long as it has been made, so as long as hesitation and considerations does not pass into an action." [ibidem]

And a consequence of this conclusion: "If I tell to myself 'oh, why have I done it', these words do not mean that I could have acted otherwise. They mean: 'oh, why am I not another man', and their nonsensical sensibility expresses one of the antinomies of the human condition." [ibidem:107]

I would say that Schopenhauer-Wolniewicz's position denies any validity to the anthropological problems called here 'pragmatic'. Thus, it could be said - in somewhat paradoxical manner - that the whole 'pragmatic' part of Schopenhauerian anthropology is reduced to the negative answer to the question put at the head of this passage: 'pragmatics' does not exist. To dispose of paradoxalness, we could precise: non-trivial 'pragmatics' does not exist. And the trivial one contains but one claim: there is no difference between the choice/decision and the act; therefore, the question of accounting for the discrepancy between planned and effectuated acts does not arise.

I tend to think that Schopenhauer-Wolniewicz's position reveals resemblance to Aristotle's theory of practical syllogism [cf. McIntyre,1995:111]. We might perhaps even say that Aristotle's thesis could be obtained from the Schopenhauerian-Wolniewiczian theory, provided a lack of self-transparency (and thus unconscious character of the syllogistic process) were allowed for. And taking the other way round, we could say that any criticism addressed at Aristotle's conception may be of some relevance for critique of Schopenhauer-Wolniewicz's position.

6.1.2. Wolniewicz is fully aware that man happens to be not satisfied with his behavior. However, he does not seem to attach any weight to this fact. Even possibly not so much as (old) Wittgenstein does while noting that "the man can cheer up himself, give orders himself, obey himself, reproach and punish himself, ask himself questions and answer them." [Wittgenstein,1972:129] And surely not so much as Sartre who opens (in Being and Nothingness) the chapter on bad faith with this thesis: "The human being...is...the one who can take the negative attitudes with respect to himself." [Sartre,1989:47]

To be more precise: There is no controversy about the very existence of those 'reflexive' phenomena. Their relevance is at stake. We could perhaps say at least two questions arise here. First, the question of what manifests itself in these phenomena. And second, what role do these phenomena play in the overall 'mechanism' of human acting? Are they of 'passive', epiphenomenal nature, or - contrarily - of 'active', (co-) determining character?

Schopenhauerian-Wolniewiczian stance can be interpreted as offering the first answer while other views, to be discussed below, present this or that version of the second answer.

Let's assume now that 'why I am not another man' says directly what is indirectly expressed in 'why have I done it'. Such an exclamation is to be, according to Wolniewicz, 'in nonsensical way sensible'. It is really so?

The answer to this question depends on the way in which the problem of self-forming (self-transformation) is solved. (The problem will be discussed in more detail in the chapter on bad faith, and in particular in the sub-chapter 7.2.; now some brief remarks will be made).

If man cannot self-form, than the 'nonsensical-ness-thesis seems to be, given the assumption, right. However, if we take into account that, as noted above, individual happens to assume various attitudes toward himself, thus - to think of
himself, and that - according to Mannheim - “self-observation serves first of all as a means for self-transforming” and “man is thinking of himself and of his acts mainly because he wants to change himself” [Mannheim,1974:84], we should allow the ‘Why have I done it!’ for more sense than Wolniewicz does.

6.1.3. Before opening more systematic discussion of the ‘pragmatic’ problem-field, some specifications are desirable. Therefore, it might be useful to cite the Chomsky’s words in which he draws the line separating the domain of ‘competition’ and ‘performance’: “Linguistic theory considers first of all an ideal speaker-listener...i.e. one who belongs to a totally homogenous language community and who knows perfectly its language. Availing of his knowledge of the language, he is not under influences exerted by such grammatically unimportant factors as memory limitations, dispersion of attention, shifts of attention and interest and errors (accidental or systematic). /.../ Therefore we make the basic differentiation between competence (knowledge of a language) and performance (practical use of language in concrete situations). But in such an ideal state as presented above, performance is a direct reflection of competence.” [Chomsky,1982:14-15]

Availing of Chomskian ideas, I would like to go beyond the intuitions which Chomsky seems to have had while introducing the term ‘performance’. This term has some additional ring which might be used while exploring the ‘pragmatical’ domain. I mean here those connotations which are there in such phrases as ‘performing arts’. Let’s for instance consider the example of an actor who every subsequent evening plays, say, Hamlet. Let us assume that that for a given period of time nothing important happens in his life and that his ‘artistic ideology’ does not change. In particular, his conception of his role, his vision of Hamlet, remains unchanged. Nevertheless, we can assume that in one evening his performance is ‘great’ while in the other only ‘good’. Similar remarks could be made in respect to a singer, to a piano or violin player...

Well, it is perhaps logically possible to maintain that every successive evening our actor is making somewhat different decision. The differences might be so minor that they could remain on the unconscious level. However, at least equally plausible seems to be approach which is based on the idea of difference between decision and its performance.

The problem of decision-performance relations might seem to be of minor importance. Such an impression may have some ground, if the problem is analyzed in the context of linguistic or artistic acts. Actually, its anthropological importance is great. The following, very personal and honest confession accounts - I believe - for, or even validates, this opinion. “I am not sure how I would have reacted if a foreigner had knocked at my door and asked me to sacrifice myself and my family in order to save some additional ring which might be used while exploring the ‘pragmatical’ domain. I mean here those connotations which are there in such phrases as ‘performing arts’. Let’s for instance consider the example of an actor who every subsequent evening plays, say, Hamlet. Let us assume that that for a given period of time nothing important happens in his life and that his ‘artistic ideology’ does not change. In particular, his conception of his role, his vision of Hamlet, remains unchanged. Nevertheless, we can assume that in one evening his performance is ‘great’ while in the other only ‘good’. Similar remarks could be made in respect to a singer, to a piano or violin player...

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the scope of more narrowly conceived anthropology some decisions are to be made as to regarding some anthropological theses as (relatively) 'factual'. In particular, the very existence of mental processes should be regarded here as 'obvious'. To put it more precisely. I do not want to discuss whether mental processes are 'independent' from physical, chemical etc. ones or - in the last resort - are but their manifestations. Whatever could be their metaphysical 'essence' or their 'mode of existence', their sheer fact of their existence, the sheer fact that we see at the world, evaluate it and make decisions - this fact is regarded here as just 'given'.

6.2.1. There is a prima facie difference between mental and bodily acts and it matters. - From such a statement we could start these remarks. - Nothing more is assumed. To be more specific, everything what I am going to assume as 'factually obvious' could be determined thus. There is a difference between a chess-beginner who moves a figure at random and a chess-master who moves the same figure in the same way after having analyzed a set of alternative moves (though the observer might not be able to tell the difference). Or, to give another example, between he who reproduces skillfully a sentence in an unknown language (just reproducing perfectly a sequence of sounds), and he who says this sentence (understanding it). This difference may be, I suppose, characterized and construed metaphysically in different ways. Neither of them is assumed here. What is assumed here is the very existence of this difference.

6.2.2. In his letter to Romans [Romans,7:14-25], St. Paul says: "We know that the law is spiritual; but I am unspiritual, sold as a slave to sin. I do not understand what I do. For what I want to do I do not do, but what I hate I do. As it is, it is no longer I myself who do it, but it is sin living in me. I know that nothing good lives in me, that is, in my sinful nature. For I have the desire to do what is good, but I cannot carry it out. For what I do is not the good I want to do; no, the evil I do not want to do - this I keep on doing. Now if I do what I do not want to do, it is no longer I who do it, but it is sin living in me that does it. So I find this law at work: when I want to do good, evil is right there with me. For in my inner being I delight in God’s law, but I see another law at work in the members of my body, waging war against the law of my mind and making me a prisoner of the law of sin at work within my members. What a wretched man I am! Who will rescue me from this body of death?" [Bible,1989:139-1394]

Interestingly enough, in this rather ancient text, we come across problems being not very distant from those which were much more recently discussed, say, by Freud. It should be also noted that these texts focuses not on purely metaphysical issues but just on more 'practical' ones. 'Mind' and 'members of [the] body' are depicted as opposite forces operating within human individual.

The Paul's text could be supplemented with the following Scheler's comments on Christian asceticism. In his view, its goal "was not to restrain natural drives, still more to suppress them, but only power and command over them and their perfect filling with the soul and spirit. It is positive asceticism and not negative one; intended, in its very essence, at that automatism of drives should not hamper the freedom of the highest personal powers." [Scheler,1977:161] And the contemporary Christian philosopher says: "Self-dominating is something...fundamental, related to the internal structure of the person which differs from the other structures and from the other beings with his dominating himself." [Wojtyła,1985:133]

Let's move now from the Christian philosophy to another orientations. One of the founders of philosophical anthropology, Helmhut Plessner, thus describes human activity: "Ich bin, aber ich habe mich nicht" - I am but I do not command myself - in such a way man's situation in his physical existence could be characterized. Speaking, acting, forming are linked with the command over one's material body, and we must learn this command and control it permanently. This distance inside me and in relation to myself gives me the chance to overcome it. The does not mean any split and tearing apart of my self - which is in its depths indivisible, but it is a condition for autonomy." [Plessner,1988:79-80] I would emphasize the phrase on learning; it can be reformulated in a way as to draw attention to the possibility of changes in the mind-body relations.

I would like to note still an intuition I owe to S. Kozyr-Kowalski. In one of his papers, in the chapter devoted to The Relation between the Man and Organ of His/Her Body as a Model of Property, he notes that in Hegel, Marx and Simmel relation between the man and his/her body is regarded as paradigmatic, and also historically fundamental, for the concept of property. [Kozyr-Kowalski,1988:227]

Interestingly, in a very different philosophical context we read somewhat similar wards: 'The person is he who owns himself - and only by himself is owned./../ The medieval thinkers expressed it in the sentence persona est sui iuris' [Wojtyła,1985:132; Cf. also [252-254] And going still back, we could note that already Aristotle spoke - in fragment 8 of Protreptikos [Lesnick,1989:133] - about "body and what belongs to the body" as "tools of a kind".

6.2.3. We need an account of what it is to be irresistibly compelled by pain, emotion, appetite, desire, or the like. And that is not easy to give. The chief difficulty is how to draw the line (even a vague, fuzzy line) between what is genuinely irresistible and what is only very difficult to resist. Genuine psychological compulsion that renders the subject powerless to do otherwise must be distinguished from weakness of will where the subject could have resisted but did not try hard enough. Weakness of will is not having too weak will, like having too little strength in one's muscle, but not exercising one's will to its maximum strength. Thus it would be a mistake to define a compulsive motive as one that is in conflict with the part of S's motives with which S identifies herself. Such a motive need not to be genuinely compulsive. Nor need a genuinely compulsive motive be such an opposed-to-the-self motive. The willing addict may be compelled and have no alternative open to him as much as the unwilling one. And even the agent who goes against his better judgment may not be the victim of a compulsive motive, but rather may be exhibiting weakness of will." [Gines,1990:120-121] This analysis seems to reveal another side of the mind-body relations.

More precisely, we could think of our bodies 'positively' - as of 'sets of instruments'. And, on the other hand, we could think of our bodies 'negatively' - as of 'barriers' which we have to overcome. These two images are not totally separated, yet differentiating them analytically may be somewhat illuminating. This might be the first observation concerning the problem of mind-body/acting.

The second observation, and a question following it, could be formulated thus. There is a 'gap' between mind(soul) and body, or rather - there are various degrees to which human body is 'permeated' by the mind? This question seems to be one of the most important questions in this domain.
6.2.4. Who - or what - dominates the body? Who is its owner? "When someone acts against his own better judgment, reason is not in control of his actions. Another way of putting the point would be to say that he is not in control of them. The equivalence between these two ways of describing what happens in a case of this kind depends on a very natural theory about the identity of the agent. The true agent is the authority within the visible agent. He identifies himself with the authority and we are simply following him when we say indifferently that his reason is not in control of his actions or that he is not in control of them." [Pears, 1984:15]

Following Pears' considerations, we could define the basic difference between mind and body thus. There is but one individual body. - This thesis I regard as obvious (one could speculate about many bodies should have, but I do not think that such speculations are, at least at the present stage of meta-antropological investigations, necessary). But the uniqueness of the individual mind is less obvious. I would even make a step further and suggest that we should start with assumption that an individual (defined ostensively by indicating his or her body) can be equipped with more than one mind. Alternatively, we could perhaps speak of several persons 'sharing' one 'common' body.

These speculations bring us to the next question.

6.3. Individual's identity and his activity

Miguel de Unamuno's, in his Del sentimiento trágico de la vida says so: "A friend of mine once told me: 'I'd like to be Mr. So-and-so' (the name was mentioned here), and I answered him: That one would like to be someone other, it is a problem I will never be able to understand. To want to be someone other is to want to be not any longer this one who one is. I understand that one desires things owned by an other, his wealth or his skills, but to be the other - I cannot comprehend it." [Unamuno, 1984:14]

And a great Argentinean writer comments on this declaration: "I do not understand Miguel de Unamuno; I would not like for ever to remain Jose Louis Borges, I would like to be someone other. I hope that my death will be complete, I hope to die with my body and with my soul." [Borges, 1988:45]

These two quotes bring us into the very heart of the problem of personal identity. A problem which, apart from its inherent importance, is also relevant for the pragmatic issues. Partly, for its relatedness to the mind-body problem.

This relatedness might be characterized thus. Mind could be, in the present context (! - it is an auxiliary image, and not the main metaphor), characterized as 'steering system', while body - as 'steered system'. It is rather obvious, that the effectiveness of 'steering' is virtually never - perfect. But if we assume, availing this image, that there are two (not to add: or more) 'steering systems', we will conclude that 'steering' should be in this case very distant from the level of perfection.

The problem of personal identity is a complex one. It can be approached in many ways. I will take three of them, starting from the ideas, subsequently, of multilayered mind, of multiplicity of roles played by an individual and of 'multi-personal' mind.

6.3.1. G.G.-Hintikka opens her work on with the following questions: "Can a person help willing what he wills? Could you will something different from what you in fact will? If it is my will that I should will something different from the current object of my will, does it follow that I really want something different from the object? Can an alcoholic will that he does not want to drink or a cigarette addict will that he does not want to smoke? If he can will that he does not will that he smokes, does it follow that he does not will in the first place? Questions like this are easily raised, but satisfactory answers to them are not easily available." And as "classical" characterizes the "question raised by Erasmus (1524), and in response to him by Luter...Can man in virtue of his own power create the will to believe in God or the will to enjoy eternal life?" [G.G.Hintikka, 1989:7]

As an aster to these questions, we can regard the theory of person presented by Harry Frankfurt in his paper on Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. The main ideas of this theory are collected in this passage: "of the essential differences between persons and other creatures can be found the structure of the will, specific for the person. Human beings are not solitary in having desires or incentives or in making choices. They share the properties with the individuals of other species, and some of these individuals seem to be able to deliberate and make decisions on this ground. But the ability of generating that what I'd like to call 'second-order desires' or 'desires of the second orders' seems to be a feature specific for human beings." [Frankfurt, 1997:22-23]

This general idea is subsequently concretized: Frankfurt introduces the concept of second-order volition, which characterized thus: "One has second-order desire either when one just wants to have a desire or when one wants that a definite desire be our will. In the situations of the second kind, I will call second-order desires 'second-order volitions'. This concept allows him to precise his main thesis; he regards as 'fundamental for being a person' not "generally, the occurrence of the second-order desires" but just "the occurrence of the second-order volitions". [Frankfurt, 1997:27]

Additionally, he avails of the name of 'wanton' in order to designate an individual who does not accomplishes second-order volitions (irrespective of his having, or not, second-order desires). The class of wantons comprises all animals having desires, and all small children. Adult human beings may also act wantonly. [Frankfurt, 1997:27]

Though Frankfurt's formulation of the idea of hierarchy of desires may be the most clear and most consequently developed one of all I happen to know, some similar conceptions may be quoted too.

K. Mannheim, for instance, is availing of the concept of "internal rationalization" which defines as "systematic control exercised by an individual over his own drives - a control which is always the first step to be made by everybody who wants to plan his life in such a way that all action should be guided by a principle and would be subordinated to a set goal." [Mannheim, 1974:82]

And Rawls, in his major work, in the section 85: The Unity of Self, characterizes the "unity of a person" as something what manifests itself in the coherence of his plan, and this unity is "based upon his following a desire of upper order". [Rawls, 1994:757]

These theses on hierarchy seem to be in general accordance with the interpretation of the concept of 'Self elaborated by the guru of the Artificial Intelligence, Marvin Minsky. His views are presented with these words: "To understand how something works, one has to know its purpose. /.../ To understand what we call the Self, we first must see what Selves are for. One function of the self is to keep us from changing us too rapidly. Each person must make some long-range plans in order to balance single-purposes against attempts to do everything at once./.../ If we changed our minds too recklessly, we could never know what we might
want next. We'd never get much done because we could never depend on ourselves. Those ordinary views are wrong that hold that Selves are magic, self-indulgent luxuries that enable our minds to break the bonds of natural cause and law. Instead, those Selves are practical necessities. The myths that say that Selves embody special kinds of liberty are merely masquerades. Part of their functioning is to hide from us the nature of our self-ideas - the chains we forge to keep ourselves from wrecking all the plans we make." [Minsky, 1986:42]

The idea of a hierarchy of desires (preferences, volitions) can be set into a broader framework outlined by Jakobson. Summarizing some of his views, a neurologist and semiologist writes that "according to Roman Jakobson, as an universal trait distinguishing Homo sapiens as a species can be regarded its ability to make use of 'multi-level' structures: producing tools serving producing other tools; communication mediated with language, of which the phonological 'units play distinctive function and serve building units of higher levels; incest taboo forming both exogamic social organization and necessary condition for exchange." [Kordys, 1991:63] This observation made by Jakobson seems to support additionally the idea described by Frankfurt, Mannheim, Rawls, or Minsky.

To the general discussion of the problem of the hierarchical organization of personality, let's add some more special remarks.

First, let's register Wojtyla's remarks on the author of Der Formalismus in der Ethik: 'The standpoint of Scheler, who thinks that moral value cannot be an object of wanting, for it would be a Pharisac attitude - this stance can be understood in the light of his own assumptions. 'To be good' is something different from 'to want to experience that one is good'. In the second case, we may suspect a Pharisacism.' [Wojtyla, 1985:196]

On the other hand, Scheler describes 'asceticism' introduced by I. Loyola as "quite modern technique of 'subordinating to the authority' which has no substantial goal but extends only the idea, taken from the military, of 'discipline' and 'blind obedience' over the whole relation between self and its thoughts, aspirations and feelings." And supplements the description with this remark: 'The transference of the relation of discipline that holds between the commander and his army to the relation between T and 'thoughts' constitutes the basic element it the Ignatius' 'exercises'."[Scheler, 1977:160]

With this issue seems to be linked the following problem, raised by Mele: 'Does self-control invoke a motivational component - perhaps motivation to exhibit self-control? Some analogies suggest that it does not. For example, someone with with the ability to wrestle well may retain that ability (for a while) even if he loses all motivation to wrestle well, or to wrestle at all. Similarly, a physically strong person may retain his strength (for a time) even if he loses his motivation to utilize it. Certain traits of character, on the other hand, plainly have a motivational component. Generosity, for example, involves motivation, to behave generously. Is self-control more like physical strength or generosity in the relevant respect?" [Mele, 1987:59]

Second, note that there is a very important concept which is closely related to that of hierarchy of desires. I mean here of the notion of 'weakness of the will', or - akrasia.

Third, it might be suppose that the higher-order desires are 'more rational' that the lower-order ones. This not need to be so. The limitations of this supposition seems to demonstrate convincingly Christine Swanton. She is saying in this way: 'I have a first-order desire to have a good meal, yet because of my ascetic dislike of eating I have second-order desire not to behave in accordance with the first desire. Assume that this second-order desire is bases not on the appreciation of what is the best, but on the ungrounded semineurotic fear of growing fat. In such a case, the action against second-order desire should not be regarded as action inconsistent with sensed demand. It is surprising, then, why the semineurotic submission to the second-order desire should be an action compatible with sensed demand." [Swanton, 1997:153]

6.3.2. In this section, few remarks on social roles are to be made. The metaphor of theater and the related metaphor of role have been, as J. Szacki rightly notes, present in social theory for a long time. In the 20th century, a whole theory of role was created. It is neither possible nor necessary to discuss this problem systematically. I want to look at one aspect of the problem: the question of performance, of its quality - of the congruence between intended and performed acts.

Let's consider some examples. I think that we could start with the role of spy. Espionage has never been (to my knowledge) a subject of philosophical analysis. Perhaps, quite rightly. But the psychology of spy seems to be quite interesting. It is interesting, theoretically, in itself. It is interesting as an explanation of the behavior of people who, though numerically unimportant, have played quite a considerable role in history. And in the present context, it is interesting as a study of the extreme case of a phenomenon which is, in its more vague forms, quite widespread.

On the other hand, we could consider a set of roles which are played by most people. Most of us are at the same time sons (daughters), husbands (wives), fathers (mothers). Such a set is neither inherently consistent nor inherently inconsistent.

6.3.3. Now, I would like to discuss the idea of multi-personal mind. This idea, however strange it might appear at the first sight is not a new one: 'The idea that the individual person may be seen - or actually is - a set of sub-individual relatively autonomous 'selves' has a long history." [Elster, 1986:1]

In particular, it can be interpreted as elaboration of the theory which presents the process of individual thinking as an (usually silent) 'internal dialogue'. In this context, we could make a reference to Hannah Arendt's Thinking, and particularly to the chapter "Two-in-one" [Arendt, 1991:246-263]. Bibler's analyses in general, and his comments on Wogotsky in particular [Bibler, 1982:152-154], should also be quoted. I am mentioning here but a few thinkers, but the whole tradition goes back to Plato.

While speaking about the tradition, I'd like to say a few separate words about Hume. His atomistic mind of mind occupies a special, position in this tradition. By its 'extreme' character, it defines a 'pole' of a spectrum: it seems to be impossible to go further in 'partitioning' of human mind (Minsky's idea of society of minds, quoted below, doesn't go so far). The second 'pole' might be represented by the St. Thomas' concept of soul, or Descartes' concept of res cogitans.

6.3.4. A few comments on the relations between these three approaches might be useful. First of all, the relation between the 'multilayer' and the 'many-personal' approach.

As we've noted, the first approach is linked with the concept of the 'weakness of will', while the second one - with that of 'internal conflict'. But we could use somewhat different language. Generalizing a bit the notion of internal conflicts, and availing of the idea of the orders of values, we might distinguish two types of such conflicts: 'horizontal' and 'vertical'. As 'horizontal', we could designate conflicts
between values of the same order. And as 'vertical' - those between values of different orders (i.e. between values of 'higher' and 'lower' order).

Considering some examples might be instructive. Let's picture a person of both very strong sexual drives and profound religious feelings comprising the reverence for the ideal of 'chastity'. Of course, such a situation need not to provoke any conflict of values: having strong desires may be experienced as a 'challenge' and an opportunity to demonstrate one's strength of will (no merit without temptation). But if the ideal of 'chastity' comprises not only actual behavior but also the state of mind and soul, then a conflict is possible. It would be an instance of 'vertical' conflict.

And now, let's modify this example. Assume that the drives are there, but the person vacillates between two second-order desires. At some moments, he would like to suppress his drives. But at some other moments, he would like to feel no inhibitions and to enjoy fully satisfying his drives. Here, we may speak of 'horizontal' conflict.

As regards the 'role' approach, it might be said to be located somewhere in between the other two. It has some elements in common both with the 'multilayer' and 'many-personal' approach: The idea of hierarchy seems to link the 'role'-approach with the 'multilayer' one. On the other hand, in the 'multilayer' approach, usually some single values (and meta-values) determine the main axis of conflict, while both in the 'role' approach and the 'multi-personal' one we have to do with groups (or systems) of values.

We can also characterize these three approaches by indicating the place occupied in each of them by conflict: It can be said that conflict between 'elements' (variably defined) is inherent in both 'multilayer' and 'multi-personal' approaches. In the 'role' approach conflict also is there, but its presence is incidental rather than essential.

Bringing these considerations on the mind-body problem and that of personal identity to its close, I'd like to stress their 'auxiliary' character: Each of these problems deserves its own monograph. I did not attempt at even brief sketches of such monographs. My task was much more narrowly defined: to study the relations between these problems and the questions of human agency; and to try to characterize some conditions which should satisfy solutions to these problems, if these solutions were to be accepted as a basis for all those anthropologies which, pace all other differences, commonly assume that non-trivial 'pragmatics' of acts does exist. This task has been - I hope - partly satisfied, and partly - its satisfaction will be completed in the next section.

Let me add that I hope to have demonstrated, though in a sketchy way, that the concept of hierarchy (system) of values may play a crucial part in the very definitions of such concepts like 'multilayer' or 'multi-personal' mind.

6.4. Humanistic interpretation and pragmatics

I'd like to locate these remarks on humanistic interpretation and pragmatics in a broader context. Thus, I want to begin this sub-chapter with a recapitulation of the remarks on the tripartite division of the anthropological field, and - on some related issues.

Making use of one of the metaphors mentioned earlier, we could say that the rationalist model of man (resp. humanist interpretation) is based on the distinction: plan (strategy) and its realization. Plan itself can be viewed as having a formal structure ('syntactically') or having a substantial content ('semantically'). Plans happen to be carried into effect; peculiarities of this process are subject of 'pragmatical' reflections. Hence, the tripartite division.

This division is, I tend to think so, not only instrumentally useful, but also reflecting some aspects of human actions, and perhaps - even some structural characteristics of the human being. Still, this division partly reveals, and partly hides, an assumption which by no means is obvious.

This assumption might be called 'assumption of linearity' or 'of sequentiality'. According to this assumption, with any human act can be associated in a way the following sequence: diagnosis (analysis of situation) - decision - act (realization of decision). This assumption is very useful from the instrumental point of view: many 'technical' difficulties are omitted due to it; moreover, it seems to have some substantial validity. Yet, it has to be revoked or at least modified in a way.

As regards the first element, namely diagnosis, I will almost completely neglect its interactions with other 'elements' of act. This is due to my general decision not to analyze the cognitive aspects of human activity. Let me only note how close are the cognitive issues to the 'pragmatical' ones. While debating them, one comes across and uses the notion of 'strong' or 'weak' will. But it was said that "the first difference between strong and weak will is the intellectual one, it consists in the degree of persistent permanence and completeness with which consequences are considered" [Dewey, 1963:140]. We should note at least that in psychology (especially some Russian schools), the concept of 'styles of acting' is used as a term characterizing various types of diagnosis (and control)-act relations. These styles are to be individuals traits. [Strelau, 1985:111]

As regards decision and realization, it could be useful to discuss already now their relations. It would however mean that some modifications into the model of decision-making were introduced. And I am going to discuss all the modifications in one place, in the next chapter. For this reason, I still preserve the 'assumption of linearity'. In other words, in this sub-chapter I've constantly assumed that an agent has already made a decision and now is accomplishing it.

6.5. On the relevance of these problems

The problems I have grouped under the label of 'pragmatics' of actions seem to be important anthropological issues. Concluding this chapter, I would like - as in previous chapters and sub-chapters - to sketch the broader context of this topic.

6.5.1. I will start from historiosophy. Quite generally, it can be said that the question of weak/strong will, or of self-control, plays an important role in various philosophies of History.

We may start with Max Weber. For the sake of brevity, I will follow the summary of The Protestant Ethic-author's views given, in the Introduction to the 1976-English edition, by Anthony Giddens. "The continual accumulation of wealth for its own sake" is 'according to Weber...the essence of the spirit of modern capitalism.' [Giddens, 1976:4] The question thus arises: "What explains this historically peculiar circumstance of a drive to the accumulation of wealth conjoined to an absence of interest in the worldly pleasures which it can purchase?" [ibidem] And it is the answer to this question which does matter here. It runs as follows: "It would certainly be mistaken...to suppose that it derives from the relaxation of traditional moralities: this novel outlook is a distinctively moral one, demanding in fact unusual self-discipline." [ibidem]
I would like to quote also Bryan S. Turner’s paper, from a collection on Weber, devoted to The Rationalization of the Body: Reflections on Modernity and Discipline. "My argument is", says Turner, "that there is an implicit philosophical anthropology in Weber’s account of rationalization, and this anthropology is not entirely unlike the anthropology that we know to be significant in the work of Karl Marx" [Turner, 1987:224] He also notes that "in...Weberian accounts of the organization of bodily functions, we find the presence of a debate about the relationship between Appolonian form and Dyonysian energy" [ibidem:225] Of more specifically historical observations, note for instance this: 'For Weber, modern disciplines had their origins in two separate orders; these are the monastery and the army' [ibidem:224]

Subsequently, Turner goes on to the theory of German historian and sociologist, Norbert Elias. He summarizes it with these words: "the civilization process involves a transformation of violent bodies into restrained bodies, and a process of individualization allowing private emotions and refined feeling to emerge within the court setting." [ibidem:229-230]

Concluding his essay, Turner claims that "a theory of embodiment is a necessary pre-condition for the development of a notion of effective agency. Sociology is still to some extent stuck with a Cartesian separation of mind and body where mind is seen to be causal knowable agent and the body is relegated to an object or an environment that is subtly manipulated by consumerism or regulated by disciplines." [ibidem:240-241]

What is, in Weber, a part of the theory of rationalization, therefore - of modernity, is - in one of his disciples - a part of Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins. Just in this posthumously published work of Lukacs, the problem of self-discipline plays quite a considerable role. Lukacs is founding his ontology, and theory of History, upon the analysis of labor. Of human labor, conceived of as a subject-object relation, is characteristic what Lukacs calls 'distancing'. And among the consequences of this distancing is the fact that "man accomplishing a work has to control his own affects. He can be tired, but he will keep working; he can be...scared, but he will be fighting with an animal" [Lukacs, 1984a:65] And in another place he says: "the central question of internal self-transformation of man consists in his achieving conscious self-domination." [ibidem:139] It is here a good place to quote Lukacs’ view of consciousness and body: the former is to play 'leading, directing, and determining role in the relation to the body' [ibidem:142]

The 'pragmatic' issues play a part in the theories of Weber and Lukacs. However important, it is there not the foreground role. I now, I want to mention a theory in which these questions are at the very central position. I mean here the historiosophy developed by the German historian and sociologist, Norbert Elias. The concept of the 'civilising process' is the central to his theory. This process "is not going on rectilinearly... Still, if we are observing the evolution in longer time-intervals, we see very clearly how coercion which results from the physical threat, from the military violence, is slowly giving way to the forms of submission and dependence which lead to the regulation and suppression of emotional tensions in the form self-discipline, 'self-control', briefly put - in the form of internal coerucion." [Elias, 1980:266]

Elias, as historian, is observing deep processes which are happening on the plane of everyday-life. In particular, he analyzes the patterns of the behavior at the table and in the bedroom. The general direction of the evolution of these patterns is, in his opinion easy to be grasped: "there has been growing up a wall, the wall between a man and a man, the wall of intimidation and shameful confusion, the emotional wall which is growing up between a body and a body in the result of forming activities, in the result of conditioning." [ibidem:241]

These theses may be supplemented with still more special observation of a historian, concerning Italian Renaissance: "The inhabitants of Italy (adult males from the upper classes, at least) ostensibly attached weight to the self-control and the ability of manipulating people. This concern cannot be met in other parts of Europe of that time, irrespective of to what degree this epoch can be correctly called the 'age of capitalism'. /.../ If self-control is - as suggested by Elias - identical with civilization, then, even without their art and literature, the inhabitants of Northern Italy would have good right to regard themselves as the most civilized nation of Europe." [Burke, 1991:169]

6.5.2. Now, some remarks on the relations between 'pragmatics' and political philosophy. To begin with, a few quotations.

First, from G. Holmstrom-Hintikka. Speaking about the problems of self-determining will, she stresses: "these questions are not of mere academic interest, either. In fields like health care, politics and advertising is often important to find answers to these questions and to similar ones and in general to find a solution to the problem as to how to bring a person to will something different from what he or she now wills?" [Holmstrom-Hintikka, 1989:7]

Second, from Plessner, who notes: "Man...commands himself...only indirectly, on roundabout way going through other people and things. From this fact stems the institutional character of the human group-existence." [Plessner, 1988:84]

Third, in Elster, we find quite extensive analysis: "Sometimes the opportunity set is deliberately shaped by a person's desires...cases in which people find it in their interest to reduce the set of options available to them. I shall discuss two reasons people might engage in such self-limiting or self-binding behavior. First, there is weakness of will...As illustrated by the story of Ulysses and sirens, people do not always trust themselves to behave rationally. If they can anticipate the kind of situations in which they might lose their head, they can act strategically to prevent the opportunity to do so from arising." [Elster, 1989a:19]

Ending this quotations, we can cite the great Polish poet - Adam Mickiewicz. In his poem, Pan Tadeusz, we find a similar idea. The title hero asks - in the final part - his fiancée to accept his proposal to liberate their serfs; he comments upon his proposal in the following way: "I am a man, I am - myself - afraid of my caprices, I will conduct in a safer way if I resign of my authority and subjugate the fate of the peasants under the protection of law." [Mickiewicz, 1973:345]

Starting from these observations, we could go in different directions. I want to take but one and speak about some consequences of these anthropological considerations for the philosophy of democratic legal system, and for constitutions in particular.

Democratically passed law is based on constitution. It is composed of legal acts/decisions of various levels. Various laws, specially if embedded in social institutions, may be viewed as forms of self-binding, of self-constraints. More precisely, it might be viewed as self-imposed constraints in the case of majority which supported the given law.

Therefore, it seems that there is a relation between the idea of hierarchically ordered legal system and the hierarchical ordering of individuals-citizens.
I believe that the importance of the latter phrase goes well beyond the area of anthropology: it seems to be relevant for the debates on the liberalism and democracy.

Let me also note that issues debated here seem to be in some important relation to the problems of suicide and that of euthanasia. The nature of this relation is not quite clear and calls for further investigations.

6.5.3. And in this point, the way from 'pragmatics' to ethics is to be traced. We will start from Władysław Tatarkiewicz's classification of ethical judgments. It comprises the following four types: (i) value-judgment (concerning intrinsic, so to say, value of an action), (ii) rightness-judgments (considering consequences of an act), (iii) morality-judgments (judgments about intention/motivation), and - (iv) merit-judgments. [Tatarkiewicz, 1971:291]

Just the fourth type is of interest here. Tatarkiewicz characterizes it as follows: "merit-judgment concerns the effort made while executing a moral act. One can act well, righteously, morally - without any effort, but without effort it is not possible to achieve what is called merit" [ibidem:292] And in Tatarkiewicz's words, just the merit-judgments seem to be the proper basis for evaluating a man. For not everybody has no difficulties with good: some strive for good instinctively, others need effort to act well" [ibidem:295] (In the final analysis, he says, however, that no type of moral judgments should have predominance.) Let's also add that, according to Tatarkiewicz, "morality conceived of as effort was the object of Kant's ethics" [ibidem:295]

It seems to me that the intuition which lies at the bottom of the idea of merit-judgments is not in accordance with Schopenhauer-Wolniewicz's stance. Thus, if we believe that this intuition is important, we gain additional support for regarding the problems of 'pragmatics' of actions as valid field of anthropological investigations.

We could add that Scheler, in his discussion of the Christian transformation of the idea of God (the idea of God's love which made Him to have created the world is to be the central element of this transformation), says: "Of all good things, the love itself is the best one! Summum bonum - it is not the value of the thing, but the value of the act, the value of love qua love; not the value of what love has made and achieved but the value of love so conceived of that all its achievements only symbolize and make the existence of the person possible to be cognized." [Scheler, 1977: 91]

This sections seems also to be a proper place for introducing some P. Winch's ideas concerning moral relevance of the success-or-failure dimension of actions. In brief, he underscores the moral importance of this element of action which initially was the sole dimension to be pushed aside by the moral role of intention. It is the real outcome of an action about which I am speaking here.

"Doing evil, we become evil people (man becomes, according to Christ words, 'impure'). /.../ If someone tries to do something wrong but he does not succeed, he does not become the man whom he would have become, had he succeeded, and thus the possibilities become in consequence different. It does not mean that a man who has not succeeded should not blame himself or be blamed. But he has not to blame himself for what he would have had to blame himself, if he had succeeded. After a time, he may thank the God for his failure. He thanks the God for that did not happen what had been in him and had been ready to happen." [Winch,1990:254-255]

Interpreting it briefly, there is - in Winch's perception - a difference between the moral situation of someone who killed a man and someone who planned in identical way (for identical motives, etc.) a murder but his hand and eye functioned in a worse (in the 'technical' sense) way.

Is the difference a real one, or is a product of Winch's moral misperception? And if this difference is real, should we regard it as a simple moral fact which can be only grasped but not accounted for, or it can be somehow explained? If so, in which way? Personally, I tend to accept Winch's stance, but I do not know any answer to the other questions. Thus, this problem appears to me as mysterious and intriguing.
7. Space of anthropologies: an attempt at a topography

7.1. On the metaphor of topography

At the beginning of the chapter in which a topography of a space is offered, let me repeat a few words on this metaphor. The very application of the term I’ve taken (as far as I can remember) from Perzanowski [1989a:278]. I think that this metaphor should be taken quite seriously: The notion of a space (in this context: of theories, in particular: of anthropological theories) is not just stylistic equivalent of that of set, or of class (collection etc.) It is to suggest some more specific images. In particular, the following.

First, that of dimension(s) of a space. I tend to think that one of the (at least to a degree) unconscious elements of the philosophical thinking is the image of interval (hence, more generally: of linearity): As regards many problems, it is widely held that but two ‘pure’ solutions are possible, all the other being compromises located somewhere ‘in-between’ these two ‘poles’ (geometrically: the ends of the interval). However, it might be so (and, personally, I suppose it is actually so) that philosophical problems are composed of several philosophical questions which are logically independent. And if so, the dimension of philosophical space (generated by a problem) must be of the same degree as the number of the independent questions (constituting the given problem).

Second, the idea of distance: some points (here: theories) are close to one points and still very distant from the other. Specially, this image gains importance if combined with the former (‘dimensionality’ of space): a point can be - in a sense - close to an other, if one dimension is taken into account, and very distant if an other is. It should be noted that, due to topology, we can think of a distance without metrical notions what is in the case of space of philosophical theories of particular importance.

Third, the question of boundedness (resp. unboundedness) of the space is interesting. To describe the application of this notion in meta-philosophy, confine our attention to the simplest case of a space generated by a single question. We can represent it with at least three images (taking into account possibilities both qualitatively different and simple): of an interval, of a ray (it has beginning but hasn’t any end), and of line without beginning and end. Further complexities would appear, if we linked the idea of dimensionality with that of (un)boundedness: the givens space could be bounded in one dimension and unbounded in another. For now, it is an abstract possibility. Whether one day this possible image will turn out practically useful, remains to be seen in a future.

Fourth, we are usually interested in some either ‘extreme’ (if the space is bounded) or ‘central’ points, in other words in points that make possible to draw a network (‘grid’) that make possible to ‘locate’ particular ‘points’ (here: theories).

So much for very idea of the metaphor of topography. In this chapter I will try to apply this idea in the domain of meta-anthropology. But before I shall undertake the task, I will have touched upon a general problem which is still awaiting us.

7.2. Once again on the notion of anthropology: man as an object of action

“The essence of materialism consists... in the metaphysical thesis that any being manifests itself as material for labor. /.../ The essence of materialism is hidden in the essence of technology..." [Heidegger,1977: 102] Those words, taken from Brief uber den 'Humanismus', direct our attention to the point which can be regarded as central for the problem-area to be discussed now.

At the moment, we could also invoke Znaniecki who wrote several decades ago these words: “social environment is observing and stressing those traits of an individual’s conduct, in which is manifested the complete or partial adequacy or inadequacy of his acts with demands, being included in his social obligations. The division of individuals into psychic types has its origins not in objective-cognitive interest in 'human nature' but in socio-practical orientation" [Znaniecki; 1973,II: 367]

A particular perspective having assumed, one might say that the central question of any anthropology concerns the scope, ways and means, and the degree of the possible - 'active' or 'passive' - controlling human actions. In other words, anthropology - as theory of any ('material'- see above Heidegger's words) object - is to say either what can be made with man (either by other people or by the man himself) or what can be expected as to his or her behavior (to what extent human behavior is predictable).

Such a formulation of the central anthropological question is of particular importance for political philosophy. Read, for instance, the following words of a prominent conservative thinker: "Tragedy of classical liberalism and utopian socialism consists in the faith that people can - in every generation and with every new social contract - start anew, to reject the past and rebuild anew their institutions. People can, to some limits, change both themselves and society, but knowledge about their own power must be accompanied by awareness of the limitations to this power. It is the oldest and the most persistent truth about human condition - if the latter is to remain human." [Bell,1994:319] - It might be side-noted that some liberal and socialist ideas were a continuation of the Baconian ideology which manifested itself as much in politics as in technology or medicine. And today, we see growing criticism not of any particular form of this ideology but of its very core.

In the context of Bell's - but surely not only his - opinion, a Chomsky's thesis from Reflections on Language (I avail of the quotation in [Magala,1984:311-312]) is to be noted. Noam Chomsky remarks that the idea of the constant 'human nature' has for long been regarded as specific for the rightist moral and political thought, while the idea of 'malleability' of this nature has been regarded as focal for the leftist trends. However, according to his view, the situation is more complicated: the idea of (trans)forming human nature may ideologically contribute to a division of society into the 'educators' and those 'to-be-educated', a situation that is not in accordance with, or just contradicts, other leftist values and projects.

Making the next step, we could note first that Chomsky's philosophy may be regarded, to some extent, as a contemporary form of Cartesianism. And having arrived at Descartes' philosophy, we could mention some its possible political implications. They were discussed in Marciszewski's paper on Epistemological Presuppositions of Democratism in Descartes' Philosophy. I am going to avail of this text later on; now, but one observation is to quoted. According to the author of this text, the main anthropological-epistemological thesis of Descartes may be put thus: "people are equal
in respect of cognitive ability." [Marciszewski,1979:257] An opinion, one which is ascribed to Abraham Lincoln, is said to be a consequence of this thesis: "it is impossible to stupify all people" [ibidem:258] In result, manipulating social consciousness should be - in the long run, at least - ineffective and senseless.

The following interesting observations made by Ossowski can enrich our discussion: "Pointing at a simple, lacking internal conflicts, psyche as an example for citizens in the authoritarian states is understandable. The more simple is human personality, the more easily it can be captured with unified methods. Complicated personality brings unexpected elements into accounting, and menaces with changes. Nobody knows what can internal conflicts result in." [Ossowski,1967a:121] This clearly written passage needs no interpretive comments. One point, however, I would like to underscore, which is not explicitly stated in Ossowski but only implicitly assumed in his text. I mean the fact that the described strategy of dominating over human minds consists of two levels. On one, short-term and particular level, the political strategy should result in obedience of the citizens in specific situations. On other, more long-term and global level, this strategy aims and making people more obedient. It is also interesting that just 'syntactic' (as contrasted with 'semantic' ones) aspects of personality make it more or less open to political manipulation or ideological indoctrination.

Somewhat similar in general orientation are remarks on the scope of application of the humanistic interpretation made by Mejbaum. In his opinion, "humanistic interpretation...defines an important socio-technical stance. The essence of this stance consists in the claiming that effective steering people demands ascribing them fixed axiological perspectives, thus treating them as rational beings." [Mejbaum,1983:187]

The political consequences of the assumption of 'plasticity' of the human nature are, as we've just seen, rather ambiguous. No matter how it should be evaluated from an abstractly philosophical point of view, it is obvious that today, a short time after the end of the 20th century, an age in which we witnessed many attempts at creating a 'new man', the tendency toward avoiding the issues in question is perfectly understandable. There is nothing surprising in the fact that the idea of constant human nature gains new popularity.

Yet, in my view, philosophers should not avoid this subject. It would mean to pursue an 'ostrich policy'. In medicine, biology, and psychology various experiments are being conducted, with little - if any at all - attention paid to the admonitions delivered by moralists, philosophers, priests...

Mass-media, Internet, 'virtual reality' are already molding human minds, and more probably will be to a still great extent in the coming future. Therefore, it is impossible to say - effectively, verbal exclamations are always possible... - just 'No!' to the 'human-nature engineering'. Intended or not intended, interventions into human behavior (mind; personality...) are there. - The process of forming 'new man' need not be publicly declared. For its sponsors it may even be better to keep it in the shadow.

To say it in other words: Karl Mannheim seems to be right - even if today, six decades after he wrote these words, they call for some reservations - while writing in his Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction that "Man does not accept any longer that human nature, as being represented by him himself or by ones being similar to him, is an immutable gift of the God; he also does not regard human soul in a pantheistic vein - with cheerful resignation - as being a part of the Nature which is inaccessible for rational cognition and which can be comprehended only due to a revelation. Contrarily, modern man regards himself in an experimental way, just as objective facts of the surrounding world." [Mannheim,1974:209]

Let me repeat: To anathematize such tendencies is of little use. We should first to understand them in possibly comprehensive way. It is, in my view, the proper way in which philosophers (qua philosophers) can and should contribute to public debates over them. Moral condemnations should be left for other specialists...

Also, in the context of the anti-Enlightenment or anti-modern (somewhat masochistic, in my personal opinion) tirades, it should be noted that the idea of formation of the individual cannot be regarded as exclusively modern one. What may be specific of modernity, it is the 'objectivist' ('externalist') approach to the process of formation rather than the very idea of it as such. In the European culture there has been a long tradition, reaching back at least to Plato, of soteriology and of the idea of self-perfecting: St. Bernard of Clairvaux, Eckhart, and - in details of somewhat different kind, yet the same basic orientation - Kierkegaard represent this tradition. But there is also that of Epicurus, Zeno or Montaigne - tradition of 'self-calming', being achieved through distastation from the external world, rather than of self-perfecting in the strict sense (though the degree of ataraxia might be regarded as a measure of perfection in a broader sense). And such traditions are known in many cultures: the philosophy and practice of Indian yoga could be taken as possibly the best example [Cyboran,1976].

It should be also noted that at the idea of self-creation of man we can look in other perspective: The assertion that "Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself", characterized by Jean Paul Sartre as "the first principle of existentialism", is to mean that "man has a greater dignity than a stone or table" [Sartre,1962:591] The first principle is of ethical importance, for "man is responsible for what he is." [ibidem]

Thus, moral considerations set aside, we should be able to estimate the validity of, say, the following claim made by Watson in his Behaviorism: "Give me a dozen of healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee you to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select - doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, and yes, even beggar man and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations and race of his ancestors." [Watson,1930:82; cited after Franklin,1982:132]

This stance might be compared with an opinion of Paul Feyerabend who - in his autobiography, while making a personal confession - formulates some remarks on moral character of man. He claims that "moral character cannot be created by argumentation, 'education' or act of will. It cannot be created by any planned scientific, political, or artistic actions. Like genuine love, moral character is a gift, and not an achievement. It depends on such incidental things like parents' affection, sense of security, friendship - of all that is composed the delicate equilibrium between self-assertion and care-for-others. We can make conditions that are conductive to this equilibrium but we cannot make this equilibrium itself. Guilt, responsibility, obligation - these notions are meaningful if the equilibrium has already existed, but are empty words, or even obstacles, if it lacks." [Feyerabend,1996:178]

Watson and Feyerabend present two opposite yet equally determined opinions. More open view was presented by the father of sociobiology - a theory philosophically rather different from behaviorism - who maintains that "Human nature is not just the set of everything what has been produced in the societies existing up to now. It comprises also the potential set of what can be produced in the future thanks to conscious planning." [Wilson,1988:234-5]
At this moment, the following moral comment seems to be necessary. Assume we think we may one day be faced with a serious danger. If the danger were real, it would be morally blameworthy not to take protective measures against it. But if the danger in question were imaginary one, it might be no less blameworthy to take these measures; specially, if they cost a lot of time, money, energy or whatever else. Thus, to adopt this remark to the Watson's claim, we should be able to decide whether the danger we think we may one day be faced with a serious danger. If the danger were real, it proves that we can have thoughts, feelings, wishes, and even sensual sensations which we subjectively feel to be ours, and yet that, although we experience these thoughts and feelings, they have been put into us from outside, are basically alien, and are not what we think, feel, and so on. [ibidem:212] And the thesis of direct moral relevance: "Most people are convinced that as long as they are not overtly forced to do something by an outside power, their decisions are theirs, and that if they want something, it is they who want it. But this is one of the great illusions we have about ourselves." [ibidem:223] At this moment, to comment this last passage, I can but repeat what I've already said at another place: "In the near future great efforts for self-formation turns out a basis for moral responsibility; and who would like to opt for rejecting such morally and legally fundamental concept?"

With the last comments, the general 'mood' of our reflections has changed again: self-formation turns out a basis for moral responsibility; and who would like to opt for rejecting such morally and legally fundamental concept? Say also some words on 'external' formation: It was the idea of the 1960's to educate children 'freely'; 'freely' means here no education at all, or as little as possible. 'Spontaneity', 'natural development' and the like were the slogans of that day. Today, when those children have grown up, we can evaluate the results of this (anti-) pedagogical ideology. They are, according to many students, at best mixed, at worst disastrous. But the 'classical' pedagogy is an art of forming human individuals... In the context of the present considerations, an interesting idea formulated by Habermas should not be neglected. In his lecture Was heisst heute Krise?Legitimationsproblemen im Spätkapitalismus, discusses problems "posed by the rapid economic growth in the late-capitalist societies" that "cannot be regarded as crisis-phenomena resulting from the system traits" [Habermas,1983:456] Their list includes: ecological equilibrium, anthropological equilibrium, and international equilibrium. As one can guess, I am going to mention the idea of 'anthropological equilibrium'. This idea is evidently fashioned after the concept of the 'limits to growth' as developed by Meadows and others and presented in the first report to the Club of Rome. Though Habermas himself declares that "there are not unequivocal signals which would allow to detect the limit to the endurance of the personality systems" [ibidem:458] the very suggestion of the possibility of the existence of such a limit deserves attention.

Similar, yet - on the one hand - more narrow, and - on the other - more concrete, idea of this sort can be found in Toffler Future Shock. The central argument of this book could be interpreted as thesis about the psychological limit to the pace of social changes.

(One could speculate about possible social and political transformations in the future. Still a few decades ago water, air, etc. - were regarded by the economists as 'free goods' nobody had to pay for. Today, more or less effectively, the value of those goods is being taken into account: local, national or even global. Will one day cease human beings, and their minds/souls in particular, to be regarded as such 'free goods' which can be wantonly destroyed? - Let the question remain open here.)

If we were to sum up briefly the considerations in this section, we would probably have no other choice than to invoke the well known phrase saying that 'the problem is complex, entangled and ambiguous'. And if we are to take some moral and political positions in relation to this problem, it should be first analytically clarified. (Otherwise, we can easily be trapped in cognitive and moral paradoxes). The analyses to be carried out below should, I hope, to contribute to such a clarification.
7.3. Three steps to topography

The final structure of the 'topography of anthropological space' will turn out to be quite complex. Thus, it may be useful to give in advance a brief outline of the process of its constructing. This topography will be approached in three steps.

In the first step, I shall describe an object called 'anthropological tetrahedron'. The image of tetrahedron is to convey some intuitions as to the structure of a space of something which might be regarded as generic models of man.

In the second step, the internal structure of action (knowledge, values, performance...) will be taken into account as well as the substantive differentiation of actions (technological, artistic, erotic etc.). It will be demonstrated how by an operation connecting in way the 'anthropological tetrahedron' and a classification of types of actions (and of its elements) a broader space of anthropologies may be obtained.

In the last, third, step the notion of human population and its various subdivisions will be introduced. Still more general space will be defined, to put it roughly, as a family of mappings linking the space defined in the third step and the population.

7.4. Meta-anthropological tetrahedron (and beyond)

In the former chapters, it might be said, I discussed various descriptions of human actions. In other words - various answers to the question 'How do people act?' Now, I am going to overview various general explanations of human actions. Thus - an overview of various answers to the question 'Why do people act as they do?' (Of course, the opposition between description and explanation is a relative one: general description of human actions may serve as an explanation of a particular action accomplished by a concrete human being. Still, it may be useful.)

There is no doubt that actual human actions depend on situations: a sailor on an open sea, an astronaut in a cosmic laboratory, a prisoner in his ward, a surgeon in operating room...they face various options, they have to make various decisions. It is of little importance whether they, the actual and the possible philosopher, are conscious of this fact, as long as they are aware of the space which they are moving in, and of the possibilities present in this space. I term these extreme points with names derived from the names of philosophers that presented theories that could be modeled with these 'points'. The reader should remember that it is but an illustration and I'm not going to claim that any of the respective theories could be reduced to such models. (It might be noted that this method of choosing the names for 'model philosophies, has already been used. For instance, P. Strawson informs the reader of his Individual that when he will 'be referring to the Leibniz's system, [he] will not be much worried that the considered views are not perfectly identical with opinions voiced by a historical philosopher of this name. [He] will use the name 'Leibniz' in order to designate a virtual philosopher being at least very similar to Leibniz as to some elements of the doctrine. It is of little importance whether they, the actual and the possible philosopher, are discernible, or not.' [Strawson,1980:114])

Still to remarks are necessary. One very brief, the other one - quite extensive. The first one: as it will be demonstrated in the subsequent sub-section, we should speak not of various anthropologies but rather of various classes (or types) of anthropologies. But for stylistic reasons I will use more simple, if less correct, formulation.

And the second, more lengthy remark. It will concern the concept freedom; a concept which is of primordial importance for the 'tetrahedral' classification of anthropologies.

I tend to agree with Fromm when he says that "human existence and freedom are from the beginning inseparable". [Fromm,1969:48] Otherwise put, this notion is so important because various anthropologies (more precisely, perhaps - the basic types of anthropologies) may be interpreted as alternative views on the problem of freedom. It should be specified: we speak of human freedom. I do not think that it should be discussed at any length, even in meta-antropology, whether man is a God-like being or not. Man, by the very definition (even if partial one), is not almighty. His 'absolute freedom', if we were to accept this notion at all, means always 'absolute freedom-in-a-situation'. In fact, the problem anthropology's debate over, can be put as follows: If a man is in a situation (which is defined by some physical, ontological or logical constraints put on an action to be undertaken in this situation), then...
degree and in which way his choice of action (out of all possible - ontologically or physically - actions) is determined.

These remarks we may supplement with some Levi-Strauss' considerations shedding additional light on the problem of freedom: "To find that coercion and freedom are not in opposition, but, contrarily, support each other - any freedom actualizes itself through passing by or overcoming coercion, and any coercion has crevasses or places offering less resistance - undoubtedly, there is no better way to shatter the contemporary illusion that freedom abhors barriers and that education, social life, and art need - to be flourishing - the act of creed in the omnipotence of spontaneity: an illusion being of course not the cause but a significant manifestation of the crises being experienced today by the West." [Levi-Strauss, 1993:17]

The following considerations of Hannah Arendt should help to define more precisely the way in which the term of 'freedom' is to be used below:

'Political freedom is very different from philosophical freedom, since the first one is a feature of a 'I can' and not of 'I want'. Because political freedom is shared by citizens and not by people in general, it can be manifested in societies, where people living together are united both with words and with numerous rapport - laws, customs, etc. In other words, political freedom refers to multiplicity of men, provided it is genuine multitude, and not regarding as true plural number the existing in man doubling, when his T refers to itself. The action engaging that 'we' into changing the common world contrasts sharply with thinking, which is being accomplished in solitude, in one's dialogue with oneself. In favorable circumstances, this dialogue... may be extended over someone else - Aristotel was right when saying that a friend is the second I. But it cannot be done with the authentic 'we', with the true plurality, proper for human action. (The supposition that it should be possible is the quite common mistake made by those philosophers who stress the importance of communication as warrant of truth - mainly by Karl Jaspers and Martin Buber and his philosophy concentrated on the I-thou relation. These philosophes believe that this intimate dialogue, the internal action in which I oriented at myself, or at the second I - the Aristotelian friend, Jaspersian loved man, Buberian 'thou' - may refer to everybody and become a model for the political sphere.)" [Arendt, 1996:275]

With the concept of freedom, there are some logical difficulties too. From this point of view, the trouble with 'freedom' is of this same sort as that with 'mass' in physics (cf. above - Part One, remarks on incommensurability). According to some views, 'freedom' is a one-argument predicate; according to some other views is at least two-argument predicate. Still, in both cases we speak, I believe, of the same freedom. (I don't discard the logical difficulties that arise here; I simply claim that we shouldn't reject this intuition in the name of logic but we should look for a solution that could be in accordance both with this intuition and logic. Almost identical situation is with the notion of intelligence as psychological parameter, measured say by an I.Q. test, of egoism etc.- Let's note, to take an example from medicine, that if we accepted Feyerabend argumentation we would probably have to admit that there no such phenomenon like 'lung-cancer' but different diseases, accordingly to the nature of factors that determine it: say, genetic or environmental.)

Most of us (unfortunately, not all) would like to avoid in our lives the alternative "To die or to condemn someone for death". Nevertheless, such (or similar) alternatives have been faced by many men. And for moral philosophy (psychology etc.) just this notion is relevant. If someone would like to preserve only other meaning of this notion, why not? But a new word should be introduced: the very notion (as a characteristic of ma's situation) does remain.

Let's recall the example discussed by Sartre: a young man during Nazi occupation is to decide whether to stay with mortally ill mother or to join Resistance. The young man is, according to Sartre, a free man. Some disagree with him; in particular, W. Gombrowicz criticized this conception of freedom. In my view, however, in comparison with Sartre, who stresses that freedom is a burden for man and not a privilege, Gombrowicz's understanding is more frivolous: freedom would be a sense of joy stemmed from the possibility of going here or there, of ease of movement: a young man able to ski, to dance etc. would be more free than an old on being to unable to move so. To speak ironically, Gombrowicz's freedom is that of one deciding whether spend his holiday in mountains or at sea, or to eat apples or oranges. Surely virtually nobody would give up such a freedom. But if it this very kind of freedom which is most intriguing, philosophically and morally... Personally, I doubt.

I am not going to follow Gombrowicz and I will not say that such an interpretation of the notion of freedom is senseless, or speculative or whatever... I only want to say that the word 'freedom' seems to be used as a name for perhaps related still different aspects of man's being-in-the-world. Of course, someone can believe that discussion of some phenomena is unimportant. - His good right. The only point is that one should not tell others that they should not pay their attention to the given issue.

Let me repeat that it is not the task of (any) anthropology to discuss the question of how complex are the situations faced by human beings; in particular - how many real alternatives they put in front of man. I tend to think that one could at once defend the anthropological idea of 'absolute freedom' and the historically-sociological thesis claiming that people are quite often located in 'one-way' situations, in situations that offer no actual choice. This remark illustrates the difficulties and nuances of the notion of freedom.

Three additional comments to this remark: Firstly, perhaps we should apply here the distinction of 'freedom' and 'liberty', the former characterizing the qualities of man (Arendt's 'philosophical freedom'), the latter - those of situation he happens to be in (Arendt's 'political freedom'). Secondly, this distinction is clearly a theoretical one; it can be supposed that only in a situation in which a man 'has some liberties' we can try to check if he is free or not. Thirdly, this distinction can be rather easily applied in the context of three discussed below theories but in the context of the 'Althusserian' one we can face some problems: in what sense should we distinguish a situation in which society deprives him of his liberties and a situation in which it deprives him of his freedom? But even here, some solutions are possible; they might be based, for instance, upon the following intuition: some forms of violence deprives men of their liberties (at least - mainly), and ideological manipulation - of freedom.

7.4.2. Having made the necessary assumptions and reservations, let us pass to the description of the tetrahedron. And in order to describe it, one has to describe the four 'extreme points' (or apexes) of this solid figure.

In the first description of the four 'points', I am going to avail of the metaphor of program. Any action is, according to this image, determined - directly - by a program (and, roughly speaking, humanist interpretation/rational-choice theory tells us how this determination works). The question is, how does it happen that an individual is equipped with this very program (and not with any other, logically possible)?
Commence with a standpoint that could be termed 'Schopenhauerian'. It represents a theory that claims that man is somehow (in the simplest present-day interpretation: genetically; but metaphysically very different stances fit into this characteristic, for instance an anthropophy based on the theory of predestination, e.g. Calvin's) equipped with a 'program' that determines his behavior in any situation.

Other of these points could be called 'Sartrian'. It represents a theory that claims that man can actually do whatever a situation allows for. No factor determines his choice. The decision, the whole act, is, so to say, created ex nihilo. Man is not equipped with any 'program' of his conduct, or - to put it in other words (but if quite equivalently?) - he can at any moment 're-program' himself.

According to a theory that could be named 'Althusserian', man's activity is always but a part of 'social practice' that provides him with a 'program' to be actualized in the given situation. Man is, so to say, 'manipulated' by his (social) environment.

The fourth apex, to be called 'Lockian', depicts man as determined by his own past. Speaking more acutely, according to this view, man comes into the world without any fixed 'program', but is provided with one at the very beginning of his life, or - more generally - throughout his life.

This brief characteristic can be supplemented with another one, made in more traditional philosophical language containing the categories of 'essence' and 'existence'. Using this language, we can obtain the following ramified classification of anthropologies. First, we can divide anthropologies into essentialist and existentialist. According to existential anthropology, man has no essence at all. Since this class cannot be further divided (in the present context), thus it becomes the 'final' element of our classification. The first class, that of essentialist anthropology, comprises all those anthropologies which maintain that man has an essence. They differ, however, in their view of this essence. Therefore, they can be further subdivided. In particular, we can distinguish two theories of essence. One might be termed 'Aristotelian', the other - 'Hegelian'. (I follow here Lucien Seve's considerations over this problem [1974:272-275].) According to the first theory, essence is 'internal' to its object; according to the second - 'external'. It might be also said that 'Aristotelian essence' is a part of an object; and that an object is a part of its Hegelian essence.

If the essence is 'external', it is - to a greater or lesser degree - changing. To what degree - cannot be decided on the anthropological ground: whether it is changing or not depends upon the external world, and not upon the man's traits. Anyway, man's essence is 'changeable' here. Therefore, no further ramifications are possible: we've reached another 'final' element of the classification: Hegelian, or let's call it so - dialectical. There remains still the group of 'Aristotelian' anthropologies. Here, the division is possible: both the case of constancy and of changeability of the essence are possible. Let's call them, respectively, static-Aristotelian and dynamic-Aristotelian anthropologies.

Having characterized individually the four 'pure' anthropologies, we may characterize them 'in relational way'. In particular, we can contrast any of those anthropologies with the group consisting of all the three remaining. Let's look now at these oppositions.

Firstly, between 'Sartrian' anthropology and the others. Only 'Sartrian' anthropology depicts man as a free being. All the others depict his as un-free. Of course, the un-freedom is caused by different factors (innate 'nature', society, or one's own past); yet the basic fact is common to all the three anthropologies.

Secondly, the opposition between the 'Schopenhauerian' one and the rest. Only in the case of 'Schopenhauerian' anthropology would we say that man's life is somehow pre-determined. In any of the other three it is not the case. The 'Lockian' perspective, which does not assume any pre-existing 'nature' of man, can be opposed against 'Schopenhauerian', alongside with 'Sartrian' and 'Althusserian'.

Thirdly, between the 'Althusserian' model and the rest. Or, here rather other way round: between the three anthropologies characterized positively and contrasted with the 'Althusserian'. In any of the three models, man is viewed as autonomous being. And only 'Althusserian' image presents man as completely dependent upon his surrounding. In particular, it is worthwhile to note that neither 'Lockian', nor 'Sartrian', nor 'Schopenhauerian' - as contrasted with the 'Althusserian' view - does basically allow for any manipulating a man by another one.

And fourthly, the difference between 'Lockian' image and the others. If we'd like to contrast 'Lockian' standpoint with all the three others, we could say that this standpoint regards man's memory as the decisive factor. Viewed from the 'Sartrian', 'Schopenhauerian' or 'Althusserian' standpoint memory is but of 'technical' importance; it is 'passive', and only in the case of 'Lockian' anthropology - 'active'. In other words, only in the 'Lockian' model the actual course of individual's life does matter for his future conduct. In the other models, the very notion of individual life (if understood in 'humanistic' way and not 'biologically') becomes almost void of meaning. It could be also said that in the 'Sartrian' and in the 'Althusserian' anthropology, and also in the 'Schopenhauerian' (though here the picture is less clear; cf. below, the remarks on there is no room for the concept of 'biography', regarded as a theoretical category. 'Biography' would be - at best - a mere collection of facts belonging to the life of a physically identifiable individual (also 'life were not a theoretical category of anthropology but would belong to the domain of biology only). And putting it other way round, 'Lockian' anthropology assumes that individuals have real life.histories that could be not only registered, but narrated and accounted for in biographies. (In the critique addressed at 'real' Althusser and 'real' Sartre we could possibly find the same tenor; in particular, MacIntyre's critique of Sartre [MacIntyre, 1996:76-77] can be applied to Althusser/Baribal. Though MacIntyre indeed compares - and identifies in a way - Sartre's position with Erving Goffman's one, yet the latter, however in many details different from that of the French Marxists, can be regarded rather as a variant of 'Althusserian' position of which 'real' Althusser's views are also but a special case.)

An additional remark on 'Lockian' (and 'Schopenhauerian') anthropology seems to me necessary. To convey first the basic intuition, let me start with the geometrical image of the anthropological space. It is tetrahedron. A regular one, it might be supposed. And here is the trouble: At the first sight, the regularity assumption seems to be correct. Yet, I tend to think that it is somewhat doubtful. More specifically, I suppose that the 'distance' between 'Lockian' and 'Schopenhauerian' is smaller than between any other two apex-points. Why should it be so? Neither 'Althusserian', nor 'Sartrian', nor 'Schopenhauerian' anthropology is explicitly dependent upon time:
there are possible such models of human life which assume that the basic nomological property of them is constant. The situation of "Lockian" anthropology is more complex. It may be supposed that "Schopenhauerian" and "Lockian" models of human life differ only for a beginning period of life: the greatest difference being at the very beginning: according to the first anthropology a complete life-program is given, according to the second - no program at all; however, at a moment in his life, the process of program-construction would be completed. Since the moment on these two models would be, all other factors equal, identical.

But, on the other hand, it might be supposed that 'normal' (in its temporal dimension; i.e. lasting no more than ca. 150 years) human life is to short so that the process of program construction should be completed. Such a possibility supports the thesis claiming for logical independence of the 'Lockian' anthropology.

In sum, there is something unclear about 'Lockian' anthropology. For the present moment, however, I am not able to say anything more, except for what's just been said.

In the next step, I am going to divide the four anthropologies into groups composed of two elements. According to elementary combinatorics, we can obtain six such groups. Therefore, we can speak of three oppositions.

First, 'Althusserian' and 'Sartrian' anthropologies on one side, and 'Schopenhauerian' and 'Lockian' on the other. Both 'Sartrian' and 'Althusserian' depict human being as having no 'fixed nature' that could manifest itself in the agent's behavior. It could be said that individual's behavior is in both model (let me stress: as they are defined here) absolutely unpredictable, though - for very different reasons. On the other hand, in 'Lockian' model as well as in the 'Schopenhauerian' one, man should during all his life behave himself in the same way; his behavior should be predictable. (This formulation is very crude; it needs some specifications: fixed program can allow for changes in behavior, but the very changes should be pre-determined.)

Second, 'Althusserian' and 'Lockian' models. They can be grouped together for the following reason: the role played by society in the determination of human behavior is in both anthropologies similar. The difference lies in the fact that according to the 'Lockian' model man is determined 'once for ever' (we obtain here somewhat paradoxical result: according to this model, the longer someone is determined by society, the more autonomous he is; in its framework, we could say that it is society which creates man's autonomy), and according to the 'Althusserian' one - 'instantly'. And both in, otherwise so different, 'Sartrian' and 'Schopenhauerian' human being is independent from society.

And third, 'Althusserian' and 'Schopenhauerian' models exclude any subjective sovereignty of man: his actions are but manifestations of extra-subjective (either interneural or external) 'forces'. It is not so in the case of 'Sartrian' and 'Lockian' anthropology. As regards the first one, it is obvious. And what about the 'Lockian' model? Here, we note again its 'dubious' character. But, perhaps, it might be said that in this model man determines himself, thus even if his actions are determined, his subjectivity is real.

As far as now, I have tried to characterize, either directly or indirectly (contextually), the 'pure' (i.e. represented by the 'apex' points) anthropologies. From this moment on, I am going to characterize the 'mixed' anthropologies. I will restrict myself to 'linear' anthropologies, i.e. to the anthropologies being represented by the points on the edges of the tetrahedron.

First, let's look at the 'Schopenhauerian-Sartrian' anthropologies. Any such anthropology assumes that man is partly pre-determined by his innate nature, and partly - free. An Indian philosopher claims that 'human being in three quarters belongs to the Nature', and in this area man manifests behavior being not different from the animal one. The other part - it is his freedom."[Bhattacharyya,1976:15] Bhattacharyya's anthropology is, due to this numerical declaration, more 'Schopenhauerian' than 'Sartrian'. But changing the figures, in the case of the Indian philosopher - given ad hoc without any theoretical ground, we can obtain the whole range of anthropologies, from 'almost Schopenhauerian' to 'almost Sartrian'.

Secondly, anthropologies of 'Schopenhauerian-Lockian' type. Here it is assumed that the 'program' is only partly given, 'uncompleted' and becomes more and more complete during the lifetime. Here again, various degrees of 'incompleteness' can be assumed, resulting in various anthropologies. More specifically, anthropologies of this kind may differ as to their theses concerning the pace, etc., of the process of 'completing' the program of acting.

Third, take into consideration 'Schopenhauerian-Althusserian' models. Here man's action is viewed as resulting from interaction between 'innate nature' and the surrounding of man. The first factor accounts for the permanent traits of individual's behavior, the second one - for its temporal variations. The remarks, etc. above on the spectrum of 'Schopenhauerian-Sartrian' anthropologies can be repeated here.

Fourthly, 'Sartrian-Lockian' anthropologies, man is determined by his own past but this determination is more or less partial, and beyond this determinacy man is free. 

Some elements of Sartre's philosophy (in which he tries to avail of psychoanalysis) seem to make up a quite good example of this type. The remarks, etc.

Fifth, any 'Sartrian-Althusserian' anthropology depicts man as partly free yet social being. It can be said that man's activity is formed in the process of interaction with other men: people form their fellowmen and are formed by them. - Some elements of symbolic interactionism could be represented by models of this sort.

Sixthly, 'Lockian-Althusserian' models can be characterized thus. Man is determined both by his past and present relations with other people. Possibly some Marxist anthropologies, in particular Seve's theory of personality, could be regarded as being represented by models in question.

The 'Lockian-Althusserian' models could be supplemented with the following, possibly quite important remark. All models of this kind present human individual as a 'product' of the social environment. Even purely Lockian model is based on this assumption. How, then, could we order them? Intuitively speaking, purely Althusserian model assumes that man adapts himself to the new social environment 'instantly'. On the other hand, various in-between models differ as to degree of 'inertia' with which man adapts himself to the new environment. The less adaptability is allowed for in the given model, the more close to the 'Lockian' one it is; the purely 'Lockian' one allows for no changes in the already formed areas of personality.

Making a step toward philosophy of History, we could say that the more 'Lockian' is the anthropology assumed by the given philosophy of History, the more importance place is to be given to the phenomena described by Pareto in his theory of elites, in particular - in his conception of the circulation of elites (cf. Arrow's remarks on this issue [Arrow:1975:51-52]). In other words, the relevance of generation changes (the importance of the mechanisms of social mobility) depends on the deterministic importance attached to the memory by the anthropology on which the given theory of History is based.
At the end of this deliberations, consider the most ‘moderate’ anthropology being represented by the center of the tetrahedron. Interestingly, what might have been expected to be the most common-sense model, turns out to be quite difficult to be specified. Partly free, partly determined by his inborn nature and by his own past, and partly by his social surrounding - such an image of man is in fact very vague. If only so charaterized, it could be located at any internal point of the anthropological tetrahedron, and not only at the center.

This difficulty demonstrates how in fact weak are our conceptual tools. Unfortunately - in my view - nothing can be done about it. More formal, even mathematical representation of various anthropologies would be necessary. This is however a task for another work.

Another partial solution to this problem will be given in the next section: it consists in assuming that different mechanism operating ‘in’ man can be characterized in various ways; in the spirit of this or that ‘pure’ anthropology.

These rather ‘pessimistic’ remarks might be counter-balanced with an ‘optimistic’, positive observation. I’d like to suggest that a part of Freud’s theory may be interpreted as represented in the tetrahedron by a ‘central’ point. The concept of super-ego corresponds with the ‘Althusserian’ component. The concept of id seems to be of double nature: on the one hand, when some basic drives (in particular sexual) are considered - it corresponds with ‘Schopenhauerian’ component; on the other, when we consider some complexes or suppressed experiences from the childhood period - id corresponds rather with ‘Lockian’ component. And ego may be interpreted, if hesitatingly, with the ‘Sartrian’ component.

I would like to supplement this sub-chapter with some remarks on psychology of personality. Of various sub-disciplines of psychology this very branch seems to be most closely related to the philosophical preoccupation in studying man; to give but the most ‘empirical’ evidence: Freud, Jung, Fromm, Heidegger, Sartre, Binswanger - these figures, so familiar to philosophers, may be met in books on psychology of personality more often than in those devoted to any other psychological sub­-discipline. Here, I want to refer to the well-known **Theories of Personality** of C.S.Hall and G. Lindzey.

In this book, they present "fifteen main types of the theories of personality" [Hall, Lindzey, 1990:623], ranging from classical psychoanalytical theory of Freud, through existential psychology (of Binswanger and Boss) to the reinforcement theory of Skinner. In the last chapter, they offer a comparative analysis of those theories. This analysis is concentrated around relevance of such concepts and ideas as goal-driving, unconscious determinants of behavior, reward and reinforcement, learning, the structure of personality, the role of genetic factors, continuity of development, organismizm, homeostasis, group-membership, plurality of motives... The list, which in complete form contains twenty four ‘dimensions’ - of which I’ve cited only a few, can hardly be regarded as systematic and complete. Nevertheless, nineteen individual psychologists (in one case - a school) are assigned - with respect to each of those ‘dimensions’ - one of three values: ‘strong emphasis’, ‘moderate emphasis’, ‘no relevance attached’ [Hall, Lindzey, 1990:633].

In my opinion, this classification demonstrates all the weaknesses of the ‘inductive’ and ‘empirical’ approach to the problem of classification and comparative analysis of theories. Yet, this classification provided material for further analyses in which statistical methods (factor analysis, cluster analysis) were adopted. D. Cartwright obtained four factors; the first one comprises such attributes as group-

membership, the second - heredity, the third - the concept of ‘self’, the fourth one - structure and heredity (it is to be significant for ‘factor’-theories only). R. Taft obtained five clusters: functionalist social-field theories, developmental approach to unconscious structures of personality, inherited self-actualization theories, development in interaction with social environment, constitutional structures of personality. Schuh obtained four clusters, the first one labeled as ‘social emphasis’ while the second - ‘self emphasis’; the third (comprising, among others, Freud and Lewin), and the fourth one (Jung, Sullivan...) obtained no names. Evans and Smith obtained quite similar classifications, composed of four groups of theories designated as ‘self emphasis’, ‘psychoanalytic emphasis’, ‘biological emphasis’ and ‘learning emphasis’, respectively. All these classifications bear some resemblance to the anthropological tetrahedron. Relatively most evidently in the case of the Evans-Smith’s classification. Here, I would suggest the following correspondence: ‘self emphasis’ - Sartrian stance, ‘psychoanalytic emphasis’ - Althusserian stance, ‘biological emphasis’ - Schopenhauerian one, and ‘learning emphasis’ - Lockian. This correspondence is rather crude and approximate. Still, this analogy between two classifications obtained independently and in the result of classifying different theories seems to be telling and deserving future analysis.

7.4.3. This model of the space of anthropologies (one which is represented by a tetrahedron) is based on many simplifying assumptions. Some of them will be discussed and removed in the subsequent sub-chapters; the model will be modified. All these modifications will be based upon general intuition: elements of actions, types of actions, and also - individuals can be nomologically heterogeneous.

In the most radical formulation: it may be that various elements of various types of actions are in the case of various individuals determined in various ways. But all these modifications are based on the assumption that a classification of possible mechanisms of acting-determination is given; the tetrahedron provides such a classification.

Now, I would like to take another direction: I’d like to demonstrate that this ‘tetrhedral’ classification is in itself a simplification. Starting from the geometrical image, the mechanism of this simplification could be characterized thus. Some (whether in more general sense i.e. all/ or precisely ‘some’ i.e. not all/ cannot be decided now) ‘points’ represent not a single theory of mechanisms determining human actions but a class of theories. Each class contains theories being in a way equivalent, thus, in a sense, identical. (In a more mathematical language, we could say that the tetrahedron represents so-called ‘quotient space’ generated by the process in which a space is ‘divided’ by a relation of equivalence, satisfying the conditions of reflexiveness, symmetry, and transitivity. More figuratively, it is sometimes being said that we are ‘sticking’ the equivalent elements together.)

More substantially, we could say thus. Each point (in particular, the extreme ones: apexes) represents a mechanism of determination of human behavior. But in fact, we should not speak of mechanisms but of types of mechanism. In other words, each point of the tetrahedron represents a set (but, on the other hand, it is not excluded that some these sets may be one-elemental) of anthropological theories.

So much in abstract terms. More should become clear in the concrete analysis.

I will focus but on one point. For rather obvious reasons - on an extreme one. For less obvious reasons - just on the point representing ‘Althusserian’ stance. The
less obvious reasons are two. First, I am personally more familiar with the theories that can be described as belonging to this class. Second, the set of those theories is on the one hand rather numerous, but - on the other - seems to have relatively simple structure.

Let us remind that the ‘Althusserian’ stance was defined thus: man’s activity is always but a part of ‘social practice’ that provides him with a “program” to be actualized in the given situation. Man is, so to say, ‘manipulated’ by his (social) environment.

Now, I am going to concretize this rather general thesis. And not by referring to other general factors (‘Schopenhauerian’ or others). I am going to stay in the domain of purely ‘environmentalist’ models. But there is a whole range of them. We can obtain their classification by scrutinizing the basic terms used in the characterization of the ‘Althusserian’ anthropology. It will be convenient to limit oneself to the two terms present in the second part of the characteristic, i.e. to ‘manipulation’ and ‘environment’.

We should ask two parallel questions: What is ‘environment’?, and - What is ‘manipulation’? Various answers to these two questions will give us various concretizations of the basic thesis of ‘Althusserian’ anthropology.

Let consider the first question: What is ‘environment’? Obviously, we think here of ‘social environment’. But it can be variously characterized and each such characteristic constitutes the core of a theory. Those characteristics should be ordered in some ways. The following seems to be quite convenient.

I will start from the previously discussed Nowak’s model, so-called ‘non-Christian’ model of man. This model is based on the idea of inter-individual interaction. When constructing this model, we need not to assume - even as a strong idealization - that the given individual holds up relations only with one other man. What we have to assume is that any of his relations with the other human beings is - in a special sense - separated (isolated) from all the other relations. In other words, his attitude toward his social environment (if it is at all to be defined) is a linear function of his attitudes toward separate partners.

In the second step, we could make a use of the Merton’s theory of reference groups. In this perspective, one’s way of acting is determined by the behavior of a group of people, more or less broadly defined. And just the extension of the reference groups, which are to determine individual’s behavior, may serve as a means of classification of various sub-types of ‘Althusserian’ anthropology.

We could start from the ‘primary’ groups, such as family, school-mates, workplace colleagues, etc. In the next step, we might speak about such groups as tribe, nation, or - civilization. In the third step, we could speak about forms of social practice of Althusser and Balibar, or - forms of social consciousness in the sense of J. Kmita. This classification might be completed with a theory of which the best epitome could be Heidegger’s conception of das Man.

Now, let pass to the second question. We can distinguish several sub-types of ‘Althusserian’ anthropology in accordance to various possible answers to the second question: ‘What is manipulation’? In the first step, two answers might be given. According to the first one, ‘manipulation’ could be characterized as ‘passive’, according to the second - as ‘active’.

In the first perspective, passive ‘manipulation’ is not, to put it somewhat paradoxically, manipulation at all. At least, accordingly to the common usage of the word. Passive ‘manipulation’ is void of not only of any intentionality but also of any, even non-intentional, directionality. It could be said that man is ‘manipulated’ by the very presence of ‘environment’. This presence should be pervasive and overwhelming. So overwhelming that man should not be able to avoid the power with which ‘environment’ imposes its patterns and requirements.

The overview of the ‘passive’ forms of ‘manipulation’ may be commenced with the Heideggerian das Man. In this case, the ‘abstract’, vague, unspecified character of ‘manipulation’ converges with the broad character of the group which ‘manipulates’.

Quite close to the former, yet more - so to say - specific, is the phenomenon of ‘imitation’, playing a key role in Gabriel Tarde’s sociology. The somewhat forgotten thinker was speaking about “the fundamental social couple...composed of two persons, of either sex” and claimed that “the relation between these two persons is the one essential element in the social life, and that it always consists, at bottom, in an imitation of one by the other.” [Tarde, 1963:113]

In between Heidegger and Tarde, we may locate such phenomena as fashion, idols, heroes, etc. Also the phenomenon of authority, studied in particular by Bocheński [idem, 1993:187-324].

And here, we arrive at the border area between ‘passive’ and ‘active’ manipulation. The sphere of mass media belongs to this area. To decide which elements of TV or radio programs should be classified as ‘passive’ or, contrarily, as ‘active’ is not a simple task; it might be a matter of special sociological analyses. And such an analysis need not be ‘scholastic’ or ‘academic’; quite contrarily, such an analysis were of practical, political importance. It is however obvious that in the present, philosophical context, such an analysis cannot be undertaken.

According to Fromm, the “most important means of transmitting the desired personality pattern to the average man is the motion picture. The young girl tries to emulate the facial expression, coiffure, gestures of a high-priced star as the most promising way to success. The young man tries to look and be Nike the model he sees on the screen. While the average citizen has little contact with the life of the most successful people, his relationship with motion-picture stars different. It is true that he has no real contact with them either, but he can see them on the screen again and again, can write to them and receive their autographed pictures. In contrast to the time when the actor was socially despised but was nevertheless the transmitter of the works of great poets to his audience, our motion-picture stars have not great works or ideas to transmit, but their function is to serve as the link an average person has with the world of the ‘great’. Even if he can not hope to become as successful as they are, he can try to emulate them; they are his saints and because of their success they embody the norms for living.” [Fromm, 1967:79]

In the second perspective, ‘manipulation’ is viewed as being - more or less - ‘active’. Perhaps intentional, or at least ‘directional’. Here, we should think of various forms of education, propaganda, and - violence. These forms range from simple verbal teaching (say, teaching Ten Commandments), trough more complex teaching (from telling the tales in the early childhood to compulsory reading in school), to systems of awards and punishments.

As you see, what was initially defined as a single stance turns out to be a large family of possible theories. And many new questions arise, if the take into account the differences between those theories.

I tend to think that the most important of all these questions could be articulated thus: Which of the forms ‘manipulation’ are most effective, and - which of them are, from a moral point of view, most humiliating, offensive to the human
dignity. This question is important not only ‘in itself’, but is so due to its relevance for political philosophy.

In Fromm’s opinion (in fact, he repeats a Marx’s thesis), “...while Luther freed people from the authority of the Church, he made them subject to a much more tyrannical authority, that of a God who insisted on complete submission of man and annihilation of the individual self as the essential condition to his salvation.” [Fromm, 1969a:100] This thesis might be regarded as a subjective moral evaluation. It gains more substance, if read in the context of another Fromm’s thesis. This time - of sociological or even historiosophical character: “Authority in the middle of the twentieth century has changed its character; it is not over authority, but anonymous, invisible, alienated authority. Nobody makes a demand, neither person, nor an idea, nor a moral law. Yet we all conform as much or more than people in an intensely authoritarian society would. Indeed, nobody is an authority except ‘It’. What is ‘It’? Profit, economic necessities, the market, common sense, public opinion, what ‘one’ does, thinks, feels.” And the conclusion: “The laws of anonymous authority are as invisible as the laws of the market - and just as unassailable. Who can rebel against Nobody?” [Fromm, 1969b:138]

An analogy, quite interesting in my view, could be written down. What makes religion psychologically attractive, more attractive than science? In particular, why the religious image of super-human power, one human being is subjected to and dependent on, is more acceptable than the scientific one? In short: why the power of God is more psychologically acceptable than their power of laws of Nature? The answer does not seem to be difficult. The time of the Persian ruler who is said to have ordered flogging the sea has definitely gone. Today, it is hardly possible to protest against ‘decisions’ of the Nature. Only personal God can be addressed with petitions, demands or even curses.

From religion, return to the market. Fromm’s considerations can be juxtaposed with Walicki’s comparative analysis of Marxian and Simmelian views on market, reification of social relations, and - freedom.

According to Walicki’s view, “the main difference between Marx’s and Simmel’s views on the question of freedom consists in the diametrically different evaluation of the importance of reification for the interpersonal relations” [Walicki, 1996:107] This citation is to be complemented with the following quote: “The contrast between the views of Marx and Simmel resulted, in the last instance, from the axiologically determined difference of opinions on what is the greatest threat to freedom: personal or objective dependence, else’s arbitrary will or domination of things.” [Walicki, 1996:109] Walicki declares also his own position and says: “we do not know why personal dependence, mediated by things or hidden beyond dependencies perceived as objective and natural, should be worse than immediate personal dependence of the slave or serf type. It seems that it was an apriori opinion resulting from the application of the scheme of self-enriching alienation to history.” [Walicki, 1996:75] In my opinion, the final question of Fromm (ending the last quote), and the intuition it expresses, offers an answer to the problem posed by Walicki. Not necessarily a decisive one, but demonstrating that the problem cannot be reduced to the irresolvable conflict of opposed moral evaluations.

And still a remark. My own interest in (meta-)anthropology is to a degree a part of my interest in (meta-)historiosophy. For this reason, I want to cite the following analysis. In his masterly presentation of historical materialism, G.A. Cohen formulates and defenses the ‘development thesis’ (the productive forces tend to develop throughout history). His defense relies partly on the notion of human nature:

“Many Marxists will be surprised by our reference to human nature, and appalled at our intention to use supposed facts of human nature as a source of argument in favor of historical materialism. Human nature, they will say, changes in the course of history: there is no single human nature on which to found reasoning about history’s course. It is a Marxist tradition to deny that there exists an historically invariant human nature. The point is made against conservatives who fix on some historically virulent behaviour pattern (usually an unpleasant one), assign it to human nature, and conclude that the pattern will appear in every society, or be eliminated only by extreme tyranny. (It is against human nature: for people not to be greedy, for them to be uncompetitive, for democracy to work, for real equality to prevail, etc.) But it is not necessary to claim, in response, that there are no quite permanent facts of human nature. All that need be denied is that the particular feature the conservatives emphasizes is one of them. It must be agreed that there are enduring facts of human nature. For man is a mammal... The proposition that human nature changes in history is important only in some important sense of ‘human nature’, but it is also true that there are permanent attributes of human nature, in some equally important, perhaps the same sense. Marxists who deny that the existence of a general human nature declare that how people are depends on the structure of society they live in: if society is s-and-so, personality and behaviour will be such-and-such. Must they not, however, accept the human beings have a nature in virtue of which a given form of society shapes their behaviour in particular way? The reply might be that the ‘underlying’ nature is itself transient, bequeathed by previous history. But at some place in what may need be a complex picture of layers and strata the contribution of biology will have to be acknowledged.” [Cohen G.A., 1980:151-152]

7.5. A space of anthropologies: anthropological tetrahedron and elements/types of action

The idea of this section is a simple one. While distinguishing various anthropologies (as being represented by points of a tetrahedron), I assumed that anthropologies answer the questions about determinants of action in their own, yet in just one and only one general way: (all) human actions (and all their elements) happen to be determined so-and-so, or they happen to be free (for the sake of brevity, assume a language convention: being free, undetermined, is a ‘degnerated’ type of determinacy; just as a single point can be termed a ‘degnerated’ space). And it is quite possible that some real anthropologies do so. But surely not all of them. And what is more important, at least in the context of meta-anthropology, they do not have to do so. It is quite possible to maintain that different elements of action or/and different types of action happen to be determined in different ways. And we have to take this possibility into account. We could say that we are now to consider anthropologies which accept negative answer (of a kind) to the following question:

[Q21] Are all types or/and elements human actions nomologically homogenous?
To be more specific, I am going to follow two - or in a sense: three - ways of reasoning. Taking the first one, I am going to consider how the image of action as being composed of some elements generates a much broader space of anthropologies. In other words, the assumption (previously tacitly accepted) of 'nomological identity' of the elements of any action is to be removed. Thus, if this assumption is rejected, we can claim for different mechanisms determining syntax, semantics, decision-making mechanisms, and pragmatics or even different aspects of them (say knowledge on the one hand, and values on the other).

And the second way leads to discussion of how qualitative differentiation of human actions makes necessary to enlarge the space of anthropologies. Here the assumption of the 'nomological identity' of the generic types of actions is rejected. Intuitively speaking, it is allowed now that the mechanisms that determine, say, labor, sexual activity, play etc. (to use for the present moment pre-theoretical classification) may be different.

In the third step, I will indicate the possibility of combination of the results obtained when the former two steps are made. Therefore, both the assumptions of 'nomological identity' are rejected.

At the very end, the 'problem of iteration' will be raised.

**7.5.1. 'Anthropological tetrahedron' and elements of action**

In the present section some possible consequences are to be drawn from the fact that action is a complex system; namely, it has a syntactic structure, a semantic 'content', it involves a decision-making mechanism and is performed in a way.

Before we will undertake more substantial analysis, let's look at the 'geometry' of the anthropological space to be generated. It can be presented in a few alternative ways. It seems to me that most conveniently we could depict this space thus: We take a number (for instance - four, if we assume the model of action characterized a few lines earlier) of tetrahedrons and regard now as representations of anthropologies finite sets of points, each point being taken from exactly one tetrahedron.

Alternatively, but in essence - equivalently, we could say that any anthropology is defined here as n-tuple (in our case - four-tuple) of some elements. So much for formal intuitions. Pass on to more substantial considerations.

We should start from a problem which is fundamental for further considerations. I think about the problem of 'nomological homogeneity/heterogeneity' of man. If we assume that that man is 'nomologically heterogeneous' then we will be able to proceed further. But if we assume, contrarily, that man is 'nomologically homogenous' than we will have to stop.

I want to stress that this reservation has not been made for formal reasons; the problem, indicated above, seems to be quite real. Take, for instance, into consideration the following deliberations of Sartre: "If we admit that the person is a totality, we cannot hope to reconstruct him by an addition or by an organization of the diverse tendencies which we have empirically discovered in him. On the contrary, in each inclination, in each tendency the person expresses himself, although from a different angle, a little as Spinoza's substance expresses itself completely in each of its attributes. But if this is so, we should discover in each tendency, in each attitude of the subject, a meaning which transcends it." [Sartre,1989:563]

I tend to think that the author of *The Sane Society* expresses, in the words to be just quoted, a quite similar attitude: "Man is a unit; his thinking, feeling and his practice of life are inseparably connected. He cannot be free in his thought when he is not free emotionally; and he cannot be free emotionally if he is dependent and unfree in his practice of life, in his economic and social relations. Trying to advance radically in one sector to the exclusion of others must necessarily lead to the result to which it lead, namely, that the radical demands in one sphere are fulfilled only by a few individuals, while for the majority they become formulae and rituals, serving to cover up the fact that in other spheres nothing has changed. Undoubtedly one step of integrated progress in all spheres of life will have more far-reaching and more lasting results for the progress of the human race than a hundred steps preached - and even for short while lived - in only one isolated sphere. Several thousands of years of failure in isolated progress should be a rather convincing lesson." [Fromm, 1969b:239]

But, on the other hand, very different positions are not only logically possible but can be actually found in some works. Hannah Arendt, for instance, maintains that "thinking, willing and judging are the three fundamental types of the acts of mind; neither of them can be derived from the others, and they cannot be reduced to any single common denominator, despite having some traits in common." [Arendt, 1991:111] The following remark with which she complements this statement is particularly important in the present context: "I have defined the above types of mind acts as basic since they are autonomous; each of them comes under its own laws" [Arendt,1991:112] I want to stress particularly the last words about the separate laws governing the three types of mental processes.

I'd like also to add that Arendt's classification of the 'fundamental types of mind's acts' is almost identical with the structural analysis of action presupposed in the rational-model of action, and therefore in the present version of meta-anthropology.

Staying still with Arendt, we could note her considerations on relations between mind and soul. In her view, "mind differs fundamentally from soul which is competing with it for the governance over our internal, invisible life. Soul, or the place where arise our passions - feelings or emotions - is a more or less chaotic waving of events, which is not so much caused as is endured by us, and which - in the case of great intensity - can overwhelm us, as it happens with pain or pleasure. /.../ On the other hand, the life of mind is a pure activity and as any activity can be commenced or stopped in accordance with our will." [Arendt,1991:115] The difference between 'mind' and 'soul' is not superficial; quite contrarily, we could say - paraphrasing Arendt's opinions into our language - that 'mind' comes under 'Sartrian' determinism, while 'soul' - perhaps under 'Lockian'.

Also Freud, making use of his vision of human mind, maintains that "the processes proceeding in unconsciousness, i.e. in id, come under different laws than the processes proceeding in preconscious ego. We call the whole of those laws 'primary process', in opposition to 'secondary process' which regulates the courses going on in pre-consciousness, in ego." [Freud,1975:167]

Let's end this part of our considerations with a quote from Fromm. He maintains in his *Escape from Freedom* that "there are certain sectors in man's nature that are more flexible and adaptable than others." [Fromm,1969a:31] This opinion seems to contradict the previously quoted one. Did Fromm change his mind after having written *Escape*? I do not believe that we should speculate about it. I tend rather to think that the juxtaposition of these two Frommian claims demonstrates that
Fromm was not fully aware of the question of 'nomological homogeneity/heterogeneity' and of its relevance.

Having formulated some rather general remarks on the problem, I am going to 'concretize' them. Thus, I will be subsequently analyzing the relations between tetrahedron and separate elements of action.

7.5.1.1. In accordance with the order of the hitherto considerations, we start with the problem: tetrahedron and 'syntax' of actions.

I'd like to commence this discussion with some remarks on the Sartrian concept of freedom. In Sartrian's view, freedom is to be a permanent trait of the 'For-itself'. Taking it in an abstract way, if we accept the Sartrian concept of freedom, we should - one might claim - accept the temporal permanence of freedom. Is this actually so? I want to suggest that it is not an easy task to reconcile the 'permanence thesis' with those anthropologies which allow for actions being very complex, thus of relatively long duration.

To make the problem more tangible, I will formulate Sartrian thesis in a quasi-formal way. More specifically, I want to offer two different formulations of this kind and to demonstrate that this difference matters. The formulations are:

(*) For each \( t \), it is possible that \( X \) is free at the moment \( t \).

(**) It is possible that, for each \( t \), \( X \) is free at the moment \( t \).

It is a simple logical fact that (*) does not entail (**). The first statement represents an anthropological thesis which, though highly controversial, is a legitimate member of the family of anthropological theses (models). As regards the second thesis, I suppose that it might be logically (analytically) refutable.

The problem put above seems to be in a (quite close) relation with the phenomenon described and discussed by Bauman under the title of 'sequential actions'.

'Sequational action seems to manifest the same traits [scil. specific for swamp - W.Cz.]. The degree, to which a participant feels obliged to fulfill a task and to overcome difficulties, seems to increase as the stages follow. The first steps are easy and if they demand any moral concessions, then only minor ones. The subsequent ones are becoming more and more repulsive. The last ones seem to be completely unacceptable. The costs of the retreat are in the meantime growing. The will to break free is slight when the reasons for doing it are slight or none. When the will to break free is growing, the troubles related to it are on each stage are sufficiently serious to counter-balance the will to go away. When the participant wants to retreat at all costs, it is usually too late. Milgram numbered sequential actions among the main 'subjugating factors' (i.e. factors putting the man into a closed situation). We are tempted to assign the affecting power of these factors to the determining influence of one's own action. A precise and convincing description of this mechanism was presented by Sabini and Silver. \( \ldots \) In the course of the realization of a sequential action, the actor is becoming a slave of his last act. This seems to subjugate him more than all other factors. This mechanism takes over the motivational function which was played at the beginning of the experiment by other, seemingly more important, factors. In particular, the reluctance to make the repeated evaluation (and condemnation) of one's own former act continues to be a very strong and gaining the power motive for continuation even long after the initial commitment lost any evaluation of one's act as a proper, or at least innocent one. The trap is, speaking differently, a paradox: you cannot purge yourself without having blackened yourself. To conceal the dirt, you have to wade in mud." [Bauman, 1991:221-222]

A phenomenon of rather dramatic character, the mechanism described by Bauman might have its counterpart, or analog, in the domain of more simple psychological mechanisms. I think here of the investigations of the Soviet psychologist, B. Zeigarnik. These investigations seem to demonstrate that there is a tendency toward completing actions which were started but not brought to their 'natural' end. [Hilgard, 1972:447]

7.5.1.2. Now, the 'semantics' of actions is to be analyzed in the context of the 'tetrahedral' classification of anthropologies. Since the 'semantics' is composed of the 'axiological' part and the 'epistemological' one (theory of individual values, and theory of individual knowledge, respectively), I will be proceeding accordingly.

Let's commence, then, from values. At the very beginning, I will try to interpret the notion of preferences (values) in the context of the four 'pure' anthropologies. In the first step, I will be speaking about values (preferences) 'in general', without paying any attention to the results of the previous considerations on positive/negative values, on values and meta-values, etc.

Thus, taking this general view, we could characterize values in the following way. In the case of 'Sartrian' anthropology (it may be noted that here it seems to be particularly close to the original anthropology of J. P. Sartre), values are, so to say, created by the individual ex nihilo.

From the point of view of the 'Lockian' anthropology, values are produced in the process of life: values are 'reflections' of the former actions of the agent; they are their 'rationalizations'.

When assuming 'Althusserian' anthropology, we can adopt the term 'internalization' (omitting the second part of the standard phrase: 'internalization of norms'): individual's values are subjective 'reflections' of the social norms, cultural patterns, imperatives of social practice or however still these elements of the social reality might be termed. Here, however, a reservation is necessary: we should add to these terms the adjective 'instantaneous' ("momentary", etc.). And if we used - alternatively - the word 'permanent', we would obtain a variant of the 'Lockian' stance.

In the case of 'Schopenhauerian' anthropology, we can regard values as manifestations of needs, drives, instinct, 'nature of man', or whatever else of this kind we might invoke.

In short, we can speak about creation, rationalization and internalization ('permanent'), 'instantaneous' internalization, and manifestation as about various interpretations of the concept of value, or - alternatively - as about various mechanisms of individual values-generating/acquisition.

Of course, we've just spoken about 'pure' mechanisms. If we take into account their possible interference, we will obtain axiological counterparts of the 'mixed' anthropologies.

So much about theories of values-generating 'in general'. Now, a few remarks on some more special issues. As the first one, take the problem of positive and negative values (both the most general and formal classification of values). It is not only logically possible, but has actually been claimed, that negative and positive values are differently generated.
In particular, it could be maintained that 'negative' values are mainly determined in a 'Schopenhauerian' way, while 'positive' ones in, say, 'Althusserian'. In a more intuitive way put, the forms of passion (pain, etc.) may be much more 'naturally' determined than various forms of joy (bliss, etc.).

Along the same lines we could analyze the problem of values, meta-values, etc. It seems to be quite natural to assume that first-order values are mostly 'Schopenhauerian' in theory nature, second-order values - 'Lockian' and 'Althusserian', while the values of sufficiently high order would represent the 'Sartrian' element in the axiology.

Of course, sticking very strictly to the program of meta-philosophy, we should consider also the opposite theories. For instance, a theory which claims for the innate character of the values of the highest order and for 'Sartrian' freedom in choosing the first-order values. - Such a possibility is somewhat disturbing form me, since it demonstrates that some doubts concerning the program of meta-philosophy appear in a quite natural way. These doubts could be summarized into this question: should we describe and analyze literally all logical possibilities?, or should we eliminate the most 'strange', 'ridiculous' and 'obviously false'? I must confess that I have no definite answer to this question, I rather hesitate and vacillate between 'yes' and 'no'.

To the problem of values and meta-values, very close is the issue of 'simple' and 'aggregate' values. The analogy between meta-values and 'aggregate' values (which comes to the mind very quickly) is, however, rather misleading. In this case, a theory which claims for the 'Schopenhauerian' character of the 'aggregate' values and for the 'Althusserian' character of some simple values is not an ridiculous item, but - a rather natural hypothesis.

I may be wrong, of course. Assume, however, that I am right. If so, have we been trapped by a contradiction? I do not think. This contradiction is apparent. It directs our attention to a possibility which seems to be quite interesting. According to the possible theory, some 'simple' values are innate, and (some) 'aggregate' ones, either. Some other 'simple' values are 'produced', say, by some 'Althusserian' or 'Lockian' mechanisms, but within 'boundaries' determined by the 'aggregate' values which are, according to this model, determined in a 'Schopenhauerian' way.

Though in the chapter 4. I omitted almost completely the epistemological part of 'semantics', I'd like to sketch at least an epistemological interpretation of the anthropological tetrahedron.

As regards 'Schopenhauerian' stance, for its best illustration in the domain of epistemology (here: conceived of as a part of anthropology) might serve, I believe, Plato's theory of anamnesis. One could consider if any better example couldn't be found. Perhaps it could; the present author has not just found any. On the other hand, we could ask a more theoretical question: is a 'purely' 'Schopenhauerian' theory of individual knowledge possible at all? A theory that would not allow for any influence of the 'extra-subjective world' to be exerted upon the individual? A theory which would assume that the complete cognitive representation of the world has been already there, from the very beginning? I tend to say 'no'. This is, however, nothing more than a mere intuition. To be deliberated in a future time...

If we take under consideration 'Lockian' cognitive anthropology and if we want to offer a historical illustration then the reference to the 'real' Locke will be most natural. If "each person's mind is in the beginning like a blank sheet of paper upon which experience alone can subsequently write knowledge" (as Stumpf summarizes Locke's theory [1993:266]), then we have here a very good instance of the position in question. Though this is the best example, other important ones might be quoted. For instance, Jean Piaget's cognitive psychology could be also located 'quite close' to the 'Lockian' point. To be more specific, I tend to think that Piaget's epistemology should be located somewhere in between Kant and Locke.

And just Kant's epistemology (or - better - its 'anthropological reduction'; reservation of some importance, if we agree that transcendentalism is not only about human beings) can be located somewhere in between 'Locke' and 'Schopenhauer'.

In the case of 'Althusserian' anthropology I cannot find any sufficiently obvious example. But thinking that an example, even if not obvious, is better than none, I would mention so-called radical program of the sociology of knowledge. On the other hand, some examples might be drawn from the social psychology. A strong interpretation of the Asch's experiment might be one.

And the last, 'Sartrian', type. Descartes' philosophy is not a bad example. However, not quite good too; actually, it may be located rather in between 'Sartrian' and 'Schopenhauerian' theory of cognition. Sartre's own philosophy (in particular - his theory of imagination) may be a closer approximation of this logical model, still not 'quite close'. The lack of a theory, which could be characterized as 'almost identical' with the 'Sartrian' one, might be not incidental. Perhaps a theory which would claim for creating knowledge ex nihilo is logically impossible.

We could go further and distinguish more sophisticated models of cognition. For instance, we distinguish self-knowledge (resp. introspective knowledge) and 'external' knowledge (resp. extraspective knowledge). Interpreting in a rather loosely way Descartes' philosophy, we may consider a thesis which claims for the two types of (individual) knowledge to be differently determined. For instance, a theory (a variant of Cartesianism) may say that self-knowledge is innate and independent from any external influences. The same theory would claim that knowledge of the 'external' world is strongly socially determined. But an opposite stance is possible (and, to a degree, plausible). According to such a stance, our 'external' knowledge is innate (say, the intuition of space and time, or the concept of natural number, respectively - Kant and Brouwer claim), but the self-knowledge is a social product (say, result of therapy, as Freud might be read).

7.5.1.3. Accordingly to the general scheme, we should drift focus of our attention to the determinants of the decision-making. In the chapter 5., I outlined a classification of the possible ways of making choices. Now, we should consider why people make their decisions in a way (in some ways) and not in the others.

Before I will start to make a list of possible answers to this question, I'd like to say a few words about this question. In a sense, it is but a concretization of the more general anthropological question about determinants of human actions. The question is formulated separately in the concretized form for it has been supposed that various aspects of human actions may be determined in different ways. In particular, it should be logically possible that all people share the same values, and that they share the same knowledge, yet their actions differ radically. The sole, yet fundamental difference, would lie in the mechanisms of decision-making.

To demonstrate that this possibility is not mere logical speculation, let's consider the two persons playing a chess-game. Assume, rather naturally, that they prefer the win to the draw to the defeat. Any other values do not play any role, say. The knowledge of the situation on the board is identical. And their chess skills (checked separately) are identical. However, their 'styles of playing' are very
different: one of them uses all the time allowed for deliberating; the other 'reacts' almost instantly to the moves of his partner. In our language, we could account for the difference just with the notion of 'decision-making strategy'. But why they differ as to the strategies they assume? Also to this questions a few alternative answers are possible.

First - 'Schopenhauerian'. It might be supposed that a mechanism of decision-making is fixed and determined once-for-ever. However, the problem whether this mechanism is 'universal' (common to all individuals) or 'particular' (specific for each individual) is not decided here. Thus, various 'Schopenhauerian' theories of decision-making can be formulated. Illustrations of this stance may be found in the Benthamian tradition in philosophy, in the main-stream economics (most notably G. Becker), and in biology ('Each living being, and in fact each cell, has permanently to make choices.' Young,1984:25)

Secondly - 'Lockian' approach: we are learning (are taught) how to make decisions. The key point is that once a method has been assimilated by an individual, it is never given up.

Third: 'Althusserian' stance is based on the idea of 'momentary instructions' the individual receives from his 'social environment'. Possibly, Max Weber's theory of rationalization (or a part of it) is the most important one which might be classified as a variant of this stance. It is a good opportunity to demonstrate the importance of the 'de-composition' (de-construction?) of the general anthropological perspectives into more specific and particular. Let's figure out a perfectly individualist culture which has only one message for his participants: satisfy rationally your natural drives and needs (incidentally it might be remarked that such a possible culture seems to be a caricature of some elements of our 20th/21st century American/European culture). Such a culture is conceivable on the ground of such an anthropology which assumes, for instance, that values are innate ('Schopenhauerian'), knowledge - learned ('Lockian'), and mechanisms of decision-making - imposed by society ('Althusserian'). And 'Sartrian' stance should claim that the way of decision-making is freely chosen by him who makes the decision.

These general remarks may be usefully complemented with the following considerations of the known American economist Kenneth E. Boulding. He is making a comparison (referring to the academic reality of 1960s; if it has changed since then might be debated - this problem is not, however, very important in the present context) between economist's and psychologist's perspective:

"The economist looks at the problem of individual behavior in a rather different way from the psychologist, and it is instructive to explore these differences, even though they may amount to no more than a somewhat different way of looking at essentially the same phenomenon. The economist thinks of the individual as seeking the position in his field of possible choice which maximizes his utility or which stands highest on his preference scale. Thus, the economist perceives the individual as looking out over the field of potential futures, ordering these according to some scheme of valuation, which means simply labeling each element in the field 'first', 'second', 'third', etc., and then choosing the one labeled first if that one is unique and proceeding into that particular future. The psychologist, by contrast, tends to think of the individual as moved by a number of specific drives and as directing his behavior toward certain specific goals. The two approaches can, of course, be reconciled formally by simply supposing that the goal of the psychologist is equivalent to the point of maximum utility of the economist. Movement toward the goal, then, is interpreted as a movement toward position of higher utility or preferably in the value field." [Boulding, 1962:80-81]

Subsequently, Boulding is discussing a problem which is closely related to the issue of positive/negative values I raised a few passages above. In his opinion, "the major contribution of the psychologist to the economist's view of behavior is perhaps to point out that there may be negative goals that repel the individual as well as positive goals that attract him. This is the basis of an important theory of conflict within the personality developed by Lewin and Miller. Lewin thought of the goal as exercising an attractive force on the individual if positive and a repulsive force if negative. These forces pull him toward attractive places in the field and repel him from unattractive ones. When an individual is in an equilibrium of forces in a part of the field - that is not in some sense optimum for him, he is said to be in conflict." [ibidem:81]

First, the 'approach-approach conflict' (exemplified by the problem of Buridan's ass) is being discussed. In such a situation 'chance fluctuations' are to be sufficient to initiate a simple and rational course of action [ibidem: 83] But if, secondly, the 'avoidance-avoidance conflict' is being considered - the situation becomes more complicated. It may happen that in such a situation the agent "is in a stable psychological conflict, or quandary...his behavior will become disjointed and random, and he will soon have a nervous breakdown". [ibidem:83]

A few pages further, Boulding suggests that we should suppose that "there are two ideal types of personality, one of which makes decisions by moving toward what he likes whereas the other makes decisions by moving away from what he dislikes. The first might be called the approacher and the second the avoider. The approacher will be able to resolve conflicts of goals easily..." The avoider, on the other hand, constantly finds himself in quandaries...". [ibidem:89]

Boulding offers also an epistemological analysis of the which deserves to be quoted: "Economic man is an approacher to the core and enjoys perfect mental health. This is probably why the economists have never even noticed this problem. They have always assumed implicitly that there was no real difference between maximizing utility and minimizing disutility, and no economist, to my knowledge, has ever even noticed the possibility of a quandary. Economic man always maximizes utility and hence resolves his psychological conflicts and goes coolly and rationally to his frequently undistinguished goals." [ibidem:90]

Let's add to those Boulding's considerations two remarks. First, the relations between these two orientations, i.e. this ofapproacher and that of avoider, and the attitudes toward risk call for more profound analysis. And second, the very existence of those relations taking for granted, we might indicate the broader, sociological or even historiosophical, importance of this problem. We could mention, for instance, the role of 'risk averse' as a barrier to the economic development [Galbraith,1987:41]

7.5.1.4. Now, the possible interpretations of the relations between intended and performed acts (resp. between decision and its execution) are to be in the focus of our attention. Differently put, various types of 'pragmatics' are to be analyzed.

In the chapter 5., I discussed those relations putting them into two frameworks: this of the mind-body problem, and that of the personal-identity one. Recalling the basic intuitions, we will say that there are two (at least) two factors that may account for incongruity between decision and its execution: On the one hand, the
effectiveness of the 'control' of mind over the body (the effectiveness of mind-steering the body). On the second hand, the 'one-directionality' of this 'steering'.

These two factors have been defined on the level of 'internal' description of action. At the present moment, we are interested in 'external' explanation. In other words, we want to know what determines these factors assuming this or that value. Thus, we are going to ask two ask two questions. First: On what does depend the level of the effectiveness of the 'control' exercised by the mind over the body? Or: What makes the 'control' rather strong or weak? And second: On what does depend the level of the 'one-directionality' of the mind-over-body control? Or: On what does depend the internal 'integrity' of the mind as the 'steering-organ'?

Let’s sketch now the lists of the possible answers to those questions. First, then, the problem of ‘effectiveness’.

According to the stance of the 'Schopenhauerian' type, the relation between mind and body is fixed, 'given' to the individual. This stance may be developed in various directions. On the one side, we find a group of theories which claim that in the case of all men this relation assumes the same value (and each single theory of this group specifies other concrete value). On the other side, we may group theories which say that people differ - in particular - as to this very relation (any single theory claims for a specific distribution - in the whole human population - of the specific values assumed by this factor). The 'strong' (resp. 'weak') will - these everyday-language terms refer to the phenomena in question. And 'strong' (resp. 'weak') will is viewed here as a 'constitutional' attribute of the individual, as something similar to his face-features.

In the 'Lockian' perspective, 'weak' or 'strong' will is a product of the actual course of life of the individual. Lockian theories may differ as to specific mechanisms determining the 'strength' of will. Some theories will focus on conscious training (education), some others would emphasize the role of the difficulties and obstacles the individual has during his life had to face and overcome.

Assuming the 'Althusserian' standpoint, we will be looking for social mechanisms which make the individual's will more or less 'strong'. We could think here about some patterns of behavior predominating in the social milieu which constitutes a part of the situation in which an action is being undertaken and performed; the same individual should manifest 'strong' will in one situation, and not so strong in another one.

And 'Sartrian' theory. We should ask first whether 'Sartrian' 'pragmatics' is possible at all. Why? The answer may run thus: To accept the possibility of a 'Sartrian' position in the 'pragmatics' is to split the decision about an action into two: the decision about the 'content' of the action and about the quality of its performance. But nevertheless, such a complex decision - it is not a decision about the action as such.

I would suggest a (meta-)hypothesis: 'Sartrian' anthropology is compatible only with 'trivial' pragmatics (i.e. one which rejects the distinction on the round of which any 'non-trivial' pragmatics can be constructed). To put it other way round, if we want to build up 'pragmatics' we should reject 'Sartrian' position (at least in its 'pure' form; stronger version of this hypothesis claims for rejection of any theory which allows for even the least degree of human freedom). I tend to think that this hypothesis is true. However, at the present level of the analytical precision I have been able to attain, I do not see how its validity could be estimated.

And secondly: the level of 'one-directionality'. Instead of the latter term, we might use that of 'personal integrity' (resp. the degree of the integration of the personality). With the 'personal integrity' we are more familiar, the 'one-directionality' is more specific; in sum, it seems to be most convenient to use the first one while remembering about its relations with the second.

Viewed in the 'Schopenhauerian' perspective, 'one-directionality' of mind's regulation of acting is pre-determined. As in the previous point, we can distinguish several theories which share this basic assumption but develop it in different directions. Nevertheless, each of us is born, this perspective being assumed, either as 'well organized' ('ordered', etc.) personality or 'disorganized' one, and nothing can be changed.

Accordingly to the 'Lockian' anthropology, the level of organization is a product of the life-process - man is becoming more or less 'organized'. Of course, various theories in different ways describe and explain the ways in which this process brings about the result in question.

'Althusserian' theories assume that the situation decides whether individual is 'well-organized' or is not. In its 'pure' and consequent version (empirically hardly plausible, but this fact doesn't matter much in this place), it tells us that man can be in a situation (and at a moment) perfectly 'organized', while in another situation (and at a different moment), he can be simply 'disorganized'.

And 'Sartrian' theories say that the degree of 'integrity' of man is the result of some his choices. He may decide to be more or less 'integral' personality. Incidentally, this thesis seems to be quite close to the philosophy of J. P. Sartre. In his opinion, man chooses himself, he chooses a project of himself. And this project is to comprise all ('mental'; even according to Sartre's philosophy of freedom, nobody chooses the color of his eyes, the natural color of his hair, etc.) traits of man.

7.5.2. 'Anthropological tetrahedron' and types of action

Three decades ago or so, an English historian E.P. Thompson launched in his The Poverty of Theory a serious attack on Althusser's philosophy, and particularly - on his 'theoretical anti-humanism'. Perry Anderson, also a historian, and also of a Marxist persuasion, yet more theory-inclined than Thompson, commented upon the debate thus: 'it is obvious that all historical subjects engage in actions all the time, of which they are agents...So long as it remains at this level of indeterminacy, the notion is analytic void. To render it operative, at least three qualitatively different types of goal have to be clearly distinguished. Throughout the history to date, the overwhelming majority of people for overwhelmingly major part of their lives have pursued 'private' goals: cultivation of a plot, coojice of a marriage, exercise of a skill, maintenance of a home, bestowal of a name. These personal projects are inscribed within existing social relations, and typically reproduce them. Yet they remain profoundly intentional enterprises, which have consumed the greater part of human energy... There have also...been collective or individual projects whose goals were 'public' in character: quantitatively far fewer, involving lesser numbers in more fitful endeavours...By definition, it is intentional reach rather than involuntary result that distinguishes one form of agency from another....there are also those collective projects which have sought to render their initiators authors of their collective mode of existence as a whole, in a conscious programme aimed at creating or remodelling whole social structures. /.../ The American and French Revolutions are the first
Firstly, I will be speaking about some ideas which offer some classifications of human activity as being composed of the domain of production, remaining the realm of necessity, and of the other spheres of human life, constituting the realm of freedom. It should be interesting, I think, to number the phenomena to the analysis of which the economic approach is applied by Becker. Their list contains such items as discrimination (racial), criminal policy, time allocation, marriage and fertility. One of important consequences of the labor-paradigm could be formulated thus: "not alienated life...is identical with not alienated labor. And conversely, if labor is not alienated, whole life is alienated too." [Heller,1982:32] This may be true in the case of the production-paradigm. And this difference is of some importance for the debates on the future ('communist' in the marxian sense) society. The first paradigm (cf. 1844 Manuscripts) presents the area of not alienated labor as that of creativity, self-realization, freedom etc. The second paradigm (cf. Capital) presents the area of social activity as being composed of the domain of production, remaining the realm of necessity, and of the other spheres of human life, constituting the realm of freedom.

In Anderson, Braudel, or Heller we find some very important intuitions. But it would be rather difficult to find there even elements of a theory. Searching for a more systematic elaboration of these intuitions, I will be proceeding in three phases. Firstly, I will be speaking about some ideas which offer some classifications of actions related to different mechanism determining the respective types of actions. Secondly, we take another way; not 'global' but 'local': I will try to demonstrate that we can, and do, ask about nomological structure of this or that type of human activity, without deciding what is the nomological structure of other types of action. The very possibility of such an approach seems to support this orientation which insists on the nomological differentiation of the human purposive behavior. Before, however, we undertake realization of this plan, it may be useful to give a brief presentation of a theory which explicitly accepts the thesis which is rejected (if implicitly) by the theories to be discussed below. Of all conceptions which assume the nomological homogeneity of human actions the theory of the '92 Nobel-prize winner (in economics), Garry S. Becker is the perhaps the best elaborated one. Thus, some remarks on The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, as the title of his basic work runs, will be made.

Let's quite his own summary of his theory: "The essence of my argumentation is that human behavior cannot be divided into groups...In relation to all human behaviors we should assume that their participants maximize their utility on the basis of a system of stable preferences and collect optimal amount of information and other resources." [Becker,1990:38-39] A particular and important role in his theory is played by the assumption of stability of preferences. It should be however stressed that not all preferences, not the very special ones - concerning for instance "oranges, cars and medical services", are regarded as stable but only the "basic' preferences [which] concern most fundamental aspects of life, such as health, prestige, satisfaction, friendliness or envy". [Becker,1990:23]

It should be interesting, I think, to number the phenomena to the analysis of which the economic approach is applied by Becker. Their list contains such items as discrimination (racial), criminal policy, time allocation, marriage and fertility. This approach may have some far-reaching consequences (I say 'may have' since I am not sure that social/political conclusions Becker draws from his anthropology actually follow them in purely logical way; on the other hand, I cannot discuss this question). In particular, a strong pro-market option should be among them. In Becker's words: 'competitive markets satisfy consumers' preferences more effectively than monopolistic markets, irrespective of whether market for aluminum or market for ideas.' [Becker,1990:24]

I would interpret Becker's theory as grosso modo a form of 'Schopenhauerian' anthropology: 'fundamental preferences' are rooted in human nature, the same can be said about mechanisms of decision-making; knowledge is to be a product of those preferences and mechanisms, thus also may be viewed as - in a sense - 'inborn'. On the other hand, it seems to me that also J. P. Sartre's original stance does not allow for any differentiation of human actions: man is to be free while undertaking action of any sort, thus all actions should be nomologically homogenous.

In brief, we can combine the assumption of 'nomological homogeneity' with all anthropological positions defined with the help of the image of 'tetrahedron'. Doing so, we obtain no new result: we obtain just the 'tetrahedron'. But having formulated explicitly this assumption we have transformed the tetrahedron into a subspace of a larger space; in other words, we have embedded it into a space.

Having spoken of the most decided proponent of the homogeneity-stance, we could take the opportunity and make some further remarks on the 'rational-choice' approach.

"The rational choice theory paradigm has benefited from, but is also limited by, its intellectual origins. Rational choice models are derived from utilitarian theory,
neoclassical economics, and game theory. Utilitarianism supplies the ultimate
certainty with how to achieve overall social welfare. Neoclassical economics provides
a theoretical model and a set of sophisticated methodologies for the investigation of
social and political questions. Game theory introduces strategic behavior into the
neoclassical model. We find ourselves sharing an increasingly widespread
concern that the rationality attributed to *homo economicus* is too simplistic or else simply wrong when applied to actors in many political and social situations.

It is interesting to compare this interpretation of the origins and intended scope
of the rational-choice theory with the respective context of the humanistic
interpretation as elaborated by the Poznán School, J. Kmita in particular. This way of
thinking, though most often occurring in economics and related domains, finds some
realizations in other domains. For instance, the famous neo-Kantian thinker, Ernest
Cassirer, seems to express ideas being similar to those of Backer, though he does it in a
more elusive language. In the view of the author of *Essay on Man*, the role of
'philosophy of man' can be played by such a philosophy "which would offer an insight
into the structure of each of those [scil., previously mentioned, language, myth, religion,
art, science, history - W.Cz.] human undertakings, and which would allow us to
understand them as an organic whole." [Cassirer, 1971:132] These varieties of human
activity are to possess not substantial but functional unity. And "it is just the basic
function of speech, myth, art, religion which we should be looking for, under
innumerable forms and manifestations..." [ibidem]

7.5.2.1. Now, I'm going to sketch an overview of some theories that may interpreted as
expressing in various ways the idea of nomological differentiation of types of human
activity.

7.5.2.1.1. I want to start with some ideas taken from Hegel's *Grundlinien der
Philosophie des Rechts*. In the part Three, on 'Ethicality' (*Sittlichkeit*), Hegel
distinguishes in three 'spheres' of social life, namely: family, civil society and 'state'.
[Hegel, 1969:169]. It might be suggested (of course, this suggestion is - to a greater
degree than in the case of other authors - an 'adaptive' and not 'historical'
interpretation) that individual's behavior in these three areas differs significantly.

Let us look at Hegel's description of these three areas. First, at that of family.
It is marriage which constitutes, in his view, this community. And about marriage
Hegel says: "The ethical moment of marriage consists in...love, trust and community
of the whole individual existence." [ibidem:172] He stresses also that "love in an
emotion" and that it is "the first moment in love is that I do not want to be a self-
sufficient person" [ibidem:390].

Second, the characteristic of the individuals as members of civil society:
"Concrete person, which is for himself a particular goal as a totality of needs...is one
of the principles of civil society" [ibidem:188] Hegel speaks also of "egoistic goal" and of
"comprehensive satisfying one's needs". [ibidem:188-189]

And the third area: state. "State is the reality of concrete freedom." The latter
consists in "the personal individuality and its particular interests...accepting general
interest as their own substantial spirit and are active for it as for their ultimate
goal." [ibidem:245-246]. In state, contrary to the union based on love, one has "to
know the rational content" of the union with others. [ibidem:390]

To this brief presentation of Hegel, add a quote from a contemporary
philosopher: "Each of us seems to be split between a private and a public self. The
'economic man' within us strives for personal hedonic satisfaction. He regards other
people as so many means to his own selfish ends - or as constraints and obstacles to
his pursuit of happiness. The 'social man', by contrast, is governed by moral and
social norms. He is kept on course by his concern for other people, and by their
approval or disapproval of his behaviour. The problem is to understand the relation
between these two homunculi that...constantly vie for our attention." [Elster, 1986:26]

At the first sight, Elster may seem to follow the line of analysis of human
behavior outlined by Hegel. Under a closer inspection, the similarity becomes less
evident. The comparison between Hegel and Elster reveals rather that they offer
alternative perspectives. Neglecting details we could characterize the difference
between them thus: According to one of them (Hegelian), different mechanisms
operate in different fields of human activity; according to the other (Elsterian), in
each field operate different mechanisms which, so to say, 'compete' for the 'power of
determining'. (It may be helpful to speak of 'horizontal' /Hegel/ and 'vertical' /Elster/
vision of internal nomological differentiation of human individual.)

7.5.2.1.2. Pass now to Weber. According to his theory, any social action "may be:
(1) *instrumentally rational* (zweckrational), that is determined by expectations as to
the behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these
expectations are used as 'conditions' or 'means' for the attainment of the actor's own
rationally pursued and calculated ends;
(2) *value-rational* (wertrational), that is determined by a conscious belief in the
value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of
behavior, independently of its prospects of success;
(3) *affectual* (especially emotional, that is, determined by the actor's specific affects
and feeling states;
(4) *traditional*, that is determined by ingrained habituation."

This rather concise characteristic is supplemented with some comments. Of
those comments, some should be quoted now.

First, both the traditional and the affectual type of behavior are viewed as types
located 'very close' to the borderline separating meaningful actions and automatic
reactions. The first type comprises actions most typical for everyday life, for simple
inter-human relations (note some analogies with Anderson and Braudel). The second,
contrarily, comprises rather reactions to some exceptional stimuli.

It is also said that action is "affectual if it satisfies a need for revenge, sensual
gratification, devotion, contemplative bliss, or for working off emotional tensions..."
[ibidem:25]

And as examples of value-rational orientation could be given "actions of
persons who, regardless of possible cost to themselves, act to put into practice their
convictions of what seems to be required by duty, honor, the pursuit of beauty, a
religious call, personal loyalty..." [ibidem] What is, in my view, of particular
importance, it is the following thesis "value-rational action always involves
'commands' or 'demands' which, in actors opinion, are binding on him." [ibidem] It
seems to me that what could be called 'heroic actions' constitutes important part of
the area of value-rational actions.
The following remark seems also important: "Value-rational action may...have various different relations to the instrumentally rational action. From the latter point of view, however, value-rationality is always irrational. Indeed, the more the value to which the action is oriented is elevated to the status of an absolute value, the more 'irrational' in this sense the corresponding action is. For, the more unconditionally the actor devotes himself to this value for its own sake, to pure sentiment or beauty, to absolute goodness, the less is he influenced by considerations of the consequences of his action." [ibidem:26]

7.5.2.1.3. In the third step, some elements of H. Arendt's theory developed in her The Human Condition, will be presented. Before this presentation is given, the following general remark seems to be necessary. Arendt's philosophy, and specially its part outlined in The Human Condition, is interwoven with a vision of the Ancient polis. The historical ('Rankian') correctness of her image will not be - for obvious reasons - debated, even in the briefest way.

According to Arendt's conception, or more precisely - to the tradition she accepts, we can distinguish two fundamental forms of life: active and contemplative, \textit{vita activa} and \textit{vita contemplativa}. Of these two, the first form, and its ramifications, is of interest here.

\textit{Vita activa} designates the three fundamental types of human activity: labor, work, and action. Each of them "refers to one of the basic conditions under which man was given his life on the Earth". [Arendt,2000:11]

The distinction between labor and action corresponds to some differences between two social institutions: household and polis. In the (Ancient) household people, in Arendt's view, "lived together, since they were directed by their needs and demands". And polis, contrarily, was the sphere of freedom, and if there was a link between those two spheres, it was self-evident that mastering the necessities of life in the household was a condition for the freedom of polis." [Arendt,2000:36] It is also important to note that, according to Arendt description, "polis...knew but the 'equals', while the household was the center of the most acute inequality." [Arendt,2000:38]

Some would perhaps say that the way in which Arendt uses the word 'action' is arbitrary and differs from its standard meaning. I'd agree but would also add that this remark is irrelevant: we could replace 'action' with any other term, and the sense of Arendt's considerations were not changed. Some would say that Arendt's 'action' has strong evaluative connotation. I do agree again. But even if we do not share those moral intuitions which are expressed in this concept, we do not have to maintain that it lacks cognitive value. With this concept Arendt describes a possible, and in her opinion, 'irrational' in this sense the corresponding action is. For, the more unconditionally the actor devotes himself to this value for its own sake, to pure sentiment or beauty, to absolute goodness, the less is he influenced by considerations of the consequences of his action." [ibidem:26]

7.5.2.1.4. Among the best known and popular ideas concerning nomological differentiation of actions are those of Jurgen Habermas. The ideas of that author are interesting also on account of their evolution, of which several stages can be distinguished. I will limit myself to the first and the last of them.

The story of this evolution might be commenced from his famous essay \textit{Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologie'}. Habermas proposed there the fundamental differentiation of labor and interaction. Labor is defined as "instrumental action, or rational choice, or union of the two." [Habermas,1977:354] And communicative action is characterized as "human interaction mediated by symbols". [ibidem:355] The rules that direct actions of these two kinds are different. In the first case, the technical rules based on empirical knowledge and strategies based on analytical knowledge play this role; in the second case - obligatory norms. "The learned rules of instrumentally-rational action equip us with the discipline of skills, the internalized norms - with the discipline of the structure of personality." [ibidem]

If we are to speak about the final stage of Habermas' theory, we could start from his classification of the notions of action being in sue is sociological theories. In his opinion, their "richness...can be in fact reduced to four basic concepts". [Habermas,1999:159] Their list comprises the following items: teleological action, norms-regulated action, dramatic action, and communicative action [ibidem:159-162]. Each of those types of action is characterized by a central concept: decision, norms-conformity, self-presentation, and interpretation.

The historical examples of theories in which these types of action play the central role are illustrative: the teleological concept is to be specific for neoclassical economics and von Neumann-Morgenstern's theory of games; norms-regulated action is to be central to the theories initiated by Durkheim and Parsons; dramatic action - in Goffman's theory; and communication action - in Mead and Garfinkel. [ibidem:162]
His own classification is an elaboration (drawing in particular upon Austin's theory of speech acts) of the cited above one.[ibidem:549]  

7.5.2.1.5 Now I'd like to focus my attention on a theory of a particular type of action. It is Johan Huizinga's theory of play of which I mean here. The scope of this conception and its general character should account for this decision.

The Dutch historian starts from the following claim: "the name of homo ludens, the playing man, seems...to indicate a function being of equal importance as action, and to deserve to exist alongside with homo faber." [Huizinga, 1985:7]

Among traits of play, Huizinga counts the following ones. First, its intensity: which "is not explained by any biological analysis, and just in this intensity, in this power to make mad, consists its essence"[ibidem:13]

Secondly, the very existence of play "confirms...supra-logical character of our situation in the Universe. ... We play and we know we play, therefore we are something more than rational beings, since play is not rational."[ibidem:15]

But, from our point of view, the following thesis seems to be crucial: "Any play is first and foremost a free action. Imposed play is no play any more."[ibidem:20] In brief, play "is freedom".[ibidem:21] With this basic trait the second one is to be linked: "play is not 'normal' or 'proper' life."[ibidem] It is "beyond the process of immediate satisfying the necessities and drives, and even breaks this process."[ibidem:22] And it "creates an order; more than that: it itself is an order."[ibidem:24]

In other words, the 'play' is beyond the process of immediate satisfying the necessities and drives, and even breaks this process. This is the core of Huizinga's theory of play.

If we shift from the anthropological to the sociological/historiosophical theses of Huizinga, we can summarize his position thus. The sphere of play is much broader than the concept of 'play' as freedom. Imposed play is no play any more. Imposed play is no play any more. Imposed play is no play any more. Imposed play is no play any more.

Having summarized his views, let's make some additional comments upon them. In particular, note that in the whole book of Huizinga does not appear the name of F. Nietzsche (except for one very brief remark). Whatever were the reasons, we should account for this decision.

The idea in question is put by Balibar thus: "We can say that each relatively autonomous action is a 'play'. On the other hand, there are some fundamental differences between them. Huizinga stresses the role of 'order' or 'logic' of a play, while manifestation of the Dionysian elements should be rather an eruption of 'disorder' and 'un-logic'.

This juxtaposition of Huizinga and Nietzsche should teach us an additional lesson concerning ambiguities of the concept of freedom. I'd say that this version of this concept which accords with Nietzsche's theory is one which is related to the concept of 'play'; and this version which accords with Huizinga's conception is one which is related to the concept of 'self-governance'.

Of course, it is not only Nietzsche whose name should be mentioned here. The great Russian thinker Nikolai Bakhtin, and Roger Caillois, and George Bataille... In other words, the sociological/historical oppositions between the sphere of 'everyday life' on the one side, and that of 'feast-day' (time of play, sacred time, etc.) are based, if implicitly, on some anthropological assumptions. These assumptions seem to be of the kind analyzed here.

7.5.2.1.6. And now some words on Wittgenstein's so-called second philosophy presented in his posthumously published *Philosophical Investigations*. This book contains a number of philosophical ideas. Whether these ideas make up a coherent philosophy, or do not, is of no importance here. I am going to avail of a few of them only, whiteout analyzing their relation to the rest of the work. More specifically, I want to limit my attention to such concepts as 'language game' and 'way of life'.

Wittgenstein defines 'language game' as "a whole composed of language and acts with which it is interwoven".[Wittgenstein, 1972:12] The notion of language links the concept of 'language game' with that of 'way of life': "To imagine a language means to imagine a way of life."[Wittgenstein, 1972:16]

In one of the successive passages, Wittgenstein asks how many types of sentences there are. And answers - 'innumerable quantity'[Wittgenstein, 1972:20].

Before the next step is being made, the following reservation is necessary: The 'late' Wittgenstein's general orientation is, I'd say, basically 'Althusserian': language games might be, perhaps even quite easily, related to the 'autonomous practices' of Balibar (cf. some lines below). Nevertheless, if we confine our attention to the central intuition expressed in *Investigations* (the plurality and diversified character of language games or ways of life) and if we link it with the 'anthropological tetrahedron', we will arrive at a stance that might be termed 'indeterminate anthropology' composed of two claims:

1/ There is an indefinite number of types of human action.
2/ Each of these types may come under any type of determination (as classified in 'tetrahedron')

7.5.2.1.7 There are words on Wittgenstein might be complemented with some remarks on E. Balibar (and if indirectly, on L. Althusser, the ideas of whom he developed). Except for its systematic relevance, these remarks may be of some historical importance: at a time there was much of clamor about so-called 'theoretical anti-humanism'. This clamor was, in my opinion, expressing - to an overwhelming degree, if not completely - (emotional) reactions to the very term, and not a theoretical evaluation of the idea. And the idea, no matter whether 'true' or 'false', is both simple, interesting, and - similar to some others, Wittgenstein's including.

The idea in question is put by Balibar thus: "We can say that each relatively autonomous practice generates proper for it forms of historical individuality. This statement results in complete transformation of the meaning of the term 'people', of which...the Introduction to the *Contribution to The Critique of Political Economy*..."
makes the basis for its whole construction. We can say now that these 'people' are not the concrete people who are said in the known formulations... 'to create history'. These are, for each practice and for each transformation of this practice, various forms of individuality that can be defined by their complex structure... there exist in social structure various forms of political, economic and ideological individuality which do not rely upon the very individuals, and which have their own, relatively autonomous history." [Althusser & Balibar, 1975:363-364]

From the systematic (meta-anthropological) point of view, this thesis is important for the following reason. Ending the sub-chapter on anthropological tetrahedron, I was stressing that a 'point' need not to represent a single theory, but a whole class of them. I tried to demonstrate that purely 'Althusserian' stance might be viewed as a theoretical scheme which can be concretized in various directions. And Balibarian thesis may be read, in this context, in the following way. Any individual action is determined by the 'social environment'. The part of the environment which plays this determining role and the mechanisms of this determination are different if the type of this action constitutes an 'autonomous social practice'.

7.5.2.2. Let's look at the same problem from another, perhaps opposite, side. We will proceed like this. We take some spheres of human activity, without paying any special attention to the way in which they are distinguished, and will try to demonstrate that in each o those spheres can be explained by theories being concretizations (applications) of the general stances represented in tetrahedron.

And if we are able to demonstrate that adoption of a mode of explanation of actions in one sphere neither implies nor is implied by the mode of action-explanation in the other sphere, then we will be able to say that the possibility of 'nomologically heterogeneous' anthropologies is logically admissible.

I am going to take under inspection two spheres of human activity: religion and language (in the broad sense comprising communication, expressive activity, etc.) Of course, neither religion nor language is to be here a subject for itself. I want to discuss only the anthropological dimension of these two domains of culture, and even this dimension is not to be surveyed in a systematic way. My sole objective is to demonstrate how the general classification of anthropologies may cast some light on the interpretations of the religious and language activity, respectively.

Let's commence from religion. While speaking of religion, or to be more specific, of religious acts, we are speaking of 'internal acts' which can be manifested externally ('behaviorally'), but it is just the sphere of internal convictions, experiences or emotions, which constitutes the domain of 'religious acts'. Therefore, while speaking of religion, I am going beyond this part of the domain of anthropology which I have studied in this text.

It may be useful to refer at a characteristic of the philosophy of religion. According to Bogusław Wolniewicz, 'all aspirations of any philosophy of religion' can be summarized into two questions "what religion is" and "where does it come from?" [Wolniewicz,1993:160] He also insists that "religion is a mundane phenomenon", therefore it should be accounted for by mundane circumstances. Following Benjamin Constant, Wolniewicz distinguishes two elements (aspects) of religion: religious forms (les formes religieuses) and le sentiment religieux (the meaning of 'le sentiment' is partly characterized by reference to German Gemuetsbewegung, thus - soul's motion).

His main idea is based upon a thesis of St.Bernard of Clairvaux: Homo est copula rationis et mortis. [ibidem:172] But Wolniewicz also notes that people need not necessarily perspectives of eternal life. They only need "something what they would value, and what would surpass the horizon their own lives." [ibidem:177] Wolniewicz represents, though in a rather weak form, the position according to which man is a religious being 'of his nature'. Thus, his philosophy may be viewed as a concretization of the 'Schopenhauerian' anthropology in the domain of the anthropology of religion. Feuerbachian philosophy of religion might be also located here. (I would like to stress that Feuerbach, at least as I think he can be read, is in the anthropological part of his theory of religion closer to Augustine than Cardinal Newman is. He seems to be also closer to St. Augustine than to K. Marx. And his atheism doesn't matter here. From the point of view of anthropology the metaphysics of God is unimportant; whether we say that 'in man's heart live God' or we say that 'human mind necessarily produces the /false/ idea of God' - we pronounce these which differ profoundly as to their metaphysical content, but which are virtually identical as to the anthropological substance.)

Marxian and Durkheimian theories of religion represent alternative concretizations of the 'Althusserian' scheme. In this framework, it makes no sense to speak about 'religiousness' as being a part of human nature. It is also not a matter of personal choice. It is the 'social situation' of man, his location is the social network which makes determines the level and forms of his 'religiousness'.

Kierkegaardian philosophy is, as it may be guessed, a concretization of the 'Sartrian' anthropological scheme. In this perspective, it is a matter of absolutely free individual decision whether a man 'trusts in God' or simply rejects His existence. In the last instance, nothing - neither other people, nor one's past, nor irremovable soul's yearning for 'Transcendence' - can determine the fundamental both metaphysical and existential decision.

And as regards the Lockian anthropology, its concretizations in the field of the anthropology of religion might be looked for among some theories of the Enlightenment. According to a version of this stance, 'religiousness' is a product of education/indoctrination. But this conception has an important second side: a man, having been once indoctrinated, cannot be 're-educated' or 're-indoctrinated': eyes once opened to the Transcendence cannot be closed; or - in another metaphysical language - illusions once imposed cannot be removed.

And now, language. Availing of this term, I've used in fact an abbreviation. Language can be (and, as I declared in the section in which the problems of meaning were discussed, in my opinion - should be) regarded as autonomous reality. But speaking (speech acts, communicative or expressive acts, etc.) - it is another thing. Here anthropology is in its rights to be involved.

To avoid long methodological considerations, a simple analogy may be helpful: to speak about 'objective existence' of a stone is one thing, and geology is an autonomous discipline which has not to make any references to anthropology; but throwing stones and specially when the other men are the target - this is a quite different problem, surely one of the central for anthropology.

Therefore, not subtleties of grammar and the factors determining them are of central importance for anthropology. Rather, the question of 'instrumental' or 'autotelic' character of communication, or - 'autotelic' character assuming - its 'position' among other forms of human activity - those issues are of that importance.
Having sketched the way in which the problem of language is to be understood here, we can pass to presentation of some of its possible resolutions.

Following the scheme, commence with the 'Schopenhauerian' perspective. It can be developed in different directions. On the one hand, it may be claimed (in the spirit of E. Cassirer or S. Langer) that man is *animal symbolicum*, that in each man there is 'natural tendency' toward self-expression. On the other hand, we could avail, rather loosely, of the Jungian opposition of 'introversion' and 'extroversion' of types of personality. Thus, we could maintain that people are born as 'expression-avoiding' or 'expression-oriented', respectively.

Secondly, we could say, continuing to avail of the Jung's conceptual pair, that—according to the 'Lockian' stance, 'extroversion' and 'introversion' are products of life-experience, education, and the like. Relations with parents and the school-training should be responsible for the basic communicative orientation of the individual.

'Althusserian' theories of the communicative/expressive behavior should derive individual speech actions from, say, the social 'logic of communication'. This logic may be, on the other side, interpreted in various ways. It may be, for instance, viewed rather as a part of the 'logic of cooperation' (in the vein of Habermas) or as part of the 'logic of conflict' (as Lyotard suggests), or—following some ideas of Wittgenstein and Hintikka—in a more general, and differentiated way.

And last, but not least, we can speak of a 'communicative' variant of the 'Sartrian' anthropology. According to this position, it should be a matter of the individual's free choice, whether he or she avoids communication or, contrarily, engages himself or herself into communication.

We should compare now the anthropological interpretations of religion and language. I will proceed step by step.

Take first the 'Schopenhauerian' stance. Assume that Wolniewicz (Feuerbach, etc.) is right. How it could be demonstrated that this position implies a thesis claiming for innate character of the 'expressive nature' of man? We can consider the relation in the opposite direction: could be the innateness of 'religious sentiments' deducted from the innate character of 'expressiveness'? I think that we can accept the negative answer to these questions; we can do so as long the necessary proofs will be demonstrated. This should be still more visible if we ask some more particular questions. For instance, does it follow from the Wolniewicz's position that grammatical structures are 'inborn', as Chomsky claims? I do not see how such an interference could be demonstrated. And from the Chomskian thesis cannot be, as far as I can see, interfered any thesis about the 'natural' character of religious sentiments.

And take now the 'Althusserian' stance. If we accept, say, the Marxian theory of religion, do we have to accept also Skinnerian (or any similar) theory of language and communication? And if we accept any 'social' theory of language, are we logically obliged to accept any 'social' (not necessarily Marxian) anthropology of religion? Again, the answer should be, in my opinion negative.

We can argue further in the same vein. We can note that acceptance of the Kierkegaardian view on religion does not oblige us to accept an 'Sartrian' view on language (if such a view is in this domain possible at all). Of course, if to develop both the theory of expressive behavior and that of religious attitudes in the spirit of the philosophy of dialogue, we could maintain that the dialogue (some would insist on writing - 'dialogue') with God and that with another man have a common 'root'. But such a claim would define a special and rather strong anthropological orientation. In general, we can claim that man can freely decide whether he communicates with God or not, but society imposes communication with other people. Somewhat less intuitive would be another position. I thing about one maintaining that we can escape, if paying a price, communication with Others, thus—that we are free in this domain, though it is an 'expensive' (difficult) freedom, but—on the other hand—we cannot evade talking with God.

The same can be said also about 'Lockian' theories of religion and language, respectively.

In short, if we start from specific types of human activity (such as religion and language, but also labor and politics, sex and art, etc.), we can construct anthropological theories accounting for each of those types in nomologically different way. But this is only a possibility, and not any logical necessity.

If our intuitions suggest us that human activity should be explained in a nomologically homogenous way, we can take two strategies. First, we can assume in the axiomatic way that human activity is determined in a (this or that, which one, it doesn't matter here) homogenous way. And second (in my view—much more productive approach), we can raise the question of 'system-ness' of the individual, and we can try to demonstrate that only some combinations of the anthropological stances are possible, and some others are not.

For the present moment, it is everything what I am able to say anything about this problem.

### 7.5.3. Tetrahedron and types-and-elements of action

In the present section, I will be trying to put together the results obtained in the two previous sections. The idea of this 'combination' is simple: it is assumed that any element of any type of action may be determined in his own way. Of course, 'may' does not mean 'has to'. Thus, anthropologies assuming that a given element of all types of action is determined in the same way, or those assuming, that all elements of a given type of action are nomologically identical, or also those claiming for nomological identity (of whatever kind) of all human actions and their elements—all these anthropologies can be viewed as 'special cases'—represented (see below) by some constant (either 'matrix-constant', or 'row-constant', or 'column-constant') function.

Formally, we could think of a matrix composed of four rows and a number (not specified—we have not assumed any classification of types of action, thus we are not able to say how many of them are to be distinguished) of columns. Each row represents an element of action ('syntax', etc.), and each column—a type; thus, any 'point' of the matrix represents a definite element of a definite type of action. Any anthropology is to be viewed now as a function from the matrix to the 'anthropological tetrahedron'. Consequently, the space of all (formally possible) anthropologies consists of all functions from the matrix to 'tetrahedron'. If someone would like to preserve fully the geometrical image, he could take a board of the proper number of rows and columns and locate on each field a tetrahedron. A finite set of points, having exactly one common point with each of the tetrahedrons, represents a single anthropology.

Since we have no classification of types of action, it is impossible to take the course of 'type-after-type' discussion. Therefore, I will follow the typology of elements of action, and 'inside' the section devoted to the given element, I will refer to some examples of different types of action, and not to any classification of them.
7.5.3.1. Let's start with 'syntax'. Our aim is to demonstrate that it is possible that 'syntactical' structures of various types of action are determined in different ways.

As the first example, take the sexual activity. A single 'intercourse' may be regarded as a complex action of a complex 'syntactical' structure. This structure may differ from person to person, or even - from an intercourse to another. What factors do account for this variety? A very natural answer of the 'Schopenhauerian' type may be given: an individual pattern of sexual behavior should be, according to this view, inborn. Perhaps still more natural are answers that might be classified as 'Lockian': the first sexual experiences (in the broad - Freudian - sense, or in the narrower one) should decide whether our sexual behavior is, say, 'natural and simple' or rather 'sophisticated'. Though intuitively less natural, also 'Althusserian' stance is logically admissible: There is nothing illogical in assuming that individual pattern of sexual intercourse follows the 'fashion' - popularized, say, by movies, erotic magazines, various manuals (from Van der Welde on). In the end, logic says perhaps nothing about the possibility of free choice between various 'formal styles' of sexual actions.

Consider now, as the second example, the speech actions. Here, the distinction between 'semantical' and 'syntactical' aspects is, of course, most obvious. We do not have to analyze what about is someone speaking, if we want to characterize his way of speaking in such terms as 'classical simplicity', 'baroque', etc. Thus, we can ask about factors determining such traits of the speech-practice. Following Chomsky, we can maintain that the syntactical properties of the individual speech are part of the individual's mind, determined already at the moment of the birth. On the other hand, taking Skinnerian (a form of 'Lockian') stance perspective of a kind, we should say that the syntactical structure of our speech acts is a product of learning. This product should be, however, rather fixed. And this fixed character assumed by this position differs it from the 'Althusserian' one. According to this stance, we should produce 'simple' or 'complex' utterances in relation to, say, the 'social conversational requirements'. Finally, there is no reason to exclude the possibility that the 'classical simplicity', 'baroque sophistication', or any other style, may be consciously chosen in the given situation by the speaking person.

Put now these two examples together. In my opinion, while proceeding step-by-step, we should be able to demonstrate that all formally possible combinations (in our case: 16 = 4*4) are, from the purely logical point of view, admissible. However, there would be of little sense to check now all of them (particularly, since no formal proofs are possible, but only - informal argumentation, intuitive 'demonstrations'). Consider, then, only some selected cases. For instance, 'Schopenhauerian' stance as to the sexual actions, and 'Sartrian' as to the speech actions. Why the innate character of 'syntactical structure' of the sexual behavior should exclude the possibility that 'style of speaking' can be deliberately chosen? I do not see any logical necessity. Perhaps more strange is the 'opposite' combination: 'Sartrian's to sex, and 'Schopenhauerian' to speech. Counterintuitive as it may be, it does not seem to be logically inconsistent. To be more precise: I do not see here any inconsistency. If someone was able to demonstrate that - contrarily to my claim - such inconsistency does exist, contrarily to my claim, it would be of considerable importance for our understanding of anthropology, and - in result - for our understanding of man.

Assuming another (less 'abstract-logical', more 'concrete-substantial') viewpoint, I'd like to declare that, according to some my intuitions, the 'syntactical' structure of our minds should be nomologically more homogenous than the 'semantical' content. To put it in a radical form: The 'syntactical' structure of our actions may be determined in this or that way, but in the same way for all types of action. On the other hand, 'semantics' of actions may be determined differently in the case of different types of action. This is but intuition. Its validation could be possible, I suppose, only on the ground of some 'substantial' (and not - 'functional') anthropological assumptions. Anyway, I am not able to offer any validation for this intuition in the context of this part of (meta-)anthropology which is considered in the work.

7.5.3.2. Now, 'semantics' is to be debated. Accordingly to previous decisions, this area is sub-divided into axiology and epistemology. These two sub-areas are to be debated separately.

First, axiology. Let's start from some very simple examples. Consider the following declaration: "If I like Scotch better than bourbon, or ice cream better than cake, the finest effort of Madison Avenue are unlikely to persuade me to order my preferences otherwise." [Margolis, 1982:13] That sounds quite convincing, though the continuous efforts to promote, say, these or those marks of chocolate-bars, would suggest some reservations. On the other hands, one could say that these bars, irrespective of the labels, differ - as to their taste - very little, if at all. It seems to be quite possible that taste/food preferences are determined partly in a 'Schopenhauerian' way, and partly - 'Lockian'. Of course, in the domain of eating, some snobbery is also possible, but it rather does not affect the 'real' tastes but social activity consisting in having dinners in fashionable restaurants, etc.

Take, on the other hand, the clothing. For ages, fashion has been playing a great role (the economic constraints leaving aside). Of course, one could claim that this role is a manifestation of social conformity. It might be and to degree probably is so. But the hypothesis that fashion actually determines preferences (that patterns of clothing promoted in various magazines, etc., are 'internalized') seems to be no less plausible.

Or, consider listening to the music. Personally, I tend to think that the nomological characteristic of preferences in this domain is to be located somewhere in between this of food-taste and that of clothing-fancies. I would also speculate that in this domain (perhaps also in literature and art) a 'Sartrian' component may be of some significance: it may be, in particular, that some 'concrete' musical preferences are deliberately accepted, on the ground - say - of some aesthetic analyses.

If it were actually so that quite simple ('sensual') preferences differ nomologically, one should expect that the more 'complex' (and less 'sensual') preferences differ too, and perhaps to a still greater degree.

Of the more complex preferences, particularly important role is played by the preferences constitutive for egoism, compassion, etc. - At this moment, we should undertake anew the issues discussed in 4.3. While formulating some critical remarks addressed to Schopenhauer-Wolniewicz's and L. Nowak's theories, I emphasized the necessity to separate two theoretical tasks: a classification of possible Other-oriented attitudes and an accounting for the fact that people assume these or those attitudes. At that chapter, I 'extracted' from these two theories such a classification. Now, the other parts of those theories are to be used as examples of possible accounting for these attitudes.

Schopenhauer-Wolniewicz's theory is an instance of 'Schopenhauerian' stance (the general idea of 'Schopenhauerian' anthropology was modeled after the example this theory). Everybody is 'born' as an egoist or 'altruist', or whoever else. Neither man himself, nor his life-experiences or educational efforts can change his 'nature'.
Nowak's theory may be viewed as a special case of the 'Althusserian' stance. It should be noted: one of the very different variance of this stance; let's add - of its 'pure' form: any 'mixed' stances ('Althusserian-Schopenhauerian', 'Althusserian-Sartrian', etc.) are neglected here. In particular, we could contrast Nowakian variant of this stance with one which might be named 'Durkheimian'. According to Nowak, the attitudes toward the given Other depend on this Other's behavior toward the agent. According to the 'Durkheimian' form of this stance, the attitudes toward the Others are determined by 'social norms' imposed by a society. These two are the extreme forms, nevertheless their combinations are possible.

As regards 'Lockian' perspective, its concretizations in the considered domain may be found, for instance, in some branches of psychology. Here we find theories which claim for the particular role of the childhood-experiences: we should be malicious or just due to the education we received in the very beginning of our life (assigning different meanings to the term of 'education' we might obtain significantly different variances of this position).

And 'Sartrian' anthropology. Also in this case, it is most close to the original position of Jean-Paul Sartre if applied in the domain of Other oriented attitudes. It's almost obvious that Sartre, while insisting on the freedom of choice, does not think about the freedom of deciding whether to eat an apple or an orange, whether to buy a red tie in green spots or a blue one, yellow-striped. But it is a matter of free choice (according to Sartre), whether I help the drowning man - perhaps risking my own life, or I will continue my walking, even being a good swimmer, without any health troubles, etc.

Similar analyses might be undertaken for many other types of action and the relevant preferences. I cannot be so much involved in details. I'd rather to draw your attention to conclusions that could be deduced from the juxtaposition of the considerations concerning 'sensual' preferences, and those about preferences concerning Others.

The basic conclusion seems to be simple. There is no reason to believe that the mechanisms which decide whether I prefer apple to orange or orange to apple, and those which decide whether I care more for my being hungry than for Others' hunger, or - conversely - the Other's hunger matters for me more than my own - that these mechanisms must be identical. They may be different. - On the level of 'functional' anthropology, such a position seems to be more natural. On the other hand, one could speculate that there exist such 'substantial' anthropologies (such theories of human brain, or, for that matter, of immortal soul) which do not allow for heterogeneity of preferences-determination mechanisms. This question might be undertaken only if at least some elements of 'substantial' anthropology would be there. Since it is not, we must remain this question open.

From then axiological part of 'semantics' we should move now to the epistemological one. We could start from an observation which may be true for all elements of action, but which is particularly important in the case of knowledge. Namely, we could note that there is an 'internal' relation between actions and their objects. Most simply put, the type of object determines the type of action. For instance solving a differential equation, persuading someone to accomplish an action, painting a wall, reading a book... each of those actions seems to represent a qualitatively different type. But also an equation, someone's convictions, a wall, a novel - each of those objects seems to be ontologically different.

General intuition relevant for this issue may be put thus. The determinants of (individual) knowledge depend on the type of knowledge, thus - on the type of object of knowledge. And availing of the classical epistemological opposition 'rationalism-empiricism', we could say two things. First, various combinations of 'empiricism' and 'rationalism' are possible. And for the various types of knowledge, different combinations of this kind may be true.

Let's look now at the 'extreme' stances, and check how their scope of validity in the epistemological-semantical domain might be defined.

Commence, as usual, with 'Schopenhauerian' position, of which as an illustration might serve - according to the previous suggestion - Plato's theory of anamnesis. According to a radical interpretation of this theory (I lack sufficient knowledge to evaluate its historical plausibility; on the other hand, this aspect doesn't matter here) our soul should have 'seen' the whole world of ideas, and since any object in the 'empirical' world is a 'shadow' of an idea, thus our soul should contain all the knowledge about all objects in the world. But we could also say that we posses - from the very beginning of our lives - only 'physical' knowledge - that concerning time and space, color and sound, pressure and resistance; still, we do not have any pre-existing knowledge about numbers and values, about logical rules and social relations.

Epistemological variant of the 'Lockian' stand may be differentiated by a simple correspondence to the differentiation of 'Schopenhauerian' stance: this part of knowledge which is of innate character cannot be determined in the 'Lockian' way. And this part of knowledge which is not determined in the 'Schopenhauerian' way may be determined in accordance with a 'Lockian' theory.

It was previously noted that Kant's epistemology (its 'anthropological reduction') can be located somewhere in between 'Locke' and 'Schopenhauer'. Advancing this idea in the present context, we could say that 'Kantianism' (the quotient marks are important!) may be more 'Lockian' or more 'Schopenhauerian', relatively to the type of objects concerned.

It could also be noted that different variants of 'Kantianism' are possible, even - so to say - of the same 'power'. Take the mathematical objects. We may assume, in accordance with an interpretation of the original Kantian position, that both the concept of (natural) number and the concept of space are of aprioric character. But we can assume a weaker position: we may assign aprioric character to one of these two concepts and regard the other as constructed on the basis of the former.

As regards 'Althusserian' anthropological epistemology, its most radical form (probably never articulated, remaining - as radical and consequent solipsism - only a logically possibility) would claim that all knowledge is 'socially determined'. A weaker form of epistemological 'Althusserianism' we might obtain by paraphrasing in a way the methodological (say, Diltheyan) opposition Geisteswissenschaften - Naturwis-senschaften. It could be maintained that the knowledge about man and society is a product of society, while the knowledge about physical world is determined in the 'Lockian' (say) way.

And the last, 'Sartrian', type of the epistemological part of 'semantics'. Continuing the previous considerations, we could focus upon the problem of (Husserlian) reduction. Of course, not on all its complexities but on a rather special aspect of it. From the anthropological point of view, of importance is the question concerning the 'psychological actuality' of the (transcendental) reduction. From the logical (= epistemological, in the Husserlian-Ingarden-Popperian sense) point of view, reduction may be regarded as a form of 'play': 'let's pretend that there is no
world, or - at least - that we do not know whether it is there" (as we used to say, years ago, "assume you are the king and you are the queen..."). For anthropology, such a 'play' is rather unimportant. On the other side, to decide whether we - the human beings and not the transcendental subjects - are able to 'bracket' our knowledge, it is of anthropological importance. And, just from the anthropological (psychological) point of view, not all domains of knowledge must be equally 'vulnerable' to be 'taken into brackets'. An anthropological paraphrase would maintain that any sort of knowledge can be actually 'bracketed' And an anthropological version of empiricism of a sort would claim that all types of knowledge can be 'taken into brackets', except for the knowledge concerning individual 'practically manipulable' physical objects. Also, it seems to be of some interest to decide whether the knowledge about the existence of other minds (souls) can be 'suspended' in a real way, or not.

In her work on Freedom of Will, Gitta Holmström-Hintikka recalls the classical question raised by Erasmus (1524), and in response to him by Luther...Can man in virtue of his own power create the will to believe in God or the will to enjoy eternal life?" [Holmström-Hintikka,1991:7] Surely, a positive answer to this question would be an instance of a very strong 'Sartrian' position in the epistemological sub-domain of 'semantics'.

To these considerations, let me add this quote: 'Both in the orthodox, Freudian psychoanalysis, and in the modified psychoanalysis in the sense of Jung and Adler, as well as in the psychotherapy being not based on the principles of psychoanalysis, therapy is based on the assumption that information stored in our mind is distributed on various levels of accessibility' [Wiener,1971:193] This Wienerian intuition may suggest a way in which the general ideas presented it this section could be developed. Two points might be formulated. First, a characteristic of the forms in which knowledge is determined: we could suppose that a unit of information is the more 'transformable' the more 'accessible' it is. And second: it may be supposed that different types of knowledge differ as to their 'accessibility', and are thus - in view of the previous point - more or less 'transformable'.

7.5.3.3. It is decision-making which comes, in the present section, under consideration. Let's start from an intuition. To take the most ordinary example: there is no general reason to believe that any rational manager or politician - who, while making his business or political decisions, is proceeding along the path determined in the Schopenhauerian' way. For anthropology, such a 'play' is rather unimportant. On the other side, to decide whether we - the human beings and not the transcendental subjects - are able to 'bracket' our knowledge, it is of anthropological importance. And, just from the anthropological (psychological) point of view, not all domains of knowledge must be equally 'vulnerable' to be 'taken into brackets'. An anthropological paraphrase would maintain that any sort of knowledge can be actually 'bracketed' And an anthropological version of empiricism of a sort would claim that all types of knowledge can be 'taken into brackets', except for the knowledge concerning individual 'practically manipulable' physical objects. Also, it seems to be of some interest to decide whether the knowledge about the existence of other minds (souls) can be 'suspended' in a real way, or not.

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7.5.3.4. Finally, to be discussed awaits still the problem of the determinants of performance in various domains of human activity. I will limit myself to a rather narrow segment of the problem. In this segment, however, some rather concrete results can be quoted. This segment comprises the role of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge (let's assume it comprises self-evaluations, self-esteem etc.) seems to play a role in determining the effectiveness of actions. The role need not to be identical in all types of action.

In his psychological theory of self-knowledge, J Kozielecki analyzes the role this special type of knowledge plays in regulating human actions. This analysis is based on the Tomaszewski's classification of the types of human actions. According to this conception (in Kozielecki's opinion, "most natural and clear" as well as "most useful and most adequate to the reality." [Kozielecki,1986:287,289])

Summing up various experimental researches, he maintains that "self-acceptance plays a relatively minor role" in the object-oriented actions [Kozielecki,1986:311]

As to the subject-oriented actions, self-knowledge "plays a bigger role...than in object-oriented actions", what is in accordance with the expectations. [Kozielecki,1986:336]

And as to the third type of actions, "the hypothesis that self-acceptance is the regulator of inter-human relations seems to be plausible." [Kozielecki,1986:351]

7.5.4. On iteration of determinacy

I do not believe that formulating a 'definition' of man should be an important task for anthropology. Still, if someone were insisting, I would suggest that such a definition might be constructed on the ground of the phenomena of hierarchy and reflexivity: Cartesian self-knowledge, Simmel's and Lukács' chains of goals, Tarskian hierarchy of meta-languages, Dennett's interpretation of the specificity of human suffering, Frankfurt's idea of first-order desires as constitutive for being a person, Drucker's learning how to learn... Along various ways, we have been approaching the same (in a sense: logically, metaphysically...) phenomenon which formally is very natural and almost obvious: phenomenon of iteration (incidentally, the sense of obviousness is here somewhat misleading: iteration entails infinity, and the latter concept is by no means philosophically 'innocent').

Determinacy (freedom, as its 'degenerated' case, included) of human actions can also be iterated. Not all kinds of determinacy come, to be sure, into consideration. Ex definitione, nothing can be done (neurosurgical or neurochemical interventions being excluded from the debate) about these elements that are determined in the 'Schopenhauerian' way. But as regards the three other modes of determinacy - the problem of iteration and level of determinacy arises.

Let us start from an overview of the issues and intuitions being relevant here. First, it may be that we can learn how to be free. But in this case - as in the case of
any other learning process, the learning can be more or less successful. And various factors may decide. Also - some inborn mechanisms. Perhaps already at the very beginning of their lives, some people are more able to learn to be free than some other ones. In particular, freedom has something to do with courage, self-control, pain-tolerance etc. All these attributes seem to be, at least partly, formable.

Second, people can create situations which limit their freedom (cf. the idea of self-bounding, explored in detail by J. Elster).

Third, they can attempt at enlarging the sphere of their freedom. While striving for this goal, they can nevertheless adopt various strategies. In particular, they can be rather 'Lockian' - based on bolstering one's 'internal autonomy', or rather 'Althusserian' - based on looking for possibly 'open' social surrounding. In other words - either increasing one's resistance to the external 'pressures' or finding such a 'place' in which the external 'pressure' is lower than in other places.

Fourth, People can, according to a view, act strategically. In particular, they can decide to limit their freedom in order to change themselves in order to be more free. In this way, one could interpret the behavior of an alcoholic (or drug addict) who asks to be 'imprisoned' so that he could not take alcohol (or drugs). He may believe that having been cured of his addiction, he will be more free.

It may be that some people are engaged into freedom-constraining (assume) struggle for money and/or power hoping that money/power will in the future make them more free.

With the last examples, we have come to the problem of the value of freedom, and - correlative to the 'costs' of freedom. The first aspect has been already discussed. The second should be still debated.

Let's consider an example. I tend to say that possessing various skills is, all other factors equal, an important element of freedom. If I would have to stay in bed my freedom would be very limited; if I could make walks, my freedom would be greater; and if I were able to ski and swim - still greater. But we could take another domain: intellectual. Very briefly, the more deep and comprehensive is my knowledge, the greater is my intellectual freedom. But enlarging one's knowledge and developing one's sport skills are but to a degree compatible. Therefore, I have to decide whether enlarge my sphere of physical freedom or rather the intellectual one.

We could sum up these considerations into a general hypothesis. This hypothesis would run thus: people are free (to a degree) as to their 'deep' nomological structure; they can (in some situations, not necessarily always) decide whether they will be more or less free.

We could say that this hypothesis is a generalization of the stance presented in the former points. This stance could be summarized thus: nomological characteristics of different types/elements of actions vary from type/element to type/element. It is implicitly assumed that this nomological characteristic constitutes what could be called 'nomological nature' of man. This nature is assumed to be 'given'. Now we allow for supposition that this nature need not be 'given' but can be formed - to a degree by the individual.

The problem we have arrived at, enjoyed - under the name of 'overdeterminacy' (overdetermination) - some popularity two decades ago or so. It was Louis Althusser who popularized this term in the context of his interpretation of historical materialism. We should not forget, particularly in the context of (meta-)anthropology, that Althusser - as he stresses it himself [Althusser&Balibar, 1975:271-272] - took this concept from psychoanalysis. In somewhat different

language, the same basic idea is presented by Althusser closest collaborator, Etienne Balibar, thus: "In various structures economy does determine in this sense that it determines that element of social structure which occupies the determining place. Not a simple relation, but relation of relations; not transitive causality but structural causality." [Althusser&Balibar,1975:324]

It is not the specific historiosophical (in the broadest sense; in this very sense, Althusser and Balibar did offer a historiosophy, if of very special type) content of these considerations but their more general philosophical (ontological) 'skeleton' which matters here. (But going in a somewhat opposite direction, we might note - not being much surprised, provided iteration being allowed - that there are some relations, itself of the overdeterminative type, between social/historical overdeterminacy and anthropological one. This issue is to be elaborated in a meta-historiosophy.)

Last but not least, I would like to note that Althusser and Balibar were coping with a very serious, difficult and important - also for anthropology - issue. Perhaps the poetics of their philosophy, rather specific for French philosophy upholding more intimate relations with literature than with mathematics and natural science, obscured their important intuitions. Nevertheless, the poetics aside, their intuitions were oriented in the same direction that those elaborated in the very distant fields of non-linear dynamics or quantum mechanics; the concept of non-linearity being a counterpart of that of overdetermination. - This but a declaration of my opinion. Let me however declare that I think I were able, having more time and space, to support this opinion with more systematic and better substantiated analysis.

The issues I have been considering are philosophically interesting in themselves. Still, keeping my eye on my ultimate goal, I would like to say a few sentences on the importance of those anthropological issues for political philosophy. Political philosophies can be classified in various ways. In particular, they can be classified as to the degree of individual freedom they postulate. In this perspective, they vary from, say, a 'strong libertarianism' which claims for 'absolute freedom' for each individual (Stirner!) to an 'absolute totalitarianism' which perhaps...cannot even be articulated.

It might be that also libertarianism is logically inconsistent if formulated in a 'naive', unrestricted way, i.e. if postulates individual freedom of acting without specifying domain(s) in which this freedom should be guaranteed.

Should people be free to 'sell' their freedom to other individuals or institutions? For a period of time? Until the very end of life? Or should people be free to 'sell' some parts of their bodies? Even if it would mean, as in the case of heart death? - These questions are formulated in a very drastic way. (Still, I am not sure that these drastic questions are of purely abstract character. Unfortunately, I suppose that they refer to some real social phenomena, if being kept very far from the reach of mass-media and public opinion.) But they should demonstrate that the postulate 'as much freedom as it does not confine other's freedom' is not sufficient. Some restrictions put on our freedom would be accepted by virtually all of us on the moral ground, even if the restricted actions were of no negative consequences for any other individual's freedom.

(The question demands much more profound analysis than possible here. In particular, one should study the validity of the self-imposing analogy with the situation of the 'naive' set theory in which no restrictions on set-definitions are assumed which results in 'set-of-all-sets' or similar paradoxes.)

Some maintain, and they seem to be at least partly right, that freedom (we should add - of some forms of activity) is incompatible with security. According to
many libertarians, we should accept insecurity in order to protect freedom. But why should people be not free to decide whether they prefer freedom (more precisely: not freedom as such, but freedom of this or that; with this reservation no paradox arises) or security, or living in a peaceful and brotherly/sisterly society?

Constitutions - and some institutions, such as constitutional tribunals - operate as mechanisms limiting the freedom of law-makers. Correspondingly, the decisions of legislators confine freedom of policy-makers. Etc.

I would risk the following, rather tentative, formulation: the most important freedom is the political freedom of the citizen who has always the right to accept or reject (in a 'civilized' form) the constitutional order, insofar the rejection does not comprise any step which would lead to the abolishing of the constitutional order, or to depriving any individual of this very freedom. (Let me stress the tentative character of this thesis; in order to formulate it in more definite and decided way, we should guarantee its coherence with a formulation of the 'right to live'.)

We could also note down that there is an analogy between the philosophical troubles of constitutionalism and epistemological troubles of the voraussetzungslos philosophy: constitution should in general protect freedom and not restrict it, but - on the other hand - should let people to restrict some freedoms if they wish. Similarly, epistemology (in a sense of this term) should assume as little as possible: so that it allows for possibly different philosophical options; on the other side, it should assume as much as necessary: so that it makes inter-philosophical debate meaningful. This relation is not only an analogy, it seems to be of more profound nature: legal order 'reflects', so to say, some logical complexities of its own philosophical presuppositions.

Roughly and summarily speaking: absolute freedom may be impossible - not (only) for practical, material reasons, but - for logical ones. Nevertheless, two lines of debate are possible. First, we can make a trade-off between freedom and other values. And second, assuming a level of freedom, we can discuss its various alternative 'allocations'. But we have to know what are the relations between freedom and other (positively evaluated) states of social relations. And we have to know what are relations between freedom in various spheres/on various levels of social life.

In other words, if we want to decide whether we are, say, libertarians or communitarians, if we want to make our fundamental political decisions consciously and rationally, really considering possible options, if we want to decide and not only to declare publicly our preconceived options - we should just know those options first. And our knowledge concerning those issues is - in my view - still very vague. Hence, the practical (political) importance of the problems debated in this point.

It is noteworthy that the problems of freedom, determinacy, over-determinacy, etc. can be regarded as apart of much wider problem which might be defined briefly as - the structure of man. This problem belongs in all its complexities to this part of anthropology which was named as 'substantial'. This part is neglected in the present work. Nevertheless, at least some remarks are to be made on these issues which constitute the 'border area' between these two anthropological fields.

It should be convenient, I suppose, to avail of some ideas of Ch. Taylor. I will follow the presentations of those ideas given by A. Bielik. She is referring Taylor's vision of the crisis of the modern culture, and - in particular - various tensions between alternative sense-creating 'horizons'. One of the most serious tensions concerns the concept of self. 'Taylor distinguishes two archetypical sources of two different approaches to the problem: hierarchical concept of self, which appeared in Plato, and non-hierarchical concept of self, of which origins can be found in Aristotle. The hierarchic conception introduces the interior of the individual strongly evaluative dualism: Reason, exclusively able to achieve the utmost god, is opposed to the sphere of senses and emotions, which are since on subdued to its control. Non-hierarchical conception assumes, contrarily, the existence of many equivalent goods, characteristic for each sphere of existence: striving for each of them is equally justified. Mediating, attempting to achieve equilibrium is this many-sided striving is in itself the utmost good. The hierarchical vision gives rise to the formalist conception of self that identifies itself with the formal element of the psychic life only - with the rational consciousness. This very vision lies at the bottom of the Cartesian 'detached self' and the Locke's 'point-like consciousness'. Upon it draw the scientist conceptions of man, taking into account but his rational part - such as utilitarianism with its calculus of goods or procedural ethics oriented at the pragmatic evaluation of the final results of action. Next, in the sources of the non-hierarchical approach originates the romantic revolt against one-sidedness of the formalist approach, the unconstrained expression of the whole human depth of the human interior being its main watchword. The conflict becomes more complex when it begins to cross over the next opposition - the opposition between two conceptions of Nature. Since Rousseau, and after him pre-romanticism, discovered 'natural good', the demand for freedom of the expression of the totality of human being gains acuteness and strength. The contemporary debate between the defenders of the permissiveness and the defenders of socially sanctioned forms of repression turns out to be but the next form the the horizons clash which began already at the time of Plato and Aristotle.' [Bielik, 1997:452-453]

7.6. From nomologically homogenous to nomologically heterogenous human populations

7.6.1. People are different. This sounds like the most banal of all the banal truths. However, this apparent banality is somewhat misleading. The only really obvious fact is that people behave in various ways: we all know that some of us make big money, and others teach children in grammar schools (receiving relatively small material reward); some are traveling around the globe, and others never leave their towns; some stay in one marriage for decades, some others change - if possible - their sexual partners weak after week... There is no sense to argue about these facts. But why people's behavior is so varied? Where the reasons for this variance is 'located'? And - to what extent this variety is significant? - The answers are by no means simple. The following Elster's words should demonstrate why it is so.

"Scholars disagree on the relative importance of preferences and opportunities in explaining behavior. Some economists argue that all people have essentially the same preferences and desires: only opportunities differ. Although usually staunch defenders of rational-choice theory, they are led, paradoxically, to argue that choice almost doesn't matter because any variations in behavior must be explained by variations in opportunities. Most social scientists, however, believe that people differ in their desires as well as in their opportunities, and this view seems to me so obviously right as not to require further defense." [Elster, 1989:15]

It is quite possible that 'some economists' are wrong, and 'most social scientists' are right. Yet, I disagree with Elster when he states that the latter's view is
regards requirements related to being citizen - basically equal talents."

I not only believe that such an 'economist view' should be taken into account as a possible anthropology (what is meta-philosophically obvious) but also that it would be interesting to construct a philosophy of History assuming that people are 'non-physically' identical. (Of course, people differ in their height, weight, strength, immunity from decease... - all those factors should be rather seen - in the context of Elster's comment - as a part of opportunities, as - in a sense - being 'external' in relation to acting subject; yet, it should be noted, the problem - if considered seriously - is anything but simple one: the problem of the border-line between the 'subjective' and the 'objective' in man, being a form of the mind-body problem, directs our attention to the more metaphysical part of anthropology, the part which is deliberately neglected in the present work). It would be interesting to see how much of the real History could be explained by such a philosophy.

It should also be noted that not only some economists assume that people are - in a way - identical. But of course people need not be 'essentially' just identical or just different. I would, for instance, maintain that we could interpret in a way Socrates' philosophy and that of Descartes, and thus obtain the following comparison.

On one side, we would have a thesis claiming that axiological system of all men is identical (say, in-born). The possible and real differences in the actual human behavior - in a given situation - can be explained in this perspective by the different knowledge, or by different understanding of the given situation

On other side, we could formulate a thesis saying that human being are - as knowing subjects - identical, equipped with identical cognitive capabilities; thus - that they are the axiological (free, 'Sartrian') decisions which account for the diversity of human actions (in identical situations)

Let us note that a somewhat similar thesis we find in a Dennett's theory. He maintains that all people 'play in the same league' as regards moral development. He adds that "civil society is considered to be composed of individuals possessing - as regards requirements related to being citizen - basically equal talents.' [Dennett,1984:96; cited after Weller,1997:216-217]

Anyway, in our every-day anthropology we usually assume that people differ not only as to their behavior, but also as to their character, or personality... And among various branches of scientific psychology, we can find psychology of individual differences which has obtained many important results. Many of those differences seem to fit well with anthropologies having been discussed up to the present moment. For instance, if we assume that people are free, in the 'Sartrian' sense, we should expect that even in practically identical situations they will act in different rather than in similar ways. But also if we assume, following Schopenhauer, that people are born with determined character/personality, we can maintain (as Schopenhauer himself) that each character/personality is individual.

We could, and should, make the next step and ask the following question. Is it conceivable that some individuals are born with 'Schopenhauerian' character, some others with a 'Sartrian' one etc.? However improbable such hypotheses may appear, they are (may be - to put it more cautiously) logically consistent. Or, at least I do not see any inherent contradiction in them. (If someone would say that such considerations are too speculative, he should be reminded that anthropology is regarded here as a part of philosophy, thus any Carnapian criteria of meaningfulness,
It may be that people are 'nomologically identical', it may be that they are
'nomologically heterogeneous'. It may be that people possess 'immortal soul', it may
be that they are completely mortal...I think that we do not have to decide these
questions if we want to develop a moral stance.

From my point of view, the following is decisive: all people suffer (experience
pain). There is no reason (the question of punishment be neglected here) why an
individual rather than another one should suffer. Thus, all people are equal,
irrespective of any other possible differences, as to their - let's call it so - 'right to
non-suffering'.

Interestingly, the problem of suffering has in our age gained some importance.
Witold Gombrowicz, while discussing Sartre's theory of consciousness, pointed
to the existential centrality of pain. And Daniel Dennett suggests that "being-able-to-
suffer does matter more...than any ability to complex, sophisticated thinking on the
future (or whatever)" [Dennett,1997:185]

Thus, in my opinion, if you accept egalitarian ideal and you understand its moral
(and not 'socio-technological') character, you should not object - even on the moral
ground - to philosophical debates over nomological differentiation of the mankind.

I would like to reiterate my general stance and add to it some specificity
provided by the context of the intelligence-debate. We can differ as to the degree to
which intelligence (particularly conceived as a single factor, measured by IQ) is well
defined. And, assuming that it is, we can differ as to the degree to which intelligence is
generically determined. However, these epistemic differences need not to imply
respective ethical differences. These differences matter, if we believe for
instance that people should be materially rewarded according to, say, the complexity
of the performed work. And if we want to make this stance compatible with
otherwise accepted egalitarianism, we have to reject the genetic theories of
intelligence. But, we can ground our egalitarianism on other premises. We can
assume that the right to (some) welfare is a consequence of the basic dignity of man
which is an attribute of any individual, irrespective of his or her abilities or skills. On
the other hand, the 'technological' mechanisms of egalitarian distribution should be
rather different when the level of intelligence is approximately identical in a
population and when differs dramatically.

So much for general notes. In the subsequent considerations, we will assume as
valid positive answers to the question:

[Q22] Are people nomologically differentiated?

Therefore, in the focus of our attention, there will be various types of the
nomological heterogeneity of human population.

7.6.2. I shall be realizing my goal in two steps. In the first step, I shall outline a
general scheme of rules allowing for generating nomologically heterogeneous
anthropologies. In the second, I shall discuss some of those rules in detail.

I see this scheme thus. All heterogeneous anthropologies could be divided into
three classes. The first class is composed of anthropologies which assume that human
population is nomologically differentiated at any given moment of time, but not
necessarily - during an interval of time. Formulating this idea in other words, we could
say thus: human population is nomologically differentiated since any human individual
(let's add for precision: whose life is 'sufficiently' long) at various moments of his life
comes under different laws of behavior. Most simply put, it might be said that they are
different laws of, say, children-behavior and of adults-behavior.

The second class contains anthropologies assuming that human population can
be divided into some groups (the extreme case of one-element groups being not
excluded) of individuals coming under different anthropological laws. To give the
simplest example: it could be (and, in fact, has been) maintained that men
and women not only differ in their ways of acting, but that those differences are of
'essential' character.

And to the third class belong those anthropologies which assume both the
nomological differentiation of the individual life-histories and the nominal
differentiation of individuals themselves. Following the already given examples, I'd
like to illustrate this possibility with a simple combination of them. I mean of an
anthropology which divides human population into four groups: boys, girls, men.
and women. Each of those groups is said to be nomologically specific. Of course, it is
very simple example; still, it should clearly demonstrate the basic idea.

The basic assumptions of the three groups of anthropologies could be
formulated in such words. Anthropologies of the first group assume that history of
(sufficiently long) individual life is composed of nomologically differentiated phases.
Yet, all individuals 'come through' the same phases.

Anthropologies of the second group assume that 'nomological structure' of any
individual life is constant, but these structures vary from one individual to another.

And the third-group anthropologies assume that 'nomological histories'
(-histories of transformations of nomological structures) differ from individual to
individual.

It should be remarked that the notions of nomological
homogeneity/heterogeneity, of nomological structure/history are drawn, though in an
informal and rather loose way, from Leszek Nowak's categorial dialectics
[Nowak,1977]. This reference is by no means accidental: human life is
prima facie a complex, structured process, if a 'micro' one. And as such, it generates - to a great
extent - problems of the same kind as those generated by, say, global History.

7.6.3. In accordance to the schedule, we should be speaking now about human life
and about its nomological differentiation. This question is a part of a broader task.
To cite the postulate of Searle, "perhaps most difficult of all, we need to account for
the melodic sequences of behaviour through the passage of time. Human activities,
after all, are not like a series of still snapshots, but something more like the movie of
our life." [Searle,1984: 62]

The movie of our life', or - as I'd prefer to say - 'biography'. And the problem of
'biography' has three aspects, at least: 'Syntactically' viewed, individual life is a
complex set of actions, and the fundamental question concerns the nature of this
complexity. Viewing from the 'semantical' stand point, we ask about the role of
'global' values in the axiological structure of an individual.

And now, we have arrived at a question about constant (resp. changing)
character of the determinants of the elements of actions performed by individual.
The question, which we have been approaching, could be formulated thus:

[Q23] Does human life has a 'deep' history? Or, alternatively: Is human life
nomologically differentiated or is not?
And if the answer is positive, a new question arises:

[Q24] What factors account for the 'deep' changes in human life?

Just these questions are to be considered in the present section.

7.6.3.1. Of many peculiarities of the development of science and philosophy also the following one, concerning the anthropological domain, could be noted. On the one hand, philosophical anthropology has been largely preoccupied with adult (and male - some would add) individual. On the other hand, developmental psychology has focused for a long time on the child's development.

As regards philosophy, two main factors might account for this situation. On the one side, anthropology has been domain in which theoretical (descriptive and explanatory) strands have been tightly interwoven with the practical (normative, ethical) ones. On the other side, philosophy has been created by adult men mainly, and philosophical anthropology has always been (to a degree - at times greater, at times smaller) a projection of 'styled' self-image.

And as regards psychology, Allport's remarks may be helpful: 'The presumption that more fundamental is what develops earlier is the...assumption of Locke's empiricism. Important are the first imprints in the wax of mind. The first impressions may later on be enriched and built into other ones, yet the primitive simple ideas remain the permanent elements of the psychic life. This type of genetism stamped a strong mark on American psychology. Sticking to the doctrine of blank card, American genetism maintains that important is what has been learnt in childhood, childish fixations and determinants...this point of view makes a serious difficulty for the theory of development and change of personality.' [Allport, 1988:16]

This general picture calls for some qualifications. Some thinkers contributed if not to the complete abolishing of the separation of these two fields of research then to at least to the bridging the gap separating those fields. Two names should be invoked in the first: Freud and Piaget. It is also interesting that the relationship between these two great thinkers has been stressed by a prominent specialist in the Artificial Intelligence: 'On the surface, the theories of Jean Piaget and Sigmund Freud might seem to lie in different scientific universes. Piaget seems to be concerned almost wholly with intellectual matters, while Freud studies emotional mechanisms. /.../ despite their differences, both these great psychologists asserted that every child proceeds through stages of mental development.' [Minsky, 1986:178]

From the pre-theoretical opposition (stabilized by the legal systems): child - adult, we could start our wandering. This rather intuitive opposition is of some importance for a few reasons.

First. It is the simplest way of approaching the indisputable fact that a newborn child's behavior fundamentally differs from the adult's. Perhaps the change is continuous. It makes however sense to ask whether a 'turning point', 'critical moment', or whatever else, could be defined and indicated.

Second. The idea of 'threshold of maturity' (which by itself does not imply any idea of a 'jump', rather that of 'maximal saturation') that should exist in (some) developmental processes - so different as learning to speak, growth of brain, or development of empirical science - is quite convincing and surely deserves attention.

Third, this distinction, in its various forms it has historically assumed, has played important social function. Most prominently perhaps, in the moral and legal concepts related to the notion of moral/legal responsibility.

The simples 'child-adult' opposition could be generalized in two, or three directions. Firstly, following Minsky, we should consider the problem of stages. Second, the issue of various sub-histories should be raised. And third, a 'combination' of these two generalizations should be taken into account.

Having marked these three points, look at them more closely. According to the list - the stages, first. We could ask at the beginning: 'How many stages?' and 'Distinguished in accordance to which rules (factors, magnitudes...)?' Any non-arbitrary (and not purely intuitive) answer should be based on a more profound analysis of the previously studied space of anthropologies.

(Let me stress this fact, perhaps interesting methodologically: A part of the 'initial', 'basic', and substantially - 'static' of meta-anthropology may be regarded as a common fundament for various anthropologies of 'dynamic' character - individual's life can be viewed, rather abstractly speaking, as a 'movement' in a space of anthropologies: man's behavior 'satisfies' 'comes under' at different moments different 'static' anthropologies; various 'dynamic' anthropologies differ each other as to the set of possible 'trajectories' and as to the assumed 'dynamics': mechanisms accounting for this 'movements'.)

Let's pass to the second point. Human life needs not to be viewed as a single process. At least equally (if not - a priori - more) plausible is the supposition that individual life is a 'weave' of processes, of which each has its own dynamic: comes through the successive stages according to its own temporality. - This supposition does not entail that these stages should be in each process different. (We could adopt here the 'formal skeleton' of Lange's historical materialism: there is a basic process in Lange: the development of productive forces/ and some 'derivatives' one - the latter following the same pattern yet with a phase delay.) However, such a hypothesis is very natural. Thus, we arrive at third point: individual's life in conceived now as a 'weave' of processes of which each has not only temporality of its own but also its own 'logic'. (more precisely:...own 'logic', therefore - own temporality).

The latter image suggests further questions. Are the processes co-constituting human life each other independent? And if 'only' autonomous - to what degree do they interact? And what are the mechanisms of those interactions? (Here, it might be noted, the Tarskian/TRACTALIAN structure of human affairs manifests again itself.)

7.6.3.2. I am going now to discuss a special theory, which may serve as a good example of theories I speak in this section about. To be more specific, I am going
now to present (in a brief form) and to comment upon the theory of L. Kohlberg and upon some related ideas. This theory concerns the problem of moral development, in other words - the problem of factors determining Others'-oriented attitudes, one of the most significant problems of anthropology. And, as it's been already noted, this anthropological theory plays an significant role in an important (Habermasian) historiosophy.

Kohlberg distinguishes three basic 'moral levels', which are designated as 'pre-conventional', 'conventional', and 'post-conventional', respectively. Additionally, he sub-divides each of the 'basic' stages (levels) into two particular stages; thus, he obtains six-stages model of moral development. In the first stage, behavior is to be directed by punishment-avoidance. In the second - by narrowly conceived principle of reciprocity. In the third one - the general approval on the part of others plays the directing role. Moral authorities, rules and social order - these are to be fourth-stage factors. In the fifth stage, the directing role is to be taken over by the 'social contract', and legalist and utilitarian attitude. And, finally, in the sixth stage, one's own conscience is to be the highest moral instance. [Golab,1975:142-143]

The general elements of Kohlberg's theory may be summarized into the points to follow:

1/ the temporal ordering of the stages is universal (each individual can achieve a stage, provided he has passed through all the previous stages);
2/ the pace of the development (of passing through the stages) is not universal (it may be individually or/and socio-culturally specific);
3/ the development of an individual may be stopped at any stage.

[Golab,1975:144]

Kohlberg's theory might be seen as an elaboration of Piaget's conception. The Swiss psychologist distinguished "two phases of the moral development of child: the period of heteronomy, called also the period of coercion morality or the phase of moral realism, and the period of autonomy, characterized also as the period of cooperative morality." [Golab,1975:140-141]

Despite of the qualitative character of the differences between heteronomy and autonomy, some reservations are necessary, if we'd like to regard them as stages of moral development. In Golab's view, these reservations may be worded as follows: "- the passing from heteronomy to autonomy does not occur simultaneously in the all domains of moral judgments... - There may be a divergence between various aspects of moral judgments... - It happens that a child, while uttering judgments of one and the same type, manifests at times heteronomous attitude, and at times - autonomous; therefore, transitory phases do exist." [Golab,1975:141]

Let's mention still some other yet similar ideas. For instance, another psychologist, Norman Bull suggests to distinguish four stages of moral development: anomie, heteronomy, socionomy, and autonomy. [Golab,1975:141] Also it should not be neglected (especially in a work being written in Poland) the fact that Kohlberg's theory was - partly - anticipated by a Polish psychiatrist Jan Mazurkiewicz who presented an image of human life as developing from instincts-determined infancy, through learning-determined childhood to self-determinacy of mature subject of action. [Jankowski K.,1978:8]

A somewhat parallel idea appears (independently) in Rawls: "morality of power is a set of imperatives, the content of morality of association is determined by... moral standards being proper in relation to the individual's role in different association he belongs to.

I'd like to cite also some remarks of the Alasdair MacIntyre, which seem to be relevant in the present context. While speaking about Rousseau, he is formulating some important comments on the concepts of one's own interest and egoism. He stresses that these concepts "are not so simple as Hobbes and his followers think." [MacIntyre,1995:241] In particular, and just this is relevant in our context, MacIntyre emphasizes that "new-born child is not egoistic, since it does not face the choice between altruism and egoism. Even a psychopath is not an egoist. Psychopath and child have not achieved the level on which egoism would be possible." [Ibidem]

Details and minor variations in the wording set aside, the basic intuition - in Piaget and Kohlberg, in Mazurkiewicz and Rawls, and in MacIntyre, either - seems to be clear: In different phases of human life, moral behavior is determined in various ways. Using the terminology adopted in the present essay, the general model of moral development might be defined a 'nomological history' composed of four stages: 'Schopenhauerian', 'Althusserian', 'Lockian' and - 'Sartrian' (the ordering in the sequence does matter!).

7.6.3.3. Having - written down some intuitions, and - debated some ideas concerning moral development, we should pass now to the problem of the mechanisms of human development.

Since the concept of freedom plays the most central role in the human development interpreted as 'nomological transformations', we might start from its reconsideration. Ant this very re-consideration might be started with some notes on Hegel's philosophy in general, and on his concept of freedom - in particular. To quote a passage from Phenomenologie des Geistes might be useful: "What is consciousness in itself - about this it learns from its reality. And just for this reason, the individual cannot know what he is in itself, until - through his action - he makes himself reality. It seems to follow from this that the individual cannot set the goal of his action, before he has accomplished it - but, at the same time, he has, for his being consciousness, to have before himself the action as totally his own action, i.e. as a goal. Therefore, the individual starting to act seems to be inside of a vicious circle, in which each moment has already assumed another moment and where the individual cannot find any other starting point: his initial essence, which has to be his goal, he may get learned from the accomplished action, but in order to act, he has previously to have had a goal. For this reason, he has to begin in an immediate way, independently from any circumstances, and to start the acting without considering where is the beginning, where are the means [for the goal] and where the end, since his essence and his nature, being something in itself, are all this: the beginning, the means and the end." [Hegel,1963:446-447]

I tend to think that two, or three, (interpretive) comments may be made. First, freedom of action is somehow related to the knowledge of the actor (incidentally it might be noted that both Piaget and Kohlberg stress the dependence of moral development upon the intellectual one). Second, the knowledge is a product of action. From these two, the third one may be inferred: freedom of action is a result of action.

These three theses are about the individual ad his actions. It is noteworthy that they are 's with the ideas on which the Hegelian philosophy of history is based. The basic thesis of this philosophy could be, I believe, put as follows:
spring does not characterize man in a continuous way, it is not anything permanent. Only moment, repetition, and - spring. And while discussing the last term, he writes: "the outperform its predecessor." [Minsky, 1986:178]

Another conservative strategy is never to let a new stage take control of actual behavior until there is evidence that it can change a system that already works./.../ Another conservative strategy is never to let a new stage take control of actual behavior until there is evidence that it can change a system that already works. This exercise consists in reformulating various ideas and concepts elaborated in theories of History so as to obtain concepts useful for the analysis of the 'micro'-histories - of human lives. The debates on evolution and revolution, on directionality (teleology) or lack of any telos, on adaptation and contradiction, on unilinear or multilinear patterns... - all these debates can shed some light on the individual histories. Not to say, that such a translation can help - in its turn - in gaining a fresh look on the 'great' History.

This task seems to be really big. It should not be unexpected that only the very first steps will be made in this direction.

Hegel's philosophy of History is a prominent instance of directional philosophies. These are, however, various. One of their most important divisions is the one grouping 'revolutionary' models on the one side, and the 'evolutionary' ones on the other.

This division preserves its importance if the meanings of the terms are appropriately modified as to be referred to individual life. To illustrate this thesis, let's read some considerations of the well-known AI-expert. In his The Society of Minds, he writes: "On the surface, the theories of Jean Piaget and Sigmund Freud might seem to lie in different scientific universes. Piaget seems to be concerned almost wholly with intellectual matters, while Freud - studies emotional mechanisms. /.../ despite their differences, both these great psychologists asserted that every child proceeds through 'stages' of mental development. And surely every parent notices how children sometimes seem to stay the same but at other times appear to change more rapidly. Rather than view particular theories of how children progress through stages, let's look at the concept of 'stage' itself. Why can't we grow by steady, smooth development? I'll argue that nothing so complex as a human mind can grow, except in separate steps. One reason is that it is always dangerous to change a system that already works. /.../ Another conservative strategy is never to let a new stage take control of actual behavior until there is evidence that it can outperform its predecessor." [Minsky, 1986:178]

Some interesting and relevant in the present context observations concerning the individual-life history can be also found in K. Toepplitz who presents the three central categories of the Kierkegaardian 'qualitative dialectics': moment, repetition, and - spring. And while discussing the last term, he writes: "the spring does not characterize man in a continuous way, it is not anything permanent. Only the most important phases of human life - according to Kierkegaard - are results of the spring. The points of support are needed only in order to take off and to negate them, but they are necessary. From this point of view, human life is alternately characterized by states in which dominates accumulating more and more quantities (of knowledge, certainty and possession), and states in which this continuity is broken - qualitative springs, which are less numerous, but are more important." [Toepplitz, 1980:117]

While speaking about Kierkegaard's idea of 'leap', we could mention a problem in Sartre's philosophy - one which demonstrates how some 'structural' assumptions imply 'historical' ones. In our case, if we consider Sartre's thesis about 'total' character of freedom (man cannot be, in his view, 'partly' free), then we have to decide: either man is already absolutely free in the very moment he comes to the world (thus an infant should be a free subject; almost absolute non-intuitiveness of such an assumptions left aside, we should note that it contradicts hypothesis - quite plausible - which claims for the language being a necessary condition of freedom; we should regard as a given fact that a child does not effectively speak any language, even if we accept Chomskian and not Skinnerian stance in the debate on the acquisition of language) or there occurs a Kierkegaardian 'leap' from a stage in which the man (infant, child) is not free (determined) to one in which the man (adult) if free (undetermined).

As to the latter possibility, let me say that though I do not regard it as being very plausible, I suppose it to be at least logically consistent. Moreover, the idea of a process resulting in a 'catastrophe' (in the sense of R. Thom) in which man passes from the 'determinist area' to the 'indeterminist' one seems to my theoretically interesting and deserving in the future amplifying.

While speaking of Sartrian stance in the 'life-historical' context, we should note the following. We should distinguish carefully two theses. Both are based on differentiation between, say, 'potential freedom' and 'actualized freedom'.

According to the first thesis, it is possible that man is free at all moments of his life. According to the second one, for all moments it is true that it is possible that man is free at the given moment. (Formally speaking, the order of modal functor 'is possible...' and general quantifier 'for all' is in both theses different; and this order does matter, both logically and - substantially.) Of course, the first thesis is stronger than the second, the latter being implied by the former; but not the other way round. (Note that we've arrived, "from a different side", to a problem already discussed in the context of the relation: 'tetrahedron' - 'syntax'.)

Logically, all this problem is rather simple. However, it is substantially important, and its simplicity - perhaps not so evident. What is the point? The point is in the (temporal) relation between decision and its actualization. If I am actualizing a decision I am not actually free, but - determined (in the 'Lockian' sense) by my own decision. Of course, at the case of any single decision, if only its actualization is not 'instantaneous', I can stop its actualization before it has achieved its completion. But, first: if I started at all a process, a time - if very short one - has to pass before I make the decision to stop it. And second (yet more important): if I permanently change my mind, I do not make any real decisions at all. For the decisions being real, and thus freedom, they have to be actualized (more or less effectively; this aspect doesn't matter here, the really important question is if I've tried - even not: have done my best but just have tried - to bring into effect my decision, or - I have not). If my life
were composed of permanent decision-making, it can hardly be said to be meaningful; the 'paper' decisions would lack any 'real-life weight', and the freedom of making such decisions would be formal and 'empty', if not illusory.

The final conclusion to these considerations could be phrased thus. Assume that man is fundamentally free (in the 'Sartrian' sense). We can maintain that maximization of freedom turns out to be self-destructive: absolute freedom (if the word can be used here) is 'absolute' due to its being meaningless and valueless. In other words, we could assume that there is a maximal level of freedom that can be achieved in one's life. This maximal level would be determined by a 'trade-off' between decision-making and (real) acting.

If you are skeptical of my argument, try to consider the familiar figure which comes at this moment to the mind. I mean of course of Hamlet. And try to go further than Shakespeare did. Try to imagine an individual who repeats every day his 'to be or not to be'. What a pitiful, miserable person would it be! (Some 'first-philosophers', to be met here or there, celebrate their freedom, being in fact simply attached to a very special, and not much challenging and demanding way of life.)

In order to make the next step, I would like to quote a Mejbaum's thesis presented in his paper on Construction of Free Will. He introduces the concept of 'internal freedom' which is firstly characterized as 'a state of consciousness being experienced at the given moment' [Mejabum,1983: 92] Later on, this concept is specified thus: 'internal freedom is...a state in which a man happens to be then and only then when he acts in accordance with his conscience.' [ibidem:93]

The whole theoretical construction which is based upon this concept need not be presented here. In the present context but one thesis is important. It says that 'internal freedom is not...an attribute of human nature, but it is a state in which people more or less often happen to be. There are, then, people internally free to greater or lesser degree, people free in some circumstances, and unfree - in others. Internal freedom is something which can be lost and what can be regained.' [ibidem:91]

This Mejbaum's idea may be put together with one of a philosopher of very different persuasion. I think of Heidegger. But first I have to risk the following interpretative hypothesis: some elements of the Heideggerian 'fundamental ontology' make up an image of the human life which might be interpreted as a special case of the 'chaotic' model of human life. In particular, I think of such concepts as 'authenticity', 'inauthenticity', and 'fallenness'. In Sein und Zeit, we cannot find any idea either of becoming more and more 'authentic' or of becoming more and more 'inauthentic'. And the notion of 'fallenness' (Verfallen) seems to confirm the supposition that Heidegger's view can be interpreted as an opinion claiming for 'incidental' nature of the passing from 'authenticity' to 'inauthenticity', or - other way round. This is a part of this interpretation; I'd say - the 'weaker' one. The 'stronger' part consists in defining the following corollary: 'authenticity' - 'Sartrian' freedom, 'inauthenticity' - 'Althusserian' determination. Summing up, we've obtained the following image: man can and occasionally happens to be free, but he also 'falls' into unfreedom of being submitted to the Man.

Let's return to the initial thesis: Human life is nomologically differentiated. However, contrarily to -models of Kohlberg-type, no directionality is assumed. The rejection of directionality open the road to different possibilities. The simplest (in a sense) one is that suggested by Mejbaum, and probably - to be found in Heidegger: 'chaotic' model. In the case of such a model, it is quite improbable (though not logically excluded) that all individual life-histories should be 'identical' ('equivalent', not identical in the strict sense), being nomologically 'chaotic'.

Whether anthropology of this kind is but a purely logical possibility, or it has some degree of empirical plausibility - I cannot decide here. I can only declare that, in my personal view, an element of nomological directionality should be contained in any anthropology claiming for the title of 'true' theory. However be the epistemic situation, such an anthropology define an 'extreme point' of the anthropological space, thus plays an important 'topographical' role.

Having defined one 'extreme point', let us try to say what an anthropology could be found at on other 'extreme point'. It seems to me that such an anthropology (more precisely: a class of anthropologies) might be defined in the following way. We could maintain that directionality of a kind (say, as in Kohlberg-type model) characterizes all individual life-histories: the same 'stages' are - potentially - to be found in all those histories. And people would differ as to say, their 'developmental potential': some would arrive at the last, 'highest' (the number of possible stages is finite), stage; some others would stop at a 'lower' one.

And now, let's take consider conflict-models. In particular, we should consider the problem of 'internal conflicts'. The subject, so important in literature, has been neglected, though not completely, by philosophy and psychology. It is Freud's theory which may be the most important exception.

Start thus with Freud. In his theory we meet at least two different conceptions which should be mentioned in this context. First, the relation between Id and Superego is basically of conflict character. But, second, the 'forces' operating in the Id are in conflict too. As Freud puts it: "Our approach has from the beginning been dualistic and is today so to a still greater degree, from the moment from which we have not spoken of the opposition between the drive of Ego and the sexual drive but between the life-drive and death-drive." [Freud,1975:76]

These two ideas offer, from the present point of view, very different perspectives. According to the first view, internal-conflict generating (determining) mechanism is of double 'Schopenhauerian'- 'Althusserian' character: the conflict is determined by the interference of external social factors and the inborn ones. In the second perspective, the conflict itself is inborn - it is the conflict between two equally 'natural' forces but operating in opposite directions. This vision of conflict seem to be of purely 'Schopenhauerian' character.

There is also a purely 'Althusserian' theory of internal conflicts. According to this theory, internal conflict is but subjective 'reflection' of some social conflicts. In particular, they reflect the opposition of the demands addressed to the actor by the various roles he plays, for instance - the role of a capitalist and the role of a Christian.

It would be interesting to check if there are some purely 'Lockian' or 'Sartrian' theories of internal conflict. As regards 'Lockian' perspective, we might refer again to psychoanalysis. (Incidentally, a remarks might be noted: The interpretive theses formulated in this essay are only by-products of very differently oriented activity. Nevertheless, some occasional interpretations my be regarded as suggestions for more historically-oriented works. In particular, we could note that Freud's theory seems to be - if only my interpretations are not of zero-degree historical correctness - rather heterogeneous set of ideas.)

We could think of 'the internalization of mother-father conflict which manifests itself not in the individual's contradictory attitudes towards his parents (this mechanism should be interpreted rather in an 'Althusserian' context), but in the
internal vacillations between, say, pious and libertine life orientations as having been imposed by father and mother, respectively.

An interesting example of the 'historically' determined conflict can be found, for instance, in Horney. Let's cite a brief presentation of her views: "Horney distinguishes three man's attitudes towards the Others: moving towards people, moving against people, moving away from people. Within the normal man, these three attitudes are reconcilable, within a neurotic man - who lacks flexibility and objectiveness of appreciation - these three attitudes come into irreolvable conflict which is called fundamental conflict. Its sources are to be looked for in the childhood of the sick person." [Wiezorek, 1973:35-36]

As regards 'Sartrian' perspective, I can but ask the question about the very possibility of such theory: does it make any sense to claim that any internal conflict is freely generated by the subject? I tend to answer this in a negative way, but I have no argument for it, only a vague intuition.

Conflict is the most obvious, non-controversial instance of a category that has arisen many debates, occasionally very hot ones. I mean of the concept of 'internal contradictions'. My personal attitude toward the concept itself and those debates it arose is rather mixed. On the one hand, there has been a lot of over-speculative, very imprecise formulations contributing little, if at all, to solving or clarifying the problem. On the other hand, the intuitions being there are, in my view, quite important. And they have something to do with a problem-field explored by various most 'exact' sciences, mathematics and physics including. I mean the problems known under the title of 'equilibrium/disequilibrium'. It is quite important problem, still of its own considerable dimension. Thus, marking the next 'link', I am passing to the specific instance of the 'internal contradictions', i.e. to the internal contradictions of human development.

I want to start from an illustration taken from Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. Among many other psychology-and-sociology border issues, Karl Mannheim is considering the phenomenon of "non-proportional development of human dispositions." [Mannheim, 1974:61] Similar intuitions can be found in Fromm: "Man's brain lives in the twentieth century; the heart of most men lives still in the Stone Age. The majority of men have not yet acquired the maturity to be independent, to be rational, to be objective." [Fromm, 1969:xiv] It might be remarked that the problem belongs - at least in Fromm's perception - to those of the significance going beyond the purely anthropological domain: "How can mankind save itself from destroying itself this discrepancy between intellectual-technical overmaturity and emotional backwardness?" [ibidem: xv]

7.6.4. That people differ nomologically turned out to be a bit more obvious than it could have been guessed. That infant's and adult's ways of behavior differ can hardly be regarded as a profound observation.

Anyway, by the way of some reformulating, we could obtain a weaker version of the anthropological thesis claiming for the nomological homogeneity of the human population. To achieve this goal, we might avail of an idea which can be expressed with such terms as 'nomological history of human life', 'nomological life's profile', or a similar one. The idea is based on the assumption that individual can be characterized nomologically at every moment of his life. In other words, a set of factors and mechanisms which determine individual's behavior is assigned to every moment of life.

Provided these concepts are introduced, we can formulate the weaker form of the homogeneity-thesis in this way: The nomological histories of all (sufficiently long - people may die before arriving to a given point in the 'nomological history') lives are identical.

In other, more intuitive, words we could say that the mechanisms that determine human activity change, from one 'stage' of live to another, but change in everybody's life in this same way, in the same direction.

A proper form of the heterogeneity-thesis we will obtain if we use the concept of 'nomological life histories'. This thesis says that people differ as to their nomological life-histories.

Actually, it should be noted, we've already obtained a thesis of this kind. I mean a thesis claiming for the existence of the 'chaotic' models, discussed in the previous section. It might be said, however, that this version of heterogeneity-thesis is very weak. In fact, if we cannot say anything more that everybody's life is nomologically specific, 'chaotic', unpredictable, then - somewhat paradoxically - all people turn out to be, in a sense, 'nomologically identical' - living through 'nomologically chaotic' life.

Thus, really heterogeneous anthropologies should indicate some different yet well-defined (and not 'just chaotic') 'nomological life-profiles'.

This aim may be approached this. We should differentiate human population, thus distinguish some sub-populations, and for each of these sub-population define different 'nomological histories of life'. Of course, the way, in which sub-populations are to be distinguished, should be independent from the differentiation of the 'life-profiles'.

Great many approaches might be invented. I will focus but on one, and - possibly - the simplest.

People differ in numerous ways. But if we want to indicate the most common and most easily noticeable division line (and dichotomic divisions are most easy-to-be-grasped) is that based on sex: there are female and male human beings. This is obvious: there are some biological differences, of which the most important are the various functions played, until today - the situation may change in the future, by both sexes in the reproduction. What is controversial is whether these biological differences are of broader significance; in particular - whether different philosophical-anthropological models should be being assumed for the separate sexes.

Let's commence with a general remark made by Max Scheler: "to the essence of human individual belongs being always either man or woman" [idem, 1987:42]. This anthropological thesis is supplemented with sociology-of-knowledge one: "the idea of human being, which is to comprise man and woman, is but masculine idea", "I do not believe that this idea could have come into existence in a culture dominated by women" [ibidem].

Interestingly, rather similar voices could be heard quite recently: "In science, women have not been noticed for ages. The male was the man. /.../ In philosophical anthropology 'man' has all features of a typical male. Similar was mainly the situation in psychology until Freud discovered the woman only to present her as a defected male, thus...uncompleted man." - in these words has been summed up one of the important elements of so-called cultural feminism. [Słęczka, 1999:413]

In my view, these opinions - though express some important facts - call for some reservations. The sex/gender differences had not been completely neglected by the past thinkers. Read, for instance, the following opinions on women; all formulated by serious thinkers in famous works...
In his Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Hegel declares that the difference "between man and woman is the same as the one existing between animal and plant". Women are said to act "not according to the requirements of generality but according to accidental inclination and accidental opinion". Practical conclusion of such views is obvious: "The destiny of a maiden is...but marriage." [Hegel, 1969:393]

And in Ferdinand Toennies' Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, we can find the following "banal" still "important truth": "women are directed rather by emotions and men by reason. Only men are able to calculate, to think in a passionless way (abstractly), to deliberate..." [Toennies, 1988:197] In our language, thus, we could say that men's behavior approximates, all other factors equal, the rationalist model much better than women's behavior.

The quoted thesis is followed by a number of other claims concerning differences between sexes. To add still an example: "women...enjoy present prosperity rather than attempt at distant, future...happiness."[ibidem:201] Quite interesting, an analogy between sex-relations and age-relations is also suggested: "Young woman is a true woman; an old one is getting similar to man. In young man's nature, there is something of woman; an old and mature man is a true one."[ibidem:204]

It is also maintained that "Oppositions between sexes are permanent and rigid"[ibidem:207].

Whatever we would think about these opinions, we should note that they do not seem to express any obvious masculine sexism. In Toennies view, "a genial man has, in many respects, the nature of woman."[ibidem:202]

Similarly, no particularly 'sexist' ring can be heard in the words of Christopher Marlow, the narrator of Heart of Darkness: "It's queer how out of touch with truth women are. They live in a world of their own, and there had never been anything like it, and never can be. It is too beautiful altogether, and if they were to set it up it would go to pieces before the first sunset. Some confounded fact we men have been living contentedly with even since the day of creation would start up and knock the whole thing over." [Conrad, 1990:10] Interestingly, in the contemporary feminist movement quite similar ideas have been pronounced. In particular, the representatives of orientations classified as 'radical' or 'cultural' feminism claim that "women by their very essence do not want anybody's enslavement and suppression or exploitation; they do not stand inflicting pains and hate death." [Ślęczka, 1993:418]

More 'sexist', but philosophically interesting opinion was formulated by Carl G. Jung. Referring to Kantian opposition Verstand - Vernunft, he maintained that the second level of intellectual activity is attainable for male human beings only. [after Ślęczka, 1999:33]

About an important difference between motherly and fatherly love wrote Fromm: "in the relationship to mother, there is little the child can do to regulate or control it. Motherly love is like an act of grace; if it is there, it is a blessing - if it is not there it cannot be created. /.../ The relationship to father, on the other hand, can be controlled. He wants the son to grow up, to take responsibility, to thin, to build; or/and to be obedient., to serve father, to be like him. Whether father's expectations are more or on development or more on obedience, the son has the chance to acquire father's love, to produce father's affection by doing the desired things." [Fromm, 1969:49-50]

From the perspective of this essay, the following hypothesis deserves particular attention. "of their very essence, women do not desire to enslave and suppers, exploit or inflict pains upon nobody." [Ślęczka, 1999:418]

In the present context, we should also note that debates among various feminists currents concern, among other subjects, also the relations between equality and identity/difference. On the one side, some stressed the incidental and secondary character of differences between sexes. And this fundamental identity of human (neither specifically male nor female) should be the essential reason for equality between sexes. On the other side, some feminists underscored the specificity of female nature. And their ideology is a form of postulate of equal rights for different groups (and individuals).

Let me repeat at the end of the point devoted to this very 'hot' subject the following declaration: From the standpoint defended in the present works any theoretical stance should be allowed and discussed, form any-one assuming fundamental (essential, nomological) identity of men and women, to various theories allowing for essential differences. And practical conclusions of any stance are not determined, as the previous passage demonstrates.

"Our moral constitution does not consist of reason and action only, as being represented in society by two strata: philosophers and proletarians, respectively. It is also characterized by emotion which makes up...its most significant element." [Comte, 1973:365] This has its political consequences: "in the necessary alliance of social factors which will direct our revival, there is a lack of the representative of the supreme regulator of human nature. /.../ This is the fundamental cause for women's joining to this reviving alliance."[ibidem:366] "Women, which are the part of humankind of the highest moral level, will always prefer the only system in which was exposed, as a principle, the supremacy of morality over politics."[ibidem:367] "If our material needs could be satisfied in an easier way, the predominance of practical life would stand in the way of the authority of intellect. Given this assumption, supremacy would belong rather to women." [ibidem:373] - Should not Comte be accepted as a 'spiritual father' of feminism, or - at least - of some its trends?

7.6.5. Let me return now to Patryas' model. He maintains that principle of rationality is an open formula which cannot be transformed into general proposition: the free variable X (which ranges over the set of human beings) cannot be bound, since 'it is known that so transformed principle of rationality would be a false proposition' [Patryas, 1979:14] It should be so, since "many people's conduct contradicts the principle of rationality".

Consequently, "the set of all people can be divided into two subsets - of rational people and of non-rational ones." And, while speaking of non-rational conduct, Patryas adds that "textbooks of psychiatry describe great many cases of this kind". [ibidem]

Apparently, in Patryas view, the division he introduces raises no fundamental doubts (empirical difficulties with identification of the 'border-cases' being omitted). But other stances are also possible. Let us read, for instance, the following opinion of Julia Sowa. Concluding her systematic study of Cultural Presuppositions of the Concept of Normality in Psychiatry, she maintains that her analyses confirmed that "health is not an 'ontological' category, but is an effect of evaluating; that it is not discovered in phenomena, but predicated of them under the influence of the attitude of the predicated person; that, thus, this attitude makes the main component of the meaning of this term." [Sowa, 1984:297] I believe that the Dostoyevskian figure of Prince Myshkin, the alleged 'idiot', might be an illustration for this claim. But do such example confirm wholly Sowa's stance? I doubt. What then is my own position?
Very roughly speaking, it could be located somewhere in-between Patryas' and Sowa's stance. More precisely, I would outline it thus.

On the one hand, I am not prone to accept the idea which says that whole psychiatry is nothing more than an ideological tool for suppressing those who think/feel differently than this or that power (either concentrated power of state or diffused power of public opinion) demands; I do not think that psychiatry is devoid of any objective content and expresses - in veiled way - pure evaluations. On the second hand, I do not think that such a simplistic division as offered by Patryas should be useful.

It might be that the stance that I'd like to accept is not very distant from the following claim of Freud: "it is impossible to delineate in the scientific way the psychic norm from the abnormality, thus this distinction - despite its practical relevance - has but a conventional value. In this way, we have validated the right to attempt the understanding the normal psychic life through the analysis of its disturbances, what would be inadmissible if those pathological states - neuroses and psychoses - had specific causes acting like foreign bodies." [Freud,1975:207] Not the very questioning the normal/abnormal division matters here, from my point of view, but the thesis that might be rephrased thus: the 'normal' and 'abnormal' (however, and with whatever precision defined) should be analyzed in a unique theoretical framework; or thus: the knowledge of the 'abnormal' contributes to the knowledge of the 'normal'.

Having subscribed to the Freud's claim, I should not neglect the following possible doubt: Is not my position as to this special issue in discordance with the general meta-philosophical strategy assumed in the present work? Though there are here some methodological subtleties that should be discussed in the future, my answer would be negative: it is not. The Freudian position I accept does not exclude any specific stance as to the specificity of 'abnormality' and as to the possibility and mechanisms of the passing from one state to another. Therefore, in my view, this very position opens the vast area of anthropological debates, while Patryas's stance would be inadmissible if those pathological states - neuroses and psychoses - had specific causes acting like foreign bodies.

First, the idea that we should divide (if at all) the human population not into two groups, but into three ones: sub-normal, normal and supra-normal. Or even into more than three groups. Such an approach seems to be much more intuitive than the normal/abnormal division: locating Kierkegaard or van Gogh into one pigeonhole together with those being not able, for instance, to perform elementary arithmetic operations is very much counter-intuitive. Of course, counter-intuitiveness could be accepted, but - if coincided with some insights offered by the counter-intuitive stance. But if such insights are in this case really possible, one can doubt it.

Second, the idea of positive disintegration demonstrates the relevance of the concept of 'levels of integration' (a concept being close to that of the 'order of action').

Third, the idea of positive disintegration has its 'dynamic' dimension. We could formulate it thus. On the one hand, the intervals of disintegration are necessary for individual's mental (intellectual, emotional...) development. On the other hand, if the development should be the case, those intervals cannot be 'too long', in particular - they cannot be stretched over the whole life-time. But perhaps the picture should be still more complex. In fact, one can suppose that a minimal yet positive (non-zero) level of disintegration should be permanent if the intervals of 'productive' disintegration are to be possible. (To be noted here is an interesting analogy with Schumpeter's theory of 'creative destruction' as an important factor in the process of economic development [Schumpeter,1950:81-86]. Also the Nietzschean theory of the 'Appolonian' and the 'Dyonisian' could be reconsidered in this context.)

Let's pass now to Anoni Kępiński. Of his numerous works, I shall avail but of his book on Schizophrenia. Note that it is dedicated to those "who feel more and understand differently, and therefore suffer more, and whom we often call schizophrenics" [Kępiński,1974:xv]. This dedication reveals both the fundamental idea and moral attitude of the great Polish psychiatrist. Let focus first on this phrase.

"We could ask if there is a 'rational level' of feeling? I would not say so. And is there only one 'rational level of understanding? The question is perhaps more difficult than the former one. Anyway, if the concept of rational understanding is to be of universal anthropological importance, it cannot be based upon ethnocentric European epistemological ideal of Aristotle or Bacon.

And if we were to be more specific, we should leave in the former sentence only the name of the English philosopher; that of the great Greek thinker does not fit well there. According to Kępiński, "in the schizophrenia, one notes the tendency toward philosophizing: the questions of good and evil, of the sense of the world and its architecture...not only are interesting for the sick persons but are becoming an important issue of their lives. Philosopher is concerned with philosophy but conducts a life being more or less the same as that of any average man. The schizophrenic-sick-person's life is absorbed by his philosophy. /.../ The known saying: 'primum vivere, deinde philosophare' he transposed into 'primum philosophare, deinde vivere'." [idem:124] Before commenting this text, let's make the following remark.

In her notice in memory of Professor Ingarden, I. Krońska invokes words of the great phenomenologist: "Once in Paris...you said me that you had survived the war since you were philosophers. I have formulated something similar, still in another way, by transforming the old saying. I used to say: primum philosophari, deinde
vivere. I think we should stay here." [Krońska,1972:61] - A surprising and intriguing convergence. Some fanatic anti-metaphysicians could try to support their attitudes with psychological arguments. But it is not, of course, my stance. Thus, what to do with this convergence? I would suggest that it supports this approach which claims for complex relations between the 'normal' and the 'abnormal', one which does not exclude the possibility of the 'abnormal' (of a sort, at least) being a particular case of the 'rational'.

Let's proceed for while still along the same path. Kępiński speaks of two "axial manifestations of schizophrenia, autism and splitting." [Kępiński,1974:1] But is not it so that autism may be regarded as a phenomenon being analogous, partly at least, with Stoics' apathy or Epicureans' ataraxia? And if such a parallel is to a degree valid, should we say that Ancient philosophers recommended non-rational behavior? Yet, perhaps the point is that Stoic apathy should have been consciously chosen while schizophrenic autism is 'self-imposing'? It seems to be a plausible conjunction. But if it really so, the difference would be not on the level of actions themselves but on the more 'deep' level of action-generating mechanisms.

To these citations, let's add still one. While describing one of untypical forms of schizophrenia, namely delusion-syndrome, Kępiński emphasizes that delusion-attitudes play a role in 'normal' individual and social life. If a man experiencing delusions is regarded as mentally ill, it is so due to the great discrepancy between his convictions and those "commonly accepted in the given epoch or cultural circle" [Kępiński,1974:83] This quote suggests, as also the previous ones (on philosophy, both 'normal' and 'schizophrenian') do, that the passing from 'normal' to 'abnormal' is rather continuous, though not necessarily - uniformly continuous.

Schizophrenia has, according to Kępiński's descriptions, its important temporal dimension. First of all, it is not a permanent state: "the illness is not always chronic, sometimes it may last but a few days, and even hours, without leaving any detectable psychic changes." [Kępiński,1974:2].

And while analyzing the beginning of the illness, Kępiński distinguishes its four types: abrupt, slow, neurotic, and paragnomen. [Kępiński,1974:12-14] In the present context, of particular interest is the second type. In such a case, "the sick person has seemingly not changed, he observes the social forms, he works. The change can be felt rather than noticed." [Kępiński,1974:13] The description of the second type is here interesting for two reasons. First, it confirm the thesis that there is no sharp division-line between 'normal' people and schizophrenics. Second, it demonstrates that schizophrenia can manifest itself in gestures, looks and grimaces rather than in the course of acting. This is important in the context of theory of action.

Describing three phases of schizophrenia, Kępiński characterizes the way in which the sick speaks. In the second phase "separate sentences are understandable, though it is difficult to understand the whole utterance, since it has no logical construction", in the third phase "even the sense of a single sentence disappears" [Kępiński,1974:41] We could avail here of the 'syntax' of actions and say that it is possible that someone's relatively simple actions are rational, while the more complex ones are not.

Rather in the 'semantic' context, the following observations might be interpreted: "Among those suffering chronic schizophrenia, there occur - though not too frequently - persons who get perfectly along with life,..., make big money." [Kępiński,1974:146] And this one: "The ill may believe that he is the God, but it does not prevent him from asking doctor for a receipt." [Kępiński,1974:34] These remarks seem to be in accordance with those stances which underscore the 'modular' character of human mind and the plurality of mechanisms determining its functioning. If one assume any such a stance, one should regarded as rather obvious (and surely not as anything surprising) that some mechanisms can be 'ill-functioning' while some others can function 'correctly'.

Some descriptions would suggest that schizophrenics are - in a sense, at least - more 'rational' than those not affected by this illness: "'societas schizophrenica' is more healthy than average society, society of mentally healthy men. There is more mutual understanding, honest compassion, readiness to help; there is no rivalry, intrigue, destroying each other." [Kępiński,1974:145]

It is still more vivid in this passage. "In schizophrenia, it comes sometimes into view the hidden mechanism of decision-forming: what normally is going on without participation of 'I', unconsciously, here comes into the center of consciousness...In consequence, the ill cannot make decision"[ibidem:199] And, in the same vein, he speaks of "broadening of the field of consciousness for unconscious decisions." [ibidem:239] This phenomenon might be somehow related to the metaphysical orientation which is to be typical for schizophrenics. In schizophrenia, contrarily to 'normal' life, 'the ultimate questions come to the fore' [ibidem:117] This conjecture seems to be confirmed by the following explanation of the specific way of walking characteristic for some schizophrenics: "steps made by the ill are not automatic walking, but they are steps of a persecuted, of a condemned, of a hero, of a god" [244].

To these quotations and comments on Kępiński, one could add the following remark of Dąbrowski: "disintegration in schizophrenia is mixed, positive and negative". [Dąbrowski,1975:22]

I want still to comment upon the following quote from Freud: "there are people whose general mood oscillates periodically - from extreme depression, through a between state, to intensified good frame of mind - while those oscillations have amplitudes of very different magnitudes, from almost unnoticeable to extreme, which in the form of melancholy and mania...disorganize the lives of people being affected by them." [Freud,1975:343] I am not interested here in the 'direct' content of this remark. I'd like rather to draw your attention to an idea which may be derived from it. And this may be summed thus: there is a factor ('mood') which determines which way mechanism determines actual actions. In particular, in some emotional states ('moods') man is not only unable to make any decision at all, but is unable to perform any action; in some others - he makes rational decisions; and still in some others - he is, say, driven by his 'impulses'. In sum, we obtain here the image of 'nomologically chaotic' human life. It may be claimed that this parameter plays a role in the process of generating life-history of any individual. But it also may be claimed that in the case of some individuals this 'nomological chaos' is significant, while in the case of some others - of only very minor importance.

There remains still one problem to be touched upon. Its formulation was suggested to me by W. Mejbaum essay on Amor fati. We find there, among many other interesting considerations, the following comments on Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus: "The last year of Adrian Leverkuehn's life. The period in which abated terrible headaches, sudden intensification of the creative capacities. The period of strenuous and fruitful work, ended with manifestation of incurable mental illness. And more. Just Adrian Leverkuehn is this figure of the 20th century literature of which it can be rightly said that he has chosen his fate: madness." [Mejbaum,1983:79]
It is impossible to discuss here the literary example with which Mejbaum presents his idea. But the idea itself is sufficiently intriguing to be noted. The same can be said about the tacit question to which this idea is an answer. And the question is both simple in formulation and fundamental.

Two levels should be distinguished. On one level, the positive answer is quite plausible; anyway, it does not rise any fundamental (logical, metaphysical) objections. (On the other hand, such an answer is anthropologically important.) We can say that the individual can 'choose madness' by accepting or even bringing about such changes in his social and/or physical environment which in their turn will cause his madness. It is sufficient to invoke drugs (LSD etc.), alcohol, possible neurological interventions, and the sense of the 'choosing madness' should be clear. But... If seen in this perspective, is not the question rather trivial? In my view, it is not. For instance, the point is not in the very possibility of the sheer fact of drugs-taking of which madness could be a 'by-product'; the point is in whether is it possible that someone takes drugs deliberately in order to become mad. Any answer is to so formulated problem is by no means obvious.

Much more difficult is seems to be the problem arising on the second level. Here we ask if madness can be, so to say, 'direct' consequence of the respective act of choice. In other words, the problem is whether human mind can 'disorganize' itself by the way of its own internal operations. I must admit that I am able but to register this question but I cannot offer any analysis of its content.

Let me conclude these remarks on psychiatry with a comment on the historiosopical importance of the subject. This seems to be double. On the one hand, such a parameter (in fact a whole set of them) as 'health' (somatic-and-mental) should be an important element of some models of History. I mean here models which could be named 'man-oriented'; models in which dependent variables characterize, roughly speaking, 'quality of life' and its distribution.

On the other hand, 'mental heath' is to be considered as a possible determining factor. It is known that some historical phenomena of importance, say Cultural Revolution in China, were described (explained?) as a fit of 'collective hysteria (madness, etc.)'. And it is clear that from the meta-philosophical point of view, historiosophies which regard the level of 'mental health' of society as a determining factor are to be taken into account as any others.

And, of course, these two aspects of the subject may be not independent.

7.6.6. At the very end of this sub-chapter, some remarks on statistical assumptions in anthropology. I shall start from Leszek Nowak's non-Marxian historical materialism. In this theory statistical-kind anthropological assumptions of historiosophy are clearly formulated and their role in the overall theoretical construction is evident. Thus they offer a good opportunity for this type of discussion I am intending to conduct here.

In particular, in his fundamental work *U podstaw teorii socjalizmu* [Foundations of a theory of socialism] L. Nowak formulates an extremely important, both theoretically and practically, "thesis on impossibility of socialization of the means of production" [Nowak,1991a:318]. The crux of the argumentation is expressed in the following implication: "If...among direct producers are always there individuals prone to maximize their economic advantages, and the mechanisms of inter-human competition is such that the people of this kind win it, then...after revolution just such people come to the forefront" [ibidem:319] This short thesis summarizes many theoretical problems, both of anthropological and sociological character.

Of them all, I'd like to tackle but one anthropological issue. I want to focus my attention on the formulation "there are always those who...". This formulation is, in my opinion, far too weak as the premise of the cited argumentation, or of any of this type in general. The premise should be formulated somehow like this: 'there always are sufficiently many...'. 'Sufficiently many' may mean, in a context, 10 per cent of a population, perhaps 1 per cent, but almost surely not 0,001 per cent. And here is the point. If we say: 'there are those...', we may pronounce an almost banal truth. But if we say: 'there are sufficiently many...', this utterance is not banal, but also - it need not be a truth.

Let's put this issue into a broader theoretical context. It seems to me that among important, yet rather hidden assumptions of Nowakian historical materialism there is one claiming for statistically normal (Gaussian) distribution of socially important traits of individuals. But, just while making the formulation more precise formally, we are demonstrating its imprecision. Putting aside anthropological content, focus for a while on the mathematical aspect of the problem. The concept of Gaussian curve does not determine any single function but a whole family of them. Any such a curve is determined by two parameters. On the one hand, the coordinate of the point in which the curve has its maximal value; in other words, the average value of the stochastic variable may differ. For instance, the IQ-measured intelligence has, let's assume, normal distribution. But, according to some estimations, the average value (as measured in some Western societies) has been increasing in the last few decades. And the standard variation decides whether the curve is, to speak figuratively, rather 'flat' or 'slender'. And, last but not least, the real-life distributions need not be perfectly symmetrical.

And having made these formal observations, we can return to more substantial issues. In particular, we could ask several questions. For instance, we could ask about on what ground could we maintain that never happens that 'there are sufficiently few' those who, say, are chasing after more money and/or power? I do not see any simple answer to this question. Of course, we can assume the controversial thesis as an axiom. But other axioms are possible, too. Even if we want to preserve the general Gaussian assumption. But we don't have to regard this general scheme as unquestionable. It should be analyzed, to what degree any Gaussian-type assumptions concerning human populations are compatible with Sartrean-type assumptions concerning members of those populations. My hypothesis would say that even a minimal Sartorial component allows for some deviations from the Gaussian curve. And we could go further, and claim - much more generally - that in the case of those distributions that are not-Schopenhauerian (assuming that distribution is - on a level - predetermined) we might face some nonlinear effects: actualization of a given distribution changes the probability of the distribution in other moment.

And if a dose of 'Althusserianism' were allowed for, it could be supposed that human population differ - across space and time - as to statistical distribution of anthropologically significant parameters. We could suggest that the Gaussian-type assumptions hold true for most societies but not for all. We could speculate if there have been such societies which evaded the Gaussian mechanism. Supporting those speculations, we wouldn't have to refer to Rousseau's myth of 'good savage'; it is enough to observe that until, say, the end of 19th century had survived relatively egalitarian societies.
I ought to stop these speculations: to continue them in a serious way, mathematical language should be adopted, what is impossible here. I hope, however, that I demonstrated that a possible mathematical formalization of those issues were not an intellectual curiosity, it were not only a 'specification' of intuitively clear formulation. It is a basic precondition for passing from anthropology to historiosophy. At least, if anthropologies assuming considerable degree of heterogeneity of humankind.

But having ended those mathematics-related anthropological speculations, I would like to say still something about historiosophical dimension of the problem. To this order, I am going to refer to the theory of 'ethnogenesis' formulated by Lew N. Gumilev, a Russian historian - specialist in the Oriental history. I am speaking of Gumilov's theory drawing upon its summary, though one presented by its author in an interview. Nevertheless, it deserves to be mentioned here: it serves as an example of some possible anthropological theories. And, what is from my point of view particularly interesting, Gumilov's anthropology is constructed as a basis for a historiosophical model.

It is 'ethnos' which is central concept of the theory. 'Ethnos' is to be a generic term, of which such concepts as `tribe', `nation' or even `religious community' are to be special cases. The history of `ethnoses' is to be an autonomous process, independent from socio-economic transformations (as described for instance by historical materialism).

In the present context, the following quote seems to be relevant. Gumilev says: "suddenly - arrives a generation of people whom I designate 'men-of-passion', from Latin passio. They posses, as it were, overabundance of energy which makes them not to rest quietly but to strive for some idealist - or even illusive - goals...In sum, they profited from it very little and lost a lot. But it could not have been otherwise since it was uncontrolled spontaneous process" [Gumilev in Osiatyński, 1980:318-319] Trying to explain the mechanisms of that process, Gumilev refers to Wiernardt's concept of `geobiochemical energy' which is supposed to determine the level of activity of organisms, human ones including. And for the instability of the level of this energy cosmic radiation is to be responsible.

Perhaps some experts would characterize this theory as para-scientific or even unscientific. This is, however, a problem of little (at least in the present context) importance: from (a) philosophical point of view such a theory is as good and interesting as any other. Philosopher would also add that the plausibility of this theory depends on the assumed model of mind-body relations. In the context of some (strongly `anti-naturalist') models Gumilow's theory is a priori implausible; in the context of some other models (more `naturalist') it may be granted with a modicum, at least, of plausibility. And, as we know, the mind-body problem is still open.

I would like to indicate a close relation between Gumilev's theory and Kozielecki's 'transgressional model of man'. We could 'combine' their views in the following way.

[1] People differ as to the 'power' of their transgressional orientation.
[2] This 'power' is biologically determined.
[3] The statistical frequency of the individuals with great 'power' is changing due to some processes in the physical environment.

One could note also some similarities between Gumilov (and Kozielecki) and the theory of character formulated by a Polish cybernetician, Marian Mazur (In my personal opinion, the lot of the Mazur's theory may be regarded as an illustration of some sociology-of-knowledge regularities. His theory was, so to say, socially misplaced. Formulated by a specialist in technology, was too 'physicalist' for psychologists and too 'psychological' for the specialists in 'hard' sciences. And for philosophers of various persuasions, it was perhaps to 'scientist'.) The comparison Mazur-Kozielecki comparison suggests the important question: what is the mechanism of 'transgression'? In a crude formulation: is it a phenomenon of the sphere of sense (content...) or it is a phenomenon of the sphere of 'vital forces' (elan vital)....

These speculations of Gumilov, could be supplemented with more sober considerations of the known biologist E. Wilson. In his words, "theory of population genetics and experiments carried on non-human organisms, they demonstrate that significant changes can take place in the life-time of less than one hundred generations, what in the case of man means the time which has passed since the Roman Empire. Two thousand generations - thus roughly the time that has passed since the typical Homo Sapiens appeared in Europe - are sufficient for a new space to come into existence..." [Wilson,1978:123] In Wilson's opinion, "although we do not know to what extent evolution has actually taken the place, it would be a precipitate assumption that modern civilizations has been built exclusively on the basis of the genetic capital accumulated during the long way through the glacial epoch." [ibidem:124-125]

7.7. The final glimpse at the space of anthropologies

The topography of the space of anthropologies is rather complex. Its precise description seems to be impossible without having adopted methods being more formal than those in use in the present essay. Therefore, just a 'glimpse' at the space.

The space in question is, so to say, generated by various answers to anthropological questions. Therefore, it may be convenient to look at the list of those questions which we have found particularly important. This list comprises the following questions:

Q1 Is always conscious action most effective, other factors equal; or it happens that some types of actions are more effective if being unconscious (thus, by definition, being co-actions of some conscious ones)?
Q2 Is it possible to make decisions (at a given moment of time) as to acts of any depth? In other words, have we to focus our attention on acts of a fixed depth, or we do not?
Q3 Is there a minimal level of 'automation' of relatively simple acts, common to most of people?
Q4 Are different people more or less tolerant to the lack of automation?
Q5 In what sense, if any, can we speak of the "sense of life"?
Q6 Does axiological 'zero' exist, or not?
Q7 Do all preferences have maximal elements, or only some of them? Or in other formulation: Which preferences (types of preferences) have maximal elements?
Q8 If maximal elements exist, are they individual or common for all people?
Q9 If it so that some preferences have maximal elements, what accounts for this fact?
[Q10] Does exist any finite upper boundary for orders of individual axiological systems?

[Q11] In which sense (in which way) can be a man a value (autonomous, non-instrumental) for another man?

[Q12] What is the relation between agent's subject-ness and the Other's existence?

[Q13] What are possible and actual 'combinations' of attitudes towards Others?

[Q14] What is (are) the structure(s) of the individual 'social worlds'?

[Q15] What is (are) the structure(s) of individual's axiological system? Or, in other words: How do various preferences of the given individual 'interact'?

[Q16] What is self-knowledge, and what role does it play?

[Q17] How do different ways (levels, etc.) of the cognition of the Others affect agent's attitudes toward them?

[Q18] How do various aspects of situations determine the decision-making strategies?

[Q19] Does it make any sense to distinguish between act (decision to undertake it) and its performance?

[Q20] In which ways is human acting determined?

[Q21] Are all types or/and elements human actions nomologically homogenous?

[Q22] Are people nomologically differentiated?

[Q23] Does human life has a 'deep' history? Or, alternatively: Is human life nomologically differentiated or is not?

[Q24] What factors account for the 'deep' changes in human life?

This list is by no means exhaustive. Nevertheless, even a cursory look at it should confirm our intuition which tells us that space of possible anthropologies should be very complex.

To orient oneself well in the space, one has to determine several orienting-points. In particular - the extreme-points. It seems to me that in the space we have just constructed we can define one 'maximal' point and four 'minimal' ones.

But before these 'points' will be indicated, a methodological (terminological) remark is to be made: It should be noted that we could define the ordering in other way, and than the 'maximal' point would be the 'minimal' one, and the 'minimal' ones would be the 'maximal'. The ordering adopted here is in accordance with the natural ordering of the set of all subsets of the given set: the given set is the maximal element in its power-set.

It should be also noticed that, a theory - being maximal as to what it allows for - is minimal as to what it rejects: it the extremal case, it rejects virtually nothing.

Let's begin with the 'maximal' point. The 'maximal' anthropology is, in a sense (!), completely trivial. It says us that some people are in all situations free, while some others are always are determined by their 'character', and still some others happen to be in some situations partly free and partly socially determined, and in some situations partly determined by their 'character' and partly - by their past...And so on.

If such an anthropology tells us about anything at all, it is about the supposed fact that human beings are profoundly different; so profoundly that they differ not only as to the content and form of their action but also as to the mechanisms determining those actions.

Such an anthropology might deserve the name of 'nomological-anthropological scotism'. The quotient mark is here of particular importance: I do not want to maintain that we can speak here of any 'application', 'development', etc., of Duns Scotus' philosophy. Yet, his theory of haecceitas, individual form, may shed some light on the anthropology in question. We could formulate this anthropology thus: each man is nomologically individual.

Thus, the trivial, in a sense, thesis turns out to be - in another sense - very strong one. As to one anthropological question, the strongest one. Probably, the strongest one which is logically possible.

As regards the 'minimal' points, we could say they are occupied by the four simplest anthropologies (represented by the four apexes of the anthropological tetrahedron). Each of these anthropologies maintains that all actions of any man are either 'Schopenhauerian', or 'Althusserian', or 'Lockian', or 'Sartrian'.

(If it should be noted that these 'points' can be regarded just as points if we think not of individual anthropologies but of classes of anthropologies. For instance, both a 'Hobbesian' anthropology (all people are of their innate nature - 'egoists') and a 'Rousseauist' one (all people are of their innate nature - 'altruists'), being substantially very different (even opposite), are instances of 'Schopenhauerian' anthropology.

All this additionally complicates the image of the anthropological space.

How to define, in a more systematic way, the structure of the space located in between the 'maximal' point and the 'minimal' ones, remains a task to be undertaken in a future study.
FINAL REMARKS

My task in these final remarks is triple. Firstly, I am going to return for a while to the first part of this essay and to reinterpret some metaphilosophical (let me remind you: in the Lazerowitz’s sense) issues in the light of the results obtaining in the second, meta-anthropological, part. Secondly, I will outline a program of the future research in the domain being explored in this essay. And thirdly, I shall formulate some remarks on political philosophy.

1. Metaphilosophy as seen in (meta-)anthropological perspective

We can re-formulate some basic ideas of a metaphilosophy (as outlined in the first part of this essay) in the terms of various anthropological models.

Such an undertaking may have a double sense. On the one hand, philosophy - like religion and art, like any other branch of culture - is a product of man, thus any anthropology cannot be said complete unless offers some account for this peculiar sort of human activity. On the other hand, the sense (more specifically: extra-cognitive, social, ethical sense) of the project of meta-philosophy depends, among others, on the 'nature of man'. Thus, one should expect that in the context of one anthropology it will turn out meaningful, and in that of another anthropological theory - perhaps completely meaningless.

I am going to commence from the model with discussion of which the construction of meta-anthropology was started, namely the 'humanist interpretation' (or 'rational-choice theory'). Later on, some further comments will be made. They will be not very systematic: my only aim is to demonstrate the very possibility (and, I hope, usefulness) of such re-formulation.

The word 'philosophy', like the name of any other branch of culture, is systematically of double meaning. Fortunately, in this particular situation, it is not dangerous: these two meanings can be distinguished in a relatively simple way. On the one side, while using such a term, we can think of a human activity (writing, painting, playing violin...); on the other - of the product of this activity (book, a painting, live music...).

Correspondingly, I am going to speak of philosophy taking subsequently two different, though somehow related, perspectives. First, the word 'philosophy' is to direct our attention at a particular object of 'cultural consumption'. And second, the label 'philosophy' will be attached to a branch of 'cultural production' producing objects (books, papers, lectures...) of this peculiar 'consumption'.

In this section, my focus will be on the first aspect. The second one will be mentioned in the context of remarks on political philosophy to be made at the very end.

1.1. Philosophy, in its mundane form of philosophical books (lectures being read etc.), can be viewed as a collection of objects of 'cultural consumption'. In fact, we should not speak of a one type of consumption. Quite as in the case of, say, poetry or cosmology, reading philosophical books can be motivated in a number of various ways. Thus, we should actually speak of different types of 'cultural consumption' of which philosophical books (lectures etc.) happen to be the objects. Intellectual curiosity and the examination requirements, snobbery and professional duty... If someone would like to analyze all the possible types of such 'consumption', he should involve himself into rather vast sociological analyses. Very interesting task, undoubtedly, yet not to be undertaken at the present moment. In the course of my considerations, I will limit myself to only one, yet - in a sense - most important, type. More specifically, I will assume that philosophy is a device of (re-)constructing one's Weltanschauung. Therefore, the notion of Weltanschauung and its relation to that of philosophy is to be discussed first.

I think that there is an intimate relation between these two notions: one may be defined by the other. Whether 'philosophy' or 'Weltanschauung' should be regarded as basic concept and the other one as derivative is not, in my opinion, of any particular importance. We could either say that philosophies are 'articulated Weltanschauungen', or - alternatively - that Weltanschauungen are 'non-articulated (spontaneous, cf. Gramsci) philosophies'. Both formulation, though formally different, express the same idea.

The last word should be stressed. The point is not in formulating arbitrary definitions but in claiming for actual, substantial links between two domains (or, better to say, 'layers') of culture.

The claim in question could be a matter of a debate. It has been, for instance, said: "As Leszek Kolakowski once used to say, philosopher seems to formulate a question concerning the essence of thing but in fact it concerns human condition. Yet, they are the proponents of this thesis who are obliged to prove it." They should demonstrate for instance "what says about human condition Platonistic and what nominalistic stance as to the existence of numbers" [Nowak:1998:34] I wouldn't like to claim that such questions can be easily answered. Yet, it is obvious that some philosophical questions are of direct relevance for human self-understanding: the question concerning the existence of God is surely among them; also the one about human freedom and moral responsibility or that about the immortality of human soul.. And a good deal of many other philosophical questions are somehow 'related' to the three invoked. And this 'relatedness' seems to be quite extensive. For example, the problem of 'analytical/synthetic' distinction. It may appear of purely 'theoretical' (here: 'not life-important') character. Still, as the debated this opposition is involved into the debate (Duns Scotus, Ockham...) over the notion of God's omnipotence: do the laws of logic determine God's creative activity or are themselves a product of this activity? Thus, it is of some, though indirect, 'mediated' importance for Weltanschauung-debates.

Developing these intuition, we could define philosophy as such a form Weltanschauung that is characterized by the consistency of its reasoning, and (what is related to the consistency but should be separately named) by its - so to say - 'going to the very end'. Most vivid, in my perception, example of this aspect of philosophy is to be found in a passage of Arendt's Thinking. She comments there on one of the 'metaphysical' passages in Wittgenstein Tractatus: "It is Wittgenstein who investigated 'to what extent solipsism is a truth' and who became its main contemporary representative that expressed existential illusion of any solipsism: 'With the death the world does not change but ends itself', 'Death is not a happening in life. Death is not being experienced.'" [Arendt,1991:89]

Even if you accepted the definition of philosophy as a form of Weltanschauung, you might find that the notion of 'articulation' should be analyzed. Sketching only the most important points, it can be said what follows.
First of all, I locate philosophies rather in the Popperian ‘third world’ while Weltanschauungen rather in the ‘second’; this decision entails some important consequences. Firstly, it seems that philosophies should be logically consistent while Weltanschauungen might be (though not necessarily) contradictory. Secondly, philosophies should consist of well-formulated propositions, while Weltanschauungen are composed of utterances being more or less ambiguous. Thirdly, philosophies may be viewed as logically closed (as theories in the logical sense), while in the case of Weltanschauungen the actually performed inferences (or even pseudo-inferences) really matter. Fourthly, philosophies may be regarded as ‘timeless’ wholes, while ‘dynamics of change’ is among the most fundamental characteristics of one’s Weltanschauung.

Second, a characteristic of any Weltanschauung (or of complete - comprising epistemology - philosophy) is to be recalled. Say, it is a pair composed of a system of theses and a complex of attitudes: W = <T,A>. The elements of this system (T and A are, viewed formally, some sets) are pairs that may be represented by complex sentences of the sort Fp, where ‘p’ is a given statement (metaphysical etc.) and F is an epistemic functor (‘I know that….’, ‘I believe that….’ et c.) More intuitively put, Weltanschauung is conceived as a complex of ‘views’, of which any is composed of its ‘content’ and of ‘attitudes’ taken toward it. These attitudes are in fact but partly represented by epistemic functors (as investigated in epistemic logic). Others attitudes (specific for Weltanschauungen) might be expressed by such phrases as ‘I cannot imagine that I might not believe that ‘p’”, “I don’t want to consider if ‘p’ is true; I just believe it to be so”, etc.

Now, we could say that in order to articulate a Weltanschauung we should find one (or more - if the given Weltanschung is contradictory) philosophy which represents (represent) the content of this Weltanschauung.

Having introduced this distinction, I can formulate a hypothesis as to some philosophical (anthropological) assumptions of the project of meta-philosophy. This project is based, among others, on the analytical approach, broadly defined. One could ask whether analytical approach is philosophically ‘neutral’ or not. My answer might be formulated thus:
[1] the analytical approach is compatible with any metaphysical stance;
[2] the analytical approach is compatible with some (but not with all) epistemic attitudes.

As regards the first point, numerous examples - such as Lukasiewicz’s or Bocheński’s philosophies, or analytical Marxism of the Poznań School (Kmita, Nowak...) - should confirm its plausibility. As regards the second point, studies in totalitarian Weltanschauungen (Stalinism or Nazism), in particular - studies in the totalitarian language (cf. V. Klemperer’s LTI, Notizbuch eines Philologen) - demonstrate that their anti-analytical orientation was not incidental.

Of course, if we moved from the dichotomic characteristic: compatible/incompatible to a continuous one, it might turn out that in the case of some metaphysical stances there is greater probability that those who accept them are prone to assume ‘cool’ (analyticity-compatible) epistemic attitudes toward them than those who accept some other stance (those being, contrarily, prone to assume ‘hot’ attitudes). This remark opens a way to rather special psychological considerations which cannot be undertaken here.

1.2. The idea of what could be called ‘free choice of Weltanschauung (philosophy)’ is to be discussed now. Let’s assume at the very beginning that such an idea deserves some attention. It is anything but evident: some would perhaps maintain that it is so plainly false that it is waste of time to speak about it. This might be, for instance, the position of Jaspers, since - according to a summary of his views - “we are not able to choose Weltanschauung, since man is, as it were, growing into the world with his Weltanschauung and is a subject only in its framework”. [Rudzinski, 1980:79] But if we take a ‘Sartrian’ position, we should claim for another, opposite to Jaspersian, view.

We could at once note that even his main thesis were valid, Jaspers’ argumentation in its favor is not. It may be that we are ‘growing into the world’ together with our Weltanschauungen. But can we really not re-construct our Weltanschauungen? Perhaps we actually cannot. But this impossibility does not follow the fact that a Weltanschauung is ‘given’ us - in the first phase of our life.

We could support Jaspers’ argumentation by supplementing it with an additional premise. Such a premise would say that no conscious intervention into one’s Weltanschauung is possible. That might be true.

But changes of Weltanschauung do happen (St. Augustine’s conversion being one of the most famous example). Therefore, given the premise, it would turn out that such changes are completely of exogenous character. It might be so, but it is by no means an evident position.

Thus, a question arises: are there are constraints limiting the scope of possible transformations? The strongest, ‘Sartrian’, view seems to allow for absolute freedom of the choice of philosophy, thus - no constraints at all. In the case of Jaspers, contrarily, constraints are to be so strong as to leave no room at all. And still others would claim for the existence of some constraints, in a case - stronger, in a case - looser. I am not going to decide this issue. However, some further considerations are possible only if at least a degree of freedom of philosophy-choice is allowed for. Thus, assume it is.

We will discuss the problem of Weltanschauung-choice in the framework of rational-choice theory. Let the situation S be interpreted as an ‘existential situation’ (one in which an individual determines his/her Weltanschauung for a part of it; such a situation need not to be identified with Jaspersian Grenzsituationen). The elements A1, A2,...,An can be interpreted as ‘acceptation of philosophical doctrine (respectively: doctrine 1, doctrine 2,...,doctrine n)’. By X’s epistemology (or, to be more precise, a special part of it) we can understand the rules for the evaluation of the (subjective) results of the acceptance of a doctrine, and a hierarchization of them (which makes it possible to order these results).

Let’s assume also that the more free in a situations - all others factors equal - an individuals is, the better he recognizes it; more precisely: the better he knows both the set of possible actions (decisions) and the set of their consequences.

Simple, but important, remark is to be made: only articulated Weltanschauung can be an object of possible choice. Pomian, quoted also in another place, noted that genuine conservatism is anti-philosophical. Event the most dogmatic philosophy contains a grain of self-destruction: its articulation. Thus, if Pomian is right, the history of relativism turns out to be very old: it goes back to the discovery of writing (of course, I don’t forget Socrates; his case is evidently an exception and not a rule).
In this language, we can formulate the idea of meta-philosophy as follows. The task of the professional philosopher is to provide any interested individual with an image of the possible 'philosophical decisions' (thus of possible philosophies, or of possible solutions of a philosophical problem). It is also his task to present an image of the possible criteria of evaluation (thus of possible epistemologies). It is not his job to suggest what decision is to be made (still less: to insist on a decision). In other words, we could say that philosopher qua (professional) philosopher is to help other individuals to be more - and not: less - free, while making their existential decisions.

The outlined above image of the problem is very simple one. And in the context of the humanist interpretation (specifically, in its most idealized variant), it must be and remain so. If however you discuss it in the framework of other anthropologies, you may find it to be more complex. The analysis of Weltanschaung-choice, if it should be made in the context of all (say even - 'main') anthropologies, would be a task for itself; surely going far beyond the scope of these final remarks. Therefore, but a few points will be touched upon.

First, let's consider the phenomenon (mentioned several times in this essay) of 'escape from freedom'. It can be assumed, and common observations confirm it, that not all people care for 'freedom of the Weltanschaung-choice' (you should not confuse this freedom with one of political liberties, the freedom to manifest their Weltanschaung). Moreover, quite a few men try to avoid the possibility (and necessity) of such a choice. Such an attitude may be variously construed. It may be interpreted as an instance of Sartrian 'bad faith' but also just as risk-avoiding. It may be viewed as a manifestation of 'hedonistic' life-orientation or of fear of losing the ground of one's personal identity...

The question, of practical importance arises here. To what extent, to what a degree, in which way, should educators (from kindergartens to universities) insist on the free choice of one's Weltanschaung (assuming such a choice to be to a degree possible)? Some positions can be taken, some declarations - made, as always. But any non-arbitrary choice can be made only in the context of a comprehensive political philosophy.

Second. Some persons, consulting professional philosophers, may be satisfied with impartial presentation of various philosophical stances. But some others may feel dissatisfied: they hoped for moral authority and guidance and received an image of the opposite stances, not to say that an image of shocking plenitude. We need not to interpret such an attitude as another manifestation of 'escape from freedom'. I would rather suggest to follow Simon's idea of bounded rationality. After all, even professional philosophers devote but a part of their lives to philosophy; nothing surprising, then, that even the most profoundly interested non-professionals wish to spend their time on philosophy but to a limited degree. Thus a kind of trade-off between impartial guidance and counseling may be necessary.

Third. Let's assume that an individual does want to make his own philosophical decisions and that he is not temporarily restricted. An interesting question arises: is it possible that even such an individual makes at a moment one 'global' philosophical decision? If the answer should be 'yes', we could continue to interrogate: who is the subject of such a decision? Possibly - a 'transcendental ego'; but if so, a new question arises: to what extent (if any), transcendental subject may be regarded as a model (even highly idealized one) of an real individual. Most answers would be, I suppose, rather negative. And if we reject 'point-like' model of individual, do we have to reject also the possibility of 'momentary' philosophy-

change? I do not think so. Yet, on the other hand, such a possibility seems to be somewhat mysterious. Thus, anthropology seems to confirm, in its own specific way, the thesis about the impossibility of assumptions-free philosophy. On the other hand, the idea of meta-philosophy, or more precisely - its relative anti-systemness, allows for rational change of philosophy: one can decide one problem while continuing to accept the decisions as to other problems having been made earlier.

In the context of these 'Husserlian' consideration, I'd like to make a brief remark on the post-modernist notion of irony (as being used, for instance, by Rorty). But first - a quote. The author of the text to be cited is considering, so to say, existential relevance of some methods and concepts of phenomenology. In particular, he suggests that "Transcendental ego, conceived as a perspective allowing for the critical attitude, may also mean human subject's non-identifying with the whole of possessed truths, the existence of a distance between the one and the other, which may make that human subject is just a subject, thus he does not fuse with the truths discovered by him but regards them as his own tools being discovered by him just in this order." [Sarnowski,1972:482] If we remember that transcendental ego is being arrived at as a result of the process of phenomenological reduction (epoche), we should note an analogy between Husserlian reduction and Rortian irony.

Putting these intuitions into a simpler language, we could maintain that utterance "The opinion 'p' is mine" has more in common (though is not identical) with declaration "It belongs to me (as a book, jacket or bicycle does)" than with the sentence "It is a part of me (as my recollections are).

1.3. As already suggested, (meta-)philosophy is risky. Thus, various anthropological opinions as to men orientations toward risk are of importance for metaphilosophy: different ideologies of the philosophical practice may be differently evaluated as to their viability, accordingly to various anthropological theories of risk and various axiological recommendations concerning attitudes toward risk.

1.3.1. Philosophy is risky and must be so. Why? Addressing this question, I would like to make a metaphysical declaration being, I suppose, a possible answer to the problem which - according to Lazerowitz - is central for metaphilosophy: why philosophical problems are non-resolvable?

This declaration is based upon two premises. First, of general-metaphysical character; it says that Being is infinite. Second, of anthropological-metaphysical character; it maintains that man is - in a sense at least - a finite being. It is Heidegger who tried to specify this meaning of man's finiteness, which is relevant here. In *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, he said that 'human character of reason' consists in its finiteness; and this finiteness is to be consistent in the 'essential structure of the very cognition' [Heidegger,1989:28]. It should be noted that great many, otherwise very different, philosophies do share these two assumptions.

To these premises I'd like to add two intuitions. First, one referring to Gödel's incompleteness theorem. Among its various consequences there is the existence of an uncountable set of various (non-isomorphic) models of theoretical arithmetics. Saying more precisely, and figuratively too, this set is of the same power as the set of all points of, say, 3-D Euclidean space. [Woleński,1993:78] Of course, if we are interested in number theory, Gödel's theorem and its consequences are not very important. But a similar situation in metaphysics should be more essential for this philosophical discipline.
And second. While characterizing *Empiricism without the Dogmas*, Quine offers the following metaphor: "total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our statements...Having reevaluated one statement we must reevaluate some others... But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice [sic! - W.Cz.] as to what statements to evaluate in the light of any single contrary experience". [Quine,1961:42] The idea expressed in this quote has its own history going back to Duhem, at least. It would perhaps offer an instructive context for discussing Lazerowitz's problem.

Now, however, I'd like but to register my own intuition (following Quine's metaphor). It could be put thus. If we try to limit our adjustments to possibly small part of the field, we can choose between relatively few options (it may be necessary to assume that there is a threshold of discrimination, which allows us to neglect very small differences between some alternative adjustments and, then, to identify them; without this assumption it might turn out that each, even smallest, part of the field generates infinite set of possible adjustments). If we decide to enlarge these limits, the scope of possible options becomes greater. And philosophy, let's assume, does not establish any such limits. Thus its scope of options is the biggest.

While discussing these issues, we could also avail of an idea presented by the American psychologist, Jeromy Brunner. According to him, any cognition goes 'beyond the received information'. But in the acts of perception, the cognitive 'added value' is relatively limited, in 'local' scientific theories - much bigger, and in 'global' philosophical conceptions - biggest. And, one could say, the bigger this 'added value', the more space for controversies. This intuition seems to be additionally confirmed by some facts from the recent history of 'hard' science. Look at cosmology. The abundance of existing cosmological models of the Universe is comparable with (if not even - greater than) the multiplicity of philosophical ontologies (cf. the texts of M.Rees, A. Guth, L. Smolin in [Brockman /ed./, 1996: 363-416]). We could of course say that cosmology is not a 'genuine' empirical science and some actually do so; for instance, in his *The End of Science*, J. Horgan is speaking about 'ironic cosmology' created by 'poets so creative and ambitious as Hawking, Linde, Wheeler, and Hoyle', and maintains that this discipline 'is not science' [Horgan,1999:146]). But if we remember that modern cosmology is, roughly speaking, a product of general theory of relativity, we will face a problem of demarcation. And one being at once more urgent and difficult than its Popperian prototype: it is - on the one hand - rather obvious that astrology and Newtonian mechanics are rather different forms of cultural activity, and - on the other one - pedantic drawing of the demarcation line separating them seems to be of little practical use; but to claim that, say, special theory of relativity is a part of 'genuine' science while general theory of relativity belongs to the domain of 'ironic' science - such a claim is, in my view, as much bold as difficult to be validated.

And if we take another direction - microphysics, we will see a similar image. Surely, the position of the quantum mechanics is, as yet, very strong. But the variety of interpretations of this theory is quite considerable (cf. essays in the collection [Davies&Brown,1996]). And passing from this modern classics to more recent inventions, the theory of strings being the most famous one, we will see an image not very different from the one we can see in cosmology.

And if you note that both microphysics and cosmology are operating in 'regions' which are closer (than, say, Newtonian mechanics is) to the Ancient *arche*, than we will find the situation 'natural': Newtonian physics is, I'd call it so, a 'Protagorasian' theory - a theory of objects of 'human scale'. Here is little room for non-resolvable controversies; if we, however, move away from this region, either 'up' - towards the 'infinitely big' or 'in depth' - towards the 'infinitely small', the situation is changing: the agreement disappears, and the scope of reasonable alternatives - grows up.

I would like to complement these considerations with some comments on some metaphilosophical theses of B. Stanosz. In her opinion, "Carnapian critique of metaphysics [Ueberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache] has not lost its value." [Stanosz,1989:71] Trying to validate this opinion, she invokes "empirical facts which were explained by the conception of Carnap...and which have not been explained in any alternative way; if one rejects this conception, these facts are still waiting for an elucidation. The multiplicity of competing philosophical doctrines, the considerable number of which claim for the status of ultimate solutions, and none of them has been able to dominate the others with purely intellectual compulsion, by the means of irrefutable argumentation - it is the most striking fact from this domain." [idem]

I do not know whether my accounting for this 'most striking fact' is at least as much (not to say - more) convincing as that of Carnap. However, it is an accounting. And this accounting is alternative.

Let's return to the metaphysical thesis with which I've opened this section. Assume is true (and I tend to think that if there exists at least one metaphysical thesis which can be qualified as true in the common, 'pre-philosophical', sense, it is just this very one). If so, then our metaphysical aspirations will never find satisfaction: between Man and Being there has always been and will for ever be a irremovable gap.

Philosophical decisions will always be intellectually risky, more so than in any other sphere of cognition. It is fact (given accepted assumption). And it constitutes a part of the issue. There is still another part: there are various possible attitudes man can assume toward this existential-metaphysical fact. And about these possible attitudes I am going to speak in the next point.

1.3.2. Now, I'd like to make a comment, both metaphysical and ethical in nature, on post-modernism, risk-avoiding, and on the idea of meta-philosophy. In a sense, it can be viewed as a continuation of some Witkacy's ideas I mean in particular the role played in his philosophy by the category of the 'Mystery of Existence' [Witkiewicz, 1974:100-149].

(I refer to Witkacy, since it is interesting to find the idea of mystery, usually linked with religious philosophy /the name of Marcel could be here invoked; cf. Tarnowski's systematic presentation [1993:58-71, in particular - 63; 172-207/], in a materialist's thought; his historiosophical remarks on this idea are also important.)

The idea of 'mystery' presupposes, so it seems to me, two claims:

[M1] there is a reality ('true', 'actual')... one wish to come to know,
[M2] this reality cannot be known, or - at least - one cannot achieve any certainty as to whether one has actually come to know it or has not.
These two assumptions constitute the metaphysical part of my 'Witkacyan' argument. They ought be supplemented with an ethical assumption ('Sisyphean'):

[S] It makes (some) sense to try to achieve some goals that are from one's viewpoint unattainable.

The Witkacy's position might be read in the light of Wittgenstein's philosophical attitude (and vice versa). Wittgenstein (the 'young' one: the author of *Tractatus*) was well aware of the, say it so, 'logical dangers' of the exploration of the 'metaphysical abyss': he lacked the self-complacency of some of the earlier metaphysicians. But, in opposition to neo-positivists, he did not regard this abyss as a 'linguistic illusion'.

It may be useful to complement those general remarks with discussion of an example. The example has not been chosen accidentally. Contrarily; in a way, the problem may be regarded as the most central in philosophy: I mean the problem of God.

Some would surely agree that the claims of either tomos or 'scientific atheism' are - if to accept contemporary (methodo-)logical standards - rather poorly validated: there is no definite proof of the existence or of the non-existence of God. As far as good: any anti-fundamentalist critique is (logically or epistemologically; whether intellectually - it's more complex issue) well-grounded. But to say that there is universally valid solution of this question is one thing, and to reject it is another one. And post-modernism actually rejects this question.

Ironically, and perhaps somewhat shamefully, post-modernism follows the path of *Wiener Kreis*. (To avoid misunderstanding, a reservation is necessary: I am aware of the great differences between - say - Carnap and Lyotard. But at one point their paths come close, or even intersect: this point might be characterized as 'anti-metaphysical orientation'.)

Ironically, for post-modernists - who tend to speak a lot about history, but seem to have scarce (or - to put it more cautiously: to make little use of) knowledge about history - like to fight against 'positivism' (which they happen to identify with 'objectivism'; Plato or St. Thomas or La Mettrie would then be 'positivists').

Shamefully, for they pretend to have avoided taking a standpoint in this debate. But to say that in one's personal-world (in a Wittgensteinian 'language-game', in a culture...) there is a God and in other personal world (etc.) there isn't one; it is to take in fact the standpoint of Feuerbach (who didn't try to pretend that his philosophy was not an atheism). In this context, a remark made by Ingarden during the 8th Congress of Philosophy in 1936 deserves to be cited: The old materialist metaphysics did not claim anything other [than neopositivists did - W.C.Z.], but it did it openly, without hiding its standpoint behind some theorems on language**. [Ingarden,1963:651] Ingarden's words might nowadays be referred to post-modernists. Of course, one might say that intellectual honesty is not an absolute value.

The attitude which I'd like to defend could also be linked with a reasoning that is a modification (generalization) of the 'Pascal's bet'. Our metaphysical decisions are unavoidably risky. But they are risky just because they are actual decisions. If there is no question (an sich) whether God exists or not, but only a problem whether 'furnish' one's 'private-world' with Him or not, then there is no risk (at least: no existential-cognitive risk; if you burn some pieces of furniture to be put in your apartment, you take a risk too...) Seen in this perspective, both epistemological absolutism of any form (be a Christian, be a Marxist, be a Husserlian...) and anti-metaphysical skepticism (in the form of neo-positivism or that of post-modern relativism) are but two different strategies of achieving this same goal: risk-avoiding.

Having mentioned Pascal's name, also those of Kierkegaard and Newman should I invoke, in order to put these remarks in a historical context.

Let's try to sum up those remarks and say so. We can distinguish three general epistemological stances. According to the first, there is 'Truth' and it is achievable. According to the second, there is no such a thing as 'Truth', then neither claim for its being achievable nor for being not achievable is meaningful. And the third stance, 'Truth' is there but is not attainable (standard reservations about in-between positions are obvious and need not be made in any extensive form).

The third position, if viewed in one perspective, seems to be a case of 'compromising' (in-between) attitude: 'yes...but...' (on the one side...on the other...'). Note that from the point of view assumed in this work, 'in-between' positions are as good as the 'extreme' ones. Having made this reservation, I'd like to demonstrate that whether a position is 'extreme' or not need not be regarded as an absolute alternative, the answer may depend upon the context. And so it is in the case of our third position: seen in another perspective, the view is radically different from the other two.

If the idea of Man-Being gap is invoked, we will obtain the following image. On the one hand, a 'reductionist' stance that tries to eliminate the gap, and on the other - 'anti-reductionist' one that regards the gap as being of the fundamental nature. The differences between the first and the second stance turn out, in the given perspective, to be of secondary importance: they differ as to the strategy of reduction. The first reduces Man to Being, while the second - Being to Man.

As regards the first strategy, two alternative variants are possible. One is assumed in religious philosophies: man participates in God's omniscience. And the second: man is regarded as a collective subject: Condorcet, Hegel, Engels took various lines along the same main road.

As regards the second strategy many variants may be listed. These variations depend upon which traits of man are regarded as important: if sensual experience - we obtain a form of neo-positivism, if conversation - post-modernism of a sort, if needs and drives - Nietzscheanism of a kind, etc.

And reverting to the concept of mystery, we could say thus. According to the first and to the second epistemological attitude, let's stress: according to both of them, there is no mystery man would have to face: either we can settle definitely metaphysical problems (as both St. Thomas and Engels would maintain; to be more precise: the former would be a bit more skeptical), or there are not any problems of this sort at all. Contrarily, the third attitude allows for the existence of mystery (as in the case of Kierkegaard, Witkacy, and - in a way - 'young' Wittgenstein who says, in point 6.5., that 'Great riddle does not exist', but who adds, in point 6.522, that 'There is indeed something inexpresible. It makes it visible, it is the mystical.' [Wittgenstein,1970:87]).

To these philosophical remarks, I would add a sociological hypothesis. It says that post-modernism, as a cultural phenomenon, can be seen as a manifestation of this same trend in to-day culture that makes us to take away death from our daily life, to push aside any tragedy. In other words: it is a manifestation of the hedonistic core of the post-Keynesian world. (Starting from the remark on the cultural 'superstructure' of the mass-consumption capitalism, we could develop a Marxist
interpretation of some trends in our-age culture. In particular, I mean here a theory of 'manipulation'; according to Lukacs, who outlined this idea in his posthumous Ontology, there is a link between manipulation as a social phenomenon and tendency toward "domination of theory of cognition, and...pushing all ontological problem out of the domain of philosophy" [idem,1982:33]. Interestingly, similar intuitions can be find in Heidegger's essay Die Zeit des Weltbildes : "some levels of performance and activity are generally characterized by the lack of consideration (Beseinnung)" [idem,1977:149]. And the concept of 'manipulation' is there, when Marcel's idea of mystery is being discussed. [Tarnowski,1993:63]. We could speak also about the phenomenon of 'bureaucratization'. It's been comprehensively debated. There is no sense to return to these debates. Let me make only a brief citation which should indicate the ways of further analyses: "Marx gave a profound definition of the bureaucrat saying: 'The bureaucrat relates himself to the world as a mere object of his activity." [Fromm, 1969b:116]

Hedonism is perhaps an admissible ethical stance. One should, however, remember that hedonism is neither new nor historically ultimate ethical stance. And one could also consider whether totally hedonism-dominated culture is the 'best' one; even if the 'best' would mean nothing more than 'functionally optimal', relative to the needs of material reproduction of globalized technological civilization (cf. interesting Woeniewicz's remarks on Milosz [Woeniewicz,1993:178]).

It can also be said, somewhat ironically no doubt, that post-modernism offers a life-strategy that is a variant of 'sour-grapes strategy' [Elster,1983]: if you cannot achieve your goal, try to persuade yourself that this goal does not in fact deserve your efforts; and it is probably so if it 'does not exist', is not 'real'.

This rule makes some sense. Perhaps life would even be impossible without its occasional application. But the scope of its applicability is surely debatable. For instance, to be not able to achieve some fundamental goals may be a source of the feeling of tragedy. But should we always eschew it? We arrive again at the point: the contemporary-culture's tendency toward elimination of tragedy (banalization of death is another, somewhat perverse, form of the same tendency), if not from life as such - what is rather impossible - then from the Lebenswelt as being daily experienced.

Concluding these considerations, I want to say a few more words on some relevant ethical issues. As Jaspers notes, "freedom of man cannot be separated form the awareness of man's finitness." [Jaspers,1990:36] I would add that (man's) finitness really matters and calls for taking an attitude towards it if is opposed to infinity. If the infinity is rejected (an intriguing temporal coincidence between Hilbert's finitism and Brouwer's intuitionism on the one side, and the program of Wiener Kreis on the other, can be but noted here), then finiteness becomes - unproblematic.

Nobody should be coerced to accept his freedom. If someone wishes so, he should escape his intellectual freedom without being blamed, mocked or otherwise pressed. But also he or she who accepts and wishes to exercise his or her freedom also should do it without cultural pressure.

If I were to make a comparison, I would say that nobody should be pressed in any way to climb Mount Everest or Giewont, and of course - even a hill in the city-park. But I think that we should not condemn those who can participate in such undertakings. I do not think that any campaigns against alpinism should be organized, though individual skepticism as to this type of sport should be freely expressed in public.

2. An agenda

Concluding this essay, I would like also to outline some perspectives for the future work in the field of meta-anthropology. In my eyes, three main directions may be distinguished. First, the further explorations of the area but cursorily inspected in the present work. Second, this area should be extended: anthropology should be seen as a part of metaphysics: this or that image of man is to be seen as a part of this or that image of the world (or Being, if you wish); in brief - anthropology is just metaphysics of man. Third, on the basis of (meta-)anthropology, we should develop (meta-) philosophy of History and (meta-)ethics, and - as their final completion - (meta-) philosophy of politics. Let's say a few words about each of those topical directions.

2.1. Further analysis of the space of anthropologies

As regards this task, the following suggestions might be formulated. First, further analytical developments should be advanced. To put it bluntly, we need some formal (mathematical) constructions that would represent anthropological intuitions. This task is more difficult to be achieved than it could be guessed: The point is that we need formal methods that both formalize and shed new light on profound intuitions and not on anthropological trivialities. Thus the research strategy should be, I believe, 'inductive' rather than 'deductive': we should rather 'draw' formal structures from the intuitively formulated anthropologies than to assume just one and 'impose' it on these intuitions. It does not necessarily means inventing new formal methods, we should first adapt those already existing. One may plausibly guess that they should be looked for in such areas as theory of games, mathematical linguistics, theory of information, fuzzy-sets theory etc.

Formalization of (meta-)anthropology is by no means a goal for itself. The first aim is to make anthropological theses possibly unambiguously formulated. And the lack of ambiguity is only secondarily of 'aesthetic' relevance. First of all, it is important for the (meta-)philosophy of History to be developed on the basis of (meta-)anthropology: the 'logical distance' between anthropological 'axioms' and historiosophical 'theorems' is rather great. And imprecision tends, with every logical step, to become greater and greater. Thus, if one believes - as I do - that any historiosophy should be based upon this or that anthropological basis, then one should opt for possibly precise way of its formulation.

Formalization is also a step toward second aim: analysis of the logical structure of the space of anthropologies. Speaking metaphorically, one could say that everything (if anything at all) what has been accomplished in this essay is a description of some 'points' (or relatively small 'surroundings') of this space; a map of it remains to be drawn. In particular, we need to know what anthropological systems (logically consistent sets of anthropological theses) exist in the given anthropological space And such a knowledge is - on the present level of formal precision - hardly possible.

Second, we should analyze in more detail the content of the space. Two directions should be regarded as complementary. On one hand, we should analyze in more detail various 'in-between' positions. And also in view of this goal, formalization is demanded. If for instance we would speak of anthropologies located in between the 'Sartrian' and the 'Schopenhauerian', we should have a measure of - say - 'degree of freedom'; we should be able to say that according to an anthropology man is 'almost' free, and according to another - 'almost completely' determined. But
without formalization, such utterances must remain expressions of some vague
intuitions rather than be formulations of definite propositions.

On other hand, we should pay special attention to the ‘extreme points’. It should
be analyzed if it is not possible to go any further and to find any still more ‘extreme’
stances. Personally, I regard this direction as less important than the former, still to be
not completely neglected. It could also be viewed as a part of a broader task, namely
finding an optimal ‘triangulation network’ allowing for orientation in this large space.

2.2. From anthropologies to metaphysical systems

Man is a part of Being. This thesis should be understood here so broadly as to be
regarded as (almost?) trivial: It is not decided in this thesis of what type he or she is
this part - central or very marginal; it is not said what relations between Man and
other parts of Being hold. Well, even the rather strange metaphysics which would
maintain that there is nothing in the whole Being except for men does not contradict
this formulation; not to say that virtually all metaphysics assume that there is
‘something’ in Being what is not identical with men.

Adopting a Hegel’s thesis, we could say that in order to answer (in a possibly
complete way: limited, partial - psychological or anthropological - answers are of
importance, philosophically cannot be regarded as satisfying) the question ‘What is
man? ’ we should answer the question ‘What man is not? ’. But the answer to the last
question depends in an obvious way on the answer to the question ‘What (at all) is
there?’

Therefore, there is no complete image of Man outside this or that metaphysics.
No escape from metaphysics... Of course, among various systems of metaphysics we
can distinguish a group of those which start from the axiom: arche = Man. But these
should be discussed on equal terms with any others, from this which says that arche =
water.

Thus we should make a step backwards: we should embed the space of
anthropologies into the space of the systems of metaphysics. Viewed other way round,
anthropologies should be regarded as consequences (or concretizations) of
metaphysical systems.

Well, where is Man to be located in the Being? Some possible ridiculous
systems of metaphysics apart, it may be answered: somewhere in between, say, stone
and God. Man is (any doubt is possible here?) more capable to understand the Being
than any stone is, and possibly less capable than God. Man is surely more potent in
determining the state of the Being, an is less potent than God. But if s/he is more
stone-like or God-like may be a matter of metaphysical/anthropological debate. Not
to say that that his/her place in the Being not necessarily has to be constant. Perhaps
man is able to make himself more science and more potent?

2.2.1. Locating man in Being (correlatively: embedding the space of anthropologies
into the space of the system of metaphysics) is not a simple task. We could note that
even the very general way I look above, can be questioned.

And actually, in his Zur Idee des Menschen, Scheler writes: ‘The error of the
hitherto conceptions of man consists in that one wanted to locate between ‘life’ and
‘God’ a permanent station, something defined as essence, i.e. man’. This station does
not exist, and just undefinability belongs to the essence of man. He is just an ‘in-

between (ein Zwischen’), a ‘border’, a ‘passing’, a ‘self-manifestation of God’ in the
current of life and a permanent life’s ‘going’ (‘Hinaus’) beyond itself.” [Scheler, 1987:26]

The task being quite complex, some intermediary steps may be useful. We
could proceed as follows. First of all, we should not forget the other part of the
anthropological domain, one tentatively characterized as ‘substantial’ (in contrast with the
‘functional’). This part seems to be more metaphysically involved than that
discussed in this essay.

As the central problem of the ‘substantial’ (meta-)anthropology may be
regarded that one known under the label ‘mind-body problem’, or under others,
related. And the central issue of a general meta-anthropology might be defined as follows. With which solutions of the mind-body problem are compatible various
theories of acting man? I would risk a hypothesis, both very simple and very strong,
which says that all theories are compatible with all (at least: all general) stances:
‘Schopenhauerian’ anthropology can be embedded either into spiritualist or
materialist metaphysics of man as well as ‘Althusserian’ or ‘Lockian’ or ‘Sartrian’ may.

On the one hand, we could take Calvin’s doctrine of predestination and
Cartesian philosophy of soul; on the other hand, Konrad Lorenz’s theory and
Watson’s behaviorism. Others examples of this sort could be found. Of course, it
might turn out that the respective theories are inconsistent. This cannot be decided
here. But the historical-philosophical evidence supports, prima facie at least, the
formulated hypothesis.

Since, on the one hand, this problem has been widely discussed, and - on the other
- some remarks on it I’ve made in the chapter devoted to the ‘pragmatics’, I will
limit myself to only one interesting citation from a prominent (1972 Nobel-Prize
winner in physiology) contemporary scientist, Gerald Edelman. According to his
opinion, “Action theory based upon the concept of human freedom - just this what
was lacked by the Enlightenment - seems to be more and more grounded upon
scientific facts.” [Edelman, 1998:237] I think that such a situation cannot be
overestimated. I believe that we should be allowed to limit the scope of validity of a
science if its conclusions contradict some our basic experiences, for instance - the
experience of freedom. But we should decide first whether such limitation is
necessary. Edelman’s thesis suggests that it is not. If he were right, if we could
demonstrate that that freedom-thesis is compatible not only with dualistic
metaphysics but also with some forms of materialist monism - such a demonstration
would be of great significance.

The second step should consist in making a comparison between man and some
other elements of the Universe. This task may be sub-divided into three fragments:
man - animals, man - computers, and man - (possible) intelligent creatures living 'out
there'. I will briefly sketch the problems which arise in each of the three fields.

2.2.2. Most (if not all) metaphysical systems allow for some kind of existence of
time. And of those, virtually all do not regard men as existing 'since ever'. And if we
take into account only those metaphysics which might be regarded as foundations
for historiosophies, therefore those including at least a modicum of 'naturalism' (even
Hegel, allegedly an idealist par excellence, opens his Vorlesungen uber die
Philosophie der Geschichte with Preface comprising an extensive chapter on
geography), we will be able to maintain that any comprehensive anthropology cannot
leave untouched the problem of anthropogenesis (while looking at man in a
temporal/historical/genetic perspective).

Any comprehensive anthropology cannot also dispense itself with the
discussion of the (non)existence of ontical hiatus between man and 'the-rest-of-the-
world' and its 'location': is, for instance, the opposition between conscious and
unconscious beings most relevant (as Descartes claimed) or that between live and non-live beings (as ancient Greeks did)? Let me point out here that the standpoint which claims for the radical ontical hiatus between man and 'the-rest-of-the-world' in general, and animals in particular is burdened with some difficulties. Namely, if the supposition about temporarily infinite existence of our kind is not taken into consideration, then accepting this hiatus, one has to accept an idea of the 'starting point' (with emphasis on the noun 'point'). It might be then said that radical anti-
naturalism implies creationism of a sort. In other words: either a first moment of our
History (following consequently this way to its very end, we should ask for the exact date from which History started, or at least to maintain that only due to the lack of empirical evidence this date cannot be precisely determined), or 'continuity' between us and our animal predecessors.

Philosophical anthropology mustn't then neglect the theory of evolution.

General, philosophical importance of this theory demonstrates, for instance, the
following remark made by S.J. Gould in his essay, _Human Equality Is A Contingent
Fact of History_: "We know that australopithecine were our ancestors and there were a
few species of them. But we regard them as our predecessors and assume tacitly that
if we exist they had to have perished. It is so but it had not to be so. /.../ We do not
know why _A. robustus_ perished. It might as well have survived and faced us with a
moral dilemma: what to do with a human species gifted with intelligence actually and
clearly smaller than our...Would we have kept it in Zoo, established reservations,
committed genocide, and yet manifested sympathy toward it? Human equality is a
contingent fact of history." [Gould,1991: 266-281]. This same, in some respects,
issue was raised by Aldous Huxley in his _New Brave World_, a world dwelled by five
types of people ('people') - from Alphs to Epsilons.

Given the same context, we could note, following E. Morin, that etiology
introducing the concepts of communication and territory - modifies the concept of
animal [Morin,1977:47]. And our concept of animal co-determines also our concept
of man. I would even say that if we try to emphasize the hiatus (between man and
animals) but we are going to do it a non-declarative and non-verbal way, our theory
of animals (philosophy of life) is still more important than in the case of the
standpoint which stresses continuity between mankind and other species.

Considerations of this kind are of general philosophical importance; yet, its
specific relevance for anthropology is less evident. It can be, however, demonstrated
that such deliberations may contribute to analyses of some special anthropological
issues. For instance, read the passage in which Elster asks if "animals possess the
capacity for having beliefs and desires which is a necessary condition for ascribing
rationality to them? Donald Davidson argues that they do not, since they lack
language. On his view, one cannot have a belief unless one has a concept of a belief,
which in turn requires having a language. This argument does not seem to be borne
out by empirical studies of animal behaviour. The higher animals are capable of
behaving in ways that are hardly explicable otherwise than by assuming that they
form mental representations of spatially and temporally distant objects, and act on
the basis of such representations. No one might say that having a mental
representation is not the same thing as having a belief; accepting this point we might
respond by saying either that animals are indeed incapable of rational choice or that
rational choice does not require having beliefs." [Elster,1986b:2] This discussion
demonstrates, in my opinion, that the problem of the role of language in man's acting
is more subtle than it might appear when analyzed in the confines of anthropology,
without being located in the animal-behavior context.

It is note worthy that the problem mention here has also its more practical
dimension. Italian political philosopher, Norberto Bobbio, ends his book - devoted to
the traditional basic opposition: right and left - with considerations on the egalitarian
ideal. And in the last words, he says: "What are more frequent and more extensive
debates over admissibility of hunting, limiting vivisection, preservation extincting
species, vegetarianism - if not a herald of the chance for extending the principle of
equality beyond the limits of the mankind, extending based upon the conviction that
animals are equal to us, people, at least as to their ability to suffering?"
[Bobbio,1995:103]

And Carl Sagan claims that initiating the search for extraterrestrial intelligence,
"we could not do better than to start with a program of rehumanization by making
friends with the whales and the dolphins." [Sagan,1975:180] Interesting
congruence: is it incidental?

Let me end these remarks on animals on a more personal note. I do agree that,
if someone wishes, he can believe that the 'ontical gap' between a man and a
chimpanzee is greater than that existing between a chimpanzee and a hydrogen atom.
But I do not see that such a stance should be acknowledged as any self-evident truth.
And personally, I tend to regard those animals as 'relatives'; but no attitude of this
kind seems to be possible in respect to any atom, even more complex than hydrogen
one.

2.2.3. The widely debated issues of Artificial Intelligence must not be avoided.
Whatever the position in this debate would be, it is of importance for anthropology.
Out of this entangled complex of questions, I'd like to draw the following.

First. Does intelligence need body? - asks in the title of his paper W.
Marciszewski [idem,1995]. He gives the positive answer. It is supported with four
groups of arguments. Of all of them I'd like to quote but the last one: "To its full
functioning, intelligence needs the axiological sphere that should be reconstructed,
together with its emotional expression, in a device that were to match man's
intelligence. It is doubtful whether silicon dice could be this very device." [ibidem:41] Interesting as it is, the paper is quoted here for one reason only. It
confirms, I believe, the importance of AI problems for anthropology. In particular,
Marciszewski's considerations seem to support a stance opposed to strong
rationalism; roughly speaking, emotions would be more important than reason.

As we then see, the field of Artificial Intelligence is closely related to that of
the mind-body problem. And the latter is of relevance not only for general
anthropology, but also - as demonstrated in the chapter on 'pragmatics' - for the part
of anthropology I've discussed in the present work. The effects of starvation,
malnutrition, sensory deprivation or sensory overstimulation - all these and many
other similar factors, all too often neglected by some representatives of 'humanist'
social theory/philosophy, deserve scrutiny and interpretation.
Second, the issue of human creativity potential: is human intelligence the highest possible one (with the possible exception for God), or could we define more and more intelligent systems? Does any upper limit to such a sequence exist? Or, firstly, do we know how such a limit define and study? It is interesting in itself but also of importance for the historiosophic issues (the question of the existence of any limits to human knowledge/understanding, cf. S. Lem's *Summa Technologicae*). If one grants some validity to the fashionable idea of 'knowledge society' [Drucker, 1999:22-44], then one will have to agree that some of the traditional, somewhat 'abstract' (in the ordinary-language sense), problems of epistemology may turn out to be historiosophically, or even sociologically, important.

Third, there is a problem, being closely related to the former, posed by Marvin Minsky (who himself suggests positive answer), whether further evolution is possible, whether man will be replaced by intelligent object he made, or - he is the final stage of the evolution.

Some perhaps would like to relegate this issue to the domain of SF literature. I do not think it were a right decision. At a time some philosophers used to debate the problem of so-called 'thermal death of the Universe'; the question of the 'future evolution', however speculative it might appear, is surely no more speculative that the cosmological one. Not to say that it concerns a situation being temporally distant in the individual-life scale, but still much closer. And it also concerns a problem which is potentially much more vulnerable to human intervention than the future state of the whole Universe. Anyway, I have no doubt that various answers to the Minsky's problem should shed some light on the 'man's place in the Universe', thus - on man himself.

2.2.4. If the title of Scheler's work - *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* - has just been invoked, the step into still another domain should be made. A domain no less speculative of that of 'future evolution'. As you can guess, I mean here the considerations about extraterrestrial intelligence. Yet, these speculations are being made in the hard sciences (two leading figures in this field, a Russian - W. Szklowski and an American - C. Sagan, were both astrophysicists). Should philosophy be more reserved? I doubt.

And, fortunately, not all philosophers are. Read, for instance, these words of one of the creators of philosophical anthropology, Helmut Plessner: "In overcoming anthropocentrism, which is heritage of the history of the emancipation of subject, the point is to make the next step in the development of method. A step on the way on which we have been advancing since the times of Copernicus and Darwin while developing historical and cultural studies on man. This way may lead us to breaking the hitherto existing monopoly of man as the only rational creature in the nature. Anthropological stance would gain practical aspect. The possibility of other forms of life has never been excluded. Today, when our terrestrial provincialism comes to its end, one is speaking about this possibility as being probable. We, the Terrestrials, know man as a hominid only. But who said us that it is the only possible form of life for a finite being having reason and creative power?"[Plessner, 1988:333]

The scientists are aware of the philosophical dimension of their speculations and practical efforts. One of the leading figures in this domain, Frank Drake emphasizes that "SETI [Search for ExtraTerrestrial Intelligence - W.Cz.] is both one of the technologically most advanced scientific problems, and one of the most human. Each tactical problem related to SETI comes to its end with the same old philosophical questions: Where do we come from? Are we unique? What does it mean to be a human being?" [Drake&Sobel, 1996:15] And an astronomer reminds us that it was Giordano Bruno who "was burned to death at the stake, in part for the heresy that there were other worlds and other beings inhabiting them." [Sagan, 1975:191]

Concluding these remarks, note that among the participants of the first conference on communication with extraterrestrial intelligence was an expert in dolphins. 'There was a feeling that this effort to communicate with dolphins...was in some sense comparable to the task that will face us in communicating with an intelligent species on another planet' says Sagan [1975:167]. He himself maintained that "it will be much easier to understand interstellar messages, if we ever pick them up, than dolphin messages...if there are any" [ibidem:167-168]

Thus, we come back to the first point. Not incidentally. The three domains: of etiology (animal psychology, etc.), of Artificial Intelligence, and of extraterrestrial intelligence make up - particularly from the philosophical point of view - one field in which also anthropology should be located.

2.2.5. I would like to say still a few words on the importance of embedding anthropology into metaphysics. It is noteworthy that the argument in favor of embedding (meta-)anthropology into (meta-)metaphysics is at its heart identical with that hermeneutically motivating meta-theoretical strategy: to understand a thesis is to understand its negation, and to understand man is to understand 'the-rest-of-Being'.

This general intuition might be developed in several directions.

While formulating some hermeneutic arguments in favor of meta-philosophy, I availed of the distinction: abstract vs. concrete negation. The idea expressed in this distinction could be also expressed in the language of *Gestalt* psychology. We could say that the perception of a 'figure' depends on the perception of the 'background'. Thus, modifying 'background', we modify perception of the given 'figure'.

Another example could be taken from mathematics. Consider the most familiar mathematical objects, namely natural numbers. What are natural numbers, virtually everybody knows well, if intuitively. Still, our understanding of them becomes much more profound if we learn that they can be interpreted in three ways (at least).

They can be viewed, first, as special case of integers (different from negative ones), or rational (as opposed to irrational), or real (not complex) numbers. Roughly speaking, this interpretation could be characterized as 'geometrical' - numbers allow us to measure some magnitudes, in particular length, area, etc. This interpretation is essentially different from the second, set-theoretical: natural numbers are cardinal numbers of finite sets, thus are to be compared with other cardinal numbers, in particular - with hierarchy of alephs.

And there is the third, also set-theoretical still different from the former, interpretation. Natural numbers can be defined as special ordinal numbers - ordinal types of some well-ordered sets.

In sum, arithmetic (and algebra; we can speak of the group of natural numbers but of the field of rational number; field being a 'stronger' algebraic structure than group), theory of cardinal numbers, and theory of ordinal numbers - they offer various 'backgrounds' for the notion of natural numbers. Viewed against each of them, natural numbers reveal other aspects of their 'nature'.

An interesting example of such considerations in a domain overlapping anthropology is to be found in Cassirer. He says: 'The difference between the 'actual' and the 'potential' exists neither for beings lower than man nor for beings higher than
he. Beings below man are closed in the confinement of the world of their sensory perceptions. They are vulnerable to concrete physical stimuli and react to those stimuli. The are not able to form any image of 'potential' things. On the other hand, the suprahuman intellect, divine mind, does not know any difference between actuality and potentiality. Whatever he has thought of is actual. God's intelligence is intellectus archetypus or intuitus originarius. God cannot think about a thing without creating and producing this thing by this very act of thinking. Only in man, in its 'derivative intelligence' (intellectus ecyptus), the question of the potentiality arises. [Cassirer,1971:112] One should note the close relation between this analysis (more exactly: a part of it, the theological considerations are not relevant for this comparison) and the fundamental idea on which a whole work of Sartre is based. I mean L'imagination and the idea of imagination as the fundament of human freedom.

Another example of this type (but coming from a very different theoretical tradition) can be found in Dennett's Kinds of Minds. He distinguishes four types of (living) creatures, each of them being a sub-type of the former, except of course for the first one. The first type groups 'Darwinian creatures', the second - 'Skinnerian' ones, the third - 'Popperian', and the fourth - 'Gregorian' (this type's name is coined after Richard Gregory, a contemporary British psychologist). [Dennett,1997:101,102,106,118]

The creatures of the first group manifest rigid patterns of behavior, though in the whole population the very patterns are changing under the natural selection pressures.

The second group consists of creatures that manifest flexible patterns of behavior. These patterns are determined by instrumental conditioning.

Popperian creatures' behavior is based upon pre-selection of alternative ways of behavior.

Gregorian creatures (people are among them) are defined as those whose "environmental environment is formed by the constructed part of the external environment". [ibidem:118]

Noteworthy (and importantly; the similarity supports, I believe, the view that traditional divisions of philosophy into various 'orientations' are of rather limited value), Dennett's classification is quite similar to a classification elaborated some decades ago by Max Scheler. In his Die Stellung des Menschen..., he notes that "the particular position of man can be better seen only if the whole structure of the biopsychic world is examined" [Scheler,1987:49] Importantly, the domain of the psychic and the domain of the live are, in Scheler's opinion, identical. All live beings are said to have 'Fursch- und Innensein' [ibidem]. In the course of the further analysis, Scheler distinguishes four levels of the psychic. The first one, which can be ascribed even to a plant, is called Gefuhlsdrang [ibidem:50]. The second is - instinct [ibidem:56], and the third - 'associative memory' [ibidem:65]. The last, fourth, level ('essential form of life') is defined as 'organically conditioned practical intelligence' [ibidem:74].

Of all particular similarities and differences between the theories of Scheler and Dennett, two points deserve special attention. First, (human) consciousness is analyzed in a broad theoretical framework of a classification of 'forms of life' (resp., 'kinds of minds'). And classification, either this or that, is not constructed (at least: intentionally) on the basis of any a priori assumed specific position of man. Rather, human consciousness (mind) is located in a pigeonhole of an a priori defined classification.

And, secondly, it can be said that both Scheler's and Dennett's classifications are of functional character: it is the character of relations between a being and its environment, relations manifesting in behavior/acting, on which the classification is based upon. And various 'levels' ('degrees') are distinguished accordingly to more or less 'mediated'/'non-mediated' (complex/simple) character of those relations.

The remarks on Cassirer and Sartre, and particularly those on Dennett and Scheler give us an occasion to formulate some further comments on the relevance of 'embedding' anthropology into metaphysics.

I think that the 'Gestalt' idea of understanding is to be compared with the Petrazycki's idea of an 'adequate theory'. (I follow the exposition of this idea given in [Nowak,1979].) This idea deserves, in my opinion, to be continued, though it may call - in the light of Skolem's logical investigations I mean, roughly put, the existence of non-isomorphic models for consistent theories - for some specifications and reservations. These reservations may be important if a very general and formally precise formulation should be given. But its intuitive content is, in my opinion, sufficiently clear for availing of it, without waiting for generalization and formalization. This idea seems to be of particular importance just in the anthropological domain: anthropology has quite often happened to be a manifestation of anthropocentric ideology which tries to elevate the position (qualities, 'calling...') of man. Performing this role, anthropology has tended to regard many traits of man as specific for him. Yet the alleged specificity of man may turn out rather apparent. For instance, the choices-making is often regarded as specific faculty of man. Yet, a British biologist I've cited above, J.Z. Young, maintains that "the man's act of choices-making is a particular case of procedure that is of fundamental importance for all life-processes. [...] Each lived being, and in fact each cell has continually to make choices" [Young,1984:25] (Cf. also Kosmicki [1982b]).

A complementary remark was made by Mejbaum. In his opinion, humanist interpretation may be reduced to what he termed 'principle of anticipation' [Mejbaum,1983:179]. An the possibility of this reduction is to prove that 'humanist interpretation may be applied in the description of rather broad class of technical devices." [ibidem:181-182] It is not my aim to discuss here whether (to what extent) Young and/or Mejbaum are right. This is not a simple problem; for instance, Young's and Mejbaum's theses are to be compared with a thesis developed by Davidson in his essay on Rational Animals; a thesis which closes up the essay: "rationality is a social trait. It belongs to the participants of communication only." [Davidson,1992:250]. Whatever the results of such a debate could be, its very possibility does matter. It seems to confirm the conjecture that 'adequacy' (in the Petrazycki's sense) of anthropological theories is not so obvious as it might be guessed.

Generalizing the latter considerations, we could ask whether there is any single trait of man which would be specific for him and only for him. In other words, one could speculate that man, being a very complex whole, need not to be nomologically homogenous. It would mean, in particular, that there are no laws that would be specific for man. But it would also mean that man could not be said to be 'just a mammal', or 'just a machine' etc. It might be that the specific collection of laws which operate in the domain of human beings could be specific for man, and not any of those laws taken in isolation.

In other words, it may be that man is - in a sense, in a way - particular being, yet that there is no adequate theory of which the set of human being would be the proper model. It seems to be logically possible that some traits of man are described
by a theory which adequately formulated speaks, say, of all animals, and some other traits are object of a theory which speaks of man and also of (some) computers.

These latter remarks may be viewed as a modification of a Scheler's thesis which says that "There is no impulse in man and no 'law' that should not be there either in Nature staying below him, or above him - in the realm of God, in 'haven'. Man exists only as the 'passing' ('Hinüber') from one realm to the other, as the 'bridge' and movement between them." [Scheler,1987:41]

Of course, let's repeat, one may declare that there is an infinitely deep gap between Man and 'the-rest-of-Being'. Perhaps one may even believe it (though I am not sure if such a standpoint can be seriously accepted). But such declarations and beliefs seem to belong to a domain beyond the scope of logically articulated thinking.

In the present work, I have insisted on the practical importance of philosophy. The plausibility of this claim depends on some philosophical (metaphysical) premises. In other words, the practical importance of philosophy depends on the actual structure of Being in general, and 'our' world in particular. This dependence may be described thus. If our world is extremely 'atomistic', the practical relevance of philosophy is minor. If, however, the world is an 'organic whole', philosophy is of major - potential - importance. Differently put, the practical relevance of philosophy depends on the level of the 'systemness' of the world: the greater (up to a point - if the world is of a Hegelian type, then - as Hegel was perfectly aware of it) of Minerva/ - philosophy plays a minor role of a commentator of the reality) is the 'systemness', the more important - philosophy.

The obvious point is that we do not 'know how much our world is 'tightly knitted'. Thus, some ethical considerations are necessary.

Roughly put, the systemness of the world determines the level (or scope) of moral responsibility. It is so, for in an 'atomistic' world consequences of human actions are rather limited (and in radically 'atomistic' world there are no consequences of anything, thus of human behavior also). The words with which Lukasiewicz concludes his paper On Determinism - "Time is consoling our worries and brings us forgiveness" [Lukasiewicz,1961:126] - express this intuition. And in a Parmenidesian world - moral responsibility is but an illusion. - More on this subject you can find in the Ingardien's work Über die Verantwortung (Ihre ontische Fundamente) [Ingardean,1972:75-183].

I've made this remark since I am interested mainly in the way going from anthropology to historiosophy and political philosophy but I want to stress that what is to be done on the way going into another direction (to metaphysics) may be of relevance just for political philosophy.

2.2.6. It is worthwhile, I think, to end these considerations on the way from anthropology to metaphysics and political philosophy but I want to stress that what is to be done on the way going into another direction (to metaphysics) may be of relevance just for political philosophy.

Philosophy is a part of human culture, is a product of human activity, and this activity is undertaken in various social forms, with various aims in mind, etc. etc. All this is obvious and hardly controversial. No more controversial than the fact that even those who accept the strong Platonist stance in the philosophy of mathematics may and do undertake such issues as social relevance of mathematics, cultural factors determining its development etc. etc.

Today, we could even write an economic history of mathematics which would be telling us, say, what sums of money are spend in this or that country for activities undertaken under this name, who gives money, how it is distributed etc. Quite similarly, the economic history of, say, music is possible. But whether such a history has any relevance for 'internal' history of mathematics and of music is a matter of debate (as regards pop-music it wouldn't be, I suppose, very hot...). But even if it has no relevance at all, it is a legitimate domain of reflection in its own right. So much for this moment (later on some modifications will be necessary), about philosophy (sociology, economic history...) of philosophy.

It should be then clear that if I speak of relations between metaphysics and anthropology I think about relations between theoretical content of these two disciplines of philosophy.

The basic question can be put thus. What is the ontical (existential) relation between man and 'the rest of the world'? Quite a few answers are possible. One of the first was formulated by Protagoras: man is the measure of all things. However, this thesis is rather ambiguous. As W. Stróżewski remarks, it is usually interpreted as "manifestation of subjectivism and relativism" [Stróżewski,1994:46]. But, according to the author of the essay The Quest for ARCHE (its last chapter is titled 'Man as archē'), other interpretations are possible - from transcendental-idealist, through vision of man as sense-creator, to the teleological one. [Idem:47-48]

We should commence with a position that may have never been explicitly formulated, though some philosophers seem to have come not very far from it. I mean a stance which claims for nonexistence of anything but men.

Subsequently, we may found some forms of transcendentalism (Fichte, Husserl - according to some interpretations, at least) which accept objects different from men but regard these objects as somehow dependent on (or 'generated' by) men (more precisely - by what can be termed as an element or sub-structure of man, e.g. transcendental ego).

Somewhat less radical is metaphysics which we can find, it seems to me, in Brzozowski. I think that his metaphysics could be read with the help of some Aristotelian categories: pre-human Being could be interpreted as 'attribute-less' matter which gets its form thanks to human activity.

A few decades later, Kolakowski outlined a similar stance, finding it in, or - if you prefer - ascribing it to, 'young' Marx. One remarks seems to be particularly interesting: "if the man, in Marx, replaces God-creator, he is not in situation of the God of St. Augustine or St. Thomas, the God making the world of nothingness; he is similar rather the God of Averroists who is organizing the world composed of preexisting matter". [Kolakowski,1967a:69]

Interestingly, similar metaphysics can be discovered in texts of philosophizing physicists, especially those who try to interpret quantum mechanics. For instance, Heisenberg says that "the passing from the 'present' to the 'actual' is taking place during the act of observation" [Heisenberg,1965:37]. As we see, Heisenberg explicitly refers to the Aristotelian opposition of 'the actual' and 'the potential'.
this pair is strictly linked with the other: matter and form. Thus, it might be said that the act of observation 'confers' (imposes) a form upon the unformed matter.

In similar vein, yet perhaps more radically than Heisenberg, J.A. Wheeler develops philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics in which the idea of 'participating Universe' plays predominant role. R. Penrose summarizes and comments on this theory thus: "the coming into existence and the evolution of conscious life on Earth depends on whether suitable mutations occurred. Assuming that mutations are quantum events, we have to assume that they existed only in the form of superposition of various states until the rise of conscious beings whose existence depends on whether the suitable mutation 'actually' occurred." [Penrose,1995:330]

And a physicist and philosopher, Abner Shimony remarks (while commenting on Penrose): "from the viewpoint of Whitehead's philosophy, hypothesis that postulated the existence not of one universe but of infinitely many universes". And C. Carter and D. Dickie, who "being directed rather by philosophical considerations, of universes. According to Michał Heller, this notion became explicit in the works of the philosopher's view even the Weak Anthropic Principle "is not a truism but contains of what he calls information gathering and utilizing systems (IUGSes). - Let me note [Mann, 1996:286] (His own proposal, rather a suggestion than explicitly formulated anthropocentric view)."

And just this idea, the so-called anthropic principle should be mentioned now. This term refers in fact to various ideas. For example, Józef Życiński, in his paper on The Anthropic Principle and the Evolutionary Design, considers two versions of this principle, of which one is named 'weak' and the second - 'strong'. In his formulation, the Weak Anthropic Principle is to say that "The values of the physical and cosmological parameters observed in the nature are not of chance character, but belong to a narrow interval of values being necessary for the origins of the protein forms of life." [Życiński, 1990:16] And the Strong Anthropic Principle is phrased thus: "The values of the physical parameters observed in the nature are necessary and had to occur in the cosmic evolution, since, at another values, the origins of the human observer would have been impossible." [ibidem]

The status of this (these) principle(s) is much controversial. For example, the famous author of the theory of quarks, Murray Gell-Mann declares that he "tried to find a version of the anthropic principle that were neither banal nor absurd". [Gell-Mann,1996:286] (His own proposal, rather a suggestion than explicitly formulated idea, is based on the notion of evolution of complex adaptive systems, in particular - of what he calls information gathering and utilizing systems (IUGSes). - Let me note the connection between this idea and the problem of the Petrażycki-adequacy of anthropology, discussed above.)

Życiński does not share the opinion expressed by Gell-Mann; in the Polish philosopher's view even the Weak Anthropic Principle "is not a truism but contains ideas leading to the basic metaphysical questions." [ibidem:17]

Any further referring of these debates is neither possible nor even purposeful here. Instead, a note contributing to location of these debates on the map of philosophical questions.

While speaking about anthropic principle, one cannot help mentioning, if very briefly, a point which is philosophically of utmost interest - and excitement. I mean the relation between anthropic principle and the cosmological idea of the ensemble of universes. According to Michal Heller, this notion became explicit in the works of Dickie and Carter, who "being directed rather by philosophical considerations, postulated the existence not of one universe but of infinitely many universes". And Carter used the notion of the ensemble of the universes to formulating the anthropic principle. According to Carter (quoted after Heller), "the existence of an organism that might be playing the role of an observer is possible for a limited number of combinations of these parameters [that define a universe - W.Cz.], that distinguish inside the ensemble of universes the subset of cognizable worlds." And Heller adds: "The existence of cosmology proves that Universe we live in belongs to this distinguished subset." [Heller, 1988:100] On my part, I would like but emphasize the obvious similarity between this cosmological idea and the metaphysical theories of D. Lewis or L. Nowak. Indirectly, the link between these theories and the anthropic principle is also indicated.

In the context of the anthropic principle, still two thinkers (of course, not necessarily only these two; someone else might suggest other names) are worthy to be mentioned: Engels and Teilhard de Chardin. The first claimed, in his Dialectics of Nature, that "the matter, in all its transformations, remains eternally the same, none of its attributes can ever disappear, thus - with the same iron necessity with which it will destroy on the Earth its utmost product: thinking spirit - the matter will create it, under the same necessity, in another place, and in another time." [Marx&Engels, 1972:390]

And Teilhard de Chardin says: "The man is not only one of many zoological types, but the center of centripetal movement of the 'involution' of the Universe, the movement on our small planet (lost, it might appear, in space and time) being a local manifestation of a hidden current which is, may be, the most essential, most important phenomenon among the vastness surrounding us. The man, around which the universe is concentrating and involving." [idem,1984:31] There is no doubt that the part man plays in Teilhard's metaphysics is not secondary. But does it deserve the name of anthropocentrism? The answer could hardly be positive. Man's role, however important, is - in the eyes of de Chardin - but one part in the cosmic drama. A drama about which the French thinker writes: "The reality of cosogenesis confirms itself in the self-consciousness of cosogenesis. A particular and important phase of the process which at a 'critical' moment becomes conscious of itself and assumes responsibility for itself!" [ibidem:279] To qualify this image of Teilhard's philosophy, we could register a concept of 'complete being' and the thesis that "it is conscious being which is complete being" [ibidem:111]

From the general metaphysics, we should pass now to the metaphysics of cognition; in other words - to epistemology (in one of the traditional meanings of the word).

I would start from some considerations of physicist and philosopher, F. von Weizsacker. They do not contain any precise radical thesis which could be confronted with any others. But it describes some fundamental intuitions that deserve further specifying which might be accomplished along various paths.

'Physics would be possible since the unity of physics is possible. Thus, object cannot be separated from method...The unity of nature, if conceived of through the unity of physics, is the unity of experience. This concept of the unity of the nature being experienced by man presupposes dualism of subject and object, of man and nature. We could ask about a higher unity, that of man and nature. In the phase preparing to the question about such unity, I studied earlier mutual dependence between man and nature, in the perspective of their historicity. Nature is older than man, and man is older than natural science. Natural science, together with all its concepts about nature, is to be conceived of as a work of man, and he - together with
all his cognitive potentialities - as the child of nature. These postulates complement in circular way each other, and the demanded unity of man and nature would be, speaking figuratively, the center of this circle, thus what makes the circle possible.”

I would say that Weizsacker suggests that various, seemingly opposite, viewpoints may turn out to be rather complementary. His image seems to confirm the basic claim of the meta-philosophical strategy: not only various (in the given case - epistemological) stances should be formulated, but also comprehensively compared.

We could start from a form of transcendentalism, namely one ascribed to Kant: man has not been, is not and will not be able to go out the field of phenomena. Then we can meet some more restricted forms of ‘agnosticism’: some ‘regions’ of Being will held to be inside while some others - outside that what is ‘cognitively accessible’ for man (or, for any subject). This set of stances addresses in this or that way the question of ‘limits’ to human cognitive capacities. Among the most important derivative questions (‘sub-questions’), we could indicated the one which manifested itself in the debates between various Kantian orientations. On the one side, we have those who, as Helmholtz or F.A. Lange, stressed the specifically human character of these limitations: peculiarities of human sensory (visual, auditory...) apparatus and of human brain should account for these limitations. On the other side, we meet the Marburg philosophers (H.Cohen in particular) who emphasized the universal character of those limitations: they should be common to all possible subjects. - As you see, the epistemological issue mentioned here overlaps the problem of the ‘adequacy’ (in Petrazycki’s sense) of Anthropology.

Another set of ‘anthropocentric’ epistemologies may be distinguished, namely one composed of the theories centered around the idea of ‘perspective’ (‘perspectivism’), introduced to the philosophical language by F. Nietzsche.

The idea of ‘perspective’ may be rather complex. Anyway, it is so if Heidegger is right when claiming that “Being as such is perspective. What means reality is determined by its perspective character. Only continuing to keep it in mind, one can think - in the framework of Nietzschean metaphysics - of proper ‘being’. And while speaking of the perspective character of the being, Nietzsche expresses what has since Leibniz’s times been the basic trait of metaphysics” [Heidegger,1999:101] These considerations may be very interesting. I have, however, to leave these subtleties on another occasion. And now, I’d like to formulate, on behalf of myself, some less sophisticated comments on the idea of ‘perspective’.

This model may be developed in two, complementary rather than opposite, directions. Firstly, the concept of perspective may be related with that of distance: some objects are located near (in the literal or metaphorical sense) the observing (knowing) subject, some others - far away from him. And, in its turn, the idea of distance may be related with that of ‘familiarity’, or - ‘accuracy of perception’: observer is more familiar with the objects close to him and less familiar with those being more distant.

Secondly, the idea of perspective is related to that of particularity: observer knows only a particular part of the reality, this part in which his ‘standpoint’ is located; and what is seen is seen only ‘under particular angle’, thus it reveals but some ‘sides’ or ‘aspects’ of the observed object.

This sketch of an interpretation of perspectivism should be further elaborated. But even this sketchy image allows for two important remarks.
From Heideggerian metaphysics let's move to the hisiroosophy and cite a passage from the introduction to Grundrisse: "Bourgeois society is the most developed and historically differentiated organization of 'production. Therefore, categories that express its relations, understanding of its structure, allow at the same time to understand structure and production relations of all passed social forms, of whose debris and elements it grew out...Anatomy of man is the key to anatomy of ape. The embryos of the upper forms in the lower animal species can be understood only when these upper forms have already been known. Bourgeois economy gives the key to the ancient, etc." [Marx&Engels,13:727]

Marx makes some references to biology. Let's follow him and look into a book on mind and brain, written by a biochemist and neurologist, Gerald Edelman. He formulates there following thesis: "in order to grasp primitive consciousness, one has to understand how higher-level consciousness is emerging from it and differentiating." [Edelman,1998:173]

Risking a far-reaching (perhaps: too far-reaching; I take the risk since the comparison is very tempting) analogy, I would say that in the cited ideas of Heidegger, Marx, and Edelman we come here a problem studied - from quite different side, and in a very different context - by Goedel and Tarski: we can add something to our knowledge of more elementary objects (say, natural numbers) by analyzing them in the context of less elementary objects (say, sets), but not other way round.

Complete these considerations with a remark on the Ancient philosophy. According to Cassirer, "Heraclitus is situated on the border-line separating cosmological and anthropological thought. Though he speaks as philosopher of nature and belongs to the ancient 'physiologists', he is sure that that we cannot investigate the mystery of nature without having investigated the mystery of man. If we want to grasp the reality and understand its meaning, we must satisfy the need of self-reflection. Therefore, Heraclitus could describe the whole of this philosophy with two words: edzesamen hemaution - 'I have been looking for myself'." [Cassirer,1971:39]

In sum, we could say, I believe, that in Heidegger, Marx and Edelman (in spite of the all obvious differences between them) we have found some ideas that might be interpreted as variations on the same basic theme: methodological anti-cartesianism or holism of a sort - go from complex to simple, and not from simple to complex.

We should return now to the second aspect of the idea of perspective. This idea seems to suggest a 'static' image: of a subject permanently occupying the given fixed standpoint, being - so to say - 'attached' to this point. But even preserving the core of perspectivism, we could think of a more dynamic picture. We could adopt here the image of the development of consciousness given by Hegel in his Phenomenology of Spirit. To speak metaphorically, it is (seems to be) unquestionable that we have to start all our intellectual efforts at a particular point, at a point where we actually stand; we have to start them with the peculiarities of the perspective determined by this very point. We can debate over the problem of how far we are able to go away. Some of us believe that not very far; perhaps they'd say that we can move nowhere - we are able but to explore the view seen from this point. Some others would claim that, if having lot of time and patience, one can reach any point, so the initial peculiarity would be of diminishing - but still actual - importance.

This (say, 'dynamic') interpretation of perspectivism displays an analogy with the description of the historical development of physics outlined by Max Planck in his essay Die Einheit des physikalischen Weltbildes. According to this description, "all physics, both its definition and overall structure, had originally anthropomorphic character." [Planck,1970:10] But a general tendency toward elimination of "historical-human element in all physical definitions" [ibidem] has operated in the whole history of physics. Interestingly, this tendency has accompanied (has been somehow correlated with) the other fundamental tendency - toward unification of physics.

As a special ('limit') form of anthropocentrism can be regarded a stance that might be called 'minimal subjectivism'. It could be constructed on the basis of some ideas presented in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. In the point 5.641 he says: "Neither man, nor human body, nor human soul investigated by psychology, but the metaphysical subject - the limit and not a part of the world - is the philosophical self." [Wittgenstein,1970:69]

In Polish philosophy some similar ideas were formulated by Wacław Mejbaum, in particular in his essay Let's Say, Instrumentalism. He claims there that "The presence of subject in the scientific cognition manifests itself as irremovability of the frame of reference." [Mejbaum,1989:235] And "The fact that the subject constructing an image does not become a part of it" - a fact presented exactly as in Wittgenstein - is, according to the Polish philosopher "the origin of the illusion that there is possible a philosophy devoid of subjectivity." [ibidem] The characteristic of subject is interesting, and also converging - though perhaps not completely - with Wittgensteinian image: "Subject is a locus. /.../ The role of subject can be played by a mechanical device...adapted to registration of images. Subject is a movable locus." [ibidem:236] We could also note that Ricoeur, while analyzing the Cartesian cogito, says - somewhat incidentally, without developing intuition - that cogito is "an empty place": [Ricoeur,1985:197]

The problem of ('Wittgensteinian', 'point-like') subject seems to be related to the problem (seemingly belonging only to logic/philosophy of language) of whether ideicals are eliminable or not. Briefly, it can be supposed that ideicals are eliminable from language iff subject is eliminable from the world-image. To this note I'd add the remark of Guido Kueng who stresses that "even in extensional logistic systems are taken into account utterances based upon intensional contents." [Kueng,1963:258]

The egocentric structure of the human world was stressed also by the known psychiatrist A. Kępiński. However, we could suppose, following his remarks, that this trait can be graded: "Delusion structure consists in the egocentricity being still stronger underscored. The normal perspective, which allows separate 'what concerns me' and 'what does not concern me', is vanishing. Everything concerns the ill, everything is related to him." [Kępiński,1974:29]

Now, pass from the 'point-like' subject (being, one might guess, located 'inside' man, or - perhaps - 'inside' some other creatures) to more 'man-like' subjects.

In this context, I'd like to recall some ideas formulated a time ago by L. Nowak. He discussed the role of practice in cognition; the thesis claiming for its importance were to be one deciding about the specificity of marxist epistemology. According to his interpretation, "the humanist theory of practical actions would turn out to be tacitly assumed by all sciences, natural ones including. This theory would then be in a sense epistemically prior to all empirical sciences." [Nowak,1973:135] To this thesis I would like, on my own responsibility, to add a few comments.

First, I would add to the phrase "prior to all empirical sciences" the following words: "... and to metaphysics, epistemology etc."
Second, it is interesting (and, I'd claim, supportive to the 'objectivist' and 'deconstructionist' position assumed in the present work) that the ideas worked out in the process of interpretation of marxist epistemology bear significant resemblance to those presented in Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*; particularly in $15 (I'd maintain that this reading of Heidegger is admissible; by no means I'd like to claim for it for any superiority.) The key concepts are there: being-in-the-world (In-de-Welt-Sein), anxiety (Sorge), tool (Zeug), tool-ness (Zeughäftigkeit), the whole of tools (Zeugganze), ready-to-hand-ness (Zuhandenheit) [Heidegger,1994:74,94-102]. And understanding "includes existential structure which we call projection" (Entwurf) [ibidem:206]. - In brief, a phenomenology of human practice is to be a basis for an ontology. (And still a methodological comment: this part of Heidegger's considerations seems to be logically independent from and weaker than/ the ideas quoted below.)

Third, you can agree with Nowak (and with Heidegger, read in the way I suggested), or you cannot. But anyway, the considered position should not be viewed as a case of anthropocentric metaphysics. To suggest the line of argumentation, I would avail of an analogy. Physics (or biology, or economics...) presupposes a logic. This rather hardly controversial fact has little, if anything, to do with a possible 'logistic' metaphysics (perhaps in the spirit of F.H. Bradley?), which would claim for the reduction of all knowledge to logic.

From human-action philosophy, we could pass now to philosophy of physics. In this domain we find a theoretical situation displaying a resemblance to the mentioned above. I mean the problem of the relations between classical and quantum physics. Can we describe in the quantum theory also the very observer? 'Copenhagen interpretation' does not do it. It methodically distinguishes between object and measuring instrument and describes the instrument with the classical concepts. /.../ Our empirical knowledge has to be thus formulated in the classical language." [Weizsaecker,1978:182]

In the context of physics, a somewhat analogous question was raised, namely the problem of geocentric character of human knowledge. Commenting on a Krajewski's book, W. Mejbaum says: "All instruments applied in physics have been constructed by men and on the Earth. Getting familiar with those instruments...demands a period of laboratory practice (which cannot be replaced with any, even most detailed, technical description). In this sense, physics is and will be geocentric..." [Mejbaum,1983:110] I am not sure that this formulation offers sufficiently clear presentation of the problem. However, it suggests a (very) weak form of anthropocentrism. The content of our knowledge is determined by our location in the Universe which need not to be homogenous.

I would like to complete these remarks on anthropocentrism with a quote and a brief comment on it. This quote is to be from a Jacob Bronowski's book. This mathematician and historian of science, writes in the introduction to his *The Ascent of Man* (quite classical, even 'scientist' - be this word read without pejorative overtones - history of science, technology etc.) what follows: "I was motivated by the...goal: endeavor to create 20th century philosophy...philosophy of nature rather than philosophy of science. It is to be a modern version of what used to be called natural philosophy." [Bronowski,1988:17] Though no names were invoked, one should guess that those of Democritus, Bruno, Holbach rather than those of Socrates, Descartes, Hegel or Husserl could have been.

In spite of this, Bronowski declares also that "Philosophy without human face is impossible, even a descent science is impossible too. I hope my book expresses this conviction in the evident way. It is, I think, the goal of understanding nature to get knowledge of human nature and human condition in nature." These two citations should demonstrate that 'axiological antropocentrism' (a view on the goal, meaning etc. of philosophy and science) can co-exist with metaphysical and epistemological naturalism.

This brief survey of problems, ideas and theories that may be pigeonholed under the label of 'anthropocentrism', seems to confirm a meta-theoretical thesis: Philosophers can (and, in a sense, should) disagree as to the actual place of Man in the Being and as to consequences of the place for his possibilities to get knowledge of the Being; they should however agree that it is a complex network of important problems with various and far-reaching consequences, and not - a single question.

2.3. From anthropology to political philosophy

The very notion of political philosophy, as conceived here, is rather simple. It might be characterized as a pair composed of a basis and of the 'consequences' of the basis. (I put the word 'consequences' into quotation mark since I am not going to discuss the logical nature of the relation between basis and what is built upon it. I want only to note that the operation of 'consequence' should contain some standard formal logical rules, but should also comprise some rather substantial rules specifying the relations between elements of the basis which are of different logical status.)

The basis of a political philosophy is just a triple <PhH,Ep,E>, where PhH stands for a philosophy of History, Ep - for an epistemology, and E - for an ethics (each of these three terms is being used here in a rather special sense to be specified below in the respective points). The structure of (any) political philosophy is but a consequence of the basic model of action. The only modification introduced to the simplest form of this model is forced by the rather obvious assumption saying that we are not able to define which philosophy of History is true. Therefore, we have to introduce a set of rules determining the way in which we are going to cope with the cognitive uncertainty.

It should be easy noticeable that political philosophy, in the sense assumed here, is a theoretical body very different from a philosophy of politics. The latter is relatively narrow in scope sub-discipline of philosophy. The former is much wider in scope. It could be characterized, in a complementary way, as a philosophical reconstruction of political doctrines. Thus, one might speak of political philosophy of conservatism, of liberalism, of socialism... The word 're-construction' has here a very strong meaning; elimination various theoretical lacunae present in political doctrines is but one of the aims of the re-construction.

The practical (both in the Baconian and Kantian sense of the word) relevance of the meta-theoretical approach is rather obvious and needs no discussion.

To avoid misunderstanding, it should be added and stressed that the term 'political philosophy' is to be interpreted rather broadly so as to cover any stance claiming for political (social) 'passeism' as well as any one promoting any (either revolutionary or reformist) sort of activism; and the word 'political' should be read in the vein of Aristotle/Arendt rather than one of Machiavelli (though the idea of 'common good' may be interpreted in various ways: from Hegelian to utilitarian). Thus, in particular, a political philosophy may recommend a philosopher (or all
Philosophy of History has for two or three decades been in disrepute. A year before the Autumn of People, Ernest Gellner wrote: "The great paradox of our age is that although it is undergoing social and intellectual change of totally unprecedented speed and depth, its thought has become, in the main, unhistorical or anti-historical. 'Historicism' has become a term of abuse, designating those who set themselves up as self-appointed prophets, in possession of a secret plan of history and hence of the key to the future, who endeavour to browbeat humanity into acceptance of their own values and receipts for the future, and who do this in the name of a possibly benign and allegedly inexorable historical necessity." [Gellner,1988:12] I tend to think that these words of the liberal thinker (let me stress this Gellner's orientation just in the context of remarks on historiosophy) remain today valid.

The situation is unsatisfactory, both theoretically and practically. From the theoretical viewpoint, it deserves to be termed as 'hypocritical'. The reason for such an evaluation may be found in Gellner. He stresses that we "inevitably assume a pattern of history. There is simply no choice concerning whether we use such a pattern. We are, all of us, philosophical historians, malgre nous, whether we wish or not." [ibidem:11] To these words I would add, on my part, the following remark. I speak of 'hypocrisy', since the antihistoriosophical stance is based on a metaphysics of History which could be, I believe, termed 'Wittgensteinian' ('atomistic'). And a 'Wittgensteinian' (= /?/) 'Berlinian') metaphysics of History is no less a historiosophy than a 'Laplacean' (='Hegelian') is. Atomism, even if restricted to the domain of human actions ('atoms' = individual 'Sartrian' actions), is a possible metaphysics, just as any form of absolute monism (be, for instance 'Reason = logic of the development of productive forces'). Not to say that the range of possible options is much wider that that consisted of these two stances.

And from the practical viewpoint? I do believe that we need, just for practical reasons, historiosophies. Quite a few arguments could be presented. I will confine myself to one. It runs thus.

The political relevance of the philosophies of History manifests itself most vividly in their prognostic parts. It might be claimed that we do not need any long-term predictions, not to say that any attempt at such prediction should be, according to the fashionable opinion, futile. I do not agree with this opinion.

Let us consider a concrete example. In 1972, the Club of Rome published the first - and the most famous - of its numerous reports. Its title, The Limits to Growth expresses clearly its central, very controversial idea. It originated a very hot debate. A fair evaluation of this debate is impossible: the sheer number of the relevant texts is too great. However, I risk the opinion, based on very selective and unsystematic reading, that two general options dominate. On the one hand, 'optimistic' view: the mankind has always solved the problems that have occurred in its history and surely will - somehow (due to the 'Popperian' unpredictability of the development of science and technology, we cannot say - how) - solve them in the future. On the other hand, almost Cassandric voices have been heard (even among rationalists; Stanislaw Lem's recent position might be here an example).

My opinion might be summed in a few points. First, epistemological and ethical issues are intertwined here; they should be disentangled. Second, according to a Frederick Duerrnatt's dictum, "a history is thought over to its very end if the worst possible outcome is considered". This rule is, in my view, not a manifestation of pessimism, but - of prudence. And prudence is, as we remember, one of the cardinal virtues. A version of this rule is applied when buildings, bridges or planes are being designed (rules based in particular on laws and parameters of materials endurability). One might be rather surprised that this rule is seldom consciously applied when the dynamics of civilization is considered, thus when the fate of whole humanity is at stake. Putting together, we need both historiosophies allowing for unlimited progress (or 'progress', as you wish) and those demonstrating that some (these or those - more 'material' as in The Limits maintained, or rather more 'social' as some would claim today) barriers are there. Thus, let me repeat, we do need historiosophies (plural form is decisive), thus meta-historiosophy.

So much about the 'right to existence' for historiosophy. Now, some words about anthropology-and-historiosophy problem. At the beginning, a few quotations.

In his Mensch und Geschichte, Max Scheler expresses the following opinion: "The basis...of each conception of history is an anthropology of a definite kind; irrespective of whether a historian, sociologist, or historiosopher is aware of it or not, and whether he knows it or does not." [Scherer,1987:157]

Karl Mannheim devotes a whole chapter of his book, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, to the "need for adequate social and historical psychology" [idem,1974:23-40] He stresses that it is difficult to find the causes of the decline of moral and cultural life (written in the late 1930's), and tries to determine the origins of these difficulties: "the main cause of the failures in this domain is having not until now any social or historical psychology." [ibidem:24] Going beyond the sphere of his contemporary problems, he notes that "there is not any economic study, and particularly any study in economic history, that would not assume any idea of stability or variability of the profit motive and of its relations to other action stimuli. There is no study in political science that would not introduce unconsciously theories concerning the essence of power and drive toward prestige." [Mannheim,1974:25]

Polish historian and methodologist, the late Jerzy Topolski, presented a (simplified, approximate) classification of various theories of the historical process. According to him, these theories may be numbered to one of two classes: "distinguished on the basis of role being ascribed to human actions in the course of the historical process and how these actions are conceived of: /.../ The first group...makes up...what might be named fatalist model of human actions. In opposition to it, the second group of theories...is of activist character." [Topolski,1974:122] (It may be noted that Topolski's important book devoted to the question of the rise of capitalism in Europe is explicitly based on psychological premises drawn from Festinger's theory cognitive dissonance.)

I would add that 'fatalist model of human action' is anyway a model of human action. Thus, even a fatalist historiosophy must assume an anthropology. Perhaps, of 'Althusserian' type (let me say that this label I choose deliberately: I wanted to stress that, in my opinion, the author of theoretical anti-humanism did assume an anthropology).
These three quotations should support my claim that any historiosophy must be based, either explicitly or not, on an anthropology.

On the other hand, historiosophy cannot be reduced to anthropology. At least for the following reason. History is, except for anything else, a game (more precisely - a 'meta-game', a set of games) with the world. And in order to account for the course of this game, we have to make some assumption concerning both the players, thus also our partner - the world. And these assumptions do not belong to anthropology, if the latter term is to have any non-arbitrary sense. In brief, I'd say that History is composed of mankind - world games, inter-human games, and relations between the games of these two types. And if you take into account that the global ecological issues are among the most important which validate the practical importance of historiosophy, you will see that at least a dose of 'naturalism' is necessary for any historiosophy which would claim for contemporary political significance. (In fact, such a postulate does not seem to be particularly demanding or restrictive: even possibly, the most emblematic figure of idealism, is speaking - in the introductory part of his Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte - about the 'geographical ground of the world history'.)

I would like to make a comment on (general)metaphysics/anthropology (metaphysics of man) relation - in the context of historiosophical problems. A comment of a pragmatic character. Since logically admissible combinations of possible metaphysical systems, anthropologies and historiosophies seem to be very numerous, a strategy of the exploration is needed. It might refer to the 'Duerenmatt's rule' of prudence. Following this principle, we should develop in the first line those philosophies that satisfy the following conditions:

[1] metaphysical objectivism - man does not confer upon the world its laws; the laws are there and they co-determine the course of game man plays with the world: they confine our freedom;
[2] epistemological skepticism - man's abilities to unravel the rules according to which world plays its game with us are limited.

We are touching here again the problem of the cognitive risk. But previously, it was discussed in the context of individual Weltanschaung decisions. Now, it is there in another framework, i.e. in the framework of collective decisions. If someone chooses a philosophical 'escape form freedom', it's but his or her private decision; and - his or her good right. But if we opt for 'optimistic' philosophical framework (a framework which in one way or another conceals the existence of cognitive risk) for political decisions, such an option is morally dubious, at best.

An the end, we should note that (re-)construction of philosophies of History that clearly defines their anthropological bases would be of importance for anthropology also. It has often been noted (and - perhaps - complained) that, due to moral constraints, some psychological experiments cannot be carried out. Regrettably, it may be claimed - I think that there are good reasons for such a claim - that History has carried out an indefinite number of most various and often most cruel psychological experiments. So, the point would be to (re)read History in this way.

It is rather obvious that any human individual is a very complex whole, possibly - as Sartre insisted - inexhaustible. It may be that no actual life-history is fully accountable for, no matter how sophisticated anthropology would serve as a basis for such an accounting. However it might be, the problem of 'to what degree does this complexity historically matter?' is a separate one. It may be that historiosophy could avail of much more simple anthropologies than biographers should. Sketching an analogy, we could suppose that the relation between anthropology and historiosophy is similar to that held between atom physics and thermodynamics: very subtle theories are needed in order to explain what's 'going on' inside atom. But these subtleties do not seem to matter much if thermodynamics (in particular, as a basis for meteorology) is being constructed.

It may be that the relations between anthropologies and historiosophies are more complex. It may be that different 'points' of the network of social relations are more or less 'sensitive' to the varieties of human individual peculiarities. And it may also be that this 'sensitiveness' is not a constant but is changing historically.

Clarifying all these issues seems to be important for both disciplines.

2.3.2. On epistemology. If not somewhat ridiculous ring, I would speak here of 'political epistemology' (the sense of this phrase would be: deliberately constructed as a part of political philosophy; focused on issues of importance for political philosophy...). Or, the term 'practical epistemology' might be a more proper name. Whatever be the terminological decision, it should be obvious that I am not going to consider epistemology as such, but a (relatively small) part of it. Let's try to say what part.

Instead of epistemology, we could (in my opinion; I am aware of its controversial nature) speak of metaphysics of cognition. It should consider various types of knowing subject, transcendent subject including. It should discuss most radically posed questions about the very possibility of any cognition. Epistemology in the sense assumed here should be 'less ambitious'.

To use an analogy. I think that Zenô's paradoxes deserve philosophical attention: they are both important and interesting. Still, I do not think that if we are going to discuss, say, the possible roads of the future technological development of the means of transportation, we should start from a debate on the very possibility of motion. And similarly, the very possibility (metaphysical one) of cognition is an issue which should not be neglected by philosophers. Still, in some situations this possibility should be regarded as given, and more specific epistemic evaluations and problems should be in focus.

Having sketched some intuitions, I'd like to specify some characteristics of 'p-epistemology' (you can interpret 'p' as standing for 'practical' or 'political', or - just an index to distinguish it from other types of epistemology).

First, p-epistemology is about our (human) knowledge. In particular, - about intersubjective knowledge objectified in theories, hypotheses, statistical data, experimental reports etc.

Second, it is to be viewed as a part of 'practical philosophy'. In other words, as an 'evaluating' epistemology rather than a 'descriptive' one (as regards this opposition cf. Wolenski [1993:113]).

But, thirdly, p-epistemology should formulate relative (comparative) and not absolute evaluations. From the practical point of view it is not important whether this or that theory is true in any absolute sense. What matters here is whether one theory is 'better' or 'worse' than another one.

Fourth. It might be said in brief that p-epistemology is about our epistemic decisions. It is to offer us some strategies of coping with the epistemic risk. It might be thus viewed as a part of normative theory of rational decisions in the situation of risk.
Fifth, p-epistemology should be an 'objectivist' epistemology. In the double sense. Firstly, there is the objective world to be getting known. And secondly, the cognition is possible. - This claim could be supplemented with the following illustration. Let us consider criminal law. Epistemic decisions - 'guilty' or 'not guilty' make up an important part of its domain. Any epistemology which is to be of practical relevance for a judge (or jurors) has to assume as obvious what otherwise, from a more academic point of view, might be regarded as controversial: a fact took place (say, a Smith was shoot), there is a causal link between triggering a gun and a bullet being in the Smith’s body, etc. And an epistemology is to say whether, given the existing evidence (witness’ statements, finger-marks on the gun, etc.), an epistemic decision can be made or not. An another example could be taken from the domain of pharmacology: authorities are to make epistemic decisions as to whether a new medicine is harmless (no side-effects may be expected, etc.) to human health or is not. And the respective experts are to give the best (of all accessible) arguments in favor of the possible decisions; it would ridiculous - in this very context! - if they start to speak, instead of biology and chemistry, about - 'perspectivism', 'cognitive interests' 'language games' or whatever else could be invoked.

I believe that there are quite a few different theories which satisfy the aforementioned conditions. Therefore, also here the meta-theoretical approach should be possible, and demanded. It is rather evident that they have to be based upon this or that anthropology.

From the historical standpoint, it could be added that it is the problem-area of Lukacs (Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsen) on the one hand, and Hayek (The Counter-Revolution of Science) on the other. Briefly and also crudely put, there is a correlation: epistemic 'optimism' has tended to go 'hand in hand' with 'progressivism' (revolutionary in particular), while epistemic 'pessimism' - with conservatism. The point is to find a way to go beyond this vague, and rather unproductive (yet indicating an important area of investigations) opposition.

I would also note that the idea of epistemology being sketched here manifests some resemblance to the W. Leinfellner's conception of 'epitheoretical analysis'.

2.3.3. On ethics. I have already made quite a few comments on ethics, while deliberating particularities of metaethics. Now, thus, I am going but summarize, what's been said, and add some further remarks.

First, as in the case of (general) philosophy, meta-ethics is to be differentiated from metaethics. The latter analyzes the logical nature of moral utterances; if sufficiently broadly conceived of, it comprises also psychology of moral cognition (expressive behavior, etc., accordingly to the metaphysical and logical options), or perhaps also - sociology, or even historiosophy of morality.

The former focuses on actual moral issues, but in different way than normally ethics does. As in the case of meta-approach, it attempts not to find 'the' solution of a moral issue, but to determine the set of possible solutions. It analyzes also the relations between moral opinions on various issues. For instance, to use Ch. Taylor's example [idem,1996:76], we could consider whether it is logically coherent to demand absolute protection of any forest and to accept completely unrestricted right to abortion. Or to be against pornography and, at the same time, in favor of unrestricted market economy. And professional philosopher should be able to offer a solution to the coherence-issue, irrespective of what is his personal moral opinion about forest-protection and right-to-abortion, or about pornography and market.
questions of this kind draw our attention to a field that might be characterized as 'ethics of risk'. I mean, in particular, the moral dimension of collective decisions made in risk-situations.

Let's consider two examples. First, there is a positive though possibly very, very small probability of nuclear apocalypse. On the one hand, it could be argued that whatever small the probability in question, if there is such possibility at all, we should try to make it smaller and smaller. On the other hand, we could consider if time, effort and money should not be invested in resolving much more urgent issues, such as starvation in Africa, unemployment in Europa, etc.

Of similar type are issues generated by the ecological crisis. And just here we have to grapple with the questions of the validity of predictions. As it is known, according to some models, serious warming of climate can be expected in the coming decades, resulting in serious dangers. But according to other models, we may not to do with some fluctuations of climate which are natural and not specially dangerous. Each model has plausibility of some degree. But according to which model should we plan our actions? In the last instance, it is an ethical question.

In view of the ethics' role as a part of political philosophy, the importance of an area that might be termed 'ethics of ends-means' is to be stressed. For illustration, let's avail of a simple example. Most of us would agree, I suppose, that we should not be not only financially but also morally supportive to our parents, say we should visit them from time to time. But if we accept (many of us, most?) that financial support can be, when necessary, imposed by the state, then very few (if any) of us would accept state intervention when the second type of support were at stake, and not only for the reason of practical impossibility of such intervention. On the other hand, some would accept non-state social pressure. Some others would oppose any concrete-case action but opt, say, for some educative actions.

This issue seems to be quite closely related to a domain which maintains rather weak 'commercial' relations with political philosophy. I mean here deontic logic. And more specifically, the analysis of deontic functors. Some of evaluative attitudes are properly expressed in the standard deontic functors, like O [it is obligatory that...] and F [it is forbidden that...]. Still, from the philosophical and moral point of view, the list seems to be too short. For instance, we need a way of expressing our moral intuitions/emotions aroused by the act of M.Kolbe or J. Korczak. Surely, most of us would refuse to say that such an act is morally obligatory. But, on the other hand, the formulation which says that it is simply morally allowed is far too weak.

In relation to the latter remark, we may quote the following thesis: "Preaching as universally obliging such a morality which demands, in order to be realized, violation of the basic motivational structure of the Real Man - it deserves moral disapproval and not only praxiological critique. Basically, there is nothing immoral in the admiring people who, according to the opinion of the given moralist, embody some particularly valuable and rare moral patterns... However, moral maximalism, which demands from the average individuals of the Homo sapiens kind that they should follow a moral pattern essentially deviated from the typical human motivational structure - such maximalism is, according to my feelings, immoral."
image is somewhat ridiculous) that a collective action oriented at destruction of any solidarity bonds is recommended. It were an instance of 'egoist--actionalism'.

Furthermore, the 'collective subjectivity' could be designed as being of democratic character or of hierarchic one. In any of those two cases (each one being actually a whole group of philosophies), moral ideas can be differentiated. At least at the first glimpse, 'actionalist' philosophies of both 'democratic' and 'hierarchic' type could be, say, Earth-homeostasis or Cosmos-expansion oriented.

Third, we can distinguish philosophies which could be called 'radical' in the sense that their moral ideals represents society very different from actually existing, and on the other side - 'moderate' which opt for society only somewhat 'better' from the being there. But, four, we can also distinguish 'brave' (= 'risk-accepting') and 'cautious' (= 'risk-avoiding') philosophies. One philosophy can be 'radical' and 'cautious', and other - 'moderate' and 'brave'. It may happen that in a specific situation (here-and-now) the first philosophy recommends less 'radical measures than the second one.

I suppose that, besides these four, some other dimensions could be distinguish. But even if we take only these four dimensions into account, we obtain a large space of political philosophies. I risk the conjecture that vast areas of this space remain unexplored.

In my opinion, exploration of this space need not wait until the other spaces (of historiosophies, of ethics, of epistemologies) will have been explored. Contrarily, I believe that even very sketchy exploration of this space may be of some heuristic value for the investigating of the more elementary spaces.

3. On the author's political philosophy

In the previous point, I spoke about political philosophies to be possibly reconstructed in the framework of meta-philosophy. Yet, decisions are to be made even if our knowledge is not complete. And specially if we know that our knowledge will never be complete, we should note wait but make our decisions, though being aware of the necessity of and being open to changing our decisions - if necessary and possible - in the future.

Thus I want to end this work, somewhat in opposition to the orientation I have tried to follow through this essay, with a presentation of the political philosophy I personally accept. We could speak of a rule of theoretical honesty, or - openness. (One should not pretend that one has not any opinions and should not conceal them.) In this way, I am coming back to the beginning of this essay.

And availing of the sketchy classification of political philosophies I outlined in the previous point, I want, before more detailed presentation will be given, to define my personal political-philosophical position.

I do opt for 'solidarism'. Of rather 'global' than 'familial' character. And, as to goods concerned, rather 'broad' than 'narrow' in scope.

I do opt for 'actionalism'. Definitely, of 'democratic' and not 'hierarchic' character.

And I am rather 'radical' than 'moderate'. But, on the other hand, definitely much more 'cautious' than 'brave'.

This brief presentation is, I believe, sufficiently clear. But not only general position but also some details matter. Thus still some remarks and comments developing this general positions are to be offered below.

3.1. I will start with a polemical note on a Hegel's thesis. The author of The Philosophy of Right maintains that philosophy is "its own epoch expressed in thoughts"; therefore is should be "stupid to suppose that any philosophy goes beyond its own contemporary world" [Hegel,1969:19]. Thus, 'philosophy always comes too late'; thus "the owl of Minerva flies up at dusk" [ibidem:21].

Briefly put, my stance as to this question is anti-Hegelian: I think that the point is just to try to go beyond one's time. The problem is how to do it. The meta-theoretical strategy is conceived, others motivations neglecting, as a means of transcending temporal/historical 'bounded-ness': If meta-philosophy actually can describe the set of 'all possible philosophies', then is generally able to 'get ahead' its own time and to describe in advance 'future philosophies'; 'future philosophy' - it means here which in the time to come is supposed to be, say, socially relevant.

If this theoretically possible method will be practically effective remains to be seen. However, I accept an ethical norm, one which has also a justification in standard rational-choice theory, which says that if the value of a state-of-world is sufficiently high, then even small probability of success must not prevent action oriented at making the world possibly near to the given one. Thus, if there is a positive probability that philosophy can evade the Hegelian circumscription, we should - in my opinion - try.

3.2. According to an opinion, published quite recently, "some with satisfaction, some with anxiety - yet all the diagnosticians of our time are speaking of 'twilight of utopia'". [Bauman,1999:11]. The great quantifier left aside, this opinion describes an important aspect of our intellectual predicament. And Bauman is also right while stressing the novelty of our situation: "Oscar Wild used to say that a map of human world comprising no utopia is not worthy to be looked at. When writing down these words, he noted an opinion being then commonsensical and banal. One hundred years later, we are in a situation in which the imagining of any world different from the one we happen to live in is very difficult even for the best minds." [ibidem] What is/are the cause(s) of the situation? In Badman's view, "the twilight of utopia is not an effect of imagination dying out but of 'crisis of agency', acting factor." [ibidem]

As the reader should guess, the present author is among those who are not happy about the demise of utopias: The world we live in is everything but an acceptable place. And to think so one does not have to compare it with a vision of any terrestrial, mundane paradise. It is enough to think of those dying each year, each month, each day of starvation or from violence. And it is everything but obvious that this situation will be changing for better - automatically. And if you add some less tragic yet dramatic problems (poverty, unemployment, ecological crisis...) the need for utopia(s) will become still more evident. But there is no necessity that this need should be satisfied. What, if anything, can philosophers do about it? Perhaps - to counteract a factor which, if not the most important, plays its role in maintaining the situation described by Bauman. There is, in my view, no doubt that the (actual or alleged) link between utopias and totalitarianism has contributed to the anti-utopian mood prevailing today.
I would say that we do need utopias and we should protect ourselves against utopianism. This might sound paradoxical but in fact is not so. Utopia is a device which can be, as virtually all instruments, used in many ways. Still, 'production' of utopias can be socially dangerous; there is no logical necessity but there is psychological possibility and positive probability that it can be so. The moral-and-methodological question is how to make this 'production' possibly safe. The answer is - according to my conviction - in the project of meta-philosophy.

The idea of meta-philosophy, if applied to the domain of social/political philosophy, seems to be an instrument which might help breaking the link. First of all, the meta-theoretical approach allows for making a distinction between utopian-construction and utopianism. Utopia-construction may be regarded as a specific way of historiosophy-building, while utopianism may be defined as a special case of epistemological and political fundamentalism. And, if I am not wrong, virtually no metaphysics (anthropology, historiosophy,...) entails (logically; from psychological point of view, the situation may be perceived differently) fundamentalism. If so, then one can be involved in utopia-construction without contributing to any fundamentism.

To put it more precisely, it might be said that any utopia (or, for that matter, also anti-utopia; the distinction itself is not clear (or just relative): what is a - positive - utopia in one axiological perspective may be an anti-utopia - negative utopia - in another), if only logically consistent, defines a set of social theories (thus a set of anthropologies also) which allow for defining given utopia as being 'possible' (theoretically realizable). Thus the positive attitude toward utopias is based, moral sentiments left aside, upon two (positive) evaluations:

- of theoretical pluralism (which lies at the bottom of the idea of meta-theory),
- of practical role/predictive function of social theory.

I would also defend the following thesis: the more utopias - the more, all other factors equal, democracy. In other words, the more real alternatives - the more ('substantial' and not 'personal') democracy. One reservation is to be made. The great number of alternatives could result in the sense of 'chaos'; the political scene could be full of 'information noise'. Such a situation would be counterproductive. Here we touch upon the praxiological function of the meta-philosophy which was discussed in the first part of this essay; thus no further words on this issue are necessary here.

3.3. Above, I have spoken of what could be called 'minimal utopia': an image of the world in which nobody dies out of starvation or nobody is murdered must be, unfortunately, still today qualified as - 'utopian', though these requirements are - from a moral point of view - quite 'minimal'.

Yet, personally, I would not like to limit myself to such a minimal utopia. I would like to speak of somewhat less 'minimalist' projects.

Any collective action (collective Praxis) I am going to ascribe to this term a very broad denotation - it should comprise sets of individual actions organized by any 'invisible hand' as well as sets of individual actions being directed by a 'commander') is composed of conservation, change and - contemplation of the (social) world. And the answer to the problem of desirability of collective subject depends, at least partly, on the ethical decision as to relative importance of these three parts of collective action.

Therefore, let me make a declaration. I do believe that that the idea of 'collective subject' of History which played so prominent role in a Marxist tradition, in particular in the Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, continues to be intriguing, important, and still much unexplored.

I do believe that 'collective subject' of History is more possible than ever. Various material (technological, economic) developments are contributing to the 'degree of possibility' becoming more and more great.

I do also believe that constitution of such a subject is desirable. Yet, this desirability is by no means unambiguous. Quite contrarily, the making of such a subject is burdened with the well known totalitarian dangers.

Philosophy is to play an important role in the process of the self-creating of the 'collective subject'. If this context it might be said that meta-philosophy is conceived of as a strategy (a means, a check - it should be obvious that only one of the many being necessary) aimed at protecting the constitution of 'collective subject' of History against those totalitarian dangers.

Do I suggest to revitalize the 'Promethean myth'; - the myth which is said to have originated human conceit? Well... In my opinion this myth need not to be revitalize; we might say that it continues to be there.

The developments in deciphering human genetic code, the technology of cloning, neurosurgery; the progress in robotics and automation, in industrial production of artificial food; computer revolution and possible developments in the Artificial Intelligence - all these processes demonstrate that the time of 'Prometheus' has not gone away; rather, its time is only coming.

According to Jean Bernard, "biological revolution...gives - or will give - men triple power: controlling reproduction, heredity, and nervous system". [Bernard,1994:56] Closely related to the just mentioned are problems generated by medicine, particularly by transplanto and bio-engineering. [Bernard,1994:56-102] In longer run, considerable enlargement of temporal span of human life is not unlikely. And if being actually the case, it will make necessary to re-think our attitudes toward death (euthanasia including) [Singer,1997:120-175]

Picking up the problem posed in the 'New Brave World' (but without reference to Huxley), Marvin Minsky says: "If we could deliberately seize control of our pleasure systems, we could reproduce the pleasure of success without the need for any actual accomplishment. And that would be the end of everything." [Minsky,1986]

The guru of Artificial Intelligence wrote nevertheless a few years later: "we will not be subjected to the process of animalization but rather to that of machinization. Does it mean that machines will replace us? I think that we should not consider it in the categories of 'we' and 'they'. I like more the opinion of Hans P. Moravec from Carnegie-Mellon University who suggests to acknowledge the thinking machines of the future as 'the children of our spirit'. We have until now considered ourselves to be the final product of the evolution, but it has not stopped. In fact, just today we are evolving fast. It is the time to become aware of our new arising being. Now, we can start to plan new systems of 'non-natural selection' which will be steering towards goals we have planned and will make use of inheriting the acquired traits." [Minsky,1994:93]

I do believe that general metaphysics and ethics, political philosophy and epistemology - in sum: whole philosophy, in the traditional sense of the word, is to be involved in solving issues that arise if we are to handle rationally the possibilities Minsky speaks of. But, on the other hand, I do not believe in any 'iron law' of rationalization; thus it is possible that we will be reacting to these transformations in a 'non-rational' way - if they of course take place at all.
We live in time in which the idea of self-transformation of the human kind, once belonging to the domain of S-F literature, is changing its character: is becoming (or, perhaps, even has already become) a prediction. Not well temporarily determined, of not known probability; yet - a prediction. In such a situation metaphysics and political philosophy are more close than whenever earlier.

It is Heidegger's disciple, Hannah Arendt, who wrote an essay on *Conquest of the Space and the Dimension of Man*, asked if the cosmic adventure of man should make him greater or rather decrease his importance. Also the great political debate over construction of great accelerator, which took place a few years ago, might have been just a harbinger of problems to come. The field of Artificial Intelligence may one turn out to be not only epistemological but also morally and politically controversial.

Putting it briefly. The nature of human praxis is evolving. In particular, I'd risk to claim that more and more not only 'the' world is an object of our activity but also some other ('possible') worlds. And if the nature of our praxis (I use the Greek form of the term when I want to stress both subjectively collective and objectively global character of practice.) is evolving, also the relation between theory and practice must evolve.

And the role of philosophy is to be viewed as evolving. Say, that's fine. One could agree that it would be great if philosophy played an important social role but... Such a conditional might be followed by a skeptical question: Why practical role of philosophy after more than twenty five centuries of its (European) history, in which our discipline played a minor part, if any?

This question leads to problems - even not of historiosophy - but of quite 'empirical' historiography. To outline an answer to our question, let me quote the great British historian, E. Hobsbawm. In his history of 20th century, he writes on this age as a turning-point in the global History: "The journalists and philosophical essayists who detected the 'end of history' in the fall of the Soviet Empire were wrong. A better case can be made for saying that the third quarter of the century marked the end of seven or eight millennia of human history that began with the invention of agriculture in the stone age, if only because it ended the long era when the overwhelming majority of the human race lived by growing food and herding animals." [Hobsbawm,1994:9]

In the context of Hobsbawm's thesis, we could reformulate our problem and ask: What role, other than actually played, could philosophy have performed in 'agrarian' societies? If you agree with me that the answer is 'virtually none', you may also agree with me that the claim for more active practical role of philosophy in the coming age, in the age of 'postindustrial' society, gains at least a bit more of plausibility.

It might be also noted that a close to philosophy discipline had been for ages purely intellectual enterprise to gain in the mid-twenty century practical, and short time does not seem to be absurd.

The Hobsbawms's remark and the observation on logic-and-computers may be just by knowledge. [Drucker,1999:13] A priori, the odds for philosophy seem to be better in knowledge-society rather than in agrarian or industrial one. But, let me note, as we have known various types of agrarian or industrial societies (more or less humane), so various types of knowledge-society may be known in the future assuming Drucker's prediction is basically correct). And in some types of this society social role of philosophy can be more prominent, while in some others - less. I believe (the reasons for this contention have been given above) that the knowledge-society with socially-important philosophy should be - all others factors being equal - more humane than one with socially-marginal philosophy.

3.4. "The social philosopher has a moral obligation to believe that social reform is possible and the discussion can be helpful both in tempering the romantic yearnings for perfectibility and in suggesting avenues for practical constructive change." [Buchanan,1986:261] Generally speaking, I do agree with the opinion of the American economist and social philosopher. And I'd also like to regard it as a bridge between the problem of utopia(nism) and the question of value-free social science I am going to touch upon just now.

The well-known Hume-Kant-Weber's problem of relation between cognition and valuation (resp. between science and ethics, and the like) has for long been hotly debated; in particular with reference to the social sciences. Some authors (A. Gouldner, in Poland - S. Kozyr-Kowalski) spoke even of the 'myth' of wertfreie Sozialwissenschaft.

In my opinion, in this debate some aspects of the problem have been insufficiently distinguished. The following aspects should be here (as in any other place) distinguished:

[1] the actuality of value-free social science(s),

[2] the possibility of such a science, and


As regards the point [1], it may hardly be doubted that various ideologies, religions and forms of Weltanschung exert profound impact on social science. Innumerable studies in the history of social sciences, philosophy, and ideology have proved it unquestionably. But, as regards point [2], it may be doubted whether this fact - as registered in the point [1] - manifests any necessity: empirical (?), ontological (??) or logical (???)

I am almost sure that there is no logical necessity about it. I suppose that also there is no ontological necessity. And I could accept that there are some empirical (sociological or psychological) necessities limiting cognitive autonomy. But are empirical necessities' necessities at all? Only in a weak, relative sense: they are tendencies, propensities, 'forces' acting in a direction... But these 'forces' (etc.) can be counteracted. And here is the point.

It could be noted here that the issue has not to be discussed in dichotomic terms: either...or... It is possible (logically, and - I suppose - ontologically) that science can be more or less 'ideological' ('value-loaded'), even if the degree of 'value-loaded-ness' will never be null. Assuming that the possibility is actual, we could say that sociology of knowledge, instead of just contemplate the situation, might be looking for methods of diminishing the ideologies' impact on social science. Or it might, and even should be, if we assume that it is desirable. Thus, we should discuss why value-free' social science should be desirable. In other words: which moral values legitimate the call for value-free social science.
Let's note first that, if viewed superficially, the situation might be perceived as paradoxical; the problem is that of relations between various values; to illustrate this idea the following analogy may be helpful: it is an ethical decision of a sportsman whether he grapples with his mate 'fairly', according to the rules of the game, paying no attention to any other possible values - like money, national pride etc., or tries to win by all means.

What has just been formulated metaphorically and intuitively was formulated in a philosophical language by Hannah Arendt. In her essay celebrating Heidegger's eightieth birthday, she wrote "nobody before Heidegger had noticed how much this nature [e.g. the nature of will, WCz.] is against thinking and how much destructively affects it. To think, one needs 'Gelassenheit' - calm, self-control, relaxation, the state of respite, briefly speaking, the temper 'let it be what is to be'. From the standpoint of will, thinker has to say, only apparently in a paradoxical way, 'I-have-the-will-not-to-have-will'; for only 'in this way' and only if we 'un-learn will', we can't liberate ourselves and find the way to the being looked for essence of thinking that is not the having will' (Gelassenheit, p.32n". [Arendt,1974:701]

I think that objectiveness of cognition is an autonomous moral value. (Among others, in the same sense in which fair-play sport-rivalry or authenticity of artistic expressions are also values of this kind.) At the present moment, however, I'd like to draw your attention to another value which is of importance here. The value which play the key role in making decisions concerning this problem is one that might be named 'prudence'. This value may be a part of various - yet surely not all - political options. Perhaps 'prudence' must characterize both a conservatist and a reformist who would apply for the title of 'enlightened' ones.

Since personally I am a reformist rather than a conservatist, I will confine myself to the importance of 'prudence' for any leftist (reformist, change-oriented) political doctrine. I would risk a thesis that a 'malaise' (one among many others) that has affected the leftist movements in general, and their theoretical thinking in particular, since (say) the French Revolution, might be identified as a kind of 'wishful thinking': a tendency to accept some forecasts since they validate (rationalize) some political programs, and the theories - since they validate (rationalize) the forecasts; the logical order would be as follows: theory - forecast - program; the actual, socio-psychological one runs in the opposite direction: program - forecast - theory. (For Marxism, being virtually the most elaborated program-forecast-theory system, I tried to demonstrate and analyze in some detail this 'reversal' in my paper [1998].)

I would like to suggest a moral rule (it might be dubbed 'rule of caution') that should, in my opinion, direct change-oriented politicians and intellectuals:

(RC) The more radical changes (reforms) one considers morally desirable and being possible goals of social actions one wants to organize, the more comprehensively and thoroughly all the possible difficulties, obstacles, unintended outcomes and consequences should be analyzed in advance.

I regard as obvious the following claim: prudence, as stipulated in (RP), demands objective, 'wertfrei', (social) science. Wishful-thinking should be then avoided as much as possible. If you share this opinion and if you agree that there is a 'natural' (psychological?) tendency toward wishful-thinking, then you should be interested in finding some ways of preventing our minds from this propensity. - I think that the idea/program of meta-philosophy is a reasonable means of this sort. (Or, at least, I do not see - at this moment - any better one.)

These theses may be supported by some similar opinions. For instance, according to a French historian, Paul Veyne, "beliefs born of passion serve passions badly" [cited after Elster,1989a:31] And the founder of humanist psychology declared: "I believe...that the more the truth is clear and less corrupted by the doctrinaires entertaining pre-established opinions, it is the better for the future of the mankind. I believe that from the future truth will result more profits for the world than from my today political convictions. I trust more in what will be known than in my today knowledge." [Maslow,1990:29]

It also seems to me that the position I would defend is in some respects close to an 'ethics of science' outlined by Jerzy Kmita. Having demonstrated the impossibility of epistemological legitimation of the value of truth, he is considering 'truth as an ethical value' [Kmita,1988:361]. As a basis for these considerations he assumes the ideal of 'the intellectual sovereignty of human individual'. This ideal is defined as a situation in which 'human individual: 1) is aware - to the maximal extent - of his convictions, being respected usually in a spontaneous way; 2) can - to the maximal extent - give reasons for which those convictions are held; 3) determines - this time in the fully conscious way - his own attitude towards those convictions." [ibidem] Kmita maintains that the acceptance of this ideal does not force the individual researcher to rejecting socially held methodological norms. The way in which Kim arguments in favor of this thesis is particularly interesting. I will quote it fully:

"Possibly methodologically self-conscious scientific conduct, not ascribing to the methodology it applies the trait of 'the only right prescription', realizing - to the practically attainable degree - extra-conscious determinants of this methodology, is closest the actualization of the ideal of the intellectual sovereignty of human individual. Strikingly shallow is the view, so popular today, that this ideal is being attained more perfectly, if we give up any methodological rigors, if instead of following them consciously we allow to be carried away by the stream of the narcotic action of the rhetoric of the proponents of various extra-scientific truths. Then, we do not even know what is happening to our mind; the scope of consciously made intellectual choices is narrowing to a minimum. We should accept the results of the critique of the illusions of the traditional scientism, but it does not mean that we should accept such a program of the authenticity of human individual which actually suggests to follow the line of least resistance: independence from the culturally worked out thought-order attained not through its critical considering, but through simple contesting this order. The independence attained in this way is at the same time a dependence, and one particularly poignant - the dependence from the chance we cannot grasp." [Kmita,1988:365-366]

3.5. As I noted before, the relation between metaphysics and anthropology may be described with the notion of hermeneutische Zirkel. Thus, I would like to complete this essay with some comments on interrelations between metaphysics and political philosophy. They will make another instance of circle of which I spoke at the beginning of this text. Let's commence from a perspective in the context of which philosophy's ultimate value lies in its own domain. Thinking in this way about philosophy you may follow, if incidentally, great mathematician G.H. Hardy who confessed in his famous book, A Mathematician's Apology, that he had never done anything 'useful' and the only value of his life-work, if any, might have been located.
inside the area of mathematics, being of no relevance for anything outside this field [cited after Davies & Hersch, 1994:80-81]. Or you may find Witakcy's theory of Pure Form a manifestation of a similar attitude (but let me note at once that this theory was linked with his critique of various political and cultural tendencies prevailing in 'mass society').

Yet, if you believe in the autonomous value of Duns Scotus' theory of haecceitas, of Vermeer's painting, of Leibniz's monadology, of Bach's violin sonatas, of Cantor's theory of cardinal numbers, ... to invoke but a few masterpieces, and if you believe that these values exist 'fully' only if actualized in acts of (human) consciousness, then... Well, it is not easy to say what then. Anyway, you should be somehow interested in existence of such a social world in which such acts (of actualization) are possible, if not widespread... And here we arrive at the domain of political philosophy.

And now let's take the same way in other direction: let's start form political philosophy. Recently, a revival of the problem of relations between capitalism and democracy may have been noted. These two are viewed as opposite rather than being in harmony. (Such a view may be found in the books of Soros [1998] or Thowr [1998].) The nature and dynamics of this opposition should be separately discussed. Here, I keep my eye on but one problem. - Many years ago, two German thinkers wrote in a famous text: 'the bourgeoisie has left remaining no other bond between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash-payment'. /.../ It had converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage-laborer.' [Marx & Engels, 1964:5-6] Today, these problems seem to be much more acute than in 1848: there is today little doubt that capitalist economy exerts erosive effects upon ('higher') culture. And the erosion of culture affects the stability of democracy which functions rather badly in the milieu of hedonist, individualist culture. Thus, if we are interested in promotion of ('genuine') democracy we should be also interested in promotion of various 'immaterial' ('spiritual') values, among them - the autonomous value of metaphysics.

3.6. The future shape of philosophy: its professional ideology, its theoretical content, its forms of expression, its institutional arrangements and social relations between philosophers, its position is society - the whole complex is a part-stake of the game in which the very stake is a democratic world in which individual freedom, social solidarity, and collective responsibility for preserving natural and cultural values take their places.

In brief: metaphysics and political philosophy and politics are different. Yet, difference need not mean separation. This work is intended as a contribution to a bridge between them. A bridge which needs, as I see it, re-construction. Some work has been done. More remains still to be done. I hope I will be able to continue this work.
[a note on] 'Wolfgang Welsch, Vernunft. Die zeitgenössische Vernunftkritik und das Konzept der transversalen Vernunft', in SKARGA ed./1(1997b)
BUCZKOWSKI Fiori & KLAWITTER Andrzej (1985). 'Rekonstrukcje, interpretacje, rozwinięcia. Przódrowa' in PSFN z.9 pp.5-16
BUCZYŃSKA-GAREWICZ Hanna (1975). 'Teoria znaku a wątpienie kartezjańskie', in Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych "Universitas" t.3(16) 189 [transl. of
BUCZYŃSKA-GAREWICZ Hanna (1975). 'Teoria znaku a wątpienie kartezjańskie', in Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych "Universitas" t.3(16) 189 [transl. of
ASH S.E. (1962). 'Nacisk grupy na modyfikacje i wypaczenia sądów', in MALEWSKI /ed./, pp. 175-189 [transl. of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgments; Readings in Social Psychology, New York 1958]


RUEGEMER Werner (1972). "Głowne dzieło Ghehna 'Der Mensch' i mit anthropologie empirycznobiotologicznej", in SF nr 8-9 (213-214) [a part of Philosophische Anthropologie und Epochenkriege, 1979].


SANOWSKI Stefan (1972). "Fenomenologia i egzystencjalizm", in FENOMENOLOGIA, pp.457-482.


The work is composed of two parts, opened with Introduction and ended with Final remarks. In the Introduction is presented an analysis of some contemporary socio-economic and political processes, in particular - of globalization. Some cultural phenomena, and among them - post-modernism, are debated, either. In this framework, the present-day situation of philosophy is being discussed. Conclusion of this discussion is following: In the ongoing transformations, philosophy has a considerable role to play. Whether it will actually do depends on meeting several conditions. Philosophy should be as profound and comprehensive as it had been in the times of, say, Plato or St. Thomas. On the other hand, it should not to neglect the criticism expressed in the modern and post-modern times by many thinkers, from Hume to Lyotard, say. The idea of meta-philosophy is conceived of as a means to 'synthesize' these two, often viewed as incompatible, traditions.

The first part of the book presents the author's idea of meta-philosophy. This presentation is composed of four steps. In the first one, two meanings of the term are distinguished. One of them was precised by M. Lazerowitz. He uses the term 'metaphilosophy' as one designating a domain which might also be termed 'philosophy of philosophy'; it is made up of studies on philosophy as linguistic, cultural, social or psychological phenomenon. 'Meta-philosophy', in the sense constitutive for the present work, is to designate not a special field of philosophical investigations, but - a special method. In brief, meta-philosophy is about Being, Truth, Good... - as philosophy has always been; yet, it is not to offer the image of Being...etc. (thus, it is not to be fundamentalist, prophetic etc.) but - to provide a set of possible images of Being...

In the second step, several motives for constructing meta-philosophy are presented. Meta-philosophy should contribute to understanding philosophies (hermeneutic motive) and to understanding their history (historiographical/historiosophical). Is is to be a device for inventing new philosophies (heuristic one) and for coping with their plentitude (praxiological). It is intended as an ideology of philosophy which does not want to indoctrinate non-philosophers (ethical, (heuristic one) and for coping with their plentitude (praxiological). It is intended as an ideology of philosophy which does not want to indoctrinate non-philosophers (ethical, or macro-social, motive) and is to be an area of cooperation rather than of conflict (micro-social). Finally, it is to be an instrument of professional criticism.

In the next step, some philosophical assumptions of the idea of meta-philosophy are being considered. The objective existence of 'space of philosophies' is both the strongest and most important. Freedom of philosophers is claimed for in another assumption. And the third assumption is of ethical character: the project is morally admissible. These considerations are complemented with some remarks on the idea of Voraussetzunglosigkeit.

This part is ended with a chapter in which a historical context - composed of philosophical roots (Leibnitz, Hartmann, Ingarden...), analogies in science (Riemann's and Klein's ideas in geometry, some cosmological ideas...) and inspirations in art (Lem, Eco...) - is sketched.

The second part is devoted to meta-anthropology. Viewed in the context of the first part, its tasks are double. Firstly, the outline of meta-anthropology is demonstrate...
an instance of practical application of the idea of meta-philosophy; this instance is to offer an additional, 'ontensive' characteristic of the this concept. Secondly, it is a practical implementation of the program presented in the first part. And only practical implementations of a program may decide of what, if any, value it is.

This part is opened with some considerations on the strategy of the meta-anthropology construction. In particular, the scope of (meta-)anthropology is discussed (its domain is divided into 'substantial' and 'functional', the latter being in the focus in this work), the peculiarities of anthropology are indicated, and the linguistic metaphors - presented.

In the next chapter, the main ideas of humanistic interpretations (known also as rational-choice theory) are presented and commented upon. This language of this theory is used in the next chapters as language of meta-anthropology. Moreover, the central thesis of this theory is regarded as a 'starting point' for meta-anthropology: various anthropologies can be interpreted as alternative concretizations of this thesis, its generalizations - in different directions, etc.

The subsequent chapters avail of a linguistic/semiotic metaphor: Any action is regarded as having a formal ('syntactic') structure, its content ('semantics') and being performed in a way (its 'pragmatics').

As regards 'syntax' of actions, at the beginning such concepts as 'state of human being', 'behavior' and 'acting' are analyzed. In the next step, the concepts of 'act' and 'action' are distinguished, and the notion of 'co-actions' - introduced. The notions of 'complex actions' and 'order of action' are investigated, either. At the end of the chapter, a number of 'syntactical' questions are formulated.

The 'semantical' area is very vast. In short, it comprises the issues of individual's knowledge and those of individual's axiology. The former has been almost completely omitted: any systematic study of this area would have been a reinterpretation of epistemology; this were a separate task. The axiological problems are undertaken, but some additional limitations turn out to be necessary. Therefore, having touched upon some formal properties of individual's axiological system, the author focuses upon two problems. First, the question of the Other(s) and his (their) representation in the individual's axiology is discussed. Two main aspects of this problem are distinguished. On the one hand, the Other is regarded *qua* subject possessing his own axiological system. Analyzing individual's attitudes *vis-a-vis* the Other's system, the author introduces the concepts of egoism, malice, compassion, and justice. On the other hand, the Other is viewed *qua* object being of this or that value for the individual (i.e. being an object of awe). Second, the structure of individual axiological system is investigated. Despite the concentration on axiology, in the end of this chapter a special epistemological problem, namely that of the cognition of the Other, is raised.

The questions of decision-making are debated in the subsequent chapter. In particular, a tentative classification of the types of decision-making is given. The fundamental concept of 'situation' is also studied: its various 'dimensions' are distinguished. The possible relations between the traits of situation and type of decision undertaken in the given situation are presented.

In the chapter on 'pragmatics' of actions several factors that might account for the discrepancy between intended and performed acts are debated. In particular, the mind-body relations and the multitude of 'selves' are considered.

The last, seventh, chapter presents a 'topography' of the 'space of anthropologies'. In this chapter anthropologies are conceived as alternative theories concerning determinants of human action. The central role in the description of this space is played by so-called 'anthropological tetrahedron'. Its apexes represent four 'pure' anthropologies. It is being claimed that no other "pure" anthropologies are (given some substantial assumptions) logically possible. All other anthropologies are interpreted as, roughly speaking, 'combinations' of some (or all) of the 'pure' ones. The four 'apex' anthropologies are designated as 'Schopenhauerian', 'Lockian', 'Althusserian' and 'Sartrian', respectively. (The names are used here in a metaphorical way to bring about some preliminary intuitions.) - This geometric image is sufficient, provided homogeneity of human activity is assumed. If this assumption is rejected, a more complex picture is to be drawn: it should comprise a number of tetrahedrons, each representing the possible determinants of elements and/or types of actions. As further analysis demonstrates all these anthropologies assume tacitly that human beings, though different on the 'phenomenal' level, are identical 'nomologically'. In the next step, this assumption is rejected, and more general concept of anthropological theory is introduced. Any such a theory defines a distribution (in the statistical sense) of 'nomological profiles'. It is to be noted that 'space' of such anthropologies is both abstract and complex, and lacks any intuitive geometric representation.

Final remarks are composed of three parts. In the first one, metaphilosophy is discussed in the anthropological framework. In particular, the concepts of (cognitive) risk and freedom are applied to an analysis of some epistemological orientations. An agenda of further works in the domain of meta-anthropology is outlined in the second part. Some remarks on relations between anthropology and metaphysics are made; a tentative analysis of various possible meanings of anthropocentrism is among them. In the last, third part some political-philosophical declarations are made. Having returned in a way to his starting point, author ends his work.
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Streszczenie

Praca składa się z dwóch części; jest poprzedzona wprowadzeniem i zamknięta uwagami końcowymi. We wprowadzeniu przedstawiona jest analiza pewnych współczesnych procesów społeczno-ekonomicznych i politycznych, a w szczególności - globalizacji. Na ich tle autor omawia pewne współczesne zjawiska kulturowe, a wśród nich - postmodernizm. W tym kontekście podejmuje kwestię położenia, w jakim znajduje się współczesne filozofia. Rozważania te prowadzą do następujących wniosków: Filozofia ma do odegrania w zachodzących transformacjach istotną rolę. To, czy ją w rzeczywistości spełni, zależy od wielu warunków. Warunki te można by było sformułować następująco: Z jednej strony, filozofia powinna być tak głęboka i wszechstronna jak w czasach, powiedzmy, Platona czy św. Tomasa. Z drugiej jednak, nie powinna lekceważyć krytyki wyrzuconej w fazach nowożytnych i postnowożytnych przez wielu myśliwców, powiedzmy, od Hume'a po Lyotarda. Oznaczałoby to, że potrzebna jest swego rodzaju synteza tych dwóch, często uznawanych za nieuzgodnialne, tradycji. Metafilozofia pomysłana została jako narzędzie, za pomocą którego można byłoby podjąć próbę dokonania takiej syntezy.

Pierwsza część przedstawia ideę meta-filozofii, sformułowana przez autora książki. Prezentacja ta dokonana jest w czterech krokach. W pierwszym, zostają odróżnione dwa znaczenia tytułuowego terminu. Jedno z tych znaczeń zostało spręczkowane przez M. Lazerowitza, który używa terminu "metafilozofia" jako desygnującego dziedzinę, dla której nazwa "filozofia filozofii" byłaby właściwa; obejmuje on badania nad filozofią jako zjawiskiem lingwistycznym, kulturowym, społecznym, czy psychologicznym. "Meta-filozofia", w drugim - konstytutywnym dla niniejszej książki - sensie ma natomiast desygnować nię ona jedynie "filozofię" jako jawną formę metafilozofii, której przekształcają w Bytem, Prawdą, Dobrem... - tak, jak to filozofia zawsze czyniła; nie jest więc fundamentalistyczna, profetyczna i. byt. Sposób językowy metafilozofii jest nader obszerny. Obejmuje on problemy dotyczące zarówno indywidualnej wiedzy, jak i indywidualnej aksjologii. Pierwsza z nich obejmuje zagadnienie Innego. Autor odróżnia dwa główne aspekty tego problemu. Z jednej strony, Inny traktowany jest jako podmiot posiadający pewną własność (syntetyczną); jest też w pewien sposób wykonane (posiada własność "pragmatyczną"). Jeśli chodzi o "syntaxę" działań, na początku analizowane są takie pojęcia, jak "syntaksis", "czynienie", "czynność". W następnym kroku odróżnione są również "syntaksis" działania, wprowadza się także pojęcie "kodziałań". Bada się także "syntaxę" działań złożonych i. jaką "syntaxę" działania. W końcu dziejemy tego rozdziału formułuje się pewną liczbę "syntaxyków".

Obszar "syntaxyków" działań jest nader obszerny. Obejmuje on problemy dotyczące zarówno indywidualnej wiedzy, jak i indywidualnej aksjologii. Pierwsza grupa zagadnień została niemal całkowicie pominięta: jakiekolwiek systematyczne badania nad metafilozofią byłyby jakąś reinterpretacją epistemologii; jest to odrębne - m.in. przez swą obszerną - zadanie. Podjęte zostają natomiast problemy aksjologiczne; jednakże dodatkowe ograniczenia okazują się niezbędne. Tak więc, rozwijajmy własności formalne systemu aksjologicznego. Autor skupia się na dwóch ważnych grupach problemów. Pierwsza z nich obejmuje zagadnienie Innego (Innych) i Jego (Ich) "reprezentacji" w aksjologii jednostki. Autor odróżnia dwa główne aspekty tego problemu. Z jednej strony, Inny traktowany jest jako podmiot posiadający swój własny system aksjologiczny. Analizując postawy jednostki wobec systemu aksjologicznego Innego (to, czy i. w jego wartości są one odbierane przez każdą aksjologię). Autor wprowadza pojście egoizmu, złożoności, współczucia i sprawiedliwości. Z drugiej strony, Inny traktowany jest jako "sui generis" przedmiot posiadający tę lub inną wartość dla danej jednostki (będący np. przedmiotem podziwu). Druga grupa problemów obejmuje zagadnienia struktury indywidualnego systemu aksjologicznego. Rozważa się tu m.in. kwestie szczęścia, autoportretu i innych "funkcji agregujących". W zakresie tego rozdziału, głównie aksjologicznego w swej tematyce, podniesiony zostaje
Problem epistemologiczny posiadający szczególne znaczenie dla dyskusji zagadnień egoizmu itd.: problem poznania Innego, a zwłaszcza - jego systemu wartości.

Problemy podejmowania decyzji są tematem kolejnego rozdziału. W szczególności, podaje się w nim pewną klasyfikację typów podejmowania decyzji, a także bada się fundamentalne pojęcie sytuacji: rozróżnia się i opisuje rozmaito jej wymiary. Przedstawia się też możliwe relacje między cechami jakiejś sytuacji a typem decyzji w jej warunkach podejmowanej.

W rozdziale o "pragmatyce" przedmiotem rozważań są rozmaito czynników, które mogą wyjaśniać ewentualne rozbieżności między czynnościami zamierzonymi a wykonanymi. Między innymi przedmiotem uwagi jest tzw. problem mind-body, a także kwestia wielości "ja" występujących w pojedynczym indywidualu psychofizycznym.


Książkę zamykają uwagi końcowe, składające się z trzech punktów. W pierwszym z nich rozwija się metafilozofię w kontekście antropologicznym. W szczególności, do analizy pewnych orientacji epistemologicznych zastosowane są pojęcia (poznawczego) ryzyka i wolności. Program dalszych prac w zakresie meta-antropologii naszkicowany jest w punkcie drugim. Obiega on też pewne uwagi dotyczące relacji między antropologią a metafizyką; w jest też przeprowadzona analiza różnych sensów kategorii "antropocentryzmu". W ostatnim, trzecim punkcie autor deklaruje swoje przekonania filozoficzno-polityczne i w ten sposób, powracając do punktu wyjścia, kończy tę pracę.